What Are The Odds Of The US Immigration Courts’ Surviving The Next Four Years?

What Are The Odds Of The U.S. Immigration Courts’ Survival?

by Paul Wickham Schmidt

Despite the campaign promises to make things great for the American working person, the Trump Administration so far has benefitted comedians, lawyers, reporters, and not many others. But there is another group out there reaping the benefits — oddsmakers. For example, Trump himself is 11-10 on finishing his term, and Press Secretary Sean “Spicey” Spicer is 4-7 to still be in office come New Year’s Day 2018.

So, what are the odds that the U.S. Immigration Courts will survive the next four years. Not very good, I’m afraid.

Already pushed to the brink of disaster, the Immigration Courts are likely to be totally overwhelmed by the the Trump Administration’s mindless “enforcement to the max” program which will potentially unleash a tidal waive of ill-advised new enforcement actions, detained hearings, bond hearings, credible fear reviews, and demands to move Immigration Judges to newly established detention centers along the Southern Border where due process is likely to take a back seat to expediency.

While Trump’s Executive Order promised at least another 15,000 DHS immigration enforcement officers, there was no such commitment to provide comparable staffing increases to the U.S. Immigration Courts. Indeed, we don’t even know at this point whether the Immigration Courts will be exempted from the hiring freeze.

At the same time, DHS Assistant Chief Counsel are likely to be stripped of their authority to offer prosecutorial discretion (“PD”), stipulate to grants of relief in well-documented cases, close cases for USCIS processing, and waive appeals.

Moreover, according to recent articles from the Wall Street Journal posted over on LexisNexis, individual respondents are likely to reciprocate by demanding their rights to full hearings, declining offers of “voluntary departure” without hearing, and appealing, rather than waiving appeal of, most orders of removal. Additionally, the Mexican government could start “slow walking” requests for documentation necessary to effect orders of removal.

Waiting in the wings, as I have mentioned in previous posts, are efforts to eliminate the so-called “Chevron doctrine” giving deference to certain BIA decisions, and constitutional challenges that could bring down the entire Federal Administrative Judiciary “house of cards.”

The sensible way of heading off disaster would be to establish an independent Article I Court outside the Executive Branch and then staff it to do its job. Sadly, however, sensibility so far has played little role in the Trump Administration. Solving the problem (or not) is likely to fall to the Article III Courts.

So, right now, I’m giving the U.S. Immigration Courts about 2-3 odds of making it through 2020. That’s a little better chance than “Spicey,” but worse than Trump himself.

To read the WSJ articles on the “clogging the courts” strategy, take this link over to LexisNexis:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/outsidenews/archive/2017/02/13/will-strong-defensive-tactics-jam-immigration-jails-clog-immigration-courts-wsj.aspx?Redirected=true

PWS

02/14/17

 

 

Rivkin & Grossman In WSJ: Why Captive Administrative Courts Are “Built To Fail” In Delivering Due Process!

http://www.wsj.com/articles/when-is-a-judge-not-really-a-judge-1485215998

David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Andrew M. Grossman write in the WSJ:

“Administrative law judges are agency employees. The proceedings they oversee provide fewer protections than court cases. They also tend to set stern deadlines and limit the right to factual investigation, often leaving defendants to rely on the SEC’s evidence. According to a 2015 Wall Street Journal analysis, the agency’s shift paid off: Through the beginning of that year, it won 90% of cases in its in-house court, compared with 69% of regular court cases. Administrative decisions can be appealed to court but are rarely reversed. That’s because the judges apply a deferential “clear error” standard to the agency’s factual findings.

The due-process problems inherent in this arrangement are apparent. Less obvious, at least to the SEC, is that it also violates the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, which requires Senate hearings and confirmation votes for department heads and other senior officials. To promote political accountability, the Constitution also requires that “inferior officers” with significant responsibility be appointed by the president or senior officials who are confirmed by the Senate.”

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Although Rivkin and Grossman were writing about Administrative Law Judges within the SEC, most of the same arguments could be made about U.S. Immigration Judges within the Department of Justice.

The article suggests that if successful, challenges to the existing administrative judiciary in the Article III Courts might bring down the entire 80-year largely failed experiment with specialized administrative courts attempting to mete out justice within the enforcement arm of the Executive Branch.  That, in turn, would require the creation of more truly independent specialized courts, such as the Tax Court and the Bankruptcy Court, and/or the transfer of many additional cases to the Article III Courts, where they perhaps could be handled by appointing more U.S. Magistrate Judges.

PWS

01/24/17