⚖️🤯 BIA SEEKS AMICUS INPUT ON HOW THEY CAN HELP DHS “REMEDY” ITS OWN MISTAKES!

Jeff Sessions
Former AG Jeff Sessions openly despised immigrants and their attorneys and encouraged “his judges” at EOIR to help out their “partners at DHS Enforcement.” That attitude lives on even under AG Merrick Garland!
This caricature of Jeff Sessions was adapted from a Creative Commons licensed photo from Gage Skidmore’s Flickr’s photostream.
DonkeyHotey
Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1592111/download

Amicus Invitation No. 23-01-08

AMICUS INVITATION (NOTICE TO APPEAR) DUE August 31, 2023

AUGUST 1, 2023

The Board of Immigration Appeals welcomes interested members of the public to file amicus curiae briefs discussing the below issue(s):

ISSUE(S) PRESENTED:

Pursuant to Matter of Fernandes, 28 I&N Dec. 605 (BIA 2022):

1. Should an Immigration Judge allow DHS to remedy a non-compliant Notice to Appear?

2. To remedy a non-compliant Notice to Appear, is either (1) issuing an I-261, or (2) amending the Notice to Appear, permitted by the regulations, and would either comport with the single document requirement emphasized by the United States Supreme Court in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021)? If not, how can a non-compliant Notice to Appear be remedied?

Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae: Members of the public who wish to appear as amicus curiae before the Board must submit a written request labeled “REQUEST TO APPEAR AS AMICUS CURIAE” pursuant to Chapter 2.10, Appendix A (Directory), and Appendix E (Cover Pages) of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual. The Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae must explicitly identify that it is responding to Amicus Invitation No. 23-01-08. The decision to accept or deny a Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae is within the sole discretion of the Board. Please see Chapter 2.10 of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual.

Filing a Brief: Please file your amicus brief in conjunction with your Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae pursuant to Chapter 2.10 of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual. The brief accompanying the Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae must explicitly identify that it is responding to Amicus Invitation No. 23-01-08. An amicus curiae brief is helpful to the Board if it presents relevant legal arguments that the parties have not already addressed. However, an amicus brief must be limited to a legal discussion of the issue(s) presented. The decision to accept or deny an amicus brief is within the sole discretion of the Board. The Board will not consider an amicus brief that exceeds the scope of the amicus invitation.

Request for Case Information: Additional information about the case, including the parties’ contact information, may be available. Please contact the Clerk’s Office at the below address for this information prior to filing your Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae and amicus brief.

Page Limit: The Board asks that amicus curiae briefs be limited to 25 double-spaced pages.

Deadline: Please file a Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae and amicus brief with the Clerk’s Office at the address below by August 31, 2023. Your request must be received at the Clerk’s Office within the prescribed time limit. Motions to extend the time for filing a Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae and amicus brief may not be entertained. It is not sufficient simply to mail the documents on time. We strongly urge the use of an overnight courier service to ensure the timely filing of your brief.

Service: Please mail three copies of your Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae and amicus brief to the Clerk’s Office at the address below. If the Clerk’s Office accepts your brief, it will then serve a copy on the parties and provide parties time to respond.

Joint Requests: The filing of parallel and identical or similarly worded briefs from multiple amici is disfavored. Rather, collaborating amici should submit a joint Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae and amicus brief. See generally Chapter 2.10 (Amicus Curiae) and Chapter 4.6(i) (Amicus Curiae Briefs) of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual.

Notice: A Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae may only be filed by an attorney, accredited representative, or an organization represented by an attorney registered to practice before the Board pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(d). A Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae filed by a person specified under 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1) will not be considered.

Attribution: Where more than three attorneys or representatives sign an amicus brief or filing, the Board will name only the first three individuals in the published case. If you wish a different set of three names or have a preference on the order of the three names, please specify the three names in your Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae and amicus brief.

Clerk’s Office Contact and Filing Address:

To send by courier or overnight delivery service, or to deliver in person:

Amicus Clerk

Board of Immigration Appeals Clerk’s Office

5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000 Falls Church, VA 22041

Business hours: Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.

Fee: A fee is not required for the filing of a Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae and amicus brief.

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Seems like the obvious “remedy” would be to require that DHS issue a new compliant NTA! 

Respondents don’t get to “remedy” all mistakes, even inadvertent ones! Why should the USG be allowed to weasel its way out of a situation they intentionally created in a misguided effort (aided and abetted by EOIR “management”) to cut corners and generate statistics to please their political masters?

Ever since the “Ashcroft purge,” the BIA has functioned less and less as an independent quasi adjudicative body and more and more as an apologist for, enabler, or justifier of each Administration’s immigration enforcement agenda! In other words, the BIA’s role has become largely to slap a “quasi-judicial veneer” on DHS enforcement policies and priorities so that OIL can argue Chevron deference or even “Brand X” in the Article IIIs!

Of course, using EOIR as a “deterrent” and “enforcer” over the past two decades has been a spectacular failure! It has led to “Aimless Docket Reshuffling on Steroids,” absurdly insurmountable backlogs, and frequent rebukes from the Article IIIs. 

Indeed, having helped create and magnify exponentially the mess at EOIR, many of the Trump and Biden Administration’s “gimmicks” appear aimed at avoiding or sidestepping the EOIR process altogether. 

It’s the height of disingenuousness! At the urging of the White House, DOJ and DHS “break” the fair hearing system at EOIR. They then use their own misconduct and mismanagement as an excuse to deny asylum seekers and others access to the fair and impartial adjudication system to which they are legally entitled!

And, while the Article IIIs, even the Supremes, have “called out” EOIR on frequent, particularized errors, they have been happy to sweep the obvious “big problem” under the rug in a monumental exercise of “judicial task avoidance!” 

That problem is that as currently operated, the EOIR system is a clear violation of the Constitutional principle that individuals facing removal, an often irreparable, even deadly, loss, are entitled to a reasonable decision from a fair and impartial decision-maker. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). While justice is served in some EOIR decisions, the systemic failures push in the exact opposite direction. 

Without the necessary systemic safeguards in place, life and death decisions are largely an arbitrary and capricious “crap shoot” where wildly inconsistent results on the same or similar facts too often depend on the attitude of the judge, the whimsical decisions by “management” on whether to interfere in decision-making, and the location and circumstances of the hearing.

This is NOT the way to run a legitimate court system in compliance with due process and fundamental fairness!

For now, advocates should continue to vocalize their strong opposition to “how can we help our partners at DHS Enforcement” adjudication passing for justice at EOIR!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-02-23

3RD CIR REAFFIRMS THAT 18 USC 16(B) “CRIME OF VIOLENCE” AS INCORPORATED INTO THE INA IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE: Mateo v. Attorney General — Supremes Remain MIA

151160p

Before: McKEE, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: JUDGE VANASKIE

KEY QUOTE:

“The petitioner in Baptiste, like Mateo, faced removal on the basis of his purported status as an alien convicted of a crime of violence under § 16(b). As stated previously, § 16(b) defines a crime of violence as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In order to determine whether the crime of conviction is a crime of violence under § 16(b), courts utilize the same categorical approach that was applied to the ACCA’s residual clause. Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 617. The petitioner in Baptiste argued that the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson striking down the residual clause should apply to negate § 16(b). After comparing the features of the § 16(b) analysis to those found to contribute to the unconstitutionality of the residual clause in Johnson, we agreed that the same defects were present in § 16(b), rendering the provision unconstitutional. Regarding the first feature, we recognized that the same “ordinary case inquiry” is used when applying the categorical approach in both contexts. Id. Like the residual clause, § 16(b) “offers no reliable way to choose between . . . competing accounts of what” that “judge- imagined abstraction” of the crime involves. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2558. Thus, we concluded in Baptiste that “the ordinary case inquiry is as indeterminate in the § 16(b) context as it was in the residual clause context.” 841 F.3d at 617. Turning to the second feature—the risk inquiry—we observed that despite slight linguistic differences between the provisions, the same indeterminacy inherent in the residual clause was present in § 16(b). Id. “[B]ecause the two inquiries under the residual clause that the Supreme Court found to be indeterminate—the ordinary case inquiry and the serious potential risk inquiry—are materially the same as the inquiries under § 16(b),” we concluded that “§ 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.” Id. at 621. This conclusion applies equally to Mateo’s petition. Our treatment of § 16(b) is in step with the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, which have all similarly deemed the provision to be void for vagueness in immigration cases. See Shuti, 828 F.3d at 451; Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1120; Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2016). The Seventh Circuit has also taken this position in the criminal context. See United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2015). In fact, the only circuit that has broken stride is the Fifth Circuit.7 See United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 677 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). In the meantime, we await the Supreme Court’s decision in the appeal of Dimaya.”

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The Dimaya case before the Supremes (again) should be a good test of whether newest Justice Gorsuch will adhere to his strict constructionist principles where they will produce a favorable result for a migrant under the immigration laws.

The Johnson case, relied on by the Third Circuit, was written by none other than the late Justice Antonin Scalia, a leading strict constructionist and conservative judicial icon, who nevertheless found that his path sometimes assisted migrants in avoiding removal.  So, on paper, this should be a “no brainer” for Justice Gorsuch, who has also been critical of some of the BIA’s “Chevron overreach” and non-responsiveness to Article III Courts.

PWS

09-07-17