🧑🏽‍⚖️🇺🇸⚖️THE NATION: CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE MIRANDA M. DU (D NV) COURAGEOUSLY & CORRECTLY  EXPOSED THE RACISM, WHITE SUPREMACY BEHIND OUR IMMIGRATION LAWS — Expect Appellate Judges At Both Ends Of The Spectrum To Discredit & Suppress “Uncomfortable Truths!” — “A lone federal judge cannot stop 100 years of bigoted policies, but if you want to know what a truly progressive legal analysis looks like, Judge Du just spelled one out.“

Chief Judge Miranda M. Du
Chief Judge Miranda M. Du
USDC Nevada
PHOTO: US Courts, Public Realm
Elie Mystal
Elie Mystal
Justice Correspondent
The Nation
PHOTO: The Nation

https://www.thenation.com/article/society/immigration-crime-law/

ELIE MYSTAL, Justice Correspondent, writes in The Nation:

. . . .

The opinion is thorough and well-reasoned, and Judge Du’s arguments are so obvious in retrospect that it’s kind of amazing they aren’t a staple of the immigration debate in this country. But this is where Judge Du’s background perhaps becomes important.

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Miranda Du was born in Ca Mau, Vietnam, in 1969. Her family fled the nation after the Vietnam War when she was 9, first to Malaysia, before eventually making its way to Alabama. She went to Berkeley for law school and was an employment lawyer in Nevada when Harry Reid and Barack Obama made her a federal district judge in 2011. I would imagine that Judge Du looks at the US immigration system with a fresh perspective, at least as compared to a person like me, who was born here and has been taught to just accept a background level of bigotry as an immutable fact of immigration law. One of the more striking parts of her opinion in this case is the section in which she calls out other courts for not doing this sooner. She essentially says that courts in other jurisdictions that have looked at Section 1326 have blindly accepted the government’s reasoning that the 1952 reauthorization cleansed the statute of its racial bias, without really looking at the 1952 Congress.

The opinion is brilliant, and I’m going to print it out so I’ll still have a copy of it when Justice Samuel Alito and the other conservatives on the Supreme Court reverse it and order Du’s opinion to be nuked from orbit. There is, practically speaking, no chance this ruling survives Supreme Court review. The high court will skate over the disparate impact analysis by saying that any person, regardless of race, who crosses the southern border will experience the same over-enforcement. Or the court will reverse the ruling of racist intent by finding, as other courts have, that the 1952 Congress did cleanse the statute of racism. Or they’ll find that the government does have a legitimate and permissible interest in discriminating against southern border crossers. After all, the Supreme Court found bigotry to be okay in Trump v. Hawaii, which upheld the Muslim ban, so finding a reason to uphold Section 1326 will be child’s play for the conservatives who like a little bigotry in their immigration rulings.

And that’s if the case even makes it to the Supreme Court, which it probably won’t. Judge Du’s ruling will first be appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and I could see it getting reversed there. It’s unlikely that other liberal judges will even want to open this can of worms. As I said, Judge Du relies on a disparate impact analysis, and I can think of at least three Supreme Court justices who might be in the mood to overturn disparate impact analysis altogether.

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Judge Du is right about the bigotry inherent in our immigration laws, but conservatives like the bigotry and liberals will be afraid that trying to stop it will just piss off the conservatives.

But at least this opinion exists now. It’s out there, and future lawyers and judges can read it and maybe think differently about the core assumptions at the heart of our immigration system. A lone federal judge cannot stop 100 years of bigoted policies, but if you want to know what a truly progressive legal analysis looks like, Judge Du just spelled one out.

Now, President Biden just needs to read it and go out and nominate 100 judges who agree.

***************

Read the full article at the link.

Biden could start by telling Garland to “redo” the U.S. Immigration Courts with well-qualified, expert, progressive judges in the “ Chief Judge Miranda Du” image! 

Different backgrounds and new, “real life” perspectives! That’s why two decades of appointments of almost exclusively prosecutors and government bureaucrats, to the exclusion of human rights experts and advocates, to the Immigration Judiciary has produced such unfair and disastrous results for humanity and American law! Similar to other “blind spots” in American law, it has also created misery and cost innocent lives.

For the most part, judges of all philosophies hate being confronted with “ugly truths” about the system they are a part of. Consequently, the impetus to sweep historical truth and logical legal reasoning under the carpet when it produces uncomfortable, unpopular, and highly controversial results is overwhelming on all sides of the judicial spectrum, with the exception of a few “brave souls” like Chief Judge Du.

One of the most obvious and disgraceful of these “dodges,” is the abject failure of the Article IIIs to confront head on the clear Fifth Amendment unconstitutionality of the Executive’s “captive Immigration Courts,” particularly as currently staffed and still operating in “Miller Lite, White Nationalist mode.” 

But, courageous decisions like this will be a part of our permanent legal history and come back to haunt today’s go along to get along Federal Judges, at all levels!

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-23-21

🇺🇸🗽BREAKING: US JUDGE IN NEVADA NIXES FEDERAL ILLEGAL REENTRY LAW AS RACIST, UNCONSTITUTIONAL — U.S. v. Carrillo-Lopez (USD Judge Miranda Du) — “The federal government’s plenary power over immigration does not give it license to enact racially discriminatory statutes in violation of equal protection,” Du wrote.

 

https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/nevada-judge-says-immigration-law-making-reentry-a-felony-is-unconstitutional-has-racist-origins

Michelle Rindels & Riley Snyder report for The Nevada Independent:

A federal judge in Nevada has ruled that a nearly 70-year-old section of law that makes it a felony to reenter the U.S. after being deported is unconstitutional, saying it was enacted with discriminatory intent against Latinos and therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Judge Miranda Du issued an order on Wednesday dismissing a case against Gustavo [Carrillo]-Lopez, who was indicted last summer for being in the U.S. in spite of being deported in 1999 and 2012. It appears to be the first time a court has made such a decision, even though the statute known as Section 1326 has been under consideration by several district courts.

“Because Carrillo-Lopez has established that Section 1326 was enacted with a discriminatory purpose and that the law has a disparate impact on Latinx persons, and the government fails to show that Section 1326 would have been enacted absent racial animus … the Court will grant the Motion,” Du wrote.

The case is a blow for the Department of Justice (DOJ), which initially filed the charge during the Trump administration — an era of hardline immigration policies — but has since switched hands to the Biden administration. Left-leaning groups have asserted that the Trump administration had “weaponized” Section 1326 and other decades-old immigration laws as part of their “zero tolerance” immigration strategy.

Julian Castro, a former Democratic presidential candidate and secretary of the Housing and Urban Development Administration, tweeted that “this law has an incredibly racist history. I doubt the Biden DOJ will want to defend it in the appellate court.”

. . . .

The order notes that the law has a disparate impact on Latinos, noting that 87 percent of people apprehended at the border in 2010 were of Mexican descent. While the federal government argued those statistics are a function of geography and Mexico’s proximity to the U.S. rather than discrimination, Du said the argument was unpersuasive.

“The federal government’s plenary power over immigration does not give it license to enact racially discriminatory statutes in violation of equal protection,” Du wrote.

 . . . .

*************************

Read the complete article at the link,

Great decision! Notable for you “liberal artists” that historical analysis of racism and eugenics in America presented by Kelly Lytle Hernández, a history professor at UCLA, helped make the record and carry the day!

Just the kind of interdisciplinary interaction that permeates judging, particularly in immigration and human rights, and argues for more liberal arts grads with backgrounds in history, the humanities, linguistics, demographics, and social sciences on the Immigration Bench and the Article IIIs. 

I’ve long criticized the “ahistorical” sometimes “anti-historical” approach taken by the BIA and other Federal Courts! For example, promoting the fiction that treaties, laws, ombudpersons, and even elections magically change centuries’ old animuses and make everything “hunky dory” for long-persecuted social, political, ethnic, religious, or racial groups. 

Now, if we can only get the Article IIIs to do their job and hold the entire EOIR system, as currently operating, which has fatal racial bias, fairness, impartiality, expertise, and operational problems that make it a “walking violation of due process,” unconstititional, we could be on the way to the change America needs to bring an end to the present national disgrace in our Immigration Courts which is diminishing justice for everyone in America. 

Nevertheless, while this decision is correct, and I’d like to share Julian Castro’s optimism, I’m inclined to doubt that the DOJ will forgo an appeal. Garland has taken a lackadaisical approach to both immigrant justice and its relationship to racial justice in America. He’s also failed to reign in, redirect, or replace DOJ attorneys defending Trump-era White Nationalist policies, procedures, and bad BIA decisions in court. See my post earlier today: https://immigrationcourtside.com/2021/08/18/the-gibson-report-08-16-21-compiled-by-elizabeth-gibson-esquire-ny-legal-assistance-group-garland-doj-continues-to-defend-millers-white-nationalist-agenda-in/

Additionally, despite life tenure, most Federal Courts have been reluctant to enforce the Constitution against the many Executive and Legislative abuses in the area of immigration and human rights. So, I would be disappointed, but not surprised, if this ruling is reversed on appeal. 

Nevertheless, it’s an important step in exposing racism, connecting it with immigration, establishing truth, and fighting the Executive’s unconscionably bad and often illegal performance on immigration and race! While Garland might incorrectly think that immigration and human rights are “back burner” issues, by the time the NDPA is done with him they might well be issues that consume most of his time and irreparably damage his reputation. That’s why a wise Attorney General would be “leading the bandwagon for Article I” while immediately bringing in the progressive experts necessary to re-establish due process and efficiency at EOIR. 

At any rate, this is exactly the kind of “creative disruption” that needs to happen until the system wakes up and makes the necessary progressive, due process, equal justice reforms long overdue at EOIR and other parts of the immigration bureaucracy.

🇺🇸⚖️🗽Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-18-21

BARR CONTINUES RESTRICTIONIST ASSAULT ON IMMIGRATION COURTS: Intends To Reverse BIA Precedents Giving “Full Faith & Credit” To State Court Sentence Modifications — Another Disingenuous Request For “Amicus Briefing!”

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1166251/download

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 556 (A.G. 2019) Interim Decision #3954

556
Matter of Michael Vernon THOMAS, Respondent
Matter of Joseph Lloyd THOMPSON, Respondent
Decided by Attorney General May 28, 2019
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Attorney General
BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i), I direct the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“Board”) to refer these cases to me for review of its decisions. The
Board’s decisions in these matters are automatically stayed pending my
review. See Matter of Haddam, A.G. Order No. 2380-2001 (Jan. 19, 2001).
To assist me, I invite the parties to these proceedings and interested amici to
submit briefs that address whether, and under what circumstances, judicial
alteration of a criminal conviction or sentence—whether labeled “vacatur,”
“modification,” “clarification,” or some other term—should be taken into
consideration in determining the immigration consequences of the
conviction.
The parties’ briefs shall not exceed 15,000 words and shall be filed on or
before June 28, 2019. Interested amici may submit briefs not exceeding
9,000 words on or before July 12, 2019. The parties may submit reply briefs
not exceeding 6,000 words on or before July 12, 2019. All filings shall be
accompanied by proof of service and shall be submitted electronically to
AGCertification@usdoj.gov, and in triplicate to:
United States Department of Justice
Office of the Attorney General, Room 5114
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530
All briefs must be both submitted electronically and postmarked on or
before the pertinent deadlines. Requests for extensions are disfavored.

********************************

Like Barr’s entire tenure and continued interference with Due Process and judicial independence in the Immigration Courts, it’s highly unethical.

Nobody outside the White Nationalist restrictionist enclave would have any interest in revisiting the BIA’s reasonable rulings, going back more than a decade and one-half, recognizing sentence modifications entered by judges in criminal cases, mostly in state courts. Matter of Song, 23 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2001) and Matter of Cota Vargas, 23 I&N Dec. 843 (BIA 2005).

Indeed, this action does not appear to have have been generated by any actual party participating in Immigration Court litigation or by any pending Circuit Court litigation. It has nothing to do with the current “border crisis” that has paralyzed this Administration’s immigration bureaucracy.

Rather, it appears to be part of a concerted politically-based attack on migrants and the independence of the Immigration Court system orchestrated by restrictionist groups outside of government who use unscrupulous and willing senior officials like Barr, and Sessions before him, as operatives.

After ignoring all of the compelling arguments favoring the current precedents, Barr will basically “adopt” or “adapt” Judge Roger Pauley’s dissenting opinion in Matter of Cota. The decision likely has already been drafted along the lines of the restrictionist groups’ agenda for stripping migrants of the few rights they still retain in what was already a bogus “court” system where the law had intentionally been skewed against them and in favor of DHS for political reasons.

The only question is whether the Article III Courts will continue to put up with Barr’s “charade of justice at Justice.” We’ll see. But, at some point, the damage to our system being inflicted by dishonest and unethical officials like Barr might become irreparable.

PWS

05-30-19

SPLIT 9TH SHRUGS OFF DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL – BUT DISSENTING OPINION GIVES DUE PROCESS HOPE FOR THE FUTURE — GOMEZ-VELAZCO V. SESSIONS

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/01/10/14-71747.pdf

Gomez-Velazco v. Sessions, 9th Cir., 01-10-18, published

STAFF HEADNOTE:

“The panel denied Eladio Gomez-Velazco’s petitions for review from the Department of Homeland Security’s final administrative order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b), concluding that Gomez-Velazco’s due process claim, based on his contention that he was denied the right to counsel, failed because he made no showing of prejudice.

Gomez-Velazco argued that DHS officers violated his right to counsel by pressuring him to concede removability without advice of counsel in his proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b), a form of summary removal proceedings in which he did not have a hearing before an immigration judge. The panel concluded that it had jurisdiction to review Gomez- Velazco’s constitutional claim and assumed, without deciding, that the officers’ conduct violated his right to counsel.

The panel held that Gomez-Velazco was required to show prejudice in order to prevail on his claim, rejecting his contention that, in the context of a due process violation based on the denial of the right to counsel, prejudice should be conclusively presumed and automatic reversal should follow. The panel concluded that, at least in cases like that of Gomez-Velazco, where an individual is in administrative removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b), does not waive the 14-day waiting period for judicial review, and is allowed to consult with counsel before the removal order is executed, a showing of prejudice is required. The panel further concluded that Gomez-Velazco failed to establish prejudice.

Dissenting, Chief District Judge Navarro wrote that she would grant the petition for review and vacate the final administrative order of removal. Judge Navarro would first make the distinct finding that Gomez-Velazco’s right to counsel was violated, and would hold that no prejudice is required to vacate the order, and that even if prejudice were required, Gomez-Velazco demonstrated sufficient prejudice.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.”

PANEL: Paul J. Watford and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges, and Gloria M. Navarro,* Chief District Judge.

* The Honorable Gloria M. Navarro, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY: Judge Watford

DISSENT BY: Chief USDC Judge Navarro

KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY:

“Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can seek to remove non-citizens from the United States through several different means. The most formal process involves a hearing in immigration court before an immigration judge, at which the individual to be removed can contest the charges against him and request various forms of relief from removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Today, however, most non-citizens are ordered removed through streamlined proceedings— expedited removal, administrative removal, and reinstatement of removal—that do not involve a hearing before an immigration judge. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, 183–84 (2017); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 Colum. J. Race & L. 1, 2–3 (2014). The proceedings are summary in nature and conducted by front-line immigration enforcement officers employed by DHS.

This case involves administrative removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b). A DHS officer ordered Eladio Gomez-Velazco, a native and citizen of Mexico, removed from the United States. Gomez-Velazco contends that his due process rights were violated because he did not have counsel present at the outset of the removal process. We will assume that a violation occurred. The question we address is whether Gomez-Velazco must show that he was prejudiced by the violation. We conclude that he must and that he has not done so. We therefore deny his petitions for review.”

TEXT OF CHIEF USDC JUDGE NAVARRO’S DISSENT:

“NAVARRO, Chief District Judge, dissenting:

I would grant the Petition for Review and vacate the Final Administrative Removal Order (“FARO”) issued on June 12, 2014.

I would first make the distinct finding—as opposed to the majority’s assumption—that Gomez-Velazco’s right to counsel was violated. “Although there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in an immigration hearing, Congress has recognized it among the rights stemming from the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process that adhere to individuals that are the subject of removal proceedings.” Tawadrus v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Rios-Berrios v. I.N.S., 776 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1985)). While “[t]he right to counsel in immigration proceedings is rooted in the Due Process Clause,” Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005), the right to counsel in expedited removal proceedings is also secured by statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as the alien shall choose.”); 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2)(i) (“[The Notice of Intent] shall advise that the alien: has the privilege of being represented, at no expense to the government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing, as long as counsel is authorized to practice in removal proceedings”);

16 GOMEZ-VELAZCO V. SESSIONS

see also 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2)(iv) (requiring ICE to provide aliens facing expedited removal “with a list of available free legal services programs”).

Moreover, expedited removal proceedings under § 1228 require “conformity with section 1229a” and the “privilege of being represented” is further codified in that section as well. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A). This right to be represented at no cost to the government is also listed on the “Notice of Intent to Issue a FARO” under “Your Rights and Responsibilities.” If the right to counsel under § 1228 is only for the noncitizen to be advised of the right to have counsel, with no practical effect, then it would be no right to counsel at all. See Rios-Berrios, 776 F.2d at 863 (explaining that the right to counsel must be respected in substance as well as in name).

Indeed, this Circuit has consistently emphasized the critical role of counsel in deportation proceedings. See, e.g., Reyes-Palacios v. I.N.S., 836 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The importance of counsel . . . can neither be overemphasized nor ignored.”); United States v. Cerda-Pena, 799 F.2d 1374, 1377 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (referring to “an outright refusal to allow an alien the opportunity to obtain representation” as “an egregious violation of due process”). We have characterized the alien’s right to counsel of choice as “fundamental” and have warned the agency not to treat it casually. Rios-Berrios, 776 F.2d at 863–64.

Here, the record clearly demonstrates that Gomez- Velazco asserted that he had counsel and wanted his counsel present. First, in Form I-213, ICE Officer Stewart explains that during the FARO proceedings, Gomez-Velazco “was unwilling to provide a sworn statement without an attorney

GOMEZ-VELAZCO V. SESSIONS 17

present.” Second, on the “Record of Sworn Statement” dated June 12, 2014, the first question states, “Are you willing to answer my questions?” to which Gomez-Velazco answered: “I prefer not to until I talk to my attorney.” DHS nevertheless proceeded with the expedited removal proceedings without first affording Gomez-Velazco the opportunity to notify and speak with his counsel as he requested. In doing so, DHS directly disregarded Gomez-Velazco’s ability to exercise this fundamental right.

Having found that Gomez-Velazco’s right to counsel was violated, I would then find that under Montes-Lopez v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2012), no prejudice is required to vacate the FARO. The Montes-Lopez court held “an alien who shows that he has been denied the statutory right to be represented by counsel in an immigration proceeding need not also show that he was prejudiced by the absence of the attorney.” 694 F.3d at 1093–94. In support, the court stated that “the absence of counsel can change an alien’s strategic decisions, prevent him or her from making potentially-meritorious legal arguments, and limit the evidence the alien is able to include in the record.” Id. at 1092.

The majority here distinguishes Montes-Lopez by a distinction without a difference. First, the majority regards Montes-Lopez as “an exception to the general rule requiring a showing of prejudice;” however, prior to Montes-Lopez, there was no general rule that required a showing of prejudice—a fact that Montes-Lopez, Hernandez-Gil, and Biwot, the cases the majority relies so heavily on, all specifically identify. Id. at 1090 (“We have never decided, however, whether prejudice is an element of a claim that counsel has been denied in an immigration proceeding.”);

18 GOMEZ-VELAZCO V. SESSIONS

Hernandez-Gil v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Because we determine that Hernandez-Gil has shown that he was prejudiced by the denial of his statutory right to counsel ‘we again leave unanswered the question whether a petitioner must show prejudice when he has been denied the right to counsel in removal proceedings.’”) (citing Biwot, 403 F.3d at 1100).

Second, the right to counsel is substantively the same under both the § 1228 expedited removal proceeding before a DHS deciding officer, as used here, and the § 1229 proceeding before the immigration judge, as in Montes- Lopez.1 Compare § 1228(b)(4)(B) with § 1229(b)(1); see also United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasizing the similarity of §§ 1228 and 1229 in the right to counsel context). Montes-Lopez’s holding refers to “an immigration proceeding” without differentiating between a proceeding before an immigration judge and a DHS deciding officer. Montes-Lopez, 694 F.3d at 1093–94.

Notably, the Montes-Lopez court purposefully distinguished pure immigration proceedings from collateral attacks on a removal order in a § 1326 illegal reentry criminal case, the latter of which requires prejudice specifically because of “the limitations on criminal defendants’ right to collaterally attack the result of a prior proceeding.” Montes- Lopez, 694 F.3d at 1093; see also Villa-Anguiano v. Holder, 727 F.3d 873, 876 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013) (contrasting the § 1326 illegal reentry collateral attack standard under Reyes-Bonilla with the immigration proceedings petition for review standard

1 The Government decides under which process to pursue deportation by issuing either a Notice of Intent to Issue a FARO under § 1228 or Notice to Appear under § 1229.

GOMEZ-VELAZCO V. SESSIONS 19

under Montes-Lopez). The Montes-Lopez court compared the collateral attack versus petition for review in the immigration context to the difference between a criminal collateral attack and a direct appeal: “A criminal defendant who alleges ineffective assistance of counsel must generally show prejudice, Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 1001 (9th Cir. 2010), but a defendant who has been denied counsel need not. Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir. 2005).” 694 F.3d at 1092.

Deprivation of counsel is per se prejudicial. See Cerda- Pena, 799 F.2d at 1377 n.3 (“[A]n outright refusal to allow an alien the opportunity to obtain representation may be such an egregious violation of due process so as not to require any further showing of prejudice”); Garcia-Guzman v. Reno, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1087 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (explaining that “Cerda-Pena therefore suggests that if the violation of the right to counsel is sufficiently egregious—i.e., a clear denial of representation or outright refusal to permit an alien to obtain representation—prejudice needn’t be shown.”).

The majority attempts to downplay the inherent prejudice of this situation by comparing it to discrete stages of a criminal proceeding, such as a preliminary hearing, a court- ordered psychiatric examination, post-indictment interactions with undercover police officers, and pre-trial line-ups. However, none of these situations are comparable to the instant case. Here, Gomez-Velazco was in custody by DHS when he asked for an attorney—a situation that, in a non- immigration case, would normally mandate an attorney as soon as a defendant requests one.

Furthermore, in drawing comparisons to these Sixth Amendment situations, the majority attempts to illustrate how

20 GOMEZ-VELAZCO V. SESSIONS

the standard in those cases are only “subject to harmless error review rather than an automatic reversal rule,” and the majority concludes that because this is a similar discrete stage, prejudice is required rather than presumed. However, in arguing this, the majority once again completely disregards Montes-Lopez. There, the court held that “[w]hen this court concludes that an agency has not correctly applied controlling law, it must typically remand, even if we think the error was likely harmless.” Montes-Lopez, 694 F.3d at 1092 (citing INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002)). Importantly, Montes-Lopez adopts the reasoning of the Second Circuit, which “declined to add a prejudice requirement to this rule because [the court] reasoned that automatic reversal upon violation of such a regulation would encourage agency compliance with its own rules and serve the interests of judicial economy.” Id. at 1091 (citing Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 1991)). We must recognize that in mandating automatic reversal, not only will we continue to protect this right to counsel, but also we will better hold these agencies accountable in their actions and conduct by enforcing their own regulations more strictly upon them. In holding that this situation is akin to a harmless error review, the majority disregards Montes-Lopez’s holding and downplays the right to counsel.

The majority attempts to distinguish Montes-Lopez by stating that it is different than the instant case because it is “based in part on the practical difficulties one would face in trying to prove that the outcome of the merits hearing would have been different had counsel been able to assist.” The majority reasons that Montes-Lopez differs because “Gomez- Velazco was not denied the assistance of counsel throughout the entirety of the administrative removal process” but that he “lacked counsel at one discrete stage of the process.”

GOMEZ-VELAZCO V. SESSIONS 21

To carve out such a nuanced distinction undermines the fundamental nature of the right to counsel. See, e.g., Hernandez-Gil, 476 F.3d at 806 (“The high stakes of a removal proceeding and the maze of immigration rules and regulations make evident the necessity of the right to counsel.”); Montes-Lopez, 694 F.3d at 1091 (“No showing of prejudice is required, however, when a rule is ‘intended primarily to confer important procedural benefits upon indiv[i]duals’’ or ‘when alleged regulatory violations implicate fundamental statutory or constitutional rights.’”) (quoting Leslie v. Attorney Gen., 611 F.3d 171 (3d Cir.2010)). Likewise, to permit an agency to continue to ignore its own regulations undermines the fundamental nature of the right to counsel. Finally, to ignore established precedent in favor of the majority’s new exception undermines the fundamental nature of the right to counsel. Accordingly, I would vacate the FARO because Gomez- Velazco established a right to counsel due process violation and therefore need not show prejudice.

Even if prejudice were required, however, it should be assessed under the “plausibility” standard set forth by United States v. Cisneros-Rodriguez, 813 F.3d 748, 760 (9th Cir. 2015): “[W]hether the defendant had identified a form of relief it was plausible he would have obtained absent the due process violation.” In Cisneros-Rodriguez, the defendant argued that “had she obtained counsel [during her predicate § 1228 proceeding], it is plausible that she would have applied for and obtained a U-visa.” Id. at 753. The court agreed that because she demonstrated prima facie U-Visa eligibility, it was plausible that she would have obtained a U- Visa had she applied for one at the time of her original § 1228 proceeding. Id. at 761. This finding was made despite the

22 GOMEZ-VELAZCO V. SESSIONS
fact that the defendant later applied for a U-Visa and was

rejected. Id. at 762.

Here, the record demonstrates that Officer Stewart—the arresting ICE officer who provided the evidence to Deciding Officer Elizabeth C. Godfrey for the issuance of the FARO—knew that Gomez-Velazco was represented by counsel and that Gomez-Velazco had a pending U-Visa application. When Officer Stewart nevertheless chose to arrest Gomez-Velazco and continue with the § 1228 proceeding without allowing him to consult with his attorney, Gomez-Velazco was prejudiced more than the defendant in Cisneros-Rodriguez because he had a plausible and pending U-Visa application. As such, I cannot agree with the majority that Gomez-Velazco failed to demonstrate sufficient prejudice under Cisneros-Rodriguez.

Ultimately, even without a finding of prejudice, the majority’s decision to deny Gomez-Velazco’s petition for review dilutes the fundamental right to counsel and completely ignores indistinguishable precedent. See Hernandez v. Holder, 545 Fed. Appx. 710, 713 (9th Cir. 2013) (Ikuta, J., concurring) (unpublished opinion) (stating disagreement with Montes-Lopez while still acknowledging that the Ninth Circuit is bound by its decision). Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.”

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Sure seems to me that Chief Judge Navarro is right that the majority fails to follow the Ninth Circuit’s long-stnding precedent in Rios-Berrios v. I.N.S., 776 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1985). Indeed, if anything the due process need for counsel in so-called “Expedited Removal” before an Immigration Officer appears even greater than that before an Immigration Judge which was found to be per se prejudicial in Rios-Berrios. Also, it’s quite ironic that a District Judge sitting by designation has a better understanding of 9th Circuit precedent than her 9th Circuit colleagues in the majority!

In any event, there is some “good stuff” in this dissent for anyone challenging the lack of counsel in Expedited Removal on due process grounds. Also, I wouldn’t be surprised to see Chief Judge Navarro’s views prevail in some other Circuits as the Trump Administration and DHS “push the envelope” on Expedited Removal.

PWS

01-13-18