GOBBLEDYGOOK CENTRAL: After 12 Years Kicking Around The System, 9th Circuit Declines Chevron Deference To Matter of Cortez Canales, 25 I. & N. Dec. 301 (BIA 2010) & Punts Issue Back To BIA — Lozano-Arredondo v. Sessions — Why “Chevron Must Go!” — Somewhere In This Judicially-Created Mess, It’s All About A 2-Decades Old “Petty Theft” Conviction!

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/08/08/11-72422.pdf

Key quote:

“We grant Lozano-Arredondo’s petition and remand to the BIA. We hold, first, that petit theft under Idaho law does not qualify categorically as a crime involving moral turpitude. We also hold that under the modified categorical approach, the record of conviction is inconclusive. Because the effect of that inconclusive record presents an open legal question now pending before another panel of this court, our analysis ends there. On remand, once this burden of proof question is resolved, the BIA should determine whether Lozano- Arredondo’s conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude under the modified categorical approach, unless the case is resolved on other grounds.

Second, we hold the BIA erred by deciding at Chevron step one that an “offense under” § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) does not include the within-five-years element. Because the BIA “erroneously contends that Congress’ intent has been clearly

24 LOZANO-ARREDONDO V. SESSIONS

expressed and has rested on that ground, we remand to require the agency to consider the question afresh.” Delgado, 648 F.3d at 1103–04 n.12 (quoting Negusie, 555 U.S. at 523) (internal quotation marks omitted); see INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002). In light of this holding and the explanations we have given, the BIA must reconsider its interpretation of the phrase “offense under” in § 1229b(b)(1)(C).”

PANEL:  Circuit Judges William A. Fletcher, Raymond C. Fisher and N. Randy Smith

OPINION BY: Judge Fisher

*****************************************************************

Com’ on Man! This case has been around the system since 2005 — 12 years! The conviction is now two decades old. The case depends on two legal questions.

The 9th Circuit should answer the legal questions and either 1) affirm the BIA’s final order of removal, or 2) remand the case to the BIA to apply the law that has been determined by the 9th Circuit to the facts of this case. The court’s prose is impenetrable; the court’s rationale, based on Chevron, is irrational.

It’s time for Chevron to go and for Article III Courts to do their job of deciding legal questions rather than bogging down the system with infinite delays through needless remands to have the BIA pass on difficult legal questions. That’s the Article III Courts’ Constitutional function; they have been avoiding it for years under the Supreme’s judge-made facade of Chevron and Brand X.

(Yes, I know the 9th Circuit is only following Chevron, as they are bound to do. This is something the Supremes need to address, sooner rather than later. The result in this case is pure legal obfuscation.)

Oh yeah, while we’re at it, if there is an “open legal question” before another panel of the 9th Circuit, why remand the case to the BIA which can’t resolve that? Why not send this case to the “other panel” or ask your colleagues on the other panel if they could expedite their consideration of this issue?

PWS

08-08-17

 

3rd Cir. “Just Says No” To DOJ Request For Remand To Give BIA Chance To Misconstrue Statute — PA misdemeanor count of obstructing the administration of law or other governmental function is categorically NOT a CIMT — Ildefonso-Candelario v. Atty. Gen.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/163625p.pdf

Key quote:

“Instead of defending the conclusion that section 5101 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, the government requests a remand without decision to permit the BIA to reconsider its position in the matter. See Ren v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2006); see generally SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1027-30 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (outlining approaches to agency remand requests). The government points out that the BIA is generally entitled to Chevron deference for reasonable interpretations of ambiguous terms, Mehboob, 549 F.3d at 275, and theorizes that the BIA might conjure up an interpretation of the term “moral turpitude” enabling a conclusion that section 5101 categorically involves “conduct that is inherently base, vile, or depraved,” Knapik, 384 F.3d at 89.

Yet the government has been unable, either in its brief or at oral argument, to articulate any understanding of the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” that could plausibly encompass section 5101. This is not because of a failure of imagination. It instead reflects the simple fact that there is no conceivable way to describe the least culpable conduct covered by section 5101 — such as the illegal but nonviolent political protest described in Ripley — as inherently vile, or as “a reprehensible act committed with an appreciable level of consciousness or deliberation.” Partyka, 417 F.3d at 414. Moreover, no “emerging case law,” Ren, 440 F.3d at 448, involving either section 5101 or the definition of moral turpitude in other contexts calls for giving the BIA a second bite at the apple. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 469 (declining to remand where the relevant legal materials, including BIA decisions, “lead[] inexorably to the conclusion” that an offense is not morally turpitudinous).

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Under the circumstances, we see no reason for remanding without correcting the legal error apparent on the face of the petition. See Mayorga v. Att’y Gen., 757 F.3d 126, 134 (3d Cir. 2014); cf. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013) (“[W]here Congress has established an ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the ambiguity will fairly allow.”). We thus deny the government’s request for a voluntary remand and hold that 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5101 is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.”

PANEL: JORDAN, KRAUSE, Circuit Judges and STEARNS, District Judge.

OPINION BY: JUDGE STEARNS

********************************************************

Looks like the 3rd Circuit is starting to get the picture on how the BIA, under pressure from the politicos in the DOJ to produce more removals, has a strong tendency to construe the law against respondents and in favor of just about any DHS position that will facilitate removals.

That’s why it’s time for the Article III Courts to put an end to Chevron and the pro-Government, anti-individual results that it favors. “Captive” administrative tribunals responsible to Executive Branch politicos can’t be trusted to fairly and independently construe ambiguous statutory language. That’s properly the job of the Article III Courts; they have been shirking it for far too long! The Supremes have essentially reversed the results of Chief Justice John Marshall’s “victory” over President Thomas Jefferson in Marbury v. Madison!

PWS

08-04-17

 

 

NEW PRECEDENT: BIA FINDS THAT SOLICITING AN UNDERCOVER POLICE OFFICER COUNTS AS SOLICITING A “MINOR” UNDER ADAM WALSH ACT — MATTER OF IZAGUIRRE, 27 I&N DEC. 67 (BIA 2017)

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/983601/download

BIA Headnote:

“An offense may be a “specified offense against a minor” within the meaning of section 111(7) of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 592, even if it involved an undercover police officer posing as a minor, rather than an actual minor.”

BIA PANEL: Vice Chair/Appellate Immigration Judge Adkins-Blanc; Appellate Immigration Judges Guendelsberger and Mann

OPINION BY: Judge Ana L. Mann

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PWS

07-22-17

BIA Requests Amicus Briefing On Modified Categorical Approach & CIMT — Deadline Is July 12, 2017

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/972601/download

June 12, 2017, Amicus Invitation Amicus Invitation No. 17-06-12 AMICUS INVITATION (MODIFIED CATEGORICAL APPROACH & CIMTS) DUE [JULY 12, 2017] JUNE 12, 2017 The Board of Immigration Appeals welcomes interested members of the public to file amicus curiae briefs discussing the below issue(s): ISSUE(S) PRESENTED: (1) Is the Board precluded from applying a modified categorical analysis for an indivisible or means-based statute within the context of crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) determinations, when the requirement in question is whether the involved conduct is reprehensible, which is a subjective determination that is not an element of the state offense? (2) Do the “three basic reasons for adhering to an elements-only inquiry,” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2252-53 (2016), have force in the CIMT context? (3) Do the answers to the first two questions require modification of the Board’s decision in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 826 (BIA 2016), and if so, how? Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae: Members of the public who wish to appear as amicus curiae before the Board must submit a Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae (“Request to Appear”) pursuant to Chapter 2.10, Appendix B (Directory), and Appendix F (Sample Cover Page) of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual. The Request to Appeal must explicitly identify that it is responding to Amicus Invitation No. 17-06-12. The decision to accept or deny a Request to Appear is within the sole discretion of the Board. Please see Chapter 2.10 of the Board Practice Manual. Filing a Brief: Please file your amicus brief in conjunction with your Request to Appear pursuant to Chapter 2.10 of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual. The brief accompanying the Request to Appeal must explicitly identify that it is responding to Amicus Invitation No. 17-06-12. An amicus curiae brief is helpful to the Board if it presents relevant legal arguments that the parties have not already addressed. However, an amicus brief must be limited to a legal discussion of the issue(s) presented. The decision to accept or deny an amicus brief is within the sole discretion of the Board. The Board will not consider a brief that exceeds the scope of the amicus invitation. Request for Case Information: Additional information about the case, including the parties’ contact information, may be available. Please contact the Clerk’s Office at the below address for this information prior to filing your Request to Appear and brief. Page Limit: The Board asks that amicus curiae briefs be limited to 30 double-spaced pages.

June 12, 2017, Amicus Invitation Amicus Invitation No. 17-06-12 AMICUS INVITATION (MODIFIED CATEGORICAL APPROACH & CIMTS) DUE [JULY 12, 2017] JUNE 12, 2017 The Board of Immigration Appeals welcomes interested members of the public to file amicus curiae briefs discussing the below issue(s): ISSUE(S) PRESENTED: (1) Is the Board precluded from applying a modified categorical analysis for an indivisible or means-based statute within the context of crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) determinations, when the requirement in question is whether the involved conduct is reprehensible, which is a subjective determination that is not an element of the state offense? (2) Do the “three basic reasons for adhering to an elements-only inquiry,” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2252-53 (2016), have force in the CIMT context? (3) Do the answers to the first two questions require modification of the Board’s decision in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 826 (BIA 2016), and if so, how? Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae: Members of the public who wish to appear as amicus curiae before the Board must submit a Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae (“Request to Appear”) pursuant to Chapter 2.10, Appendix B (Directory), and Appendix F (Sample Cover Page) of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual. The Request to Appeal must explicitly identify that it is responding to Amicus Invitation No. 17-06-12. The decision to accept or deny a Request to Appear is within the sole discretion of the Board. Please see Chapter 2.10 of the Board Practice Manual. Filing a Brief: Please file your amicus brief in conjunction with your Request to Appear pursuant to Chapter 2.10 of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual. The brief accompanying the Request to Appeal must explicitly identify that it is responding to Amicus Invitation No. 17-06-12. An amicus curiae brief is helpful to the Board if it presents relevant legal arguments that the parties have not already addressed. However, an amicus brief must be limited to a legal discussion of the issue(s) presented. The decision to accept or deny an amicus brief is within the sole discretion of the Board. The Board will not consider a brief that exceeds the scope of the amicus invitation. Request for Case Information: Additional information about the case, including the parties’ contact information, may be available. Please contact the Clerk’s Office at the below address for this information prior to filing your Request to Appear and brief. Page Limit: The Board asks that amicus curiae briefs be limited to 30 double-spaced pages.

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PWS

06-14-17 Continue reading BIA Requests Amicus Briefing On Modified Categorical Approach & CIMT — Deadline Is July 12, 2017

9th Circuit Reverses BIA, Says CAL Fleeing From A Police Officer Not A Categorical CIMT! — Ramirez-Contreras v. Sessions — Read My Mini-Essay “Hard Times In The Ivory Tower”

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/06/08/14-70452.pdf

Here is the summary prepared by the court staff:

“Immigration

The panel granted Ramirez-Contreras’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision concluding that his conviction for fleeing from a police officer under California Vehicle Code § 2800.2 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude that rendered him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal.

In holding that Ramirez-Contreras’s conviction is not a crime of moral turpitude, the panel accorded minimal deference to the BIA’s decision due to flaws in its reasoning.

Applying the categorical approach, the panel viewed the least of the acts criminalized under California Vehicle Code § 2800.2, and concluded that an individual can be convicted under subsection (b) for eluding police while committing three traffic violations that cannot be characterized as “vile or depraved.” Therefore, the panel held that California Vehicle Code § 2800.2 is not a crime of moral turpitude because the conduct criminalized does not necessarily create the risk of harm that characterizes a crime of moral turpitude.

The panel also held that the modified categorical approach does not apply because the elements of California Vehicle Code § 2800.2 are clearly indivisible.”

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Andre M. Davis,** and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Schroeder

** The Honorable Andre M. Davis, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.

********************************************

HARD TIMES IN THE IVORY TOWER

by Paul Wickham Schmidt

The BIA has been having a rough time lately on its rulings concerning both “aggravated felonies” and “crimes involving moral turpitude.” The BIA appears to take an “expansive” or “inclusive” approach to criminal removal statutes, while most courts, including the Supremes, seem to prefer a narrower approach that assumes the “least possible crime” and ameliorates some of the harshness of the INA’s removal provisions.

In my view, the BIA’s jurisprudence on criminal removal took a “downward turn” after Judge Lory D. Rosenberg was forced off the BIA by then Attorney General John Ashcroft around 2002. Judge Rosenberg’s dissents often set forth a “categorical” and “modified categorical” analysis that eventually proved to be more in line with that used by higher Federal Courts all the way up to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Since the “Ashcroft purge,” the BIA has visibly struggled to get on the same wavelength with the reviewing courts on analyzing criminal removal provisions. At the same time, the BIA’s own precedents have been remarkable for their lack of meaningful dissent and absence of any type of visible judicial dialogue and deliberation. Maybe that’s what happens when you try to build a “captive court” from the “inside out” rather than competitively selecting the very best Appellate Immigration Judges from different backgrounds whose  views span the entire “real world” of immigration jurisprudence.

Just another reason why it’s time to get the United States Immigration Courts (including the “Appellate Division” a/k/a/ the BIA) out of the Executive Branch and into an independent judicial structure. No other major court system in America is run the way DOJ/EOIR runs the Immigration Courts. And, that’s not good news for those seeking genuine due process within the immigration system.

PWS

06-09-17

Led By Justice Thomas, Unanimous Supremes Reject USG’s Attempt To Deport Mexican Man For Consensual Sex With A Minor — “Strict Interpretation” Carries The Day!

Here is then full text of the opinion in Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-54_5i26.pdf

Here’s a key excerpt from Justice Thomas’s opinion:

“Relying on a different dictionary (and “sparse” legislative history), the Government suggests an alternative “‘everyday understanding’” of “sexual abuse of a minor.” Brief for Respondent 16–17 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990)). Around the time sexual abuse of a minor was added to the INA’s list of aggravated felonies, that dictionary defined “[s]exual abuse” as “[i]llegal sex acts performed against a minor by a parent, guardian, relative, or acquaintance,” and defined “[m]inor” as “[a]n infant or person who is under the age of legal competence,” which in “most states” was “18.” Id., at 997, 1375. “‘Sex- ual abuse of a minor,’” the Government accordingly contends, “most naturally connotes conduct that (1) is illegal, (2) involves sexual activity, and (3) is directed at a person younger than 18 years old.” Brief for Respondent 17.

We are not persuaded that the generic federal offense corresponds to the Government’s definition. First, the Government’s proposed definition is flatly inconsistent with the definition of sexual abuse contained in the very dictionary on which it relies; the Government’s proposed definition does not require that the act be performed “by a parent, guardian, relative, or acquaintance.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). In any event, as we explain below, offenses predicated on a special relationship of trust between the victim and offender are not at issue here and frequently have a different age requirement than the general age of consent. Second, in the context of statutory rape, the prepositional phrase “of a minor” naturally refers not to the age of legal competence (when a person is legally capable of agreeing to a contract, for example), but to the age of consent (when a person is legally capable of agreeing to sexual intercourse).

Third, the Government’s definition turns the categorical approach on its head by defining the generic federal offense of sexual abuse of a minor as whatever is illegal under the particular law of the State where the defendant was convicted. Under the Government’s preferred ap- proach, there is no “generic” definition at all. See Taylor, 495 U. S., at 591 (requiring “a clear indication that . . . Congress intended to abandon its general approach of using uniform categorical definitions to identify predicate offenses”); id., at 592 (“We think that ‘burglary’ in §924(e) must have some uniform definition independent of the labels employed by the various States’ criminal codes”).

C

The structure of the INA, a related federal statute, and evidence from state criminal codes confirm that, for a statutory rape offense to qualify as sexual abuse of a minor under the INA based solely on the age of the participants, the victim must be younger than 16.”

*****************************************************

Notwithstanding a supposedly “conservative” Court, going back several Administrations the USG has been losing on a surprisingly regular basis in its attempts to take the most extreme and inclusive interpretations of various already very harsh deportation provisions. And, “strict constructionists” like Justice Thomas and the late Justice Scalia have sometimes had just as much problem with the Government’s overreach as have supposedly more liberal or “middle of the road” justices. That’s why I’m not convinced that Justice Gorsuch (who did not participate in this case) will be as much of a “Government ringer” as some believe, at least in immigration matters.

Despite a number of notable setbacks at the Court, DHS, DOJ, and the BIA all seem to be rather “tone deaf” to the Court’s message. The Executive Branch continues to take the most extreme anti-immigrant positions even where, as in this case, it requires ignoring the “unambiguous” statutory language.

Given the “maximo enforcement” posture of the Trump Administration, there is little reason to believe that the Executive Branch will “get” the Court’s message about more reasonable interpretations of deportation statutes. Hopefully, the Court will continue to stand up against such abuses of Executive authority.

PWS

05-31-17

PRECEDENT: BIA Finds “Assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury under California law is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.” — Matter of Wu, 27 I&N Dec. 8 (BIA 2017)

Here’s the link to the full opinion:

https://www.justice.gov/file/957431/download

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BIA PANEL: Appellate Immigration Judges Malphrus, Mullane, & Creppy

OPINION BY: Judge Malphrus

PWS

04-14-17

BIA Says MD Sexual Solicitation Of Minor Is Categorical CIMT — Matter of JIMENEZ-CEDILLO, 27 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2017) — BIA Reaches A Publication Milestone!

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/955631/download

Here’s the headnote:

“(1) A sexual offense in violation of a statute enacted to protect children is a crime involving moral turpitude where the victim is particularly young—that is, under 14 years of age—or is under 16 and the age differential between the perpetrator and victim is significant, or both, even though the statute requires no culpable mental state as to the age of the child. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 826 (BIA 2016), clarified.

(2) Sexual solicitation of a minor under section 3-324(b) of the Maryland Criminal Law with the intent to engage in an unlawful sexual offense in violation of section 3-307 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.”

PANEL: Appellate Immigration Judges Pauley, Mullane, and Greer; Opinion by Judge Pauley.

*************************************

Yeah, I know that they teach you in law school never to rely on headnotes. So, if you are going to use this case for any legal filing you should of course read the entire opinion.

But, for the rest of us, the BIA headnotes are some of the “best in the business” if I do say so myself, having had some role in setting up the “modernized version” of BIA precedent distribution and formatting in one of my former lives.

And with this case, the BIA crosses another threshold in its 77 year history: completion of Volume 26 and the very first decision in Volume 27.

PWS

04-08-17

 

 

 

AMICUS INVITATION (PROTECTED CLASS OF VICTIMS), DUE MARCH 6, 2017

Amicus Invitation No. 17-02-02
AMICUS INVITATION (PROTECTED CLASS OF VICTIMS), DUE MARCH 6, 2017

FEBRUARY 2, 2017

The Board of Immigration Appeals welcomes interested members of the public to file amicus curiae briefs discussing the below issue:

ISSUE PRESENTED:

(1) Whether, in light of the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Ortega-Lopez v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2016), a conviction under 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1), constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act. In this regard, discuss whether a crime involving moral turpitude requires a protected class of victims and, if so, whether animals may constitute a protected class of victims.

Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae: Members of the public who wish to appear as amicus curiae before the Board must submit a Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae (“Request to Appear”) pursuant to Chapter 2.10, Appendix B (Directory), and Appendix F (Sample Cover Page) of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual. The Request to Appear must explicitly identify that it is responding to Amicus Invitation No. 17-02-02. The decision to accept or deny a Request to Appear is within the sole discretion of the Board. Please see Chapter 2.10 of the Board Practice Manual.

Filing a Brief: Please file your amicus brief in conjunction with your Request to Appear pursuant to Chapter 2.10 of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual. The brief accompanying the Request to Appear must explicitly identify that it is responding to Amicus Invitation No. 17-02-02. An amicus curiae brief is helpful to the Board if it presents relevant legal arguments that the parties have not already addressed. However, an amicus brief must be limited to a legal discussion of the issue(s) presented. The decision to accept or deny an amicus brief is within the sole discretion of the Board. The Board will not consider a brief that exceeds the scope of the amicus invitation.

Request for Case Information: Additional information about the case may be available. Please contact the Amicus Clerk by phone or mail (see contact information below) for this information prior to filing your Request to Appear and brief.

Page Limit: The Board asks that amicus curiae briefs be limited to 30 double-spaced pages.

Deadline: Please file a Request to Appear and brief with the Clerk’s Office at the address below by March 6, 2017. Your request must be received at the Clerk’s Office within the prescribed time limit. Motions to extend the time for filing a Request to Appear and brief are disfavored. The briefs or extension request must be RECEIVED at the Board on or before the due date. It is not sufficient simply to mail the documents on time. We strongly urge the use of an overnight courier service to ensure the timely filing of your brief.

1

Service: Please mail three copies of your Request to Appear and brief to the Clerk’s Office at the address below. If the Clerk’s Office accepts your brief, it will then serve a copy on the parties and provide parties time to respond.

Joint Requests: The filing of parallel and identical or similarly worded briefs from multiple amici is disfavored. Rather, collaborating amici should submit a joint Request to Appear and brief. See generally Chapter 2.10 (Amicus Curiae).

Notice: A Request to Appear may be filed by an attorney, accredited representative, or an organization represented by an attorney registered to practice before the Board pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(f). A Request to Appear filed by a person specified under 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1) will not be considered.

Attribution: Should the Board decide to publish a decision, the Board may, at its discretion, name up to three attorneys or representatives. If you wish a different set of three names or you have a preference on the order of the three names, please specify the three names in your Request to Appear and brief.

Clerk’s Office Contact and Filing Address:

To send by courier or overnight delivery service, or to deliver in person:

Amicus Clerk
Board of Immigration Appeals Clerk’s Office
5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000 Falls Church, VA 22041 703-605-1007

Business hours: Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
Fee: A fee is not required for the filing of a Request to Appear and amicus brief.

 

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PWS

02/03/17

Advocates: Here’s Your Opportunity To Shape The Future Of American Immigration Law — Don’t Blow It! — BIA Asks For Amicus Briefing On Whether “Misprision Of A Felony” Is A “Crime Involving Moral Turpitude!”

Amicus Invitation No. 17-01-05
AMICUS INVITATION (MISPRISION OF A FELONY), DUE FEBRUARY 6, 2017

The Board of Immigration Appeals welcomes interested members of the public to file amicus curiae briefs discussing the below issue:

ISSUES PRESENTED:

  1. (1)  Does the offense of misprision of a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 4 categorically qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude? Please see in that regard and address Matter of Robles- Urrea, 24 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 2006), reversed, Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2012); and Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2002).
  2. (2)  Assuming the Board should decide to adhere to Matter of Robles-Urrea, supra, in circuits other than the Ninth, is the application of such precedent impermissibly retroactive to convictions for acts committed prior to the publication of Matter of Robles- Urrea inasmuch as that decision overruled a prior precedent holding that misprision of a felony was not a crime involving moral turpitude?

Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae: Members of the public who wish to appear as amicus curiae before the Board must submit a Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae (“Request to Appear”) pursuant to Chapter 2.10, Appendix B (Directory), and Appendix F (Sample Cover Page) of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual. The Request to Appear must explicitly identify that it is responding to Amicus Invitation No. 17-01-05. The decision to accept or deny a Request to Appear is within the sole discretion of the Board. Please see Chapter 2.10 of the Board Practice Manual.

Filing a Brief: Please file your amicus brief in conjunction with your Request to Appear pursuant to Chapter 2.10 of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual. The brief accompanying the Request to Appear must explicitly identify that it is responding to Amicus Invitation No. 17-01-05. An amicus curiae brief is helpful to the Board if it presents relevant legal arguments that the parties have not already addressed. However, an amicus brief must be limited to a legal discussion of the issue(s) presented. The decision to accept or deny an amicus brief is within the sole discretion of the Board. The Board will not consider a brief that exceeds the scope of the amicus invitation.

Request for Case Information: Additional information about the case may be available. Please contact the Amicus Clerk by phone or mail (see contact information below) for this information prior to filing your Request to Appear and brief.

Page Limit: The Board asks that amicus curiae briefs be limited to 30 double-spaced pages.

Deadline: Please file a Request to Appear and brief with the Clerk’s Office at the address below by February 6, 2017. Your request must be received at the Clerk’s Office within the prescribed time limit. Motions to extend the time for filing a Request to Appear and brief are disfavored. The briefs or extension request must be RECEIVED at the Board on or before the due date. It is not sufficient simply

1

to mail the documents on time. We strongly urge the use of an overnight courier service to ensure the timely filing of your brief.

Service: Please mail three copies of your Request to Appear and brief to the Clerk’s Office at the address below. If the Clerk’s Office accepts your brief, it will then serve a copy on the parties and provide parties time to respond.

Joint Requests: The filing of parallel and identical or similarly worded briefs from multiple amici is disfavored. Rather, collaborating amici should submit a joint Request to Appear and brief. See generally Chapter 2.10 (Amicus Curiae).

Notice: A Request to Appear may be filed by an attorney, accredited representative, or an organization represented by an attorney registered to practice before the Board pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(f). A Request to Appear filed by a person specified under 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1) will not be considered.

Attribution: Should the Board decide to publish a decision, the Board may, at its discretion, name up to three attorneys or representatives. If you wish a different set of three names or you have a preference on the order of the three names, please specify the three names in your Request to Appear and brief.

Clerk’s Office Contact and Filing Address:

To send by courier or overnight delivery service, or to deliver in person:

Amicus Clerk
Board of Immigration Appeals Clerk’s Office
5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000 Falls Church, VA 22041 703-605-1007

Business hours: Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
Fee: A fee is not required for the filing of a Request to Appear and amicus briefs.

**********************************

The key case to read is Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2012), where the Ninth Circuit rejected the BIA’s conclusion in Matter of Robles- Urrea, 24 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 2006) that misprision of a felony is “categorically” a “crime involving moral turpitude” for removal purposes.

In  simple terms, among other things, the BIA is now considering whether to “blow off” the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in other circuits and adhere to its prior interpretation which the Ninth Circuit found to be wrong and which, of course, is must less favorable to respondents.

So, anybody who thinks that the BIA is about to “bark up the wrong tree” here (and, not for the first time, ignore the well reasoned decision of an Article III Court under the so-called “Chevron doctrine”) better get their group together and get crackin’ on a brief to convince the BIA that the Ninth Circuit got it right.

The deadline is February 6, 2017, (WARNING:  The BIA seldom extends amicus deadlines) and everything you need to know about how to file the brief is in the BIA’s notice, reproduced above.

Here are links to Robles-Urrea v. Holder:  https://casetext.com/case/roblesurrea-v-holder

and Matter of Robleshttps://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/07/25/3542.pdf to help you get started.

Good luck!

PWS

01/06/17