ANALYSIS BY HON. JEFFREY CHASE: BIA ONCE AGAIN FAILS REFUGEES: Matter of N-A-I-, 27 I&N Dec. 72 (BIA 2017) Is Badly Flawed!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2017/8/10/the-bias-flawed-reasoning-in-matter-of-n-a-i-

Jeff writes

“In its recent precedent decision in Matter of N-A-I-, 27 I&N Dec. 72 (BIA 2017), the Board of Immigration Appeals held that when one who was granted asylum adjusts his or her status under section 209(b) of the I&N Act, their asylum status automatically terminates.  The Board further held that as a result, the restriction under section 208(c) of the Act, preventing the removal of an asylee to the country from which he or she was granted asylum, no longer applies.  Although this decision hasn’t received much attention, I believe it warrants discussion, as the conclusion runs contrary to well-established principles of asylum law.

Let’s begin by looking at some basic asylum concepts.  The reason refugees are granted asylum is because, in their inability to avail themselves of the protection of their native country, they are essentially stateless.  A refugee is one who is outside of his or her country of nationality, and unable or unwilling to return because doing so will result in a loss of life or liberty due to a statutorily-protected ground. One becomes a refugee when these criteria are met; a grant of asylum is merely a legal recognition of an already existing status.

In the same way that one becomes a refugee when the above conditions are met (and not upon a grant of asylum status), one remains a refugee until those conditions cease to exist.  This generally happens in one of two ways.  Less frequently, conditions may change in the original country of nationality to the extent that the individual can safely return.  In the far more common scenario, the asylee eventually obtains citizenship in the country of refuge, at which point he or she ceases to be stateless.  Under U.S. immigration law, the only way to get from asylee to U.S. citizen is by first adjusting one’s status to that of a lawful permanent resident.  Our laws encourage this step towards citizenship (and an end to refugee status) by allowing one to adjust status one year after being granted asylum.  Furthermore, our laws waive several grounds of inadmissibility that apply to non-refugee adjustment applicants, and allow for most others to be waived (with the exception of those convicted of serious crimes or who pose security concerns).

Obviously, the fact that one takes the step towards citizenship of adjusting their status does not mean that they magically cease to be a refugee.  The change in their U.S. immigration status does not make them able to safely return to a country where they might face death, rape, lengthy imprisonment,or torture.  For that reason, section 208(c)(1) of the Act forbids the return of one granted asylum to the country of nationality from which they fled.  The statute makes no mention of this protection terminating upon a change in the asylee’s immigration status; it states that it applies “[i]n the case of an alien granted asylum.”

. . . .

To support its position that adjustment of status is a voluntary surrender of asylum status, the Board needed to provide an alternative to the purportedly voluntary act.  It therefore claimed that one “who prefers to retain the benefits and protections of asylee status, including the restrictions against removal under section 208(c) of the Act, is not obligated to file an application for adjustment of status.”  This is a disingenuous statement, as first, no one would prefer to remain a refugee forever, and second,  the statute itself states that asylum conveys only a temporary status.  Furthermore, the law should not encourage individuals with a direct path to permanent status to instead live their lives in indefinite limbo in this country.

It will be interesting to see whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (under whose jurisdiction the present case arose) will decline to accord Chevron deference to the Board’s decision for the reasons stated above.”

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Read Jeffrey’s complete analysis at his own blog at the above link. Here’s a link to my earlier post on Matter of N-A-I-: http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/08/04/new-precedent-bia-says-adjustment-to-lpr-status-terminates-asylum-status-matter-of-n-a-i-27-in-dec-72-bia-2017/

I agree with Jeffrey that the BIA once again has worked hard to limit protections for refugees under U.S. law. For many years now, basically since the “Ashcroft purge” of 2003, the BIA has, largely without any internal opposition, manipulated the law in many instances to avoid offering refugees appropriate protections. And, lets face it, with xenophobes Donald Trump as President and Jeff Sessions as Attorney General, nobody realistically expects today’s BIA to stand up for refugees or for the due process rights of migrants generally. That would be “career threatening” in a “captive Immigration Court system” that has abandoned its mission of “being the world’s best administrative tribunals, guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.”

PWS

08-13-17

NEW PRECEDENT: BIA SAYS ADJUSTMENT TO LPR STATUS TERMINATES ASYLUM STATUS — MATTER OF N-A-I-, 27 I&N Dec. 72 (BIA 2017)

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/986401/download

BIA Headnotes:

“(1) An alien who adjusts status under section 209(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2012), changes his or her status from that of an alien granted asylum to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, thereby terminating the alien’s asylee status. Matter of C-J-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 284 (BIA 2014), clarified.

(2) The restrictions on removal in section 208(c)(1)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(A) (2012), do not apply to an alien granted asylum whose status is adjusted to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence pursuant to section 209(b) of the Act.”

PANEL: BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES, MALPHRUS, MULLANE, LIEBOWITZ

OPINION BY: JUDGE MALPHRUS

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This seems to follow to BIA’s previous jurisprudence in this area.

PWS

08-04-17