Category: Article I Immigration Court

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2022/10/11/amending-lozada

Amending Lozada?

October 11, 2022

In 1984, the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington announced the standard for determining when the Constitution’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires the overturning of a criminal conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel.1 Strickland involved a death penalty case; on its winding path to the Supreme Court, a circuit court panel found in the defendant’s favor. That ruling was later overturned; the defendant was executed two months after the Supreme Court’s decision established a standard that the defendant could not satisfy.

A commentator writing years later could find no record of a malpractice claim or disciplinary complaint of any type having been filed against the attorney impugned in that case.2 The commentator cited this example in making the point that attorneys who are found to be Constitutionally deficient in criminal defense cases very rarely face disciplinary complaints.3 And the standard for establishing ineffective assistance laid out in Strickland does not require the filing of any such complaint.4

By contrast, the requirements for claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in immigration proceedings were set forth by the Board of Immigration Appeals in its 1988 decision Matter of Lozada.5 As immigration proceedings are civil in nature, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was found not to apply; the Board determined that a right to counsel in the removal context “is grounded in the fifth amendment guarantee of due process.”6The BIA thus created its own standard in Lozada that requires (1) filing an affidavit attesting to the relevant facts; (2) informing prior counsel of the allegations, and providing any response received; and (3) if claiming “a violation of ethical or legal responsibilities” by prior counsel, indicating “whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate disciplinary authorities regarding such representation, and if not, why not.”7

A practice advisory of the American Immigration Council points out that requirement number three “on its face…does not require filing a bar complaint in all circumstances.”8 The AIC advisory cites circuit decisions excusing the filing of disciplinary complaints, including Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2007) (allowing no bar complaint “where counsel acknowledged the ineffectiveness and made every effort to remedy the situation”), and Correa-Rivera v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that Lozada only requires an explanation of whether a bar complaint was submitted, not proof that the complaint was filed).9

Nevertheless, a 1996 BIA precedent, Matter of Rivera,10 underscores the risk of not filing a bar complaint. In that case, the requirements of Lozada were satisfied. As to the third requirement, new counsel indicated that a disciplinary complaint was not filed against prior counsel because “if any error was made in this case it was a postal error or an error of inadvertence by [former counsel].”11 Although this explanation accorded with Lozada, as it was explained both whether a bar complaint was filed and why, the Board rejected the explanation as insufficient.

The majority opinion in Rivera went on to provide a list of reasons why it considered “[t]he requirement of a bar complaint” important in ineffective assistance claims. A dissenting opinion written by then-BIA chair Paul Schmidt addressed the issue far more sensibly:

I do not need a Lozada motion or a state bar complaint to find that ineffective assistance has occurred here. The respondent’s affidavit and that of former counsel are sufficient to establish that former counsel’s duties to the respondent were not properly discharged. There is no hint of collusion between former counsel and the respondent. Under these circumstances, I see no basis for making the filing of a state bar complaint the determinative factor…12

Thus, in Rivera (and in a subsequent precedent, Matter of Assaad,13 the Board reframed the need to file a disciplinary complaint as a categorical requirement under Lozada. But in its circumstance-specific approach, Judge Schmidt’s dissent raised the question of whether this requirement is really necessary.

Nearly six years after Rivera, the answer to that question came from an unlikely source. Matter of Lozada was briefly vacated in the final days of the Bush Administration by then Attorney General Michael Mukasey.14His decision reframed ineffective assistance claims from a due process right into a discretionary agency action, and in doing so, created a new, tougher standard for establishing ineffective assistance that far fewer respondents would be able to satisfy. But interestingly, the A.G.’s decision felt the need to rethink the Board’s disciplinary complaint requirement:

By making the actual filing of a bar complaint a prerequisite for obtaining (or even seeking) relief, it appears that Lozada may inadvertently have contributed to the filing of many unfounded or even frivolous complaints. See, e.g., Comment filed by the Committee on Immigration & Nationality Law, Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Sept. 29, 2008), in response to the Proposed Rule for Professional Conduct for Practitioners—Rules and Procedures, and Representation and Appearances, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,178 (July 30, 2008) (“Under the Lozada Rule, an ineffective assistance of counsel charge is often required in order to reopen a case or reverse or remand an unfavorable decision. The practice of filing such claims is rampant, and places well-intentioned and competent attorneys at risk of discipline.”). Such unfounded complaints impose costs on well-intentioned and competent attorneys, and make it harder for State bars to identify meritorious complaints in order to impose sanctions on lawyers whose performance is truly deficient. The new approach is intended to avoid these problems by requiring only that the [noncitizen] submit to the Board a completed and signed but unfiled complaint…15

In light of these concerns, the new Compean standard still required the preparation of a disciplinary complaint against prior counsel, but (perhaps in a bizarre nod to Moses E. Herzog) added that the respondent “need not actually file the complaint with the appropriate State bar or disciplinary authorities, as Lozada had required.”16

Less than five months after its issuance, Compean was vacated by Mukasey’s successor, Attorney General Eric Holder, thus restoring the Lozada standard, along with its mandatory bar requirement.17 Holder’s decision further directed EOIR to draft proposed regulations on the topic for public comment “as soon as practicable.”18

When the agency finally published those proposed regulations more than seven years later, they retained Rivera’s mandatory complaint requirement.19 In its comments to the proposed rule, the American Immigration Lawyers Association opined that the mandatory complaint requirement should be eliminated, stating that “rather than centering on attorney discipline, the rules governing ineffective assistance of counsel should focus on assisting and protecting the noncitizen victim…” The comment continued that “EOIR already has ample existing procedures to police the immigration bar without requiring the filing of a formal complaint.”20As no final rule was ever published, we don’t know EOIR’s reaction to the comment.

Another six years later, the question first raised in the Rivera dissent, and to which a Bush Administration Attorney General and leading bar groups seem in agreement on the answer, remains unresolved.Recently, immigration law experts have revived the issue.21As those experts again point out, the purpose of reopening a proceeding in which attorney error occurred is to remedy a harm that was beyond the respondent’s ability to control. The focus on correcting the harm (as opposed to punishing the lawyer) is why in the criminal context bar complaints rarely if ever accompany ineffective assistance claims. The lack of sucha requirement allows attorneys to admit to their occasional errors without fear of retribution.

In its unique approach to the contrary, the BIA discourages attorneys from being forthcoming about their errors, and further forces counsel to turn on their own colleagues for acts that would not warrant the extreme action of a bar complaint in any other context. It seems remarkable that even an Attorney General decision issued during the Bush Administration acknowledged that most bar complaints filed pursuant to Lozada are “unfounded” and “impose costs on well-intentioned and competent attorneys,” while also hampering state bars from identifying and disciplining genuine incidents of malpractice.

According to one proponent of amending the standard, attorney Rekha Sharma Crawford, the current Lozada requirement pits members of the private bar against one another in a very destructive way, and adds unnecessary stress on the immigration removal defense counsel who are often at the forefront of these claims-many which are meaningless and done only to comply with Lozada.22

Hopefully, this will be the year that the agency finally gets around to resolving this issue by removing the mandatory complaint requirement of Lozada, and thus bringing the standard in immigration proceedings into alignment with those required in other civil and criminal courts and tribunals.

Copyright 2022 Jeffrey S. Chase.All rights reserved.

Notes:

1. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
2. Joseph H. Ricks, Raising the Bar: Establishing an Effective Remedy against Ineffective Counsel, 2015 BYU L. Rev. 1115, 1120 (2016).
3. Id.
4. The Strickland standard requires a finding that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there was a reasonable probability that the result would have been different if not for counsel’s inadequate performance.
5. 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988).
6. Id. at 638.
7. Id. at 639.
8. American Immigration Council, Practice Advisory, “Seeking Remedies For Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Immigration Cases,” (Jan. 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/seeking_remedies_for_ineffective_assistance_of_counsel_in_immigration_cases_practice_advisory.pdf, at 11.
9. Id.
10. 10.21 I&N Dec. 599 (BIA 1996) (en banc).
11. 11.Id. at 606.
12. 12.Id. at 608. It bears noting that Judge Schmidt, and two of the three Board Members who joined in his dissent (Lory Rosenberg and Gustavo Villageliu) are presently members of the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges.
13. 13.23 I&N Dec. 553 (BIA 2003).
14. 14.Matter of Compean, Bangaly, & J-E-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 710 (A.G. Jan. 7, 2009).
15. 15.Id. at 737-38.
16. 16.Id. at 737. Moses E. Herzog, the fictional protagonist of Saul Bellow’s novel Herzog, authored numerous strongly-worded letters that he never sent.
17. 17.Matter of Compean, Bangaly, & J-E-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 1 (A.G. June 3, 2009).
18. 18.Id. at 2.
19. 19.81 Fed. Reg. 49556, 49565 (July 28, 2016), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/07/28/2016-17540/motions-to-reopen-removal-deportation-or-exclusion-proceedings-based-upon-a-claim-of-ineffective.
20. 20.Comment filed by the American Immigration Lawyers Association (Sept. 26, 2016), in response to the Proposed Rule for Motions Reopen Removal, Deportation, or Exclusion Proceedings Based Upon a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 81 Fed. Reg. 145 (July 28, 2016).
21. 21.See, e.g., an October 3 AILA Roundtable, “Changing the Bench: A New Narrative on Lozada and Bar Complaints.”
22. 22.Private email to the author.

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Republished by permission.

As “Sir Jeffrey points out,” in Matter of Compean, Bangaly, & J-E-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 1 (A.G. June 3, 2009), AG Eric Holder directed EOIR to promulgate new regulations providing guidance on ineffective assistance of counsel. More than seven years later, in 2016 — essentially the entire Obama Administration — DOJ/EOIR issued flawed “proposed” regulations. Not surprisingly, no final regulations were ever issued. A dozen yers after the AG directed EOIR to take action — a big “nothingburger.”

This by no means is the only example of EOIR/DOJ’s unsuitability to the task facing it. It’s reminiscent of the tortured history of the “gender based asylum” regulations ordered by former AG, the late Janet Reno, but issued only as a badly flawed proposal and never finalized.

Additionally, incoming President Joe Biden made issuing “gender based regulations” one of his Administration’s highest priorities, ordering action by October 2021. A year later — nothing! 

Meanwhile, EOIR Judges’ applications and interpretations of the governing precedent on gender-based asylum — Matter of A-R-G-G- — are wildly inconsistent. Beyond that, the 5th Circuit has taken the right-wing misogynistic “liberty” of simply ignoring the law on gender-based asylum. 

“Lozada reform” is long overdue. But, so is meaningful EOIR reform! 

Ultimately, America needs and deserves an independent U.S. Immigration Court with exceptionally well-qualified judges, at all levels, who are recognized experts in asylum law and unswervingly committed to due process and best judicial practices.

Until then, those appearing in Immigration Court — disproportionately individuals of color and women — and their hard-working attorneys — will continue to receive grossly substandard “justice” from “Justice!”

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

10-12-22