📖COURTSIDE HISTORY: BEYOND THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT, RACISM IS AT THE CORE OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY — Professor Andrew S. Rosenberg Interviewed On New Book By Isabela Dias @ Mother Jones!

Isabela Dias
Isabela Dias
Staff Writer, Immigration & Social Issues
Mother Jones
PHOTO: Twitter
Professor Andrew S. Rosenberg
Professor Andrew S. Rosenberg
Assistant Professor of Political Science
U of Florida
PHOTO: Website

https://apple.news/AOMcfZiMFQ0OSgozcppDcjg

“Undesirable Immigrants: Why Racism Persists in International Migration”

. . . .

In the book, you dispute the assumption that the right to border control and to exclude foreigners is an inherent feature of sovereign states. Instead, you frame it as a “modern consequence of racism.” Why do you see it that way?

The nation-state is a relatively modern invention on the scale of human history. Today, we have this conventional wisdom floating around that it is the natural right and duty of nation-states as sovereign entities to be able to restrict foreigners and have these really hard borders—and that it’s that ability that makes a state what it is. Actually, if you go back in time and look at the international legal thought that emerged from the 15th through the 19th centuries on what it actually means to be a state, the commonly held assumption that people like the late Justice [Antonin] Scalia and others talk about, is actually an invention of the 19th century. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the great thinkers of international legal jurisprudence or of state theory either thought that states had a right or an obligation to be hospitable to foreigners and to allow them free passage into their territory or, at most, it was up for raucous debate. It was only in the 19th century, when immigrant-receiving countries like the United States began receiving a large influx of racially different outsiders like the Chinese, that this presumption that sovereign states have a right and an obligation that can be tied back to their status as sovereign states to restrict outsiders emerged.

People like Texas Governor Greg Abbott seem to invoke that supposed inherent right when they describe migrants at the border as an “invasion.”

Precisely. These types of “declarations of war” are one of the clearest examples of this ideology seeping into public debate, which leads everyday people to create this idea that migrants are undesirable outsiders who are not fit for, or are undeserving of reaping the benefits of living in the United States or participating in our society.

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Read the complete interview at the link.

The myth of the “undesirable immigrant” — at the heart of the anti-immigrant rabble rousing of Trump, Miller, Bannon, DeSantis, Abbott, Cotton, Hawley, etc. — has deep roots in American racial history.

I’ve said it many times: There will be neither racial justice nor equal justice for all without justice for immigrants (regardless of status). Laws like the Refugee Act of 1980, that very explicitly make arrival status irrelevant to access to a fair legal process, have been intentionally misinterpreted and misapplied by right-wing judges from the Supremes all the way down to the Immigration Courts. 

Advocates for civil rights, womens’ rights, LGBTQ+ rights, voting rights, disability rights, and other fundamental rights that have been unlawfully restricted or diminished, usually, but certainly not exclusively, by the right, who continue to ignore the primacy of dealing with the intentional unfair, racially biased treatment of migrants do so at their own peril!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-12-22

UNADULTERATED BS — CONEY BARRETT’S CLAIM OF “IMPARTIAL JUSTICE” FLUNKS “STRAIGHT FACE TEST” — “Amy Coney Barrett’s originalism does not work as a method of safeguarding democracy against an activist, ideologically motivated judiciary. It does, however, function quite well as a means of obscuring a far-right movement’s efforts to impose its unpopular agenda by judicial fiat.”

Judge Amy Coney Barrett
Supreme Court Nominee by Bob Englehart, PoliticalCartoons.com
Published under license
Eric Levitz
Eric Levitz
Associate Editor
Intelligencer
New York Magazine
Photo source: Twitter

https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/10/amy-coney-barrett-confirmation-hearing-originalism.html

Eric Levitz reports for NY Magazine:

. . . .

Even Republicans don’t have the stomach to outsource judgment on all modern constitutional questions to the slaveholding elite of a preindustrial, post-colonial backwater. As Dean of Berkeley Law Erwin Chemerinsky has observed, a ruthless adherence to text and history would require forfeiting judicial protection of “liberties such as the right to marry, the right to procreate, the right to custody of one’s children, the right to keep the family together, the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children, the right to purchase and use contraceptives, the right to abortion, [and] the right to refuse medical care,” none of which are guaranteed by the Constitution.

Amy Coney Barrett herself has acknowledged the undesirability of applying originalism indiscriminately, noting in 2016, “Adherence to originalism arguably requires, for example, the dismantling of the administrative state, the invalidation of paper money, and the reversal of Brown v. Board of Education,” and other institutions that “no serious person would propose to undo,” even if they lack constitutional grounding. Barrett’s proposed solution to this conundrum is for courts to simply avoid ruling on cases where originalism would dictate socially unthinkable overturnings of precedent; she wrote in 2017 that “discretionary jurisdiction generally permits [the Court] to choose which questions it wants to answer.”

But this expedient degrades originalism’s claim to neutrality. If an originalist Supreme Court can apply its doctrine opportunistically — taking only those cases in which its “neutral” juridical method will yield outcomes acceptable to a “serious” person (as they define that adjective) — then originalism isn’t much of a binding restriction on judicial discretion.

What’s more, Barrett’s concession tacitly betrays awareness of a critical fact that originalists love to elide when speaking for a lay audience: Amending the Constitution has become so phenomenally difficult it’s not at all clear that the American people could promptly replace an overturned Brown v. Board of Education with an amendment forbidding school segregation, despite overwhelming popular support for that Supreme Court decision. Originalists like to portray their judicial approach as highly democratic, since they purport to defer to the letter of a democratically enacted Constitution. But once one stipulates that the demos is manifestly no longer capable of passing constitutional amendments with regularity, it becomes clear that the originalist practice of striking down democratically elected laws in deference to the letter of a centuries-old document is profoundly anti-democratic.

Of course, in real life, “originalist” Supreme Court justices haven’t just applied their method opportunistically by selecting cases in which originalism will produce a favored outcome; they’ve also simply declined to abide by their method when they feel like it. On Monday, Barrett named Antonin Scalia as her guiding light on judicial philosophy. But as Georgia State University Law professor Eric J. Segall notes, Scalia voted “for broad rules limiting congressional power to enact campaign finance reform, to commandeer state legislatures and executives to help implement federal law, and to allow lawsuits against the states for money damages by citizens of other states” without “justifying these broad rules from a textual or historical perspective,” presumably because they have no textual or historical basis.

In sum: Amy Coney Barrett’s originalism does not work as a method of safeguarding democracy against an activist, ideologically motivated judiciary. It does, however, function quite well as a means of obscuring a far-right movement’s efforts to impose its unpopular agenda by judicial fiat.

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Read Eric’s complete article, which is an outstanding debunking of  “originalism” — a totally bogus invention of the reactionary right — intended to pervert the law and promote far-right attacks on humanity — at the link. 

Just think about it: Supposedly a bunch of guys who risked everything on a never-before-realized long shot of defeating the British King and setting up a republic actually  intended that 230 years after the fact the governors of that republic would be so backwards, unimaginative, and intellectually limited that they would still be attempting to divine the “true meaning” of various two-centuries out of date words and concepts that nobody agreed upon in the first place! Preposterous! Not to mention totally intellectually dishonest!

Obviously, if the GOP Senators actually believed that Coney Barrett would be an unbiased judge with an open mind to progressive, liberal, humane, common sense interpretations of law and committed to implementing the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection and due process under the law for all persons, they would be apoplectic. They would be outraged at Trump for foisting such an unreliable and unpredictable jurist on them! 

I’m not necessarily saying that Coney Barrett couldn’t educate herself and “get smarter” on the bench — abandoning her false dogma and actually showing some empathy, courage, independence, and commitment to equal justice for all. She wouldn’t be the first GOP-appointed Judge or Justice to move left on the bench. After all, spending a lifetime mired on the wrong side of history screwing up the lives of your fellow humans can get old, even for well-trained right-wing ideologues.

Also, she will have the benefit of the only current Justice who actually appears up to the job and consistently understands the proper role of a High Court in a democratic republic — Justice Sonia Sotomayor. Sotomayor actually “gets it right” in an amazing number of cases and usually explains her reasoning in coherent, non-legalistic terms that most folks can understand. 

But, sadly, I find relatively little in Coney Barrett’s career to predict that type of self-awareness, intellectual honesty, moral courage, and capacity for human growth. Her family situation shows some capacity for empathy and human understanding. 

But, sadly, to date, she evidently has been unable to “connect the dots” between her kids’ lives and futures and the future of humanity. To understand that but for the grace of God, the refugee she is expelling based on BS non-defects could be someone she actually loves or regards as human. That the benefits that neo-Nazi Stephen Miller is unethically and illegally stripping from deserving immigrants could be the lifeline that, but for life’s quirks, would allow her, her family, or other loved ones to survive and achieve their full human potential. The capacity to function as a real jurist certainly is there, but the will and perspective seem to be largely lacking.

In a way, Coney Barrett’s squandered potential to achieve good is her own human tragedy. But, one for which those “other than Coney Barrett” are likely to pay the ultimate price.

PWS

10-14-20

👩‍⚖️⚖️ONE MEAN☠️🤮⚰️ MOTHER: Soon-To-Be Justice Barrett’s Immigration Jurisprudence Shows Cruelty, Legal Ignorance, Lack Of Empathy For The Vulnerable Humans Whose Lives Are At Stake In An Unconstitutional System Rigged Against Them!

Judge Amy Coney Barrett
Supreme Court Nominee by Bob Englehart, PoliticalCartoons.com
Published under license

 

Dahlia Lithwick
Dahlia Lithwick
Supreme Court Reporter
Slate
Wikimedia Commons — Public Domain
Mark Joseph Stern
Mark Joseph Stern
Reporter, Slate

 

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/10/democrats-amy-coney-barrett-confirmation-supreme-court-chat.html

Dahlia Lithwick & Mark Joseph Stern in Slate:

. . . .

Dahlia: I wonder what you thought of Barrett’s statement, about how she reads each of her opinions through the eyes of the losing party. As you have written, the losing party tends to be the prisoners, the Black worker, the teen seeking abortion, the asylum seeker. It reminded me of Justice Samuel Alito testifying at his hearings about his great solicitude for immigrants.

Mark: Barrett’s opening statement made me think about one of her worst decisions (so far), in which she approved the deportation of an asylum seeker because there were small, trivial variations in his account of persecution. Over a dissent, Barrett said, yep, this asylum seeker must be sent home to be tortured and murdered because tiny details in his story changed over time. Would a judge who views the case through the eyes of the asylum seeker really dismiss his claims so cavalierly? I doubt it.

. . . .

************************

Read the complete dialogue at the link.

So much for intellectual honesty! It also shows Barrett’s fundamental lack of experience and legal understanding of what Immigration “Courts” really are and how they have been politicized and weaponized against asylum seekers by “judges” who report to overtly biased and xenophobic politicos in the Executive Branch. Just how would this “naked farce” satisfy any rudimentary concept of Due Process? Clearly it doesn’t. And just as clearly, intentionally tone-deaf judges like Barrett don’t care!  They lack the guts, relevant experience representing migrants, and the intellectual presence to stand up for the Constitutional and human rights of “the other.” 

How would YOU like to be sentenced to torture and/or death based on trivial inconsistencies found by an Immigration “Judge” working directly for the Attorney General and his regime in a badly flawed assembly line process designed to achieve political policy objectives, not justice?

Also, did anyone else pick up the facial absurdity of Barrett’s disingenuous claim to be “apolitical” while pledging allegiance to GOP “superhero” the late Justice Antonin Scalia, probably the most overtly “political Justice” of modern times?

Bottom Line: Once you’re out of the womb, this is one mother you don’t want on your case!🏴‍☠️☠️⚰️

Better Judges For A Better America! Judge/Justice Barrett is part of the problem, not the solution! The best way to insure that she is among the last, far-right, anti-democracy, inhumane judges given life tenure on the Supremes or anywhere else, vote ‘em out, vote ‘em out! Then, we’ll discover the “true meaning” of Barrett’s “I’m not there to make policy nonsense!” (Indeed, I would submit that the sole reason for her appointment was the GOP’s belief and expectation that she will reliably elevate disingenuous right-wing policies, biases, and prejudices over the Constitutional, individual, and human rights of individuals and that she will be a steadfast opponent of Constitutionally-required equal justice under law.)

Justice for the George Floyds, Breonna Taylors, dehumanized dead asylum seekers, and wrongfully imprisoned migrant kids of the world (e.g., the end of unconstitutional “Baby Jails”) will require a different type of “Justice” than Amy Coney Barrett in the future! Far from being truly “independent” and “apolitical,” Barrett is likely to be the perfect representative of the warped man who appointed her and his anti-democracy party. And, that’s likely to cause problems for all Americans of good will far into the future!

PWS

10-13-20

LINKEDIN SAVES LIVES: NDPA Superstar Michelle Mendez Of CLINIC With Some Good News On How Litigation Success Has Saved Lives In The Face Of Regime’s Scurrilous White Nationalist Attack On Asylum Laws! — These Are The True Brilliant Minds & Courageous Heroes Of Our Legal System, Carrying On RBG’s Legacy Of Fighting Tirelessly For Equal Justice!

 

Michelle Mendez
Michelle Mendez
Defending Vulnerable Populations Director
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (“CLINIC”)
Aimee Mayer Salins
Aimee Mayer Salins
Staff Attorney
Defending Vulnerable Populations
CLINIC
Source: Linkedin

*******************

Sorry for the small print. But, well worth the read.

Compare the courage and fidelity to due process, fundamental fairness, equal justice for all, and defense of human dignity demonstrated by brilliant lawyers like Michelle Mendez, Aimee Mayer Salins (former BIA JLC), and the terrific CAIR litigators with the warped right wing, anti-constitutional, anti-humanity jurisprudence of Trump’s Supreme Court choice, Judge Amy Coney Barrett:

Faced with two plausible readings of a law, fact, or precedent, Barrett always seems to choose the harsher, stingier interpretation. Can job applicants sue employers whose policies have a disproportionately deleterious impact on older people? Barrett said no. Should courts halt the deportation of an immigrant who faced torture at home? Barrett said no. Should they protect refugees denied asylum on the basis of xenophobic prejudice? Barrett said no. Should they shield prisoners from unjustified violence by correctional officers? Barrett said no. Should minors be allowed to terminate a pregnancy without telling their parents if a judge has found that they’re mature enough to make the decision? Barrett said no. Should women be permitted to obtain an abortion upon discovering a severe fetal abnormality? Barrett said no.

There is no question that, if confirmed, Barrett would cast the fifth vote to either hollow out Roe v. Wade or overturn it altogether. Similarly, there is no doubt that Barrett would dramatically expand the Second Amendment, invalidating gun control measures around the country. It’s quite possible, perhaps even likely, that within a year of her confirmation, Americans will be forbidden from terminating a pregnancy in 21 states—but permitted to purchase assault weapons and carry firearms in public in every state.

https://immigrationcourtside.com/2020/09/21/insult-to-injury🤮☠%EF%B8%8F👎🏻-trump-to-tap-unqualified-cruel-righty-zealot-to-replace-rbg-one-leading-candidate-the-anti-rbg/

In other words, guns yes; human rights and human dignity, no! Some lawyers spend their lives saving lives and advancing humanity; others spend them pursuing and spreading anti-humanitarian, right wing dogmas. Why are commitments to cruelty, inhumanity, and a fundamentally unjust society things to “tout” in a judicial candidate? You need to look inside the deep perversity of the GOP minority who control our nation and are running it into the ground to get the answer.

There are thousands of progressive lawyers, many of them women and minorities, committed to standing up for equal justice for all who are better qualified than Judge Barrett. There is something wrong with a system that elevates the wrong people to the judiciary and other high offices.

It’s time to establish meritocracy and save our democracy. Vote to throw the GOP out of office and end the selection of far-right judges whose reactionary views and lack of empathy for the most vulnerable in society are far outside both the reality of our diverse nation and our future as a vibrant, progressive democracy that will promote equal justice and human rights at home and abroad!

Keep the future Judge Barretts where they belong — on the sidelines and in the margins of our legal system, while those with a better view of the Constitution, the rule of law, and human progress take their rightful places in positions of power and progressive influence in all there branches of our Government.

Judge Barrett parrots great admiration for RBG while aiming to trash her legacy of fairness and equality with a far-right, exclusive, intolerant agenda. In the future, we need Federal Judges who will constantly confront Judge Barrett, her soon-to-be-fellow GOP Supremes, and other righty judges bent on taking us back to the darkest corners of our past.  Make them face the truly courageous and enlightened legacy of RBG and others like her. Force the “Barretts of the world” to reckon with their own smugly disingenuous jurisprudence and their lack of commmitment to humanity and true equality before the law for all persons in the U.S.! Constantly confront complicit courts for change!

Better judges for a better, fairer America!

This Fall, vote like your life and the future of humanity depend on it! Because they do!

 

PWS

09-27-20

GONZO’S WORLD: BOGUS “COURT SYSTEM” REVEALED IN ALL OF ITS DISINGENUOUS INGLORIOUSNESS — SESSIONS MOVES TO TRASH THE “LIMITED DURESS” DEFENSE FOR ASYLEES BEFORE TRUMP TURNS HIM BACK INTO A PUMPKIN (AFTER HALLOWEEN) – Why Have A BIA If It Is Only Permitted To Decide Major Issues In Favor Of The DHS Position? — Matter of Daniel Girmai NEGUSIE, 27 I&N Dec. 481 (A.G. 2018)

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1101746/download

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 481 (A.G. 2018) Interim Decision #3943

Matter of Daniel Girmai NEGUSIE, Respondent

Decided by Attorney General October 18, 2018

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General

BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2018), I direct the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) to refer this case to me for review of its decision. The Board’s decision in this matter is automatically stayed pending my review. See Matter of Haddam, A.G. Order No. 2380-2001 (Jan. 19, 2001). To assist me in my review, I invite the parties to these proceedings and interested amici to submit briefs on: Whether coercion and duress are relevant to the application of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s persecutor bar. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (2012).

The parties’ briefs shall not exceed 15,000 words and shall be filed on or before November 8, 2018. Interested amici may submit briefs not exceeding 9,000 words on or before November 15, 2018. The parties may submit reply briefs not exceeding 6,000 words on or before November 15, 2018. All filings shall be accompanied by proof of service and shall be submitted electronically to AGCertification@usdoj.gov, and in triplicate to:

United States Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General, Room 5114 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530

All briefs must be both submitted electronically and postmarked on or before the pertinent deadlines. Requests for extensions are disfavored.

**************************************

Here’s the BIA headnote a link to Matter of NEGUSIE, 27 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2018):

(1) An applicant who is subject to being barred from establishing eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal based on the persecution of others may claim a duress defense, which is limited in nature.

(2) To meet the minimum threshold requirements of the duress defense to the persecutor bar, an applicant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he acted under an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others; (2) he reasonably believed that the threatened harm would be carried out unless he acted or refrained from acting; (3) he had no reasonable opportunity to escape or otherwise frustrate the threat; (4) he did not place himself in a situation in which he knew or reasonably should have known that he would likely be forced to act or refrain from acting; and (5) he knew or reasonably should have known that the harm he inflicted was not greater than the threatened harm to himself or others.

http://immigrationcourtside.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/3930.pdf

********************************************************

Remains to be seen whether Session’s November 16, 2018 “deadline for brief submission” will exceed his job tenure! But, don’t kid yourself: this decision has already been written, maybe with input or assistance from a “restrictionist” organization. And, even if Sessions departs shortly after the midterms, as most expect, I’m sure Trump will be able to find another “restrictionist patsy” to do his “immigration dirty work” for him.

Want to know how ludicrous Sessions’s action is:  This case has been pending before the Immigration Court, the BIA, the Supreme Court, and now the Attorney General for nearly 15 years, with no end in sight. After Sessions rules against Negusie, the case will go back to the Court of Appeals, and then, perhaps, back to the Supremes, assuming Mr. Negusie lives long enough to see it through to its conclusion. When it comes to removing folks without Due Process, “time is of the essence” for guys like Sessions; but, when it comes to screwing asylum seekers, “time has no essence” — whatever it takes, no matter how long it takes.

Additionally, this is a great illustration of the absurd dereliction of duty in the Supreme’s so-called “Chevron doctrine.” It’s a purely judge-created device that enables the Supremes to avoid deciding important and potentially controversial legal issues by, in effect, “shuffling them off to Buffalo” (a/k/a the Executive Branch). Once in “Buffalo,” sometimes dysfunctional and often biased Executive Branch agencies can exercise their (often purely imaginary) “expertise” in construing ambiguous statutes (which is, after all, a question of law that constitutes the only function of the Article III Courts). And, does anybody (other than Jeff Sessions) really think that a politico like Jeff Sessions has any real “expertise” in immigration adjudication?

Interestingly, Justice Gorsuch, like his conservative predecessor the late Justice Scalia, has been openly skeptical of the Chevron doctrine. Perhaps ironically, he, along with the outlandish actions of the Administration that appointed him, could ultimately spell the well-deserved end or limitation of “Chevron deference.”

As we say in the business, stay tuned.  But, please, please, don’t “hold your breath” on this one!

PWS

10-18-18

🎃🎃🎃

 

 

 

PROFESSOR MAUREEN SWEENEY ON WHY THE BIA DOESN’T DESERVE “CHEVRON” DEFERENCE – JEFF SESSIONS’S ALL OUT ATTACK ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDICIARY IS EXHIBIT 1!

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2018/08/immigration-article-of-the-day-enforcingprotection-the-danger-of-chevron-in-refugee-act-cases-by-mau.html

Go on over to ImmigrationProf Blog at the  above link for all of the links necessary to get the abstract as well as the full article. Among the many current and former Immigration Judges quoted or cited in the article are Jeffrey Chase, Ashley Tabaddor, Dana Marks, Lory Rosenberg, Robert Vinikoor, and me. (I’m sure I’m missing some of our other colleagues; it’s a very long article, but well worth the read.)

In an article full of memorable passages, here is one of my favorites:

Full enforcement of the law requires full enforcement of provisions that grant protection as well as provisions that restrict border entry. This is the part of “enforcement” that the Department of Justice is not equipped to fully understand. The agency’s fundamental commitment to controlling unauthorized immigration does not allow it a neutral, open position on asylum questions. The foundational separation and balance of powers concerns at the heart of Chevron require courts to recognize that inherent conflict of interest as a reason Congress is unlikely to have delegated unchecked power on refugee protection to the prosecuting agency. In our constitutional structure, the courts stand as an essential check on the executive power to deport and must provide robust review to fully enforce the congressional mandate to protect refugees. If the courts abdicate this vital function, they will be abdicating their distinctive role in ensuring the full enforcement of all of our immigration law—including those provisions that seek to ensure compliance with our international obligations to protect individuals facing the danger of persecution.

This is a point that my friend and colleague Judge Lory Rosenberg made often during our tenure together on the BIA. All too often, her pleas fell on deaf ears.

The now abandoned pre-2001 “vision statement” of EOIR was “to be the world’s best administrative tribunals, guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.” Nothing in there about “partnering” with DHS to remove more individuals, fulfilling quotas, “sending messages to stay home,” securing the border, jacking up volume, deterring migration, or advancing other politically motivated enforcement goals. Indeed, the proper role of EOIR is to insure fair and impartial adjudication and Due Process for individuals even in the face of constant pressures to “just go along to get along” with a particular Administration’s desires to favor the expedient over the just.

Under all Administrations, the duty to insure Due Process, fairness, full protections, and the granting to benefits to migrants under the law is somewhat shortchanged at EOIR in relation to the pressure to promote Executive enforcement objectives. But, the situation under the xenophobic, disingenuous, self-proclaimed “Immigration Enforcement Czar” Jeff Sessions is a true national disgrace and a blot on our entire legal system. If Congress won’t do its job by removing the Immigration Courts from the DOJ forthwith, the Article III courts must step in, as Maureen suggests.

PWS

08-23-18

SUPREME BOMBSHELL: JUSTICE GORSUCH PROVIDES CRITICAL FIFTH VOTE FOR OVERTURNING DEPORTATION STATUTE FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL VAGUENESS! — Administration Suffers Yet Another Legal Setback, This Time At the High Court! – Sessions v. Dimaya — Get The Full Opinion, Court Syllabus, Key Quotes, & My “Instant Analysis” HERE!

Dimaya–15-1498_1b8e

Sessions v. Dimaya, No. 15–1498, 04-17-18 (5-4 Decision)

Syllabus By Court Staff:

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) virtually guarantees that any alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” after entering the Unit- ed States will be deported. See 8 U. S. C. §§1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C). An aggravated felony includes “a crime of violence (as defined in [18 U.S.C. §16] . . . ) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” §1101(a)(43)(f). Section 16’s definition of a crime of violence is divided into two clauses—often referred to as the elements clause, §16(a), and the residual clause, §16(b). The residual clause, the provision at issue here, defines a “crime of violence” as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” To decide whether a person’s conviction falls within the scope of that clause, courts apply the categorical approach. This approach has courts ask not whether “the particular facts” underlying a conviction created a substantial risk, Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 7, nor whether the statutory elements of a crime require the creation of such a risk in each and every case, but whether “the ordinary case” of an offense poses the requisite risk, James v. United States, 550 U. S. 192, 208.

Respondent James Dimaya is a lawful permanent resident of the United States with two convictions for first-degree burglary under California law. After his second offense, the Government sought to deport him as an aggravated felon. An Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals held that California first-degree bur- glary is a “crime of violence” under §16(b). While Dimaya’s appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit, this Court held that a similar re-

2

SESSIONS v. DIMAYA Syllabus

sidual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)—defining “violent felony” as any felony that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)—was unconstitutionally “void for vagueness” under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. ___, ___. Relying on Johnson, the Ninth Circuit held that §16(b), as incorporated into the INA, was also unconstitu- tionally vague.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

803 F. 3d 1110, affirmed.
JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to

Parts I, III, IV–B, and V, concluding that §16’s residual clause is un- constitutionally vague. Pp. 6–11, 16–25.

(a) A straightforward application of Johnson effectively resolves this case. Section 16(b) has the same two features as ACCA’s residu- al clause—an ordinary-case requirement and an ill-defined risk threshold—combined in the same constitutionally problematic way. To begin, ACCA’s residual clause created “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime” because it “tie[d] the judi- cial assessment of risk” to a speculative hypothesis about the crime’s “ordinary case,” but provided no guidance on how to figure out what that ordinary case was. 576 U. S., at ___. Compounding that uncer- tainty, ACCA’s residual clause layered an imprecise “serious poten- tial risk” standard on top of the requisite “ordinary case” inquiry. The combination of “indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime [and] indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony,” id., at ___, resulted in “more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates,” id., at ___. Section 16(b) suffers from those same two flaws. Like ACCA’s residual clause, §16(b) calls for a court to identify a crime’s “ordinary case” in order to measure the crime’s risk but “offers no reliable way” to discern what the ordinary version of any offense looks like. Id., at ___. And its “substantial risk” thresh- old is no more determinate than ACCA’s “serious potential risk” standard. Thus, the same “[t]wo features” that “conspire[d] to make” ACCA’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague also exist in §16(b), with the same result. Id., at ___. Pp. 6–11.

(b) The Government identifies three textual discrepancies between ACCA’s residual clause and §16(b) that it claims make §16(b) easier to apply and thus cure the constitutional infirmity. None, however, relates to the pair of features that Johnson found to produce imper- missible vagueness or otherwise makes the statutory inquiry more determinate. Pp. 16–24.

(1) First, the Government argues that §16(b)’s express require-

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 3

Syllabus

ment (absent from ACCA) that the risk arise from acts taken “in the course of committing the offense,” serves as a “temporal restriction”— in other words, a court applying §16(b) may not “consider risks aris- ing after” the offense’s commission is over. Brief for Petitioner 31. But this is not a meaningful limitation: In the ordinary case of any of- fense, the riskiness of a crime arises from events occurring during its commission, not events occurring later. So with or without the tem- poral language, a court applying the ordinary case approach, whether in §16’s or ACCA’s residual clause, would do the same thing—ask what usually happens when a crime is committed. The phrase “in the course of” makes no difference as to either outcome or clarity and cannot cure the statutory indeterminacy Johnson described.

Second, the Government says that the §16(b) inquiry, which focus- es on the risk of “physical force,” “trains solely” on the conduct typi- cally involved in a crime. Brief for Petitioner 36. In contrast, ACCA’s residual clause asked about the risk of “physical injury,” requiring a second inquiry into a speculative “chain of causation that could possibly result in a victim’s injury.” Ibid. However, this Court has made clear that “physical force” means “force capable of causing physical pain or injury.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133, 140. So under §16(b) too, a court must not only identify the conduct typically involved in a crime, but also gauge its potential consequenc- es. Thus, the force/injury distinction does not clarify a court’s analy- sis of whether a crime qualifies as violent.

Third, the Government notes that §16(b) avoids the vagueness of ACCA’s residual clause because it is not preceded by a “confusing list of exemplar crimes.” Brief for Petitioner 38. Those enumerated crimes were in fact too varied to assist this Court in giving ACCA’s residual clause meaning. But to say that they failed to resolve the clause’s vagueness is hardly to say they caused the problem. Pp. 16– 21.

(2) The Government also relies on judicial experience with §16(b), arguing that because it has divided lower courts less often and resulted in only one certiorari grant, it must be clearer than its ACCA counterpart. But in fact, a host of issues respecting §16(b)’s application to specific crimes divide the federal appellate courts. And while this Court has only heard oral arguments in two §16(b) cases, this Court vacated the judgments in a number of other §16(b) cases, remanding them for further consideration in light of ACCA decisions. Pp. 21–24.

JUSTICE KAGAN, joined by JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concluded in Parts II and IV–A:

(a) The Government argues that a more permissive form of the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies than the one Johnson employed

4

SESSIONS v. DIMAYA Syllabus

because the removal of an alien is a civil matter rather than a crimi- nal case. This Court’s precedent forecloses that argument. In Jor- dan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223, the Court considered what vague- ness standard applied in removal cases and concluded that, “in view of the grave nature of deportation,” the most exacting vagueness standard must apply. Id., at 231. Nothing in the ensuing years calls that reasoning into question. This Court has reiterated that deporta- tion is “a particularly severe penalty,” which may be of greater con- cern to a convicted alien than “any potential jail sentence.” Jae Lee v.United States, 582 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 4–6.

(b) Section 16(b) demands a categorical, ordinary-case approach. For reasons expressed in Johnson, that approach cannot be aban- doned in favor of a conduct-based approach, which asks about the specific way in which a defendant committed a crime. To begin, the Government once again “has not asked [the Court] to abandon the categorical approach in residual-clause cases,” suggesting the fact- based approach is an untenable interpretation of §16(b). 576 U. S., at ___. Moreover, a fact-based approach would generate constitutional questions. In any event, §16(b)’s text demands a categorical ap- proach. This Court’s decisions have consistently understood lan- guage in the residual clauses of both ACCA and §16 to refer to “the statute of conviction, not to the facts of each defendant’s conduct.”Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 601. And the words “by its na- ture” in §16(b) even more clearly compel an inquiry into an offense’s normal and characteristic quality—that is, what the offense ordinari- ly entails. Finally, given the daunting difficulties of accurately “re- construct[ing],” often many years later, “the conduct underlying [a] conviction,” the conduct-based approach’s “utter impracticability”— and associated inequities—is as great in §16(b) as in ACCA. John- son, 576 U. S., at ___. Pp. 12–15.

JUSTICE GORSUCH, agreeing that the Immigration and Nationality Act provision at hand is unconstitutionally vague for the reasons identified in Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. ___, concluded that the void for vagueness doctrine, at least properly conceived, serves as a faithful expression of ancient due process and separation of powers principles the Framers recognized as vital to ordered liberty under the Constitution. The Government’s argument that a less-than-fair- notice standard should apply where (as here) a person faces only civ- il, not criminal, consequences from a statute’s operation is unavail- ing. In the criminal context, the law generally must afford “ordinary people . . . fair notice of the conduct it punishes,” id., at ___, and it is hard to see how the Due Process Clause might often require any less than that in the civil context. Nor is there any good reason to single out civil deportation for assessment under the fair notice standard

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 5

Syllabus

because of the special gravity of its penalty when so many civil laws impose so many similarly severe sanctions. Alternative approaches that do not concede the propriety of the categorical ordinary case analysis are more properly addressed in another case, involving ei- ther the Immigration and Nationality Act or another statute, where the parties have a chance to be heard. Pp. 1–19.

KAGAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, IV–B, and V, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined, and an opin- ion with respect to Parts II and IV–A, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY and ALITO, JJ., joined as to Parts I–C–2, II–A–1, and II–B.

Key Quote From Justice Kagan’s Majority (Pt. V):

Johnson tells us how to resolve this case. That decision held that “[t]wo features of [ACCA’s] residual clause con- spire[d] to make it unconstitutionally vague.” 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5). Because the clause had both an ordinary-case requirement and an ill-defined risk thresh- old, it necessarily “devolv[ed] into guesswork and intui- tion,” invited arbitrary enforcement, and failed to provide fair notice. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). Section 16(b) possesses the exact same two features. And none of the minor linguistic disparities in the statutes makes any real difference. So just like ACCA’s residual clause, §16(b) “produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 6). We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Key Quote From Justice Gorsuch”s Concurring Opinion:

Vague laws invite arbitrary power. Before the Revolu­ tion, the crime of treason in English law was so capa­ ciously construed that the mere expression of disfavored opinions could invite transportation or death. The founders cited the crown’s abuse of “pretended” crimes like this as one of their reasons for revolution. See Declaration of Independence ¶21. Today’s vague laws may not be as invidious, but they can invite the exercise of arbitrary power all the same—by leaving the people in the dark about what the law demands and allowing prosecutors and courts to make it up.

The law before us today is such a law. Before holding a lawful permanent resident alien like James Dimaya sub­ ject to removal for having committed a crime, the Immi­ gration and Nationality Act requires a judge to determine that the ordinary case of the alien’s crime of conviction involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used. But what does that mean? Just take the crime at issue in this case, California burglary, which applies to everyone from armed home intruders to door-to-door salesmen peddling shady products. How, on that vast spectrum, is anyone supposed to locate the ordinary case and say whether it includes a substantial risk of physical force? The truth is, no one knows. The law’s silence leaves judges to their intuitions and the people to their fate. In my judgment, the Constitution demands more.

Key Quote From Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissenting Opinion:

The more constrained inquiry required under §16(b)— which asks only whether the offense elements naturally carry with them a risk that the offender will use force in committing the offense—does not itself engender “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime.” And the provision’s use of a commonplace sub- stantial risk standard—one not tied to a list of crimes that lack a unifying feature—does not give rise to intolerable “uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify.” That should be enough to reject Dimaya’s facial vagueness challenge.4

Because I would rely on those distinctions to uphold

——————

4 The Court also finds it probative that “a host of issues” respecting §16(b) “divide” the lower courts. Ante, at 22. Yet the Court does little to explain how those alleged conflicts vindicate its particular concern about the provision (namely, the ordinary case inquiry). And as the Government illustrates, many of those divergent results likely can be chalked up to material differences in the state offense statutes at issue. Compare Escudero-Arciniega v. Holder, 702 F. 3d 781, 783–785 (CA5 2012) (per curiam) (reasoning that New Mexico car burglary “requires that the criminal lack authorization to enter the vehicle—a require- ment alone which will most often ensure some force [against property] is used”), with Sareang Ye v. INS, 214 F. 3d 1128, 1134 (CA9 2000) (finding it relevant that California car burglary does not require unlaw- ful or unprivileged entry); see Reply Brief 17–20, and nn. 5–6.

14 SESSIONS v. DIMAYA ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

§16(b), the Court reproaches me for not giving sufficient weight to a “core insight” of Johnson. Ante, at 10, n. 4; seeante, at 15 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (arguing that §16(b) runs afoul of Johnson “to the extent [§16(b)] requires an ‘ordinary case’ analysis”). But the fact that the ACCA residual clause required the ordinary case approach was not itself sufficient to doom the law. We instead took pains to clarify that our opinion should not be read to impart such an absolute rule. See Johnson, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). I would adhere to that careful holding and not reflexively extend the decision to a different stat- ute whose reach is, on the whole, far more clear.

The Court does the opposite, and the ramifications of that decision are significant. First, of course, today’s holding invalidates a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act—part of the definition of “aggravated felony”—on which the Government relies to “ensure that dangerous criminal aliens are removed from the United States.” Brief for United States 54. Contrary to the Court’s back-of-the-envelope assessment, see ante, at 23, n.12, the Government explains that the definition is “critical” for “numerous” immigration provisions. Brief for United States 12.

In addition, §16 serves as the universal definition of “crime of violence” for all of Title 18 of the United States Code. Its language is incorporated into many procedural and substantive provisions of criminal law, including provisions concerning racketeering, money laundering, domestic violence, using a child to commit a violent crime, and distributing information about the making or use of explosives. See 18 U. S. C. §§25(a)(1), 842(p)(2), 1952(a), 1956(c)(7)(B)(ii), 1959(a)(4), 2261(a), 3561(b). Of special concern, §16 is replicated in the definition of “crime of violence” applicable to §924(c), which prohibits using or carrying a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence,” or possessing a firearm “in furtherance of any such crime.” §§924(c)(1)(A), (c)(3). Though I express no view on whether §924(c) can be distinguished from the provision we consider here, the Court’s holding calls into question convictions under what the Government warns us is an “oft-prosecuted offense.” Brief for United States 12.

Because Johnson does not compel today’s result, I respectfully dissent.

Key Quote From Justice Thomas’s Dissent:

I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that 18 U. S. C. §16(b), as incorporated by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), is not unconstitutionally vague. Section 16(b) lacks many of the features that caused this Court to invalidate the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) in Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. ___ (2015). ACCA’s residual clause—a provision that this Court had applied four times before Johnson—was not unconstitu­ tionally vague either. See id., at ___ (THOMAS, J., concur­ ring in judgment) (slip op., at 1); id., at ___–___ (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 13–17). But if the Court insists on adhering to Johnson, it should at least take Johnson at its word that the residual clause was vague due to the “‘sum’” of its specific features. Id., at ___ (majority opinion) (slip op., at 10). By ignoring this limitation, the Court jettisonsJohnson’s assurance that its holding would not jeopardize “dozens of federal and state criminal laws.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12).

While THE CHIEF JUSTICE persuasively explains why respondent cannot prevail under our precedents, I write separately to make two additional points. First, I continue to doubt that our practice of striking down statutes as unconstitutionally vague is consistent with the original meaning of the Due Process Clause. See id., at ___–___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 7–18). Second, if the Court thinks that §16(b) is unconstitutionally vague be­ cause of the “categorical approach,” see ante, at 6–11, then the Court should abandon that approach—not insist on reading it into statutes and then strike them down. Ac­cordingly, I respectfully dissent.

****************************************

Gee whiz, those Trumpsters and GOP Senators who were overflowing with their praise of Justice Gorsuch’s brilliance during his confirmation hearings must be beside themselves now that he joined the “Gang of Four” in striking down a statute in an immigration enforcement case!

I predicted early on that Gorsuch might surprise those on both sides who expected him to be a “complete Trump toady.”  Indeed, the case that drove today’s decision in Dimaya, Johnson v. United States, was written by none other than Justice Scalia, one of Justice Gorsuch’s “juridical role models.” At bottom, Dimaya is all about strict adherence to the Constitution and separation of powers, two things that Gorsuch as extolled in past decisions.

No, I don’t think that Justice Gorsuch is likely to team up with Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor on most future immigration cases. But, I am encouraged that he seems to be going where his legal principles, whether one agrees with them or not, take him, rather than just voting to support the Administration’s hard-line immigration agenda as many had predicted and some had hoped or assumed would happen.

There are other important immigration cases before the Supremes where adherence to the literal language of a statute and skepticism about giving the Executive unbridled power under separation of powers could aid the respondent’s position. So, while this might not be a “normal” majority configuration, it could well be repeated in some future immigration case. Let’s hope so!

Interestingly, I had this issue come up in one of the last cases I wrote before retiring from the Arlington Immigraton Court. I noted that the respondent made a strong argument for unconstitutionality under Johnson v, United States. However, as an Immigration Judge, I had no authority to hold a statute unconstitutional (although, ironically, under today’s convoluted system, the respondent was required to make his constitutional argument before me to “preserve” it for review by the Court of Appeals). So, I merely “noted” the constitutional issue for those higher up the “judicial food chain” and decided the issue on the basis that burglary as defined under the state law in question was not categorically a “crime of violence” under the so-called “categorical approach.”

Two other points worth mentioning:

  • In this particular case, the Supremes upheld the ruling of the much maligned (particularly by Trump & Sessions) 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, having jurisdiction over California ;
  • This type of issue is frequently recurring in Immigration Court where many, perhaps the majority, of respondents are unrepresented. How would an unrepresented individual who does not even speak English make the type of sophisticated legal arguments that a) got this case to the Supremes in the first place, and b) persuaded the majority of the Court? Of course, they couldn’t. That’s why much of what is going on in today’s U.S. Immigration Courts is a farce — a clear violation of constitutional Due Process that the Federal Courts have been doing their best to ignore or gloss over for many decades.
  • As more light is shed on the much misunderstood U.S. Immigration Court system, both Congress and the Article III Courts must come to grips with the  procedural, ethical, and fairness inadequacies built into today’s “captive” Immigration Courts and the utter lack of any concern about protecting the legal rights of migrants shown by Jeff Sessions and the rest of the Trump Administration. Shockingly, they have actually pledged to stomp on migrants already unfulfilled rights to fair hearings in the name of a “false efficiency.” 
  • Join the “New Due Process Army” and help stop the continuing abuses of human rights, statutory rights, and constitutional rights of migrants by Sessions and the rest of the “Trump Scofflaws!”

PWS

04-17-18

PETER MARKOWITZ IN THE NYT: CA Can Thank The Late Justice Scalia For Likely Win On Sanctuary Case!

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/opinion/trump-california-sanctuary-movement.html

The Justice Department lawsuit emphasizes that immigration is a federal matter, that we must have a uniform scheme to oversee it and that this scheme is being undermined by sanctuary laws. In most states, federal immigration authorities are able to leverage state and local criminal justice systems. The Justice Department is arguing that California’s refusal to participate requires it to adapt and employ different enforcement strategies.
It is fair to ask whether states should have the power to abstain from federal law enforcement programs that they view as immoral or adverse to their local interests. It is not, however, a new question.
In fact, the question was decisively answered by the Supreme Court in 1997 in a case called Printz v. United States. That case involved a challenge to the federal Brady Act, which required local sheriffs to conduct background checks for gun purchasers. Some sheriffs resisted because they objected to the federal regulation of firearms. The Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, made clear that the sheriffs, and states generally, have a right to abstain from federal law enforcement schemes with which they disagreed.
It is this principle that distinguishes California’s decision to opt out of deportation efforts from Arizona’s decision to opt in.
The Justice Department is correct that the regulation of immigration is a federal matter. That’s why the Supreme Court made clear in the Arizona case that states may not insert themselves into immigration enforcement by directing its officers to arrest people on immigration charges. California, far from inserting itself, has extracted itself from federal immigration enforcement efforts in precisely the same way that the sheriffs in Printz extracted themselves from the federal effort to regulate the purchase of firearms.
Attorney General Sessions’s attempt to spin his attack on sanctuary laws as a logical extension of the Supreme Court’s Arizona decision is a transparent attempt to sidestep the clear rule established in Printz.
As California’s attorney general, Xavier Becerra, recently explained, “California is in the business of public safety, not in the business of deportations.” By exercising their constitutional right to stay out of the business of deportation, California and other sanctuary jurisdictions have been able to strengthen ties between local law enforcement and immigrant communities. Those ties, in turn, mean that immigrant witnesses and victims of crime are not fearful of coming forward to assist the local police. That is why a recent report by the Center for American Progress demonstrated that, contrary to Mr. Trump and Mr. Sessions’s heated rhetoric, sanctuary laws improve public safety by driving down overall crime rates.
This is precisely the type of legitimate justification for local abstention that the Supreme Court established as a bedrock principle of our federal system of government over two decades ago.
Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook and Twitter (@NYTopinion), and sign up for the Opinion Today newsletter.
Peter L. Markowitz is a professor at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.

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Interesting point. Strange bedfellows. Read the rest of Professor Markowitz’s article at the link.

PWS

03-10-18

RICHARD L. HASEN IN WASHPOST: THE ORIGINAL DISRUPTER – THE LATE JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/02/13/antonin-scalias-disruption-of-the-supreme-courts-ways-is-here-to-stay/

Hasen writes:

“A few years ago, a populist disrupter of the established political order said that Arizona was right to try to take immigration enforcement into its own hands when the Obama administration was not aggressive enough. Its “citizens feel themselves under siege by large numbers of illegal immigrants who invade their property, strain their social services, and even place their lives in jeopardy.” He similarly expressedsympathy for the “Polish factory workers’ kid” who was going to be out of a job because of affirmative action and lamented that the Supreme Court’s giving too many constitutional rights to Guantanamo detainees “will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.”

Who made the statements? Donald Trump? Newt Gingrich? No, those were the words of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, who died two years ago Tuesday. Scalia disrupted business as usual on the court just like Gingrich disrupted the U.S. House of Representatives in the 1990s and Trump is now disrupting the presidency. Scalia changed the way the Supreme Court writes and analyzes its cases and the tone judges and lawyers use to disagree with each other, evincing a pungent anti-elitist populism that, aside from some criminal procedure cases, mostly served his conservative values. Now the judiciary is being filled at a frenetic pace by Trump and Senate Republicans with Scalian acolytes like Supreme Court Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, who will use Scalia’s tools to further delegitimize their liberal opponents and continue to polarize the federal courts.

Scalia joined the Supreme Court in 1986 after a stint as a law professor, a government official and a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. He arrived at a court in which justices used an eclectic mix of criteria, from text to history and purpose to pragmatism and personal values, to decide the meaning of the Constitution and federal statutes. Justices disagreed with one another, but for the most part, they were polite in their written dissents.

Scalia came in with different ideas, which he said were compelled by the limited grant of judicial power in the Constitution and would increase the legitimacy of judicial decision-making. He offered revamped, supposedly neutral jurisprudential theories. Yet, as I argue in my upcoming book, “The Justice of Contradictions: Antonin Scalia and the Politics of Disruption,” his doctrines were usually flexible enough to deliver opinions consistent with his conservative libertarian ideology.

He was an “originalist” who believed that constitutional provisions should be interpreted in line with their public meaning at the time of enactment, as when he argued that the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause did not apply to sex discrimination — except when he wasn’t, as when in affirmative action cases, he consistently ignored evidence that at the time the equal protection clause was ratified, Congress enacted preferences specifically intending to help African Americans.”

. . . .

Scalia, the Harvard law graduate, frequently cast his fellow justices as out-of-touch Ivy League elitists sticking it to the little guy. Yet he often sided with big business over consumers and environmental groups, deciding cases on issues related to standing and arbitration law that made it harder for people to have their rights protected and vindicated in court.

He disagreed with others using a tone like no other justice. The day after it decided King v. Burwell in June 2015, the court recognized a right of same-sex couples to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges. Scalia, applying his originalist understanding of the 14th Amendment, unsurprisingly rejected the majority’s approach. But he leveled his harshest words at Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s majority opinion, which he described as “couched in a style that is as pretentious as its content is egotistic.” He added that “if, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined an opinion for the Court that began: ‘The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity,’ I would hide my head in a bag.” He compared the opinion to an aphorism in a fortune cookie.

The combination of Scalia’s view that textualism and originalism were the only legitimate way to decide cases and his caustic dismissal of anyone who dared to disagree with him led to a much coarser, polarized court after his tenure on the bench. He gave the Supreme Court’s imprimatur to the practice of delegitimizing one’s ideological opponents rather than simply disagreeing with them.

Most important, he gave key conservative acolytes tools to advance an ideological agenda — tools that he presented as politically neutral. The most important of these acolytes is Gorsuch, the newest Supreme Court justice (and, thanks to the refusal of Senate Republicans to consider President Barack Obama’s nomination of Merrick Garland after Scalia died, also the justice who replaced his ideological role model). While not quite a Scalia clone, he is fully following in Scalia’s tradition. Not long after joining the court, Gorsuch admonished his colleagues in a statutory interpretation case that “if a statute needs repair, there’s a constitutionally prescribed way to do it. It’s called legislation.” And at oral argument in the 2017 Wisconsin partisan gerrymandering case, he dismissively interjected that “maybe we can just for a second talk about the arcane matter, the Constitution.” Think Scalia, but without the spontaneous wit and charm. Without Scalia, Gorsuch would have been just as conservative, but he would not have been packaging his jurisprudence in Scalian terms. And he perhaps would not have been as aggressive out of the box.

According to Time magazine, Trump wants to appoint more “originalists” and “textualists” on the court — flamethrowers who will disrupt things even more, following Scalia’s model. Gorsuch’s early record and the posthumous deification of Scalia by Federalist Society members and others on the right since his death show that Scalia’s pugnacious populism is the wave of the future for court appointees by Republican presidents and that the bitter partisan polarization we’ve seen in the political branches is in danger of becoming fixed as a permanent feature of the Supreme Court. Indeed, the main criticism of Scalia’s followers is that he was not consistent enough in insisting that originalism and textualism are the only right way to decide cases, consequences be damned.

Thanks to Scalia’s disruption, the Supreme Court may never be the same.

 

Richard L. Hasen is the chancellor’s professor of law and political science at the University of California at Irvine and the author of “The Justice of Contradictions: Antonin Scalia and the Politics of Disruption.”

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Read the complete article at the link.

Yes, I always thought that beneath all the “origionalist” BS, Justice Scalia was pretty much just another jurist with a peculiar right-wing agenda. He rewrote history to match his own preconceived worldview. Additionally, he detested equality, social justice, and common sense in equal proportions. But, occasionally his intellectual machinations led him to side with the “good guys.”

He might not have been a “stable genius,” but he was a heck of a lot smarter than Trump and much funnier. And, while there are indications in his jurisprudence that he was a “racist at heart” (who despised Hispanics as much as African-Americans) he was somewhat less overt about his White Christian Nationalism than guys like Trump, Sessions, Miller, Bannon, Steve King, etc.

PWS

02-14-18

 

3RD CIR REAFFIRMS THAT 18 USC 16(B) “CRIME OF VIOLENCE” AS INCORPORATED INTO THE INA IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE: Mateo v. Attorney General — Supremes Remain MIA

151160p

Before: McKEE, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: JUDGE VANASKIE

KEY QUOTE:

“The petitioner in Baptiste, like Mateo, faced removal on the basis of his purported status as an alien convicted of a crime of violence under § 16(b). As stated previously, § 16(b) defines a crime of violence as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In order to determine whether the crime of conviction is a crime of violence under § 16(b), courts utilize the same categorical approach that was applied to the ACCA’s residual clause. Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 617. The petitioner in Baptiste argued that the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson striking down the residual clause should apply to negate § 16(b). After comparing the features of the § 16(b) analysis to those found to contribute to the unconstitutionality of the residual clause in Johnson, we agreed that the same defects were present in § 16(b), rendering the provision unconstitutional. Regarding the first feature, we recognized that the same “ordinary case inquiry” is used when applying the categorical approach in both contexts. Id. Like the residual clause, § 16(b) “offers no reliable way to choose between . . . competing accounts of what” that “judge- imagined abstraction” of the crime involves. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2558. Thus, we concluded in Baptiste that “the ordinary case inquiry is as indeterminate in the § 16(b) context as it was in the residual clause context.” 841 F.3d at 617. Turning to the second feature—the risk inquiry—we observed that despite slight linguistic differences between the provisions, the same indeterminacy inherent in the residual clause was present in § 16(b). Id. “[B]ecause the two inquiries under the residual clause that the Supreme Court found to be indeterminate—the ordinary case inquiry and the serious potential risk inquiry—are materially the same as the inquiries under § 16(b),” we concluded that “§ 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.” Id. at 621. This conclusion applies equally to Mateo’s petition. Our treatment of § 16(b) is in step with the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, which have all similarly deemed the provision to be void for vagueness in immigration cases. See Shuti, 828 F.3d at 451; Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1120; Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2016). The Seventh Circuit has also taken this position in the criminal context. See United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2015). In fact, the only circuit that has broken stride is the Fifth Circuit.7 See United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 677 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). In the meantime, we await the Supreme Court’s decision in the appeal of Dimaya.”

*******************************************

The Dimaya case before the Supremes (again) should be a good test of whether newest Justice Gorsuch will adhere to his strict constructionist principles where they will produce a favorable result for a migrant under the immigration laws.

The Johnson case, relied on by the Third Circuit, was written by none other than the late Justice Antonin Scalia, a leading strict constructionist and conservative judicial icon, who nevertheless found that his path sometimes assisted migrants in avoiding removal.  So, on paper, this should be a “no brainer” for Justice Gorsuch, who has also been critical of some of the BIA’s “Chevron overreach” and non-responsiveness to Article III Courts.

PWS

09-07-17

 

U.S. IMMIGRATION JUDGES CAN BREATHE EASIER: Judge Richard “Dickie The P” Posner Retires — 7th Cir. Jurist Was Caustic, Unrelenting Critic Of U.S. Immigration Courts!

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-judge-richard-posner-retires-met-20170901-story.html

The Chicago Tribune reports:

“Judge Richard A. Posner, one of the nation’s leading appellate judges, whose acerbic wit attracted an almost cultlike following within legal circles, is retiring after more than three decades with the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago.

Posner, 78, is stepping down effective Saturday, according to a news release Friday afternoon from the 7th Circuit. He was appointed to the court by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and served as its chief judge from 1993 to 2000.

Posner said in a statement he has written more than 3,300 opinions in his time on the bench and is “proud to have promoted a pragmatic approach to judging.” He said he spent his career applying his view that “judicial opinions should be easy to understand and that judges should focus on the right and wrong in every case.”

Posner’s biting and often brilliant written opinions as well as his unrelenting questioning from the bench have made him an icon of the court for years.

 

Known as a conservative at the time of his appointment, Posner’s views skewed more libertarian through the years, and he often came down in favor of more liberal issues such as gay marriage and abortion rights.

Lawyers who regularly appeared before the 7th Circuit knew that when Posner was on a panel they had to be ready for a line of questioning that could come out of left field. The salty judge was known to abruptly cut off lawyers who he thought were off-point, often with a dismissive “No, no, no!” delivered in his trademark nasal tone.”

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Read the full article at the link.

Here’s a classic Posner comment on the U.S. Immigration Courts from a 2016 case,  Chavarria-Reyes v. Lynch:

“POSNER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. This case involves a typical botch by an immigration judge. No surprise: the Immigration Court, though lodged in the Justice Department, is the least competent federal agency, though in fairness it may well owe its dismal status to its severe underfunding by Congress, which has resulted in a shortage of immigration judges that has subjected them to crushing workloads.”

See my prior blog on Chavarria-Reyes:

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/01/02/the-u-s-immigration-courts-vision-is-all-about-best-practices-guaranteeing-fairness-and-due-process-7th-circuits-judge-posner-thinks-its-a-farce-blames-congressional-underfunding/

Judge Posner was always provocative, often entertaining, and eminently quotable. While I found some of his commentary on the Immigration Courts and the BIA, and particularly some of his harsh words about individual Immigration Judges, to be “over the top,” his blunt criticism of the failure to provide due process to migrants and his recognition that the DOJ and Congress shared the majority of the responsibility for screwing up the system was spot on.

He was always a “player,” and he will be missed even by those who disagreed with him. I look forward to a “Posner commentary” on the state of due process in the Immigration Courts in the Sessions regime.

PWS

09-03-17

 

 

TRAVEL BAN UPDATE: “SOPS” Continue To Flow From 9th Cir. Judges in Washington v. Trump — WSJ & WASHPOST Hang “Stupid But Constitutional” Tag On Trump — CNN’s Danny Cevallos Agrees With Rappaport That Trump Has Good Chance Of Ultimate Legal Win!

What’s a “SOP?”  That was BIA lingo for “separate opinion,” a fairly frequent occurrence on the “Schmidt Board.”

There are now five separate opinions commenting on the refusal of the en banc 9th Circuit to vacate the panel’s decision in State of Washington v. Trump following the Government’s decision to withdraw it’s appeal form the TRO on “Travel Ban 1.0:”

“This order is being filed along with a concurrence from Judge Reinhardt, a concurrence from Judge Berzon, a dissent from Judge Kozinski, a dissent from Judge Bybee, and a dissent from Judge Bea. No further opinions will be filed.

Josh Gerstein explains in Politico:

“President Donald Trump’s travel ban has triggered an unusually caustic public spat among the judges of the federal appeals court that first took up the issue.

The disagreement began to play out publicly Wednesday when five 9th Circuit Court of Appeals judges publicly recorded their disagreement with a decision three of their colleagues issued last month refusing to allow Trump to reinstate the first version of his travel ban executive order.
The fight escalated dramatically on Friday with the five Republican-appointed judges filing another withering attack on the earlier opinion and two liberal judges accusing their conservative colleagues of trying to make an end-run around the traditional judicial process.

In the new opinion, Judge Alex Kozinski blasted the earlier ruling for essentially ignoring the fact that most of those affected by Trump’s initial travel ban have no constitutional rights.

“This St. Bernard is being wagged by a flea on its tail,” Kozinski wrote, joined by Judges Carlos Bea, Jay Bybee, Sandra Ikuta and Consuelo Callahan.

Kozinski’s opinion harshly criticized the earlier 9th Circuit decision for blessing the idea that courts could take account of Trump’s campaign-trail statements vowing to implement a Muslim ban.

“My colleagues err by failing to vacate this hasty opinion. The panel’s unnecessary statements on this subject will shape litigation near and far. We’ll quest aimlessly for true intentions across a sea of insults and hyperbole. It will be (as it were) a huge, total disaster,” Kozinski said, in an an apparent tip of the hat to Trump’s bombast.

That didn’t sit well with Judge Stephen Reinhardt, who accused his colleagues of trying to affect the ongoing litigation over Trump’s redrafted executive order.

“Judge Kozinski’s diatribe, filed today, confirms that a small group of judges, having failed in their effort to undo this court’s decision with respect to President Trump’s first Executive Order, now seek on their own, under the guise of a dissent from the denial of en banc rehearing of an order of voluntary dismissal, to decide the constitutionality of a second Executive Order that is not before this court,” wrote Reinhardt, an appointee of President Jimmy Carter. “That is hardly the way the judiciary functions. Peculiar indeed!”

Another liberal 9th Circuit judge, Marsha Berzon, weighed in Friday with a more restrained rejection of her colleagues’ efforts to undermine the earlier ruling.

“Judges are empowered to decide issues properly before them, not to express their personal views on legal questions no one has asked them. There is no appeal currently before us, and so no stay motion pending that appeal currently before us either,” wrote Berzon, an appointee of President Bill Clinton. “All the merits commentary in the dissents filed by a small minority of the judges of this court is entirely out of place.”
“My dissenting colleagues should not be engaging in a one-sided attack on a decision by a duly constituted panel of this court,” Berzon added. “We will have this discussion, or one like it. But not now.”

Kozinski responded by accusing his liberal colleagues of trying to silence the court’s public debate on the issue.”

“My colleagues’ effort to muzzle criticism of an egregiously wrong panel opinion betrays their insecurity about the opinion’s legal analysis,” wrote Kozinski, an appointee of President Ronald Reagan.”

Here’s the link to Gerstein’s article:

http://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/9th-circuit-judges-feud-trump-travel-ban-236211

And, here is the link to the court’s order containing all of the opinions, so you can judge for yourself:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2017/03/17/17-35105_Amd_Order.pdf

Meanwhile, the WSJ Editorial Board channeled a little of the late Justice Antonin Scalia:

“The late Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia once wished aloud that all federal judges be issued a stamp that said “Stupid but Constitutional.” Such a stamp would have been useful this week to the two federal judges who bounced President Trump’s revised travel ban that suspends immigration from six Muslim-majority countries that the Administration says pose particular terror risks.

Our view is that the ban is lousy policy, and any urgency that Mr. Trump’s first-week executive order once had is gone. But after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals blocked the original version, the White House went back to the drafting board and tailored the new order to address the court’s objections. The President has vast discretion over immigration, and the do-over is grounded both in statute and core presidential powers, which is when the Supreme Court’s Youngstown decision teaches that a President’s authority to act is strongest.”

Read the complete editorial here:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-trump-legal-exception-1489706694

On today’s editorial page, the Washington Post made much the same point, if only a little less emphatically with respect to the Administration’s legal position:

“THE SPEED and enthusiasm with which two federal courts halted President Trump’s latest travel executive order might suggest that the revised policy is as obviously problematic as the last, which was a sloppy rush job that the government poorly defended in court. In fact, the revised policy, while still more likely to harm than help national security, is legally far more defensible. Decades of precedent instruct judges to defer to the executive branch on immigration and national security matters such as this. It should surprise no one if the Supreme Court eventually allows the Trump administration to proceed.”

Read the complete Post editorial here:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-new-travel-order-is-self-defeating-and-maybe-legal-too/2017/03/17/95171a6c-0a93-11e7-93dc-00f9bdd74ed1_story.html?utm_term=.7cf47133cd49

Finally, CNN Legal Analyst Danny Cevallos makes many of the same points that Nolan Rappaport has made in his articles in The Hill in predicting that the Administration legally has a winner if they are ever able to get this issue to the Supremes:

“The president is in charge of immigration. Immigration policy, by its very definition, is a form of discrimination. The only truly nondiscriminatory immigration policy would be: Everyone come in, whenever you want. Anything short of that is discrimination in some form, and it’s generally within the president’s province. This is not some village rezoning policy. This is national immigration policy, and it’s different than any of the other Establishment Clause cases.
If courts can look into this particular President’s prior statements when considering the constitutionality of his actions, then every single executive action is potentially vulnerable. A gender-neutral executive order could be challenged as discriminatory against women. After all, this is the candidate who believes women can just be grabbed by the …, well, you know. A presidential action that is disability-neutral could be challenged on the basis that the candidate mocked a disabled reporter.
While the court in Hawaii cited established Supreme Court precedent in finding a probable Establishment Clause violation, the appellate courts could still find that Trump’s executive authority prevails. Yes, the district court cited some controlling authority, but an appellate court could distinguish those cases from the unique case before it — one that pits constitutional executive power head-to-head with the First Amendment.”

Read the full Cevallos analysis here:

http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/16/opinions/trump-win-travel-ban-appeal-danny-cevallos-opinion/index.html

Then, read Nolan’s previous articles from The Hill or as reposted on this blog.

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Overall, I think it is a good thing when there is some spirited dissent and disagreement among members of a collegial court like the 9th Circuit.  It shows that the Judges are engaged and that they care about the issues, as they should. Also, dissent is often directed at other courts (like the Supreme Court), at Congress, the Executive, or at educating the media and the public at large about important legal issues. Without dissent and the resulting dialogue it often provokes, you would have “a room full of people patting each other on the back.” And, what’s the purpose of a “deliberative” collegial court that doesn’t “deliberate?”

PWS

03/18/17

 

E. Donald Elliott In The WSJ: Dems Would Be Wise To Take A Pass On Filibuster Of Judge Gorsuch!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/refugees-are-part-of-americas-fabric-and-its-promise/2017/02/06/c10179ba-ea59-11e6-80c2-30e57e57e05d_story.html

Elliott, an Adjunct Professor of Law at Yale Law writes:

“Moderates could do a lot worse than Judge Neil Gorsuch—and we probably will if he isn’t confirmed. Donald Trump is clearly determined to nominate a judicial conservative to the Supreme Court. Elections have consequences, as Barack Obama once chided congressional Republicans.

Judge Gorsuch’s judicial philosophy isn’t mine. He believes that the Constitution’s meaning is fixed, that whatever the words signified in the era of the Founders is what they still express today. My view, which aligns more closely with that of Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan, is that judges must respect the Constitution’s text and history but may also interpret them to fit the changing times.

But among judicial conservatives, Judge Gorsuch is as good as it possibly gets. I have known him personally for more than a decade, since he was an attorney in the Justice Department. He is a brilliant mind, but more important he is a kind, sensitive and caring human being. Judge Gorsuch tries very hard to get the law right. He is not an ideologue, not the kind to always rule in favor of businesses or against the government. Instead, he follows the law as best as he can wherever it might lead.

Judge Gorsuch has demonstrated in his rulings that he believes the judiciary has a sworn duty to protect individual liberties, even when they lack broad public support. Today Judge Gorsuch rules that Hobby Lobby cannot be forced to offer employees certain contraceptive coverage that violates its owners’ religious beliefs. (That ruling was upheld by the Supreme Court.) But tomorrow it could mean standing up for an unpopular minority group that liberals like better.”

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PWS

02/07/17

 

From “The Week:” Strange Bedfellows — If “Sanctuary Cities” & Migrants’ Advocates Defeat President Trump’s Policies In Court, They Might Owe A Huge Debt To Conservative Judges, Like The Late Justice Antonin Scalia!

http://theweek.com/articles/674498/how-conservative-judges-unintentionally-sabotaged-president-trumps-immigration-crackdown

Self-described “free-market progressive libertarian” Shikha Dalmia writes in The Week:

“But there’s another big cost that will hamstring this sanctuary city crackdown: If he can’t command local cooperation by threatening to cut funds, then President Trump also can’t de facto deputize local law enforcement agents. So he will have to cough up large sums of federal money to triple the size of the federal deportation force that would be required to eject millions of additional people.

And that will also mean bad optics, because without cooperative local authorities, President Trump will not be able to order ICE agents to whisk away all of these folks quietly in the dead of the night, shielded from media cameras. Instead, he’ll have to start raiding schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces, which will make for terrible publicity.

Whether Trump will go that far remains to be seen. But thanks primarily to the conservative justices on the Supreme Court, it’ll be very hard for him to do so. And that gives undocumented workers far more of a chance than if they had to depend only on the good intentions of local liberal politicians.

The irony is that these immigrants would be in much bigger trouble if Justice Sonia Sotomayor, along with her liberal colleague Ruth Bader Ginsburg, had prevailed in the ObamaCare ruling, as many liberals had hoped at the time. They were completely on board with ObamaCare’s efforts to use federal funds to strong-arm states.

So what’s the lesson? That standing up for bedrock checks and balances is a far better protector of vulnerable minorities than do-gooding liberal politics.”

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I’ve written before that the Trump Administration might not get the anticipated “free pass” to bash migrants that they apparently anticipate from Republican appointees on the U.S. Courts of Appeals and a conservative majority Supreme Court.  Leaving aside “hot button” or “litmus test” issues like abortion, doctrinal conservatives often have great Constitutional reservations about the unbridled use of Executive Power. Indeed, doctrinal conservatism at some point comes close to libertarianism, and libertarianism has some things in common with liberalism.

Thus, at some point in my career, I found myself sitting at a Cato Institute Seminar and nodding in agreement when none other than Grover Norquist described his essentially “free market” approach to migration and border enforcement issues.

In  the end, the fact that independent Article III judges, conservative, liberal, middle of the roaders, Republicans, and Democrats, freed of political control, will deliberatively decide what the law requires could turn out to be a bigger problem for the Trump Administration than they had anticipated.

PWS

01/27/17

VOX News: Supreme Short List — Trump To Go With A U.S. Appeals Judge — Judges Gorsuch (10th C), Hardiman (3rd C), & Pryor (11th C) Top List!

http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/1/24/14372842/donald-trump-supreme-court-gorsuch-hardiman-pryor

“Now, Politico’s Eliana Johnson and Shane Goldmacher report that Trump has narrowed the choices to three, all of whom are on federal appeals courts:

Neil Gorsuch, 49, of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals (which covers Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, and Oklahoma)
Thomas Hardiman, 51, of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (which covers Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania)
William “Bill” Pryor, 54, of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals (which covers Alabama, Georgia, and Florida)
Johnson and Goldmacher report that Gorsuch and Hardiman have an advantage and Pryor’s chances have waned.

All three finalists are white men appointed to their posts by George W. Bush, but they vary in background and in how contention [sic] their nominations would likely be.”

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Read full bios of all three judges at the above link.  Reportedly, after the Republicans “stonewalled” the Garland nomination, the Democrats are not going to be racing to complete the confirmation process for the late conservative icon Justice Antonin Scalias’s replacement. But, in the end, the Republicans have the votes to put President Trump’s nominee on the Court.  And, given that all three of these judges have been previously vetted and confirmed for prestigious U.S. Court of Appeals judgeships, barring any surprises, President Trump will get his choice.

Interestingly, I heard on a news report today that the average time lapse between formal nomination and confirmation for a Supreme Court Justice is 70 days.  Compare that the with the snail-paced hiring process for U.S. Immigration Judges who are Executive Branch employees and do not require Senate confirmation.

The U.S. Immigration Judge hiring process sometimes takes a year or more. While in the past judicial hiring was sometimes completed in 70 days or less, those days are long gone. What’s the deal here? Most of the recent Immigration Judge appointees have been from Government backgrounds and already had security clearances. And, background clearances, although important, are basically a ministerial/administrative process, not “rocket science.” With more than half a million pending cases and many judicial vacancies (which might or might not be frozen) there remarkably does not seem to be any sense of urgency in the DOJ/EOIR judicial hiring process. Go figure!

PWS

01/24/17