🏴‍☠️ 🤯 ABSURDIST SCOFFLAW TEX “GOV” ABBOTT BLOWN AWAY IN ROUND I OF “BUOY BATTLE!” — Texas Federal Judge Rejects Ludicrous “Invasion Defense!”

Priscilla Alvarez
CNN Digital Expansion 2019, Priscilla Alvarez
Politics Reporter, CNN

Priscilla Alvarez reports for CNN:

https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/06/politics/texas-mexico-border-water-barriers-migrants/index.html

CNN  —

A federal judge ordered Texas to remove floating barriers in the Rio Grande and barred the state from building new or placing additional buoys in the river, according to a Wednesday court filing, marking a victory for the Biden administration.

Judge David Alan Ezra ordered Texas to take down the barriers by September 15 at its own expense.

The border buoys have been a hot button immigration issue since they were deployed in the Rio Grande as part of Gov. Greg Abbott’s border security initiative known as Operation Lone Star. The Justice Department had sued the state of Texas in July claiming that the buoys were installed unlawfully and asking the judge to force the state to remove them.

In the lawsuit, filed in US District Court in the Western District of Texas, the Justice Department alleged that Texas and Abbott violated the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act by building a structure in US water without permission from United States Army Corps of Engineers and sought an injunction to bar Texas from building additional barriers in the river. The Republican governor, meanwhile, has argued the buoys are intended to deter migrants from crossing into the state from Mexico.

Texas swiftly appealed the judge’s order.

. . . .

Ezra also found Texas’ self-defense argument – that the barriers have been placed in the face of invasion – “unconvincing.”

. . . .

Ezra also found Texas’ self-defense argument – that the barriers have been placed in the face of invasion – “unconvincing.”

. . . .

*********************************

Read the rest of Priscilla’s report at the link.

Who knows how this will play out in the 5th Circuit and the Supremes, given the composition of those courts. But, at least for a day, Judge Ezra has brought some common sense and the rule of law to bear on out of control grandstanding Texas “Governor” Greg Abbott. 

In addition to being cruel and illegal, Abbott’s $140 million buoy boondoggle is predictably a failure from a deterrence standpoint. See, e.g., https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwi-5saEvpiBAxUXpIkEHU1VBwoQFnoECBoQAQ&url=https://www.livemint.com/news/texas-floating-border-wall-fails-to-deter-migrants-11693942981798.html&usg=AOvVaw0TX6bBkO0Fv0MezJLQPJkk&opi=89978449. (Although Abbott and his White Nationalist supporters falsely claim otherwise.) But, as my friends Dan Kowalski and Judge “Sir Jeffrey” Chase often say, effective deterrence isn’t the point — the cruelty and dehumanization is!

We should also remember that the vast majority of those whom Abbott and the nativists bogusly call “invaders” seek only to turn themselves in to U.S. authorities so they can exercise their clear legal rights to apply for asylum — rights that attach regardless of status or manner of entering the U.S. (Rights that also have improperly been diminished and impeded by the Biden Administration’s ill-advised asylum regulations, currently under legal challenge).  

If successful (under a legal system intentionally rigged against them), these so-called “invaders” will use their skills and work ethic to expand our economy and help Americans prosper while saving their lives and those of their families. To anybody other than Abbott and other White Nationalists, that sounds like a potential “win-win” that could and should be “leveraged” for everyone’s benefit!

Judge Ezra’s opinion in the aptly-named U.S. v. Abbott can be found here:

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.txwd.1172749163/gov.uscourts.txwd.1172749163.50.0.pdf?ftag=YHF4eb9d17

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

09-07-23

PRISCILLA ALVAREZ @ CNN EXPOSES BIDEN’S SECRET, DUE-PROCESS-FREE, DEPORTATIONS OF VENEZUELANS TO COLOMBIA! ☠️🤮 — Venezuela’s Repressive Left-Wing Dictatorship — So Horrible It’s Not Even Recognized By The US — Has Sent Millions Of Refugees Fleeing — That Hasn’t Stopped Biden From Arbitrarily Rejecting Them!

Priscilla Alvarez
CNN Digital Expansion 2019, Priscilla Alvarez
Politics Reporter, CNN

Priscilla’s latest:

https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/31/politics/border-venezuela-colombia/index.html

US begins quietly flying Venezuelan migrants to Colombia under controversial border policy

By Priscilla Alvarez, CNN

Updated 12:27 PM ET, Mon January 31, 2022

(CNN)The Biden administration, unable to return an increasing number of Venezuelans arrested at the US-Mexico border to their home country, is now sending those migrants to Colombia if they previously resided there, according to two Homeland Security officials.

White House officials have grown increasingly concerned about the large numbers of single adults continuing to cross the US southern border, particularly from countries that Mexico won’t accept under a controversial Trump-era policy, two sources familiar with discussions said.

The flights of Venezuelans to Colombia, which have not been previously reported, marks another effort by the administration to try to stem the flow of migrants, pushing those who arrive further away from the US-Mexico border including those seeking asylum.

In December, US Customs and Border Protection encountered more than 13,000 single adults from Venezuela on the US southern border, compared with 96 in December 2020, according to agency data.

A humanitarian crisis and political instability have taken hold of Venezuela in recent years. Around 6 million people have fled the country, according to the United Nations, usually fleeing to other parts of Latin America which have also struggled during the pandemic.

There’s been bipartisan acknowledgment of the deteriorating situation in Venezuela. Last year, Sens. Marco Rubio, a Republican, and Bob Menendez, a Democrat, introduced a Senate resolution expressing alarm over the situation in the country.

Colombia also granted temporary legal status to Venezuelans who had fled there, allowing them to legally work in the country. But for those who opted to journey to the US-Mexico border to seek protections in the US, expulsion to Colombia now puts them thousands of miles away from the possibility of claiming asylum in the US.

The handling of the US-Mexico border has dogged the Biden administration since the early days of Joe Biden’s presidency as a growing number of migrants journey to the United States, fleeing deteriorating conditions in the western hemisphere. Republicans have recently seized on the releases of migrants — some of whom can’t be expelled because of their nationality — citing it as another example of what they describe as the administration’s poor management of the border.

Under a public health authority, known as Title 42, authorities can swiftly remove migrants encountered at the US southern border, effectively barring those seeking asylum from doing so and marking an unprecedented departure from previous protocol. The authority was invoked at the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, despite suspicions among officials that it was politically motivated.

The White House has repeatedly referred to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on the future of the policy, saying the agency deems it necessary given the Delta and Omicron variants.

Last Thursday, the Department of Homeland Security returned two Venezuelan nationals to Colombia, where they had previously resided, the department told CNN, adding that flights to Colombia are expected to take place “on a regular basis.”

“As part of the United States COVID-19 mitigation efforts, DHS continues to enforce CDC’s Title 42 public health authority with all individuals encountered at the Southwest border. However, DHS’s ability to expel individuals may be limited for several reasons, including Mexico’s ability and capacity to receive individuals of certain nationalities,” DHS said in a statement, adding that the department has removed migrants to third countries in the region where they had lived or had status.

DHS has also acknowledged the precarious situation in Venezuela by granting a form of humanitarian relief for Venezuelans already in the United States.

Still, the Biden administration has continued to rely on the public health authority and recently defended it in court — a move that received criticism from immigrant advocates and Democratic lawmakers. The latest decision to expel migrants from Venezuela — a country in crisis — to Colombia reveals a further dependence on the public health authority amid a growing number of Venezuelans arriving at the US-Mexico border.

In December, US Customs and Border Protection encountered 24,819 Venezuelans at the US southern border including single adults, families and minors, up from the previous month and continuing an increasing trend. As a point of comparison, in December 2020, CBP encountered only around 200 Venezuelan migrants, according to agency data.

While tens of thousands of migrants have been turned away at the US-Mexico border, some, like South Americans, aren’t accepted by Mexico and therefore those nationals largely can’t be expelled. Under the public health authority, DHS has removed migrants to Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Brazil.

Some migrants from Venezuela crossed the border in Yuma, Arizona — often flying to an airport in Mexico and then crossing at a gap along the Colorado River, cutting the journey down to just days. It’s the most viable option for many Venezuelans and Brazilians, for example, who can’t obtain a visa that allows them to work in the US — or can’t afford the years-long wait for the legal immigration process. Mexico recently put new visa restrictions in place for Venezuelans traveling to Mexico.

The US has previously taken measures to try to lower the number of migrants at the US-Mexico border. Last year, the administration started flying migrants apprehended at the southern border and subject to the Trump-era border policy linked to the pandemic to the interior of Mexico.

**************

Let’s see. Colombia, a country of approximately 50 million, has taken in about 1.7 million Venezuelans. https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2021/10/31/supporting-colombian-host-communities-and-venezuelan-migrants-during-the-covid-19-pandemic

The US, a far larger and more prosperous country with approximately 7x the population of Colombia, has taken fewer than 350,000. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/09/us-temporary-protection-venezuelans

Forced migration is real, no matter what fictions and myths Administrations of both parties use to deny it. 

Pretending otherwise, and that lawless deportations and “deterrence” will materially change the forces that drive it, is both immoral and ultimately futile.

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

02-03-22

🤮🏴‍☠️☠️⚰️ GARLAND’S “SHAMEFUL RECORD” GETS EVEN WORSE AS HE DEFENDS STEPHEN MILLER’S DEGRADATION OF HUMANITY AT OUR BORDERS!

Stephen Miller Monster
Biden’s “Shadow Attorney General” speaks through the likeness of Merrick Garland! Attribution: Stephen Miller Monster by Peter Kuper, PoliticalCartoons.com
Priscilla Alvarez
CNN Digital Expansion 2019, Priscilla Alvarez
Politics Reporter, CNN

Priscilla Alvarez reports for CNN:

https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/19/politics/title-42-biden/index.html

. . . .

“Today we heard the same unconvincing arguments from the Biden administration that we’ve been hearing for the last year about this xenophobic and baseless policy, arguments that have already been rejected in federal court. Title 42 unjustly and unnecessarily inflicts harm on families seeking asylum at our border, and we will continue to work tirelessly to ensure that this policy ends once and for all,” said Diana Kearney, senior legal adviser with Oxfam America, in a statement.

In a recently released report, Human Rights First found nearly 9,000 reports of kidnappings and other violent attacks against people who had been expelled to Mexico or blocked from seeking protection in the US.

*******************

Read Priscilla’s full story on the bottomless depths to which Garland has taken American “justice” and the Department of “Justice” at the link.

I can always count on Garland to illustrate and punctuate my points about his unfitness for the job of achieving racial equality, re-establishing the rule of law, and promoting human rights in America, not to mention his total unsuitability and inability to run a fair, impartial, due-process-oriented court system! He probably would have been right at home with the “GOP Six” on the Supremes.

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

01-20-22

⚖️🗽CHAMPIONS OF JUSTICE, MAKING A DIFFERENCE: 🛡⚔️ Round Table’s Fight For Better Policies, Best Practices, Earns Acclaim!

Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table
Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

From “Sir Jeffrey” Chase:

Our statement yesterday on MPP was referenced and quoted by CNN at the end of this article by Priscilla Alvarez and Geneva Sands on the MPP restart:

https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/06/politics/biden-remain-in-mexico/index.html

Priscilla Alvarez
CNN Digital Expansion 2019, Priscilla Alvarez
Politics Reporter, CNN
Geneva Sands
CNN Digital Expansion 2019, Geneva Sands

This morning, Democracy Now referenced our letter in a segment covering the issue, saying:

 A group of former immigration judges released a statement condemning the return of the program as the “antithesis of fairness.”  

Here is the link:

https://www.democracynow.org/2021/12/7/biden_trump_era_remain_in_mexico

Furthermore, in oral arguments before the Supreme Court yesterday in Patel v. Garland, our amicus brief received a brief mention:

  • JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: — questions, how 

  • 10  could an appellate court — and this question 

  • 11  cuts both ways, so — but how can an appellate 

  • 12  court look at a cold record and determine a 

  • 13  factual error when it relates to credibility, 

  • 14  for example, or something like that? Just give 

  • 15  me some examples where this will matter, I 

  • 16  guess. 

  • 17  MR. FLEMING: Well, there — as the 

  • 18  amici, the American Immigration Lawyers 

  • 19  Association and the EOIR judges, point out, it 

  • 20  — it’s not uncommon.Best, Jeff

********************

And, here’s more coverage from Human Rights First:

Courtesy Paul Ratje — AFP via Getty Images

 

A man sits in a migrant camp near Reynosa, Tamaulipas, Mexico.

The new version of MPP expands its focus to asylum seekers from across the hemisphere, stranding even more people seeking safety in dangerous conditions at the border.

 

Kennji Kizuka, Associate Director for Research and Analysis, Refugee Protection, appeared on Democracy Now! and detailed the many human rights violations faced by asylum seekers processed under the “Remain in Mexico” policy.

 

“It’s extraordinarily concerning that the Biden administration is not only restarting this policy but expanding it,” said Kizuka.

Human Rights First also announced the resumption of our research documenting the human rights abuses suffered by people turned away to wait in danger under MPP.

 

Human Rights First’s Associate Attorney, Refugee Protection Julia Neusner and Advocacy Strategist for Refugee Protection Ana Ortega Villegas are on the ground in Ciudad Juárez to monitor the first days of MPP’s reinstatement.  Please follow their live updates and other reports through Human Rights First’s twitter account.

Our team’s view of the Mexican government’s

staging area in Cuidad Juárez for Remain in Mexico 2.0

 

Our position is gaining widespread support from those who understand the issue.  The Roundtable of Former Immigration Judges condemned

MPP as the “antithesis of fairness,” concluding that there has been “no greater affront to due process, fairness and transparency,” and called for administration to “permanently end the program.”

 

The union for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) asylum officers tasked with MPP screenings call it “irredeemably flawed.”  They said that restarting MPP “makes our members complicit in violations of U.S. federal law and binding international treaty obligations of non-refoulement that they have sworn to uphold.”

******************

So proud to be a part of this group and so grateful for the leadership of colleagues like Judges Jeffrey Chase, Ilyce Shugall, Lory Rosenberg, Carol King, Joan Churchill, Denise Slavin, Sue Roy, John Gossart, Charles Honeyman, Charlie Pazar, Sarah Burr, Cecelia Espenoza, Bruce Einhorn, Tue Phan-Quang, Bob Weisel, Paul Grussendorf, Jennie Giambastini, and many, many, many others! 

As an “appreciative fellow NDPA member” told me yesterday, “it’s a true team effort!“ This type of teamwork for the public good was once encouraged at EOIR and even incorporated into the “leadership vision,” but now, sadly, it has “fallen by the wayside” in what has basically become a “haste makes waste race to the bottom.”

Fortunately, the Round Table and other members of the NDPA still share a “vision of what American justice should look like” and are willing to speak up for what’s legal and right rather than just “expedient!”

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

12-09-21

☹️MEDIA SHOULD STOP GIVING GOP TOTALLY UNWARRANTED “FREE PASS” ON “BORDER BS!” — “The situation under former president Donald Trump was substantially worse from a humanitarian and a pragmatic governing perspective: worse for the migrants, worse for the rule of law and worse for our country.” — Greg Sargent @ WashPost sets the record straight!

 

Greg Sargent
Greg Sargent
Opinion Writer
Washington Post

https://apple.news/Axz03Bes6T3ODoCivCDQ96g

Republicans are convinced that attacking President Biden’s border policies will win them the midterms. House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) has gleefully labeled the situation there “Biden’s border crisis.”

In this, Republicans are benefiting from a media debate that has gone off the rails.

There’s a huge hole in this GOP attack, but it’s rarely described clearly in news reports and commentary. You can read endless headlines warning of a “crisis.” But even if that’s so, a crisis relative to what, exactly ?

What’s missing is a serious comparison with the pre-Biden status quo. It’s as if the current situation exists in a vacuum: Before there was no crisis, and now there’s a crisis .

That’s absurd. The situation under former president Donald Trump was substantially worse from a humanitarian and a pragmatic governing perspective: worse for the migrants, worse for the rule of law and worse for our country.

Biden is cleaning up Trump’s mess

It’s true that child and teenage migrants are overwhelming our facilities.

Because they can’t get released alone, they must be held at Border Patrol facilities for 72 hours before getting transferred to the Office of Refugee Resettlement, which places them with relatives or guardians. The ORR facilities are jammed, backlogging border facilities.

This is a terrible situation. But it’s happening in large part because Biden is undoing a Trump policy that should be undone.

Due to covid-19, the previous administration turned away most asylum seekers — without hearings — under a legal provision allowing a temporary block on noncitizens from entering to protect public health.

Biden is no longer applying this provision to unaccompanied children and teenagers (while keeping it for adults), helping fuel child backlogs. But that’s a move in the right direction, both from a humanitarian and rule-of-law perspective.

Coronavirus will be tamed before long, and we have a legal obligation to allow migrants to exercise their right to seek asylum. And as David Bier notes, that provision is not for controlling migrant flows outside a genuine public health rationale. If anything, expelling adults abuses it.

So continuing to use this tool is not a tenable long-term solution to the humanitarian problem, and it’s not in keeping with the rule of law. That requires letting in the kids, and we will have to allow more adults to apply for asylum. The question is how we manage it.

. . . .

******************

Read Greg’s full op-ed at the link.

I understand why Fox News, Breitbart, and the rest of the “truth averse” right wing media shills promote the GOP’s racist, xenophobic “border crisis” myths.

What I don’t get is why the so-called “mainstream media” doesn’t do its homework on the real situation on the border and the Trump-created mess facing Biden in restoring some sense of order and lawful behavior to an intentionally broken and dysfunctional system. 

A few journalists like Greg, his WashPost colleague Arelis Hernandez, Cindy Carcamo (LA Times), Nicole Narea (Vox News), and Priscilla Alvarez (CNN), to name some, have taken the time to get it right (or close to right). But, far too many reporters who should know better just repeat the Abbott, McCarthy, GOP disingenuous nonsense without critical analysis or pushback. 

And, what’s sorely missing is the perspective of those at the heart of this situation: the kids and families faced with such a desperate situation in their home countries that they are willing to seek mercy and refuge in a country that proudly advertises its lack of respect for their humanity, our own laws, and international norms that are supposed to insure fair and humane treatment. 

They aren’t numbers, stats, bar graphs, and trend lines — they are human beings. They assert rights to apply for refuge under international norms that the U.S. has written into laws –  laws we have unilaterally decided not to follow.

The overwhelming majority seek not to “evade” authorities, but to turn themselves in to our legal system: A system that functionally no longer exists at our Southern Border thanks to Trump and, to some extent, the Supremes. This is neither a “law enforcement” nor a “national security” crisis — it’s a fundamental breakdown in our legal system and a betrayal of humane values. 

That’s the real problem here. It originated long before the Biden Administration. To date, no GOP  politico has offered any type of constructive solution. And, too few journalists have held the GOP nativists accountable for their racist-inspired lies, misrepresentations, myths, and lack of any semblance of constructive proposals for rational, lawful, governance — real solutions for problems aggravated by their own toxic, inhumane, and often illegal policies!

🇺🇸⚖️🗽Due Process Forever!

PWS

03-17-21

CNN: Some Separated Families Reunited; Biden Restores Legal Immigration; “Remain in Mexico” Phaseout Begins!

Priscilla Alvarez
CNN Digital Expansion 2019, Priscilla Alvarez
Politics Reporter, CNN

Immigration

 

Lawyers are slowly making progress in locating and reuniting children and families separated at the southern US border as part of the Trump administration’s “zero tolerance” immigration policy. A month ago, the parents of 611 children had yet to be located. Now, that number is down to 506. President Biden this month signed an executive order establishing a new task force designed to identify and reunify these separated families. Meanwhile, the Biden administration has lifted an order that temporarily banned certain immigrant visas during the pandemic and will begin admitting some of the hundreds of migrants held in deplorable conditions in tent camps as part of a policy requiring them to stay in Mexico until their US court dates. Both these decisions are reversals of controversial Trump-era policies.

*********************

Progress on restoring the rule of law at the border and in our legal immigration system, although many advocates yearn for much faster remedial action. Links to more detailed analysis, much of it by CNN All-Star 🌟 Immigration Reporter Priscilla Alvarez, are embedded in the above CNN summary.

🇺🇸⚖️🗽Due Process Forever!

PWS

02-25-21

DEMS INTRODUCE BIDEN’S COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION BILL — “U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACT OF 2021” — Lots Of Good Ideas, But Likely DOA In Narrowly Divided Congress! — Judge Garland Must Begin Immigration Court Reforms NOW!

Priscilla Alvarez
CNN Digital Expansion 2019, Priscilla Alvarez
Politics Reporter, CNN, PHOTO: CNN.com
Lauren Fox
Lauren Fox
White House Correspondent, CNN News
PHOTO: CNN.com

https://apple.news/AATkWfagCTF2iNQGfw6dDOA

White House announces sweeping immigration bill

Priscilla Alvarez and Lauren Fox, CNN

5:00 AM EST February 18, 2021

The White House announced a sweeping immigration bill Thursday that would create an eight-year path to citizenship for millions of immigrants already in the country and provide a faster track for undocumented immigrants brought to the US as children.

The legislation faces an uphill climb in a narrowly divided Congress, where House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has just a five-vote margin and Senate Democrats do not have the 60 Democratic votes needed to pass the measure with just their party’s support.

Administration officials argued Wednesday evening that the legislation was an attempt by President Joe Biden to restart a conversation on overhauling the US immigration system and said he remained open to negotiating.

“He was in the Senate for 36 years, and he is the first to tell you the legislative process can look different on the other end than where it starts,” one administration official said in a call with reporters, adding that Biden would be “willing to work with Congress.”

The effort comes as there are multiple standalone bills in Congress aimed at revising smaller pieces of the country’s immigration system. Sens. Lindsey Graham, a Republican from South Carolina, and Majority Whip Dick Durbin, a Democrat from Illinois, for example, have reintroduced their DREAM Act, which would provide a path to citizenship for immigrants who came to the country illegally as children.

Administration officials said the best path forward and plans either to pass one bill or break it into multiple pieces would be up to Congress.

“There’s things that I would deal by itself, but not at the expense of saying, ‘I’m never going to do the other.’ There is a reasonable path to citizenship,” Biden said at a CNN town hall in Milwaukee on Tuesday.

“The President is committed to working with Congress to engage in conversations about the best way forward,” one administration official said.

Officials did not say if they believed that the reconciliation process, a special budget tool that applies only to a specific subset of legislation and allows the Senate to pass bills with a simple majority, would be applicable for an immigration bill. “Too early to speculate about it right now,” one official said.

The Senate is working on passing the President’s coronavirus relief legislation through reconciliation. The expectation is that the administration could also use the process to pass an infrastructure bill.

Biden’s immigration bill will be introduced by Democrats Bob Menendez of New Jersey in the Senate and Linda Sanchez of California in the House.

Here’s what the bill, titled the US Citizenship Act of 2021, includes:

. . . .

**************************

Read the rest of Priscilla’s & Lauren’s analysis at the link.

The White House “Fact Sheet” on the legislation is also available at the link at the end of the above excerpt.

Here’s what that summary says about the U.S. Immigration Courts:

  • Improve the immigration courts and protect vulnerable individuals. The bill expands family case management programs, reduces immigration court backlogs, expands training for immigration judges, and improves technology for immigration courts. The bill also restores fairness and balance to our immigration system by providing judges and adjudicators with discretion to review cases and grant relief to deserving individuals. Funding is authorized for legal orientation programs and counsel for children, vulnerable individuals, and others when necessary to ensure the fair and efficient resolution of their claims. The bill also provides funding for school districts educating unaccompanied children, while clarifying sponsor responsibilities for such children.

  • Support asylum seekers and other vulnerable populations. The bill eliminates the one-year deadline for filing asylum claims and provides funding to reduce asylum application backlogs. It also increases protections for U visa, T visa, and VAWA applicants, including by raising the cap on U visas from 10,000 to 30,000. The bill also expands protections for foreign nationals assisting U.S. troops.

Unfortunately, the bill does not contain the most important legislative solution: An Article I  Immigration Court. Nevertheless, a separate Article I bill will be introduced in the House soon. Since the “USCA of 2021” is largely a “talking draft” anyway, there is no reason why Article I couldn’t be combined with the other changes in the bill.

While attention to improving the Immigration Courts is welcome and long overdue, I think this proposal actually misses the major point: What’s needed right now isn’t necessarily more Immigration Judges; it’s better Immigration Judges, starting, but not ending, with a replacement of the current dysfunctional Board of Immigration Appeals. Only with the improvements in the administrative case law, docket management, and “best practices” that better EOIR judges would bring could we really tell whether more judges are actually necessary.

Right now, throwing more bodies into the ungodly mess at EOIR would only create confusion and aggravate existing problems. And, while the proposal correctly spotlights woeful inadequacies in IJ training and professional development, those alone will not be enough to restore due process to a system wracked by decades of bad judicial selection practices that basically have excluded the “best and brightest” immigration experts from the private sector, those with actual experience representing individuals in Immigration Court, from the “21st Century Immigration Judiciary.”

The good news: Judge Garland won’t need legislation to get this system back on track by:

  • Immediately replacing the current BIA with judges who are renowned experts in immigration, human rights, and due process, with special attention to those with actual experience representing asylum seekers;
  • Vacating all of the improper Sessions and Barr precedents, and letting the “new BIA” straighten out the law and implement best practices, including holding IJs who are members of the “Asylum Deniers Club” accountable;
  • Implementing efficient merit-based judicial hiring practices which would involve public input and actively recruit from communities now underrepresented in the Immigration Judiciary;
  • Eventually re-competing all Immigration Judge jobs under these merit criteria, again with public input on the performance of current judges part of the process;
  • Replacing all of EOIR’s incompetent upper “management” with competent professional judicial administrators;
  • Examining the justification and “bang for the buck” in EOIR’s bloated, yet highly ineffective, headquarters operation in Falls Church with an eye toward maximizing support for the local Immigration Courts and minimizing counterproductive and politicized micromanagement and interference with the operation of local courts;
  • Making peace and working with the National Association of Immigration Judges (“NAIJ”), which is much more “on top of” the real problems in the Immigration Courts than often clueless EOIR “management” in Falls Church;
  • Instituting e-filing and other long overdue 21st Century judicial administration practices in the Immigration Courts;
  • Working cooperatively with the private bar, NGOs, ICE, and local IJs to maximize representation and improve docketing and scheduling practices.

Judge Garland has the authority to make all the foregoing changes, which will immediately improve the delivery of justice at the critical “retail level” of our justice system and make the achievement of racial justice and equal justice for all more than just “pipe dreams.” Immigrant justice is essential for racial justice!

The only question is whether Judge Garland will actually do what’s necessary. If not, he can expect some “aggressive pushback” from those of us who are fed up with the “EOIR Clown Show” 🤡🦹🏿‍♂️☠️ and its daily mockery of American justice!

🇺🇸🗽⚖️👨🏻‍⚖️🧑🏽‍⚖️👩‍⚖️Due Process Forever!

PWS

02-18-21

********************

UPDATE: Here’s the text of the bill:

2021.02.18 US Citizenship Act Bill Text – SIGNED

PWS

02-18-21

 

 

🏴‍☠️☠️AMERICAN JUSTICE FAILS: SUPREMES SHAFT ASYLUM SEEKERS — Only Justices Sotomayor & Kagan Stand Up For Rule of Law, Human Rights, Rationality: “Today’s decision handcuffs the Judiciary’s ability to perform its constitutional duty to safeguard individual liberty and dismantles a critical component of the separation of powers. It will leave significant exercises of executive discretion unchecked in the very circumstance where the writ’s protections ‘have been strongest.’ INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 301 (2001). And it increases the risk of erroneous immigration decisions that contravene governing statutes and treaties.”—DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ET AL. v. THURAISSIGIAM

☠️👎

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ET AL. v. THURAISSIGIAM, 06-25-48

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-161_g314.pdf

COUIRT SYLLABUS:

Syllabus

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ET AL. v. THURAISSIGIAM

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–161. Argued March 2, 2020—Decided June 25, 2020

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) provides for the expedited removal of certain “applicants” seeking admission into the United States, whether at a designated port of entry or elsewhere. 8 U. S. C. §1225(a)(1). An applicant may avoid expedited removal by demonstrating to an asylum officer a “credible fear of persecution,” defined as “a significant possibility . . . that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum.” §1225(b)(1)(B)(v). An ap- plicant who makes this showing is entitled to “full consideration” of an asylum claim in a standard removal hearing. 8 CFR §208.30(f). An asylum officer’s rejection of a credible-fear claim is reviewed by a su- pervisor and may then be appealed to an immigration judge. §§208.30(e)(8), 1003.42(c), (d)(1). But IIRIRA limits the review that a federal court may conduct on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 8 U. S. C. §1252(e)(2). In particular, courts may not review “the deter- mination” that an applicant lacks a credible fear of persecution. §1252(a)(2)(A)(iii).

Respondent Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam is a Sri Lankan national who was stopped just 25 yards after crossing the southern border with- out inspection or an entry document. He was detained for expedited removal. An asylum officer rejected his credible-fear claim, a super- vising officer agreed, and an Immigration Judge affirmed. Respondent then filed a federal habeas petition, asserting for the first time a fear of persecution based on his Tamil ethnicity and political views and re- questing a new opportunity to apply for asylum. The District Court dismissed the petition, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that, as applied here, §1252(e)(2) violates the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause.

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Syllabus

Held:

1. As applied here, §1252(e)(2) does not violate the Suspension

Clause. Pp. 11–33.

(a) The Suspension Clause provides that “[t]he Privilege of the

Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Art. I, §9, cl. 2. This Court has held that, at a minimum, the Clause “protects the writ as it existed in 1789,” when the Constitution was adopted. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 301. Habeas has traditionally provided a means to seek release from unlawful detention. Respondent does not seek release from custody, but an additional opportunity to obtain asy- lum. His claims therefore fall outside the scope of the writ as it existed when the Constitution was adopted. Pp. 11–15.

(b) Respondent contends that three bodies of case law support his argument that the Suspension Clause guarantees a broader habeas right, but none do. Pp. 15–33.

(1) Respondent first points to British and American cases de- cided before or around the Constitution’s adoption. All those cases show is that habeas was used to seek release from detention in a vari- ety of circumstances. Respondent argues that some cases show aliens using habeas to remain in a country. But the relief ordered in those cases was simply release; an alien petitioner’s ability to remain in the country was due to immigration law, or lack thereof. The relief that a habeas court may order and the collateral consequences of that relief are two entirely different things. Pp. 15–23.

(2) Although respondent claims to rely on the writ as it existed in 1789, his argument focuses on this Court’s decisions during the “fi- nality era,” which takes its name from a feature of the Immigration Act of 1891 making certain immigration decisions “final.” In Nishi- mura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, the Court interpreted the Act to preclude judicial review only of questions of fact. Federal courts otherwise retained authority under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 to determine whether an alien was detained in violation of federal law. Thus, when aliens sought habeas relief during the finality era, the Court exercised habeas jurisdiction that was conferred by the habeas statute, not because it was required by the Suspension Clause—which the Court did not mention. Pp. 23–32.

(3) The Court’s more recent decisions in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, and St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, also do not support respond- ent’s argument. Boumediene was not about immigration at all, and St. Cyr reaffirmed that the common-law habeas writ provided a vehicle to challenge detention and could be invoked by aliens already in the coun- try who were held in custody pending deportation. It did not approve respondent’s very different attempted use of the writ. Pp. 32–33.

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2. As applied here, §1252(e)(2) does not violate the Due Process Clause. More than a century of precedent establishes that, for aliens seeking initial entry, “the decisions of executive or administrative of- ficers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.” Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U. S., at 660. Respondent ar- gues that this rule does not apply to him because he succeeded in mak- ing it 25 yards into U. S. territory. But the rule would be meaningless if it became inoperative as soon as an arriving alien set foot on U. S. soil. An alien who is detained shortly after unlawful entry cannot be said to have “effected an entry.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 693. An alien in respondent’s position, therefore, has only those rights re- garding admission that Congress has provided by statute. In respond- ent’s case, Congress provided the right to a “determin[ation]” whether he had “a significant possibility” of “establish[ing] eligibility for asy- lum,” and he was given that right. §§1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (v). Pp. 34–36.

917 F. 3d 1097, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., andTHOMAS,GORSUCH,andKAVANAUGH,JJ.,joined. THOMAS,J.,fileda concurring opinion. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judg- ment, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined.

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A very sad, tragic moment for American Justice, as seven Justices turn their collective backs on Constitutional Due Process, international asylum protections, common sense, and human decency. 

It also shows their appalling intellectual dishonesty and/or lack of knowledge about how asylum seekers lives and human rights are being trashed by this Administration’s White Nationalist agenda. One could only hope that these seven Justices are someday “reincarnated” and condemned to being refugees seeking justice, mercy, and humanity from America in the “age of Trump.” Little wonder that Stephen Miller and his White Nationalist gang believe they will get away with eliminating asylum law under the guise of bogus “regulations” that eliminate eligibility for everyone who might need protection.

In the end, despite the denial of this tone-deaf judicial group, human rights are everyone’s rights and demeaning and disregarding them will come back to haunt and disfigure our nation and our world for generations to come.

The only part of this decision worth reading is the Sotomayor/Kagan dissent, which I set forth in full as a “marker” for future historians chronicling the “death of the Constitution and humanity in America” and the Supreme Court’s key enabling and encouraging role in “Dred Scottifying” and “dehumanizing” the other, largely along racial, ethnic, and religious lines. Sotomayor’s critique of her colleagues is correct.

The good news: The best way to solve Executive abuses is with a new and better Executive. Moreover, a future Administration and a better Congress could restore asylum and refugee laws and “re-codify due process rights as statutes” so that they would be enforced by courts, even the Supremes. The problem started with Congress. A wiser, better, and more humanitarian Congess could end it.

But, in the meantime, back in the grim real world of refugees and asylum seekers, many will die, be tortured, or otherwise harmed because of the Supremes’ willful blindness to the abuses and indignities being inflicted upon the most vulnerable with the aid and active assistance of our own Government. There is a name of that type of conduct.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–161 _________________

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. VIJAYAKUMAR THURAISSIGIAM

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 25, 2020]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN joins, dissenting.

The majority declares that the Executive Branch’s denial of asylum claims in expedited removal proceedings shall be functionally unreviewable through the writ of habeas cor- pus, no matter whether the denial is arbitrary or irrational or contrary to governing law. That determination flouts over a century of this Court’s practice. In case after case, we have heard claims indistinguishable from those re- spondent raises here, which fall within the heartland of ha- beas jurisdiction going directly to the origins of the Great Writ.

The Court thus purges an entire class of legal challenges to executive detention from habeas review, circumscribing that foundational and “stable bulwark of our liberties,” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 99 (Am. ed. 1832). By self-im- posing this limitation on habeas relief in the absence of a congressional suspension, the Court abdicates its constitu- tional duty and rejects precedent extending to the founda- tions of our common law.

Making matters worse, the Court holds that the Consti- tution’s due process protections do not extend to noncitizens like respondent, who challenge the procedures used to de- termine whether they may seek shelter in this country or

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whether they may be cast to an unknown fate. The decision deprives them of any means to ensure the integrity of an expedited removal order, an order which, the Court has just held, is not subject to any meaningful judicial oversight as to its substance. In doing so, the Court upends settled con- stitutional law and paves the way toward transforming al- ready summary expedited removal proceedings into arbi- trary administrative adjudications.

Today’s decision handcuffs the Judiciary’s ability to per- form its constitutional duty to safeguard individual liberty and dismantles a critical component of the separation of powers. It will leave significant exercises of executive dis- cretion unchecked in the very circumstance where the writ’s protections “have been strongest.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 301 (2001). And it increases the risk of erroneous immigration decisions that contravene governing statutes and treaties.

The Court appears to justify its decision by adverting to the burdens of affording robust judicial review of asylum decisions. But our constitutional protections should not hinge on the vicissitudes of the political climate or bend to accommodate burdens on the Judiciary. I respectfully dis- sent.

I

The as-applied challenge here largely turns on how the Court construes respondent’s requests for relief. Its de- scriptions, as well as those of one of the concurrences, skew the essence of these claims. A proper reframing thus is in order.

A

Respondent first advances a straightforward legal ques- tion that courts have heard in habeas corpus proceedings in “case after case.” Id., at 306. His habeas petition claimed that an asylum officer and Immigration Judge “appl[ied] an

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incorrect legal standard” by ordering him removed despite a showing of a significant possibility of credible fear to es- tablish “eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and [Convention Against Torture] claims.” App. 31–32; see also 8 U. S. C. §1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (setting standard for credible fear as “a significant possibility, taking into account the . . . statements made by the alien . . . and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eli- gibility for asylum”). The Government itself has character- ized that claim as a challenge to the “ ‘application of a legal standard to factual determinations . . . underlying the Ex- ecutive’snegativecredible-fearfindings.’” 917F.3d1097, 1117, n. 20 (CA9 2019) (case below). At bottom, respondent alleged that he was unlawfully denied admission under gov- erning asylum statutes and regulations.

The Court disagrees, flattening respondent’s claim into a mere plea “ultimately to obtain authorization to stay in this country.” Ante, at 2; see also ante, at 12 (describing the re- quest as a “right to enter or remain in a country”); ante, at 13, n. 14 (framing relief sought as “gaining a right to remain in this country”); ante, at 16 (equating relief with “authori- zation . . . to remain in a country other than his own”). Yet while the Court repeatedly says that respondent seeks nothing more than admission as a matter of grace, its own descriptions of respondent’s habeas petition belie its asser- tions. See, e.g., ante, at 5, n. 5 (“[T]he gravamen of his pe- tition is that [respondent] faces persecution in Sri Lanka ‘because of’ his Tamil ethnicity and political opinions”); ibid. (suggesting that the same persecution inquiry governs respondent’s Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment claim); ante, at 36, n. 28 (observing that respondent’s habeas peti- tion contains factual allegations that resemble documented persecution on the basis of ethnicity or political opinion). Though the Court refuses to admit as much, its descriptions of respondent’s arguments illustrate, at bottom, claims that

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immigration officials legally erred in their review of his asy- lum application.

In papering over the true nature of respondent’s claims, the Court transforms his assertions of legal error in the ex- ercise of executive discretion into a naked demand for exec- utive action. But the distinction between those forms of re- lief makes all the difference. The law has long permitted habeas petitioners to challenge the legality of the exercise of executive power, even if the executive action ultimately sought is discretionary. See St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 307 (citing cases). That principle has even more force today, where an entire scheme of statutes and regulations cabins the Exec- utive’s discretion in evaluating asylum applications. For that reason, the Court’s observation that the ultimate “grant of asylum is discretionary” is beside the point. Ante, at 5, n. 4.

For its part, one concurring opinion seems to acknowledge that claims that assert something other than pure factual error may constitutionally require some judi- cial review. Ante, at 3–5 (BREYER, J., concurring in judg- ment). It simply determines that respondent’s credible-fear claims amount to nothing more than a “disagreement with immigration officials’ findings about the two brute facts un- derlying their credible-fear determination,” namely, the identity of his attackers and their motivations. Ante, at 5. It also faults respondent for failing to develop his claims of legal error with citations “indicating that immigration offi- cials misidentified or misunderstood the proper legal stand- ard” or that they “disregarded” or were not properly trained in identifying relevant country conditions. Ante, at 5–6.

But the essence of respondent’s petition is that the facts as presented (that he, a Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, was abducted by unidentified men in a van and severely beaten), when considered in light of known country condi- tions (as required by statute), amount at least to a “signifi- cant possibility” that he could show a well-founded fear of

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persecution. So viewed, respondent’s challenge does not quibble with historic facts, but rather claims that those “settled facts satisfy a legal standard,” which this Court has held amounts to a “legal inquiry.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 4). The concur- ring opinion suggests that any conclusions drawn from the discrete settled facts here could not be “so egregiously wrong” as to amount to legal error. Ante, at 6. But the ul- timate inquiry is simply whether the facts presented satisfy a statutory standard. While this concurring opinion may believe that the facts presented here do not show that re- spondent is entitled to relief, its view of the merits does not alter the legal nature of respondent’s challenge.

B

Second, respondent contended that the inadequate proce- dures afforded to him in his removal proceedings violated constitutional due process. Among other things, he as- serted that the removal proceedings by design did not pro- vide him a meaningful opportunity to establish his claims, that the translator and asylum officer misunderstood him, and that he was not given a “reasoned explanation” for the decision. App. 27, 32; see also id., at 32 (arguing that “[u]nder constitutionally adequate procedures, [respond- ent] would have prevailed on his claims”). Again, however, the Court falls short of capturing the procedural relief ac- tually requested. The Court vaguely suggests that respond- ent merely wanted more cracks at obtaining review of his asylum claims, not that he wanted to challenge the existing expedited removal framework or the process actually ren- dered in his case as constitutionally inadequate. See ante, at 2 (characterizing respondent as asking for “additional administrative review of his asylum claim”); see also ante, at 5, n. 5 (describing petition as seeking “another oppor- tunity to apply for asylum”). That misconstrues respond-

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ent’s procedural challenges to the expedited removal pro- ceedings, which matters crucially; a constitutional chal- lenge to executive detention is just the sort of claim the com- mon law has long recognized as cognizable in habeas. See generally Part II, infra.

One concurring opinion, meanwhile, properly character- izes respondent’s claims on this score as “procedural” chal- lenges. Ante, at 7 (opinion of BREYER, J.). Yet it concludes that those claims are not reviewable because they do not allege sufficiently serious defects. See ante, at 7–8 (describ- ing cognizable claims as those involving “ ‘no [factual] find- ing[s],’” contentions that officials “skipped a layer of intra- agency review altogether,” the “outright denial (or construc- tive denial) of a process,” or an official’s “fail[ure] entirely to take obligatory procedural steps”). But these are simply distinctions of degree, not of kind. Respondent claimed that officials violated governing asylum regulations and de- prived him of due process by conducting an inadequate in- terview and providing incomplete translation services. It is difficult to see the difference between those claims and the ones that the concurring opinion upholds as cognizable. Cf. ante, at 7–8 (finding cognizable claims that an official “short-circuit[ed] altogether legally prescribed adjudication procedures by ‘dictating’ an immigration decision” and that an official deprived a noncitizen of “ ‘an opportunity to prove his right to enter the country, as the statute meant that he should have’”).

Indeed, the concurring opinion notes that the core ques- tion is whether a defect “fundamentally undermined the ef- ficacy of process prescribed by law.” Ante, at 7. Respond- ent’s petition plainly posits procedural defects that violate, or at least call into question, the “efficacy of process pre- scribed by law” and the Constitution. Ibid. The concurring opinion might think that respondent is not entitled to addi- tional protections as a matter of law or that the facts do not show he was denied any required process. But conclusions

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about the merits of respondent’s procedural challenges should not foreclose his ability to bring them in the first place.

C

Finally, the Court asserts that respondent did not specif- ically seek “release” from custody in what the Court styles as the “traditional” sense of the term as understood in ha- beas jurisprudence. Ante, at 10, 13; cf. ante, at 14 (suggest- ing that respondent “does not claim an entitlement to re- lease”). Instead, the Court seems to argue that respondent seeks only a peculiar form of release: admission into the United States or additional asylum procedures that would allow for admission into the United States. Such a request, the Court implies, is more akin to mandamus and injunc- tive relief. Ante, at 13.

But it is the Court’s directionality requirement that bucks tradition. Respondent asks merely to be freed from wrongful executive custody. He asserts that he has a cred- ible fear of persecution, and asylum statutes authorize him to remain in the country if he does. That request is indis- tinguishable from, and no less “traditional” than, those long made by noncitizens challenging restraints that prevented them from otherwise entering or remaining in a country not their own. See Part II–B–1, infra.

The Court has also never described “release” as the sole remedy of the Great Writ. Nevertheless, respondent’s peti- tion is not limited in the way the Court claims. As it acknowledges, ante, at 10, respondent directly asked the District Court to “[i]ssue a writ of habeas corpus” without further limitation on the kind of relief that might entail, App. 33. Respondent also sought “an [o]rder directing [the Government] to show cause why the writ should not be granted” and an order “directing [the Government] to va- cate the expedited removal order entered against [him].” Ibid. As the petition’s plain language indicates, respondent

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raised a garden-variety plea for habeas relief in whatever form available and appropriate, including, but not limited to, release.

***

Fairly characterized, respondent’s claims allege legal er- ror (for violations of governing asylum law and for viola- tions of procedural due process) and an open-ended request for habeas relief. It is “uncontroversial” that the writ en- compasses such claims. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, 779 (2008) (concluding that release is but one form of relief available); see also St. Cyr., 533 U. S., at 302, 304– 308 (citing cases predating the founding to show that the writ could challenge “the erroneous application or interpre- tation” of relevant law); see also Part II–D, infra.

II

Only by recasting respondent’s claims and precedents does the Court reach its decision on the merits. By its ac- count, none of our governing cases, recent or centuries old, recognize that the Suspension Clause guards a habeas right to the type of release that respondent allegedly seeks.1

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1 The Court wisely declines to explore whether the Suspension Clause

independently guarantees the availability of the writ or simply restricts the temporary withholding of its operation, a point of disagreement be- tween the majority and dissent in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289 (2001). Ante, at 11, n. 12. Justice Scalia, dissenting in St. Cyr, wrote that the Suspension Clause “does not guarantee any content to (or even the exist- ence of ) the writ of habeas corpus, but merely provides that the writ shall not (except in case of rebellion or invasion) be suspended.” 533 U. S., at 337. But no majority of this Court, at any time, has adopted that theory. Notably, moreover, even Justice Scalia appears to have abandoned his position just three years later in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 555– 556 (2004) (dissenting opinion) (“The two ideas central to Blackstone’s understanding—due process as the right secured, and habeas corpus as the instrument by which due process could be insisted upon by a citizen illegally imprisoned—found expression in the Constitution’s Due Process and Suspension Clauses”); see also id., at 558 (“The writ of habeas corpus

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Ante, at 13, n. 14 (finding no evidence that the writ was un- derstood in 1789 to grant relief that would amount to “gain- ing a right to remain in this country”); ante, at 13 (charac- terizing a “‘meaningful opportunity’” for review of asylum claims as falling outside of traditional notions of release from custody). An overview of cases starting from the colo- nial period to the present reveals that the Court is incor- rect, even accepting its improper framing of respondent’s claims.

A

The critical inquiry, the Court contends, is whether re- spondent’s specific requests for relief (namely, admission into the United States or additional asylum procedures al- lowing for admission into the United States) fall within the scope of the kind of release afforded by the writ as it existed in 1789. Ante, at 11, 12; see also ante, at 10 (criticizing the court below for holding §1252(e)(2) unconstitutional “with- out citing any pre-1789 case about the scope of the writ”). This scope, it explains, is what the Suspension Clause pro- tects “at a minimum.” Ante, at 11. But as the Court implic- itly acknowledges, its inquiry is impossible. The inquiry also runs headlong into precedent, which has never de- manded the kind of precise factual match with pre-1789 case law that today’s Court demands.

To start, the Court recognizes the pitfalls of relying on pre-1789 cases to establish principles relevant to immigra- tion and asylum: “At the time, England had nothing like modern immigration restrictions.” Ante, at 18–19 (“As late as 1816, the word ‘deportation’ apparently ‘was not to be found in any English dictionary’”). It notes, too, that our

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was preserved in the Constitution—the only common-law writ to be ex- plicitly mentioned”). Even one concurring opinion seems to recognize that the Suspension Clause “protect[s] a substantive right.” Ante, at 3– 4 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).

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cases have repeatedly observed the relative novelty of im- migration laws in the early days of this country. Ante, at 20 (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 588, n. 15 (1952) (“An open door to the immigrant was the early federal policy”); St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 305 (remarking that the first immigration regulation was enacted in 1875)); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 539 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“Because colonial America imposed few restrictions on immigration, there is little case law prior to that time about the availa- bility of habeas review to challenge temporary detention pending exclusion or deportation”).

The Court nevertheless seems to require respondent to engage in an exercise in futility. It demands that respond- ent unearth cases predating comprehensive federal immi- gration regulation showing that noncitizens obtained re- lease from federal custody onto national soil. But no federal statutes at that time spoke to the permissibility of their en- try in the first instance; the United States lacked a compre- hensive asylum regime until the latter half of the 20th cen- tury. Despite the limitations inherent in this exercise, the Court appears to insist on a wealth of cases mirroring the precise relief requested at a granular level; nothing short of that, in the Court’s view, would demonstrate that a noncit- izen in respondent’s position is entitled to the writ. See ante, at 18, n. 18 (dismissing respondent’s cited cases on the ground that “[w]hether the founding generation understood habeas relief more broadly than described by Blackstone, Justice Story, and our prior cases . . . cannot be settled by a single case or even a few obscure and possibly aberrant cases”); see also Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Deten- tion, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 961 (1998) (noting the inherent difficulties of a strict originalist approach in the habeas context because of, among other things, the dearth of reasoned habeas decisions at the founding).

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But this Court has never rigidly demanded a one-to-one match between a habeas petition and a common-law habeas analog. In St. Cyr, for example, the Court considered whether a noncitizen with a controlled substance conviction could challenge on habeas the denial of a discretionary waiver of his deportation order. 533 U. S., at 293. In doing so, the Court did not search high and low for founding-era parallels to waivers of deportation for criminal noncitizens. It simply asked, at a far more general level, whether habeas jurisdiction was historically “invoked on behalf of nonciti- zens . . . in the immigration context” to “challenge Execu- tive . . . detention in civil cases.” Id., at 302, 305. That in- cluded determining whether “[h]abeas courts . . . answered questions of law that arose in the context of discretionary relief ” (including questions regarding the allegedly “erro- neous application or interpretation of statutes”). Id., at 302, and n. 18, 307.

Boumediene is even clearer that the Suspension Clause inquiry does not require a close (much less precise) factual match with historical habeas precedent. There, the Court concluded that the writ applied to noncitizen detainees held in Guantanamo, 553 U. S., at 771, despite frankly admit- ting that a “[d]iligent search by all parties reveal[ed] no cer- tain conclusions” about the relevant scope of the common- law writ in 1789, id., at 746. Indeed, the Court reasoned that none of the cited cases illustrated whether a “common- law court would or would not have granted . . . a petition for a writ of habeas corpus” like that brought by the noncitizen- detainee petitioners, and candidly acknowledged that “the common-law courts simply may not have confronted cases with close parallels.” Id., at 746, 752. But crucially, the Court declined to “infer too much, one way or the other, from the lack of historical evidence on point.” Id., at 752. Instead, it sought to find comparable common-law habeas cases by “analogy.” Id., at 748–752.

There is no squaring the Court’s methodology today with

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St. Cyr or Boumediene. As those cases show, requiring near-complete equivalence between common-law habeas cases and respondent’s habeas claim is out of step with this Court’s longstanding approach in immigration cases.

B 1

Applying the correct (and commonsense) approach to de- fining the Great Writ’s historic scope reveals that respond- ent’s claims have long been recognized in habeas.

Respondent cites Somerset v. Stewart, Lofft. 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K. B. 1772), as an example on point. There, Lord Mansfield issued a writ ordering release of a slave bound for Jamaica, holding that there was no basis in English law for “sending . . . him over” to another country. Id., at 17– 19, 98 Eng. Rep., at 509–510. Thus, the writ issued even though it “did not free [the] slave so much as it protected him from deportation.” P. Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire 175 (2010). Somerset establishes the longstanding availability of the writ to challenge the legal- ity of removal and to secure release into a country in which a petitioner sought shelter. Scholarly discussions of Mur- ray’s Case suggest much of the same. There, the King’s Bench granted habeas to allow a nonnative to remain in England and to prevent his removal to Scotland for trial. Halliday, Habeas Corpus, at 236.

The Court dismisses these examples outright. It acknowledges that the petitioner in Somerset may have been allowed to remain in England because of his release on habeas, yet declares that this was “due not to the wri[t] ordering [his] release” but rather to the existing state of the law. Ante, at 20. But the writ clearly did more than permit the petitioner to disembark from a vessel; it prevented him from being “sen[t] . . . over” to Jamaica. Lofft., at 17, 98 Eng. Rep., at 509. What England’s immigration laws might have prescribed after the writ’s issuance did not bear on the

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availability of the writ as a means to remain in the country in the first instance.

The Court also casts aside the facts of Murray’s Case, even though they, too, reveal that habeas was used to per- mit a nonnative detainee to remain in a country. Ante, at 18, n. 18. The Court minimizes the decision as “obscure and possibly aberrant.” Ibid. But given the relative paucity of habeas cases from this era, it is telling that the case serves as another example of the writ being used to allow a noncit- izen to remain in England.2

The reasoning of Somerset and Murray’s Case carried over to the Colonies, where colonial governments presumed habeas available to noncitizens to secure their residence in a territory. See generally Oldham & Wishnie, The Histori- cal Scope of Habeas Corpus and INS v. St. Cyr, 16 Geo. Im- migration L. J. 485 (2002). For example, in 1755, British authorities sought to deport French Acadian settlers from Nova Scotia, then under the control of Great Britain, to the American Colonies. Id., at 497. The Governor and Assem- bly of South Carolina resisted the migrants’ arrival and de- tained them in ships off the coast of Charleston. They rec- ognized, however, that the exclusion could not persist because the migrants would be entitled to avail themselves of habeas corpus. Id., at 498. Ultimately, the Governor re- leased most of the Acadian migrants for resettlement throughout the Colony. Ibid.

Founding era courts accepted this view of the writ’s scope. Rather than credit these decisions, the Court marches

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2 The Court notes “the ‘delicate’ relationship between England and

Scotland at the time” of Murray’s Case. Ante, at 18, n. 18. Interestingly, the Court does not mention the delicate nature of the relationship be- tween the United States and Iraq in Munaf v. Geren, 553 U. S. 674 (2008), the centerpiece of the Court’s argument, even though that case arose during a military conflict. Ante, at 14–15. Nor does it acknowledge the impact that the relationship had on the Munaf Court’s decision to refrain from issuing the writ. See Part II–B–3, infra.

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through an assorted selection of cases and throws up its hands, contending that the case law merely reflects a wide range of circumstances for which individuals were deprived of their liberty. See ante, at 16–17. Thus, the Court con- cludes, the common law simply did not speak to whether individuals could seek “release” that would allow them to enter a country (as opposed to being expelled from it).

At the same time, notwithstanding its professed keen in- terest in precedent, the Court seems to discount decisions supporting respondent’s view that habeas permitted re- lease from custody into the country. At least two other clas- ses of cases demonstrate that the writ was available from around the founding onward to noncitizens who were de- tained, and wanted to remain, including those who were prevented from entering the United States at all.

First, common-law courts historically granted the writ to discharge deserting foreign sailors found and imprisoned in the United States. In Commonwealth v. Holloway, 1 Serg. & Rawle 392 (1815), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted a writ of habeas corpus to a Danish sailor who had deserted his vessel in violation of both an employment con- tract and Danish law. The court explained that the deser- tion did not violate any domestic law or treaty, and thus imprisonment was inappropriate. Id., at 396 (opinion of Tilghman, C. J.). By ordering an unconditional discharge and declining to return the noncitizen sailor to the custody of any foreign power, the court used the writ to order a re- lease that authorized a noncitizen to remain in the United States, a country “other than his own.” Ante, at 16. The same was true in similar cases that even the Court cites. See ante, at 19 (citing Case of the Deserters from the British Frigate L’Africaine, 3 Am. L. J. & Misc. Repertory 132 (Md. 1810) (reporting on a decision discharging deserters); Case of Hippolyte Dumas, 2 Am. L. J. & Misc. Repertory 86 (Pa. 1809) (same)).

Curiously, the Court does not contest that the writs in

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these cases were used to secure the liberty of foreign sailors, and consequently their right to enter the country.3 Rather, it remarks that judges at the time “chafed at having to or- der even release,” ante, at 19, which some saw as incon- sistent with principles of comity, Holloway, 1 Serg. & Rawle, at 394. But reluctance is not inability. That those judges followed the law’s dictates despite their distaste for the result should give today’s Court pause.

The Court seizes on one case where a court ordered a de- serting sailor to be returned to his foreign vessel-master. See ante, at 14, 19 (citing Ex parte D’Olivera, 7 F. Cas. 853, 854 (No. 3,967) (CC Mass. 1813)). But it reads too much into this one decision. In D’Olivera, the court held that de- serting sailors were unlawfully confined and granted a writ of habeas corpus, but directed that they be discharged to their vessel-master out of “a desire not to encourage deser- tion among foreign seamen.” Id., at 854. As illustrated by other deserter cases supra, the kind of results-oriented de- cisionmaking in D’Olivera does not seem to be the norm. The Court’s proclamation about how the scope of common- law habeas cannot hinge on a “single case” should have equal force here. Ante, at 18, n. 18.

Next, courts routinely granted the writ to release wrong- fully detained noncitizens into Territories other than the detainees’ “own.” Many involved the release of fugitive or former slaves outside their home State. In these cases, courts decided legal questions as to the status of these peti- tioners. In Arabas v. Ivers, 1 Root 92 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1784), for example, a Connecticut court determined that a former slave from New York held in local jail on his alleged master’s instructions had, in fact, been freed through his service in the Continental Army. The court ordered him

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3 Indeed, the Court highlights a striking similarity to the present asy-

lum challenge by observing that the foreign-deserter cases show the “use of habeas to secure release from custody when not in compliance with . . . statute[s] and relevant treaties.” Ante, at 21.

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discharged “upon the ground that he was a freeman, abso- lutely manumitted from his master by enlisting and serving in the army.” Id., at 93. See also In re Belt, 7 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 80 (1848) (granting habeas to discharge an imprisoned fugitive slave whose owner did not timely apply for his re- turn to Maryland); In re Ralph, 1 Morris 1 (Iowa 1839) (dis- charging person from custody on the grounds that he was not a fugitive slave subject to return to Missouri when he had been allowed to travel to the Iowa Territory by his for- mer master); Commonwealth v. Holloway, 2 Serg. & Rawle 305 (Pa. 1816) (holding on habeas corpus that a child born in a free State to a slave was free); In re Richardson’s Case, 20 F. Cas. 703 (No. 11,778) (CC DC 1837) (ordering prisoner to be discharged in the District of Columbia because war- rant was insufficient to establish that he was a runaway slave from Maryland); Commonwealth v. Griffith, 19 Mass. 11 (1823) (contemplating that the status of a freeman seized in Massachusetts as an alleged fugitive from Virginia could be determined on habeas corpus).

The weight of historical evidence demonstrates that com- mon-law courts at and near the founding granted habeas to noncitizen detainees to enter Territories not considered their own, and thus ordered the kind of release that the Court claims falls outside the purview of the common-law writ.

The Court argues that none of this evidence is persuasive because the writ could not be used to compel authorization to enter the United States. Ante, at 20. But that analogy is inapt. Perhaps if respondent here sought to use the writ to grant naturalization, the comparison would be closer. But respondent sought only the proper interpretation and application of asylum law (which statutorily permits him to remain if he shows a credible fear of persecution), or in the alternative, release pursuant to the writ (despite being cog- nizant that he could be denied asylum or rearrested upon release if he were found within the country without legal

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authorization). But that consequence does not deprive re- spondent of the ability to invoke the writ in the first in- stance. See, e.g., Lewis v. Fullerton, 22 Va. 15 (1821) (af- firming that a judgment on habeas corpus in favor of a slave was not conclusive of her rights but merely permitted re- lease from custody on the record before the court and did not prohibit recapture by a master); Ralph, 1 Morris, at 1 (noting that an adjudication that petitioner was not a fugi- tive only exempted him from fugitive-slave laws but did not prohibit master from entering Territory to reclaim him on his own accord).

For these reasons, the Court is wrong to dispute that com- mon-law habeas practice encompassed the kind of release respondent seeks here.

2

The Court also appears to contend that respondent sought merely additional procedures in his habeas adjudi- cation and that this kind of relief does not fall within the traditional scope of the writ. That reflects a misunder- standing of the writ. Habeas courts regularly afforded the state additional opportunities to show that a detention was lawful before ordering what the Court now considers a re- lease outright.

The common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum evolved into what we know and hail as the “Great Writ.” See 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of Eng- land 131 (1768). That writ, at bottom, allowed a court to elicit the cause for an individual’s imprisonment and to en- sure that he be released, granted bail, or promptly tried. See Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States—1776–1865, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 243, 244 (1965). From its origins, the writ did not require immediate release, but contained procedures that would allow the state to proceed against a detainee. Under the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, jailers were ordered to make a “return” to a writ within a designated

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time period and certify the true causes of imprisonment. Id., at 252–253. Justices of the King’s Bench obtained re- turns that provided full legal accounts justifying detention. Halliday & White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 Va. L. Rev. 575, 599–600 (2008) (Halliday & White). They also examined and were guided by depositions upon which a de- tention was founded to determine whether to admit a peti- tioner to bail. Oaks, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 258. Indeed, the King’s Bench routinely considered facts not asserted in the return to assist scrutiny of detentions. Halliday & White 610; see also id., at 611 (documenting instances where the court would consider affidavits of testimony beyond what was included in the return).

Moreover, early practice showed that common-law ha- beas courts routinely held proceedings to determine whether detainees should be discharged immediately or whether the state could subject them to further proceed- ings, including trial in compliance with proper procedures. See Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 125 (1807) (taking tes- timony in conjunction with an “inquiry” to determine whether “the accused shall be discharged or held to trial”). In Ex parte Kaine, 14 F. Cas. 78 (No. 7,597) (CC SDNY 1853), for example, a federal court analyzed whether a pe- titioner, who had been found guilty of an offense by a com- missioner, was subject to extradition. The court passed on questions of law concerning whether the commissioner had the power to adjudicate petitioner’s criminality. Id., at 80. Ultimately, the court found that petitioner was “entitled to be discharged from imprisonment” due to defects in the pro- ceedings before the commissioner, but entertained further evidence on whether he could nevertheless be extradited. Id., at 82. Only after finding no additional evidence that would permit extradition did the court order release. Ibid.

Similarly, in Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509 (1879), the petitioner had been convicted of a capital offense by a

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state court, even though he had committed the offense while a soldier in the United States Army. Id., at 510–511. This Court granted habeas on the grounds that the state- court judgment was void but, because the petitioner had also been found guilty of murder by a military court, never- theless turned the prisoner over to the custody of the mili- tary for appropriate punishment. Id., at 518–520. Not sur- prisingly, then, the Court has found that habeas courts may discharge detainees in a manner that would allow defects in a proceeding below to be corrected. In re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242, 261 (1894).

These examples confirm that outright habeas release was not always immediately awarded. But they also show that common-law courts understood that relief short of release, such as ordering officials to comply with the law and to cor- rect underlying errors, nevertheless fell within the scope of a request for habeas corpus.4

3

Despite exalting the value of pre-1789 precedent, the Court’s key rationale for why respondent does not seek “re- lease” in the so-called traditional sense rests on an inappo- site, contemporary case: Munaf v. Geren, 553 U. S. 674 (2008).5 Ante, at 14. Munaf, the Court claims, shows that

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4 The Court considers irrelevant cases demonstrating that the execu-

tive was permitted to cure defects in detention because “the legality of [respondent’s] detention is not in question” here. Ante, at 17; see also ante, at 32–33 (acknowledging that it is “often ‘appropriate’ to allow the executive to cure defects in a detention” in habeas cases (quoting Boumediene, 553 U. S., at 779)). But as explained in Part I–A, supra, that is exactly what respondent questions by arguing that his detention violated governing asylum law.

5 Oddly, the Court embraces Munaf—a recent decision involving de- tainees held outside the territorial limits of the United States who were subject to prosecution by a foreign sovereign—to support its conclusion about the availability of habeas review. Yet at the same time, it dis- misses respondent’s reliance on Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723 (2008), outright on the grounds that the case is “not about immigration

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habeas is not available to seek an order to be brought into this country. Ante, at 14. But that case is in a category of its own and has no bearing on respondent’s claims here. Munaf addressed a one-of-a-kind scenario involving the transfer of individuals between different sovereigns. There, two United States citizens in Iraq filed habeas petitions seeking to block their transfer to Iraqi authorities after be- ing accused of committing crimes and detained by Ameri- can-led coalition forces pending investigation and prosecu- tion in Iraqi courts. 553 U. S., at 679–680, 692. The central question, this Court repeatedly stated, was “whether United States district courts may exercise their habeas ju- risdiction to enjoin our Armed Forces from transferring in- dividuals detained within another sovereign’s territory to that sovereign’s government for criminal prosecution.” Id., at 689; see also id., at 704.

In concluding that habeas did not extend to the relief sought by the citizens detained in Iraq, the Munaf Court relied on cases involving habeas petitions filed to avoid ex- tradition. Id., at 695–696 (citing Wilson v. Girard, 354 U. S. 524 (1957) (per curiam), and Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109 (1901)). These decisions, the Court concluded, established that American courts lack habeas jurisdiction to enjoin an extradition or similar transfer to a foreign sovereign exer- cising a right to prosecution. 553 U. S., at 696–697. These circumstances, which today’s Court overlooks, mean that Munaf is more like the extradition cases that the Court deems not “pertinent.” Ante, at 20.6

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at all.” Ante, at 32.

6 Nor is the Court correct in dismissing common-law extradition prec- edents as inapposite because they show “nothing more than the use of habeas to secure release from custody.” Ante, at 21. Indeed, these extra- dition cases demonstrate that the common-law writ encompassed exactly the kind of permission to remain in a country that the Court claims falls outside its scope. Ante, at 12, 14. In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 296 (No. 13,563) (CC SDNY 1875), which the Court cites in passing, emphatically af- firmed that habeas corpus was available to challenge detention pending

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In any event, respondent is not similarly situated to the petitioners in Munaf, who sought habeas to thwart removal from the United States in the face of a competing sover- eign’s interests. Mindful that the case implicated “sensitive foreign policy issues in the context of ongoing military op- erations,” the Munaf Court observed that granting habeas relief would “interfere with Iraq’s sovereign right to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders.” 553 U. S., at 692 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id., at 689, 694, 700. For that reason, it proceeded “‘with the circumspection appropriate when this Court is adjudi- cating issues inevitably entangled in the conduct of . . . in- ternational relations.’ ” Id., at 689, 692. Here, of course, no foreign sovereign is exercising a similar claim to custody over respondent during an ongoing conflict that would trig- ger the comity concerns that animated Munaf.

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extradition: “[T]he great purposes of the writ of habeas corpus can be maintained, as they must be. The court issuing the writ must inquire and adjudge whether the commissioner acquired jurisdiction . . . and had before him legal and competent evidence of facts whereon to pass judg- ment as to the fact of criminality, and did not arbitrarily commit the ac- cused for surrender.” Id., at 303. Although the Stupp court did not ulti- mately issue the writ, other courts have. See, e.g., Ex parte Kaine, 14 F. Cas. 78, 82 (No. 7,597) (CC SDNY 1853) (granting the writ to a pris- oner whose detention was “in consequence of illegality in the proceedings under the [extradition] treaty”); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U. S. 205, 219–220 (1904) (affirming a grant of habeas where a prisoner’s detention violated the terms of an extradition treaty with Great Britain); In re Washburn, 4 Johns. Ch. 106, 114 (N. Y. 1819) (granting a habeas petition of a noncit- izen after a request for extradition); People v. Goodhue, 2 Johns. Ch. 198, 200 (N. Y. 1816) (releasing prisoner subject to possible interstate extra- dition). These extradition-related habeas cases show that the writ was undoubtedly used to grant release in the very direction—that is, away from a foreign country and into the United States—that the Court today derides. Indeed, the same scholar the Court cites makes the point that extradition specifically allowed courts to hear challenges to the Execu- tive’s ability to “detain aliens for removal to another country at the re- quest of [the] government.” Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Deten- tion, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 961, 1003 (1998).

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C

Next, the Court casually dismisses nearly 70 years of precedent from the finality era, the most relevant historic period for examining judicial review of immigration deci- sions. It concludes that, in case after case, this Court exer- cised habeas review over legal questions arising in immi- gration cases akin to those at issue here, not because the Constitution required it but only because a statute permit- ted it. Ante, at 23–24. That conclusion is both wrong in its own right and repeats arguments this Court rejected a half century ago when reviewing this same body of cases.

At the turn of the 20th century, immigration to the United States was relatively unrestricted. Public senti- ment, however, grew hostile toward many recent entrants, particularly migrant laborers from China. In response, Congress enacted the so-called Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, which prohibited the entry of Chi- nese laborers to the United States. The Scott Act, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504, enacted in 1888, forbade reentry of Chinese laborers who had left after previously residing in this coun- try. Although immigration officials routinely denied entry to arriving migrants on the basis of these laws, many of these decisions were overturned by federal courts on habeas review. See, e.g., United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U. S. 621 (1888).

This did not escape Congress’ attention. See Select Com- mittee on Immigration & Naturalization, H. R. Rep. No. 4048, 51st Cong., 2d Sess., 273–275 (1891) (documenting rate of reversal of immigration exclusion orders by Federal District Court in San Francisco). Congress responded by enacting the Immigration Act of 1891, which stripped fed- eral courts of their power to review immigration denials: “All decisions made by the inspection officers or their assis- tants touching the right of any alien to land, when adverse to such right, shall be final unless appeal be taken to the

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superintendent of immigration, whose action shall be sub- ject to review by the Secretary of the Treasury.” Act of Mar. 3, 1891, §8, 26 Stat. 1085. By its terms, that restriction on federal judicial power was not limited to review of some un- defined subset of issues, such as questions of law or fact; it made executive immigration decisions final in all respects.

The Court, however, quickly construed the statute in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651 (1892) (Ekiu), to preclude only review of executive factfinding. Having so construed the statute, the Court in Ekiu, and in case after case following Ekiu, recognized the availability of habeas to review a range of legal and constitutional ques- tions arising in immigration decisions. The crucial question here is whether the finality-era Courts adopted that con- struction of jurisdiction-stripping statutes because it was simply the correct interpretation of the statute’s terms and nothing more or because that construction was constitu- tionally compelled to ensure the availability of habeas re- view. The better view is that Ekiu’s construction of the 1891 statute was constitutionally compelled.

In Ekiu, the Court recognized that a Japanese national was entitled to seek a writ of habeas corpus to review an exclusion decision issued almost immediately upon her ar- rival to the United States. As the Court notes, ante, at 26, the relevant issue in that case was whether the 1891 Act, “if construed as vesting . . . exclusive authority” in the Ex- ecutive to determine a noncitizen’s right to enter the United States, violated petitioner’s constitutional “right to the writ of habeas corpus, which carried with it the right to a deter- mination by the court as to the legality of her detention,” 142 U. S., at 656 (statement of the case). That is, the Ekiu Court confronted whether construing the 1891 Act as pre- cluding all judicial review of immigration decisions like the exclusion order at issue would violate the constitutional guarantee to habeas.

The Court answered that question by construing the 1891

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Act as precluding judicial review only of questions of fact. “An alien immigrant,” the Court first held, who is “pre- vented from landing [in the United States] by any [execu- tive] officer . . . and thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful.” Id., at 660. The Court then explained that it had authority to hear the case (de- spite Congress’ clear elimination of judicial review) because it interpreted the 1891 Act as meaning only that an immi- gration official’s determination of “facts” was final and un- reviewable. Ibid. (explaining that Congress could entrust the final determination of facts to executive officers).

After so articulating the 1891 Act’s limits on judicial re- view, the Court analyzed two challenges to the integrity of the proceedings, neither of which raised questions of histor- ical fact. See id., at 662–663 (considering whether immi- gration officer’s appointment was unconstitutional such that his actions were invalid); id., at 663 (determining whether proceedings were unlawful because the officer failed to take sworn testimony or make a record of the deci- sion).7 Although the Court ultimately concluded that those legal and constitutional challenges lacked merit, id., at 662–664, what matters is that the Court evaluated the ar- guments and recognized them as possible grounds for ha- beas relief.

What, then, can Ekiu tell us? Today’s Court finds signif- icant that the brief opinion makes no explicit mention of the Suspension Clause. Ante, at 28. This omission, it con- cludes, can only mean that the Ekiu Court did not think that (or had no occasion to consider whether) the Suspen- sion Clause “imposed any limitations on the authority of Congress to restrict the issuance of writs of habeas corpus

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7 These claims are uncannily reminiscent of the kinds of claims re-

spondent advances here. See Parts II–A and II–B, supra.

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in immigration matters.” Ante, at 27. According to this the- ory, Ekiu concluded that the plain terms of the1891 Act pro- hibited judicial review of executive factfinding alone, and nothing more can be said.

But this myopic interpretation ignores many salient facts. To start, the 1891 Act was enacted for the purpose of limiting all judicial review of immigration decisions, not just a subset of factual issues that may arise in those deci- sions. Further, the plain terms of the statute did not cabin the limitation on judicial review to historical facts found by an immigration officer. Ekiu, moreover, evaluated the Act’s constitutionality in view of the petitioner’s argument that the limitation on judicial review violated the constitutional “right to the writ of habeas corpus.” 142 U. S., at 656 (state- ment of the case). These considerations all point in one di- rection: Even if the Ekiu Court did not explicitly hold that the Suspension Clause prohibits Congress from broadly limiting all judicial review in immigration proceedings, it certainly decided the case in a manner that avoided raising this constitutional question. Indeed, faced with a jurisdic- tion-stripping statute, the only review left for the Ekiu Court was that required by the Constitution and, by exten- sion, protected by the guarantee of habeas corpus.

The Court also maintains that Ekiu concluded that “ ‘the act of 1891 is constitutional’” in full, not “only in part.” Ante, at 27 (quoting Ekiu, 142 U. S., at 664). Yet as the Court acknowledges, it was only “after interpreting the 1891 Act” as precluding judicial review of questions of fact alone that the Ekiu Court deemed it constitutional. Ante, at 26; see also Ekiu, 142 U. S., at 664 (concluding that “[t]he result” of its construction is that the 1891 Act “is constitu- tional”). That cannot mean that Ekiu found the 1891 Act constitutional even to the extent that it prevented all judi- cial review of immigration decisions, even those brought on habeas. What it can only mean, instead, is that Ekiu’s con-

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struction of the 1891 Act was an answer to the constitu- tional question posed by the case: whether and to what ex- tent denying judicial review under the 1891 Act would vio- late the constitutional “right to the writ of habeas corpus.” 142 U. S., at 656 (statement of the case).8

Bolstering this interpretation is that the Court has re- peatedly reached the same result when interpreting subse- quent statutes purporting to strip federal courts of all juris- diction over immigration decisions. In Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U. S. 3 (1915), for example, the Court observed that Ekiu decided that “[t]he conclusiveness of the decisions of immi- gration officers under [the 1891 Act]” referred only to “con- clusiveness upon matters of fact.” 239 U. S., at 9. It relied heavily on Ekiu to support its determination that the Im- migration Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 898, which also rendered decisions of immigration officers to be “final,” §25, id., at 907, similarly only barred judicial review of questions of fact, 239 U. S., at 9. Indeed, time and again, against a back- drop of statutes purporting to bar all judicial review of ex- ecutive immigration decisions, this Court has entertained habeas petitions raising a host of issues other than historic facts found by immigration authorities.9

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8 The Court also claims that because Ekiu stated that the 1891 Act was

constitutional, respondent must be wrong that Ekiu found the 1891 Act “unconstitutional in most of its applications (i.e., to all questions other than questions of fact).” Ante, at 27. But the point here is not that Ekiu actually found the 1891 Act unconstitutional in part; it is that Ekiu in- terpreted the 1891 Act to avoid rendering it unconstitutional in part.

9 See, e.g., The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86 (1903) (habeas petition filed by noncitizen alleged to have entered unlawfully and ap- prehended four days after being let on shore); Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1 (1904) (habeas petition filed by resident of Puerto Rico detained at the port, who claimed that Puerto Rican nationals are United States citizens allowed to enter the mainland as a matter of course); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279 (1904) (habeas petition by noncitizen found within the United States 10 days after entry alleging his arrest was unconstitutional); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8 (1908) (habeas petition filed by a Chinese individual with a claim of U. S.

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To be sure, this entrenched line of cases does not directly state that habeas review of immigration decisions is consti- tutionally compelled. But an alternate understanding of those cases rests on an assumption that is farfetched at best: that, year after year, and in case after case, this Court simply ignored the unambiguous texts of the serial Immi- gration Acts limiting judicial review altogether. The Court’s pattern of hearing habeas cases despite those stat- utes’ contrary mandate reflects that the Court understood habeas review in those cases as not statutorily permitted but constitutionally compelled.

In any event, we need not speculate now about whether the Ekiu Court, or the Courts that followed, had the consti- tutional right to habeas corpus in mind when they inter- preted jurisdiction-stripping statutes only to preclude re- view of historic facts. This Court has already identified which view is correct. In Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229 (1953), the Court explained that Ekiu and its progeny had, in fact, construed the finality statutes to avoid serious con- stitutional questions about Congress’ ability to strip federal courts of their habeas power. As Heikkila reiterated, the key question in Ekiu (and in later cases analyzing finality statutes) was the extent to which the Constitution allowed Congress to make administrative decisions unreviewable. 345 U. S., at 234. And it concluded that the jurisdiction- stripping immigration statute in that case, a successor to

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citizenship who was detained on a steamship and prohibited from disem- barking); Yee Won v. White, 256 U. S. 399 (1921) (habeas petition filed on behalf of noncitizen wife and child denied admission to the United States upon arrival despite claiming legal right to join a family member residing in the country); Tod v. Waldman, 266 U. S. 113 (1924) (habeas petition by family fleeing religious persecution in Russia denied entry on the grounds that they were likely to become a public charge); United States ex rel. Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U. S. 279 (1932) (habeas petition filed by residents of Greek ancestry who left the United States and sought reentry after a lengthy trip abroad).

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the 1891 Act, “preclud[ed] judicial intervention in deporta- tion cases except insofar as it was required by the Consti- tution.” Id., at 234–235.

Heikkila thus settles the matter; during the finality era, this Court either believed that the Constitution required ju- dicial review on habeas of constitutional and legal questions arising in immigration decisions or, at the very least, thought that there was a serious question about whether the Constitution so required. Although the Court tries to minimize that conclusion as not dispositive of the question presented, ante, at 29, such a conclusion undoubtedly weighs against finding §1252(e)(2) constitutional in spite of its broad prohibition on reviewing constitutional and legal questions.

The Court dismisses Heikkila and its explanation of the finality-era cases outright. It fixates on the fact that Heik- kila was not itself a habeas case and instead analyzed whether judicial review of immigration orders was availa- ble under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Ante, at 31–32. Heikkila’s discussion of the APA does not detract from its affirmation that when the language of a jurisdic- tion-stripping statute precludes all judicial review, the only review that is left is that required by the constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus. 345 U. S., at 235.10 Most im- portantly, Heikkila concluded that APA review was not equivalent to that judicial review. Second, the Court also

——————

10 Indeed, the Government itself embraced that position in a brief to

the Court during that time. Brief for Respondent in Martinez v. Neelly, O. T. 1952, No. 218, p. 19 (“The clear purpose of this [finality] provision was to preclude judicial review of the Attorney General’s decisions in al- ien deportation cases insofar as the Congress could do so under the Con- stitution”); id., at 33 (“[T]he courts have long recognized” the finality pro- visions “restric[t] review of deportation orders as far as the Constitution permits”); see also id., at 18 (explaining that the finality provisions “pre- cluded judicial review of deportation orders except for the collateral re- view in habeas corpus which the Constitution prescribes in cases of per- sonal detention”).

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 29 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

states that Heikkila never interpreted Ekiu as having found the 1891 Act “partly unconstitutional.” Ante, at 32. But there was no need for the Ekiu Court to find the 1891 Act unconstitutional in part to construe it as prohibiting only review of historic facts. Instead, as Heikkila explained, Ekiu reached its decision by exercising constitutional avoid- ance.

By disregarding Heikkila, the Court ignores principles of stare decisis to stir up a settled debate. Cf. Ramos v. Loui- siana, 590 U. S. ___, ___, ___ (2020) (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1, 12). Perhaps its view is tinted by the fact that it doubts the Suspension Clause could limit Congress’ abil- ity to eliminate habeas jurisdiction at all. The Court scoffs at the notion that a limitation on judicial review would have been understood as an unconstitutional suspension of ha- beas, noting and distinguishing the limited number of occa- sions that this Court has found a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. See ante, at 28–29; but see ante, at 7, n. 4 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (noting that historically, suspen- sions of habeas did not necessarily mention the availability of the writ). The references to those major historic mo- ments where this Court has identified a suspension only es- tablish the outer bounds of Congress’ suspension powers; it says nothing about whether, and to what extent, more lim- ited restrictions on judicial review might also be found un- constitutional.

Indeed, the Court acknowledges that some thought it an open question during the finality era whether the Suspen- sion Clause imposes limits on Congress’ ability to limit ju- dicial review. See ante, at 31, n. 25 (quoting Justice Brewer’s concurring opinion in United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 295 (1904), raising the question). That this question remained unsettled, see n. 1, supra, suf- fices to support the Court’s conclusion in Heikkila: The fi- nality-era Courts endeavored to construe jurisdiction-strip- ping statutes to avoid serious constitutional questions

30 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. THURAISSIGIAM

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

about the extent of congressional power to limit judicial re- view.

At bottom, the better view of the finality-era cases is that they understood the habeas right they sustained to be, or at least likely to be, constitutionally compelled. Certainly the cases do not establish the Court’s simplistic view to the con- trary: That the finality-era Court entertained habeas peti- tions only because no statute limited its ability to do so, and no Constitutional provision required otherwise. That read- ing of precedent disregards significant indications that this Court persistently construed immigration statutes strip- ping courts of judicial review to avoid depriving noncitizens of constitutional habeas guarantees. Ignoring how past courts wrestled with this issue may make it easier for the Court to announce that there is no unconstitutional suspen- sion today. But by sweeping aside most of our immigration history in service of its conclusion, the Court reopens a question that this Court put to rest decades ago, and now decides it differently. The cost of doing so is enormous. The Court, on its own volition, limits a constitutional protection so respected by our Founding Fathers that they forbade its suspension except in the direst of circumstances.

D

Not only does the Court cast to one side our finality-era jurisprudence, it skims over recent habeas precedent. Per- haps that is because these cases undermine today’s deci- sion. Indeed, both INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289 (2001), and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723 (2008), instruct that eliminating judicial review of legal and constitutional ques- tions associated with executive detention, like the expe- dited-removal statute at issue here does, is unconstitu- tional.

The Court acknowledges St. Cyr’s holding but does not heed it. St. Cyr concluded that “‘[b]ecause of [the Suspen- sion] Clause some “judicial intervention in deportation

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 31

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

cases” is unquestionably “required by the Constitution.”’” Ante, at 33 (quoting 533 U. S., at 300). This statement af- firms what the finality-era cases long suggested: that the Suspension Clause limits Congress’ power to restrict judi- cial review in immigration cases. Nor did St. Cyr arrive at this conclusion simply based on canons of statutory con- struction. The Court spoke of deeper historical principles, affirming repeatedly that “[a]t its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the le- gality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” Id., at 301; see also id., at 305 (“The writ of habeas corpus has always been available to review the legality of Executive detention”). The Court looked to founding era cases to establish that the scope of this guarantee extended to both the “interpreta- tion” and “application” of governing law, including law that guided the exercise of executive discretion. Id., at 302.

Based on that history, the Court also concluded that “a serious Suspension Clause issue would be presented” by precluding habeas review in the removal context, id., at 305, even where there was “no dispute” that the Govern- ment had the legal authority to detain a noncitizen like St. Cyr, id., at 303. Thus based on the same principles that the Court purports to apply in this case, the St. Cyr Court reached the opposite conclusion: The Suspension Clause likely prevents Congress from eliminating judicial review of discretionary executive action in the deportation context, even when the writ is used to challenge more than the fact of detention itself.

Boumediene reprised many of the rules articulated in St. Cyr. It first confirmed that the Suspension Clause applied to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, repeating the “un- controversial” proposition that “the privilege of habeas cor- pus entitles” an executive detainee to a “meaningful oppor- tunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.”

32 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. THURAISSIGIAM

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

553 U. S., at 779 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 302). Then the Court detailed the writ’s remedial scope. It affirmed that one of the “easily identified attributes of any constitu- tionally adequate habeas corpus proceeding” is that “the ha- beas court must have the power to order the conditional re- lease of an individual unlawfully detained.” 553 U. S., at 779. Notably, the Court explained that release “need not be the exclusive remedy,” reasoning that “common-law habeas corpus was, above all, an adaptable remedy” whose “precise application and scope changed depending upon the circum- stances.” Ibid. (citing 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *131). The Court noted that any habeas remedy might be tempered based on the traditional test for procedural ade- quacy in the due process context and thus could accommo- date the “rigor of any earlier proceedings.” 553 U. S., at 781 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976)).

The Court discounts these cases because it objects to the perceived direction of respondent’s requested release. Ante, at 32 (explaining that Boumediene did not suggest that the enemy combatant petitioners were entitled to enter the United States upon release). It similarly contends that re- spondent’s attempted use of the writ is “very different” from that at issue in St. Cyr. Ante, at 33.

Neither rejoinder is sound. St. Cyr and Boumediene con- firm that at minimum, the historic scope of the habeas power guaranteed judicial review of constitutional and le- gal challenges to executive action. They do not require re- lease as an exclusive remedy, let alone a particular direc- tion of release. Rather, both cases built on the legacy of the finality era where the Court, concerned about the constitu- tionality of limiting judicial review, unquestionably enter- tained habeas petitions from arriving migrants who raised the same types of questions respondent poses here. See, e.g., St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 307 (citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260 (1954) (habeas case

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 33

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

attacking the denial of an application for suspension of de- portation); see also id., at 268 (“[W]e object to the Board’s alleged failure to exercise its own discretion, contrary to ex- isting valid regulations” (emphasis deleted))).

As discussed above, respondent requests review of immi- gration officials’ allegedly unlawful interpretation of gov- erning asylum law, and seeks to test the constitutional ad- equacy of expedited removal procedures. As a remedy, he requests procedures affording a conditional release, but cer- tainly did not so limit his prayer for relief. His constitu- tional and legal challenges fall within the heartland of what St. Cyr said the common-law writ encompassed, and Boumediene confirms he is entitled to additional procedures as a form of conditional habeas relief. These precedents themselves resolve this case.

***

The Court wrongly declares that §1252(e)(2) can preclude habeas review of respondent’s constitutional and legal chal- lenges to his asylum proceedings. So too the Court errs in concluding that Congress need not provide a substitute mechanism to supply that review. In so holding, the Court manages to flout precedents governing habeas jurispru- dence from three separate eras. Each one shows that re- spondent is entitled to judicial review of his constitutional and legal claims. Because §1252(e)(2) excludes his chal- lenges from habeas proceedings, and because the INA does not otherwise provide for meaningful judicial review of the Executive’s removal determination, respondent has no ef- fective means of vindicating his right to habeas relief. Quite simply, the Constitution requires more.

III

Although the Court concludes that habeas relief is not available because of the particular kind of release that it

34 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. THURAISSIGIAM

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

thinks respondent requests, it also suggests that respond- ent’s unlawful status independently prohibits him from challenging the constitutionality of the expedited removal proceedings. By determining that respondent, a recent un- lawful entrant who was apprehended close in time and place to his unauthorized border crossing, has no proce- dural due process rights to vindicate through his habeas challenge, the Court unnecessarily addresses a constitu- tional question in a manner contrary to the text of the Con- stitution and to our precedents.

The Court stretches to reach the issue whether a noncit- izen like respondent is entitled to due process protections in relation to removal proceedings, which the court below mentioned only in a footnote and as an aside. See ante, at 34 (quoting 917 F. 3d, at 1111, n. 15). In so doing, the Court opines on a matter neither necessary to its holding nor se- riously in dispute below.11

The Court is no more correct on the merits. To be sure, our cases have long held that foreigners who had never come into the United States—those “on the threshold of in- itial entry”—are not entitled to any due process with re- spect to their admission. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 212 (1953) (citing Ekiu, 142 U. S., at 660); see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U. S. 21, 32 (1982). That follows from this Courts’ holdings that the po- litical branches of Government have “plenary” sovereign power over regulating the admission of noncitizens to the United States. Ante, at 35; see also Ekiu, 142 U. S., at 659.

——————

11 While the Court contends that the writ of habeas corpus does not

allow an individual to “obtain administrative review” or additional pro- cedures, it arrives at this conclusion only in the context of discussing what sorts of “relief ” properly qualified as release from custody at com- mon law. Ante, at 2, 14–16 (contrasting request for additional remedies with a “simple” release from custody). To the extent that this discussion necessarily prohibits federal courts from entertaining habeas petitions alleging due process violations in expedited removal proceedings, the Court’s separate discussion in Part IV is unnecessary.

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 35

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Noncitizens in this country, however, undeniably have due process rights. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886), the Court explained that “[t]he Fourteenth Amend- ment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens” but rather applies “to all persons within the terri- torial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.” Id., at 369; Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 693 (2001) (reiterating that “once an alien enters the country,” he is entitled to due process in his re- moval proceedings because “the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”).

In its early cases, the Court speculated whether a noncit- izen could invoke due process protections when he entered the country without permission or had resided here for too brief a period to “have become, in any real sense, a part of our population.” The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 100 (1903); see also ante, at 34 (quoting Ekiu, 142 U. S., at 660 (remarking that for those not “‘admitted into the country pursuant to law,’” the procedures afforded by the political branches are all that are due)). But the Court has since determined that presence in the country is the touch- stone for at least some level of due process protections. See Mezei, 345 U. S., at 212 (explaining that “aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally,” possess con- stitutional rights); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 77 (1976) (“There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdic- tion of the United States. The Fifth Amendment . . . pro- tects every one of these persons . . . . Even one whose pres- ence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection”). As a nonciti- zen within the territory of the United States, respondent is entitled to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause.

In order to reach a contrary conclusion, the Court as- sumes that those who do not enter the country legally have

36 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. THURAISSIGIAM

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

the same due process rights as those who do not enter the country at all. The Court deems that respondent possesses only the rights of noncitizens on the “threshold of initial en- try,” skirting binding precedent by assuming that individu- als like respondent have “ ‘assimilated to [the] status’ ” of an arriving noncitizen for purposes of the constitutional anal- ysis. Mezei, 345 U. S., at 212, 214. But that relies on a legal fiction. Respondent, of course, was actually within the ter- ritorial limits of the United States.

More broadly, by drawing the line for due process at legal admission rather than physical entry, the Court tethers constitutional protections to a noncitizen’s legal status as determined under contemporary asylum and immigration law. But the Fifth Amendment, which of course long pre- dated any admissions program, does not contain limits based on immigration status or duration in the country: It applies to “persons” without qualification. Yick Wo, 118 U. S., at 369. The Court has repeatedly affirmed as much long after Congress began regulating entry to the country. Mathews, 426 U. S., at 77; Zadvydas, 533 U. S., at 693–694. The Court lacks any textual basis to craft an exception to this rule, let alone one hinging on dynamic immigration laws that may be amended at any time, to redefine when an “entry” occurs. Fundamentally, it is out of step with how this Court has conceived the scope of the Due Process Clause for over a century: Congressional policy in the im- migration context does not dictate the scope of the Consti- tution.

In addition to creating an atextual gap in the Constitu- tion’s coverage, the Court’s rule lacks any limiting princi- ple. This is not because our case law does not supply one. After all, this Court has long affirmed that noncitizens have due process protections in proceedings to remove them from the country once they have entered. See id., at 693–694; Mezei, 345 U. S., at 212.

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 37

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Perhaps recognizing the tension between its opinion to- day and those cases, the Court cabins its holding to individ- uals who are “in respondent’s position.” Ante, at 36. Pre- sumably the rule applies to—and only to—individuals found within 25 feet of the border who have entered within the past 24 hours of their apprehension. Where its logic must stop, however, is hard to say. Taken to its extreme, a rule conditioning due process rights on lawful entry would permit Congress to constitutionally eliminate all proce- dural protections for any noncitizen the Government deems unlawfully admitted and summarily deport them no matter how many decades they have lived here, how settled and integrated they are in their communities, or how many members of their family are U. S. citizens or residents.

This judicially fashioned line-drawing is not administra- ble, threatens to create arbitrary divisions between noncit- izens in this country subject to removal proceedings, and, most important, lacks any basis in the Constitution. Both the Constitution and this Court’s cases plainly guarantee due process protections to all “persons” regardless of their immigration status, a guarantee independent of the whims of the political branches. This contrary proclamation by the Court unnecessarily decides a constitutional question in a manner contrary to governing law.12

IV

The Court reaches its decision only by downplaying the

——————

12 The Court notes that noncitizens like respondent seeking legal ad-

mission lack due process rights “‘regarding [their] application.’” Ante, at 34 (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U. S. 21, 32 (1982)). It does not, however, explain what kinds of challenges are related to one’s applica- tion and what kinds are not. Presumably a challenge to the length or conditions of confinement pending a hearing before an immigration judge falls outside that class of cases. Because respondent only sought prom- ised asylum procedures, however, today’s decision can extend no further than these claims for relief.

38 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. THURAISSIGIAM

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

nature of respondent’s claims, ignoring a plethora of com- mon-law immigration cases from a time of relatively open borders, and mischaracterizing the most relevant prece- dents from this Court. Perhaps to shore up this unstable foundation, the Court justifies its decision by pointing to perceived vulnerabilities and abuses in the asylum system. I address the Court’s policy concerns briefly.

In some ways, this country’s asylum laws have repre- sented the best of our Nation. Unrestricted migration at the founding and later, formal asylum statutes, have served as a beacon to the world, broadcasting the vitality of our institutions and our collective potential. For many who come here fleeing religious, political, or ideological persecu- tion, and for many more who have preceded them, asylum has provided both a form of shelter and a start to a better life. That is not to say that this country’s asylum policy has always, or ever, had overwhelming support. Indeed, many times in our past, particularly when the Nation’s future has appeared uncertain or bleak, members of this country have sought to close our borders rather than open them. See S. Legomsky & C. Rodriguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 875–876 (5th ed. 2009) (explaining that restric- tionist sentiments in the 1930s were fueled in part by the Great Depression). Yet this country has time and again re- affirmed its commitment to providing sanctuary to those es- caping oppression and persecution. Congress and the Ex- ecutive have repeatedly affirmed that choice in response to serial waves of migration from other countries by enacting and amending asylum laws and regulations. In fact, a cen- terpiece of respondent’s claim is that officials were not fol- lowing these statutorily enacted procedures.

The volume of asylum claims submitted, pending, and granted has varied over the years, due to factors like chang- ing international migration patterns, the level of resources devoted to processing and adjudicating asylum applica- tions, and amendments to governing immigration laws. See

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 39

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Congressional Research Service, Immigration: U. S. Asy- lum Policy 25 (Feb. 19, 2019); see also Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2018 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 43 (2019) (Table 16) (“Individuals Granted Asylum Affirmatively or Defensively: Fiscal Years 1990 to 2018” (quotation modified)). For the past few years, both new asylum applications and pending applications have steadily increased. Immigration: U. S. Asylum Policy, at 25.

It is universally acknowledged that the asylum regime is under strain. It is also clear that, while the reasons for the large pending caseload are complicated,13 delays in adjudi- cations are undesirable for a number of reasons. At bottom, when asylum claims are not resolved in a timely fashion, the protracted decisionmaking harms those eligible for pro- tection and undermines the integrity of the regime as a whole. D. Meissner, F. Hipsman, & T. Aleinikoff, Migration Policy Institute, The U. S. Asylum System in Crisis: Chart- ing a Way Forward 4 (Sept. 2018).

But the political branches have numerous tools at their disposal to reform the asylum system, and debates over the best methods of doing so are legion in the Government, in the academy, and in the public sphere.14 Congress and the

——————

13 In 2018 Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, the Director of the

Executive Office of Immigration Review identified factors contributing to the backlog of cases, including lengthy hiring times for new immigration judges and the continued use of paper files. See Testimony of James McHenry, Strengthening and Reforming America’s Immigration Court System, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Border Security and Im- migration of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 115th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (2018). The Court, meanwhile, insinuates that much of the bur- den on the asylum system can be attributed to frivolous or fraudulent asylum claims. See, e.g., ante, at 1, 7–8, nn. 9 and 10. But the magnitude of asylum fraud has long been debated. See S. Legomsky & C. Rodriguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 1034 (5th ed. 2009); Immigra- tion: U. S. Asylum Policy, at 28.

14 See, e.g., GAO, Immigration Courts: Actions Needed To Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and Operational

40 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. THURAISSIGIAM

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Executive are thus well equipped to enact a range of measures to reform asylum in a number of ways and rou- tinely do so.15 Indeed, as the Court notes, the expedited re- moval process at issue here was created by law as one such measure to ease pressures on the immigration system. Ante, at 4.

In the face of these policy choices, the role of the Judiciary is minimal, yet crucial: to ensure that laws passed by Con- gress are consistent with the limits of the Constitution. The Court today ignores its obligation, going out of its way to restrict the scope of the Great Writ and the reach of the Due Process Clause. This may accommodate congressional pol- icy concerns by easing the burdens under which the immi- gration system currently labors. But it is nothing short of a self-imposed injury to the Judiciary, to the separation of powers, and to the values embodied in the promise of the Great Writ.

Because I disagree with the Court’s interpretation of the reach of our Constitution’s protections, I respectfully dis- sent.

——————

Challenges (GAO–17–438, June 2017); Uchimiya, A Blackstone’s Ratio for Asylum: Fighting Fraud While Preserving Procedural Due Process for Asylum Seekers, 26 Pa. St. Int’l L. Rev. 383 (2007); Martin, Reform- ing Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1247 (1990).

15 P. Alvarez & G. Sands, Trump Administration Proposes Sweeping Changes to U. S. Asylum System in New Rule, CNN, June 10, 2020 (online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov).

Congratulations to Priscilla Alvarez and Geneva Sands of CNN, frequent contributors to “Courtside” for being cited by Justice Sotomayor in FN 15.

This November, vote like your life and everyone’s rights depend on it. Because they do!

PWS

06-25-48

MILLER, OTHER TRUMP WHITE NATIONALISTS SEEK TO FURTHER DISHONESTLY EXPLOIT THE PANDEMIC TO ENACT NATIVIST IMMIGRATION PROGRAM W/O CONGRESS – Counting On Supremes & Feckless Federal Courts To Go “Belly Up” On Regime’s Racist, Xenophobic Agenda!

Priscilla Alvarez
CNN Digital Expansion 2019, Priscilla Alvarez
Politics Reporter, CNN

https://apple.news/A4blmWGWoQ1GmZyfSpSkpUw

Priscilla Alvarez reports for CNN:

White House prepares new immigration limits, using coronavirus as cover

7:40 PM EDT June 9, 2020
Washington

The Trump administration is preparing to roll outanother set of restrictions on legal immigration, citing the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, even as it argues for the reopening of the US economy, according to sources familiar with the deliberations.

Despite a push from President Donald Trump to move past the pandemic, the administration is continuing to usher forward immigration measures, citing the outbreak and its toll on the economy.

One of the key figures behind the push to limit immigration is Stephen Miller, Trump’s lead immigration adviser and the architect of the President’s hardline immigration agenda. In April, Trump signed an executive order barring some immigration to the US after teasing an outright ban on immigration to the country. Trump argued that the order was needed to protect American jobs.

Against the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic, the administration has pressed forward with a series of immigration measures that, prior to coronavirus, had struggled to break through. Among those changes is the closure of the southern border to migrants, including those seeking asylum, unless certain conditions are met.

After the President’s April proclamation, Miller cast the move as a first step toward reducing the flow of immigrants coming into the United States. That proclamation set up deadlines for review, one of which is approaching this weekend, and left the possibility open for its extension or modification.

The economic argument is expected to be raised again in an anticipated expansion or new immigration executive order. While Trump has touted recent job numbers,unemployment numbers remain high — though businesses have said in a series of letters to the President that continued immigration is important for economic recovery.

Interest groups, businesses and experts are fighting any new restrictions, saying that visas allowing immigrants to temporarily work in the US are critical to the economy.

“Why would he want to cut off critical workforce that will help the economy recover?” said Greg Chen, director of government relations for the American Immigration Lawyers Association.

“It’s not a rational or reasonable approach to the stated goals of what they’re trying to achieve, which only points to the underlying purpose of effectuating the President’s campaign goals of cutting off immigration,” Chen added.

Trump pledged the previous order would “ensure that unemployed Americans of all backgrounds will be first in line for jobs as our economy reopens.”

The White House did not immediately comment for this story.

CNN previously reported that Trump’s political advisers view the immigration steps as motivating for his base supporters at a moment when the President’s key election message — a strong economy — is badly weakened by the pandemic.

Legal immigration, which has already taken a hit during the outbreak, is again in focus in deliberations about an anticipated immigration executive order.

. . . .

**************************************

Read the rest of Priscilla’s article at the link.

Emboldened by the lack of judicial pushback and absence of legal and moral leadership from the Supremes on racial injustice, the regime is planning an all-out assault on non-white immigration with coronavirus as a cover. Blacks and Latinos have already been disproportionately affected by the Cornoavirus, which has been of little concern to Trump except as it relates to his reelection schemes. Now, sensing lack of support for racial justice from a Federal Judiciary already stacked with far rightists raced by Mitch through the Senate, Trump, Miller, Barr, Wolf, and their cronies see a chance to further their dehumanization and “Dred Scottification” of the other.

Sure, it’s despicable! But, when those whose responsibility it is to promote racial justice and resist Executive abuses go AWOL, that’s what tyrants do! Even incompetent tyrants can sense institutional weaknesses and lack of moral leadership in others.

 

PWS

06-10-20

SCRUTINY 🔎: IG to Look Into EOIR’s “Three Ring Circus” 🤡 Operations During  Pandemic! — Priscilla Alvarez Reports for CNN

EYORE
“Eyore In Distress”
Once A Symbol of Fairness, Due Process, & Best Practices, Now Gone “Belly Up”
Priscilla Alvarez
CNN Digital Expansion 2019, Priscilla Alvarez
Politics Reporter, CNN

https://apple.news/A_cgrTbprRN6R9noX9DJOuQ

Priscilla Alvarez reports for CNN:

The Justice Department’s inspector general is reviewing the Trump administration’s decision to keep the nation’s immigration courts open while the coronavirus swept through the United States.

The Executive Office for Immigration Review, the agency within the Justice Department that oversees the immigration court system, came under increased criticism from immigration judges, attorneys, and prosecutors for proceeding with immigration hearings despite social distancing guidelines and shelter in place orders. 

Eventually, the agency postponed hearings scheduled for immigrants who are not in detention, providing some reprieve and resulting in less traffic at the court, but hearings for immigrants in detention, including children, continue to proceed.

It made incremental changes to court operations in the first weeks of the outbreak, often late at night and through Twitter, frustrating immigration judges and lawyers who repeatedly urged the agency to close courts altogether.

According to the inspector general’s website, the office will “assess EOIR’s communication to staff, parties to proceedings, and the public about immigration court operations; its use of personal protective equipment; its use of worksite flexibilities; and its ability to mitigate health risks while maintaining operations during the COVID-19 pandemic.”

************************

Read the rest of Priscilla’s article at the link.

Communication with the field and the public hasn’t been a strong point for EOIR in this regime. Nor has getting employee or public input before taking drastic actions been a concern. The disrespect for its own judges is graphically illustrated by EOIR’s frivolous attempt to “decertify” the National Association of Immigration Judges (“NAIJ”) when it should be getting input from them (and the public) and working cooperatively to implement “best practices.”

Past IG investigations haven’t turned out particularly well for EOIR. But, the regime has shown a spectacular capacity for “blowing off” the results of independent investigations into its conduct and following up by “punishing” the investigators without consequences for the wrongdoers. 

Ironically, then, if the investigation is critical of EOIR, it could be more “career threatening” for the investigators than for the delinquent EOIR management officials carrying out the “party line.”

Due Process Forever! Clown Courts 🤡 Never!

PWS

05-07-20

WILL CLUELESS CLOWN COURTS ENDANGER PUBLIC HEALTH & SAFETY? 🤡🤡 — The Inevitable Spread of Coronavirus Is “Old News” & Poorly Designed & Mismanaged Immigration Courts Appear To Be a “High Risk” Potential Breeding Ground — Predictably, Dysfunctional EOIR Has No Contingency Plans In Place! — 100-Case “Master Calendars” in Mini-Courtrooms Bringing Old & Young, Infirm & Able, From Far & Near Together Under Threat Of In Absentia Deportation — What Could Possibly Go Wrong?

Laura Lynch
Laura Lynch
Senior Policy Counsel
AILA

NDPA stalwart Laura Lynch, Senior Policy Counsel @ AILA reports:

Flagging this new CNN article along with two letters from the NAIJ.

 

 

 

Immigration judges want to know how to handle coronavirus

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By Priscilla Alvarez, CNN

Updated 5:04 PM ET, Mon March 9, 2020

 

(CNN)The union representing immigration judges urged the Trump administration in a letter Monday to “immediately” implement steps to protect judges and their staff and provide guidance on how to proceed amid the coronavirus outbreak, which also has the potential to exacerbate the overwhelming backlog of pending cases.

 

The letter calls for the Executive Office for Immigration Review, an agency within the Justice Department that oversees the nation’s immigration courts, to inform employees about the plan “as it relates to a potential pandemic,” noting that some immigration court functions “may not lend themselves to telework.”

 

“As you know, our work requires us to be in close contact with the public on a daily basis, often in very large numbers and groups,” wrote Judge Ashley Tabaddor, president of the National Association of Immigration Judges.

 

She continued: “Beyond our own employees, the respondents who come before us may also be at high risk for developing serious illness. Because we order their appearance and they face the prospect of removal if they don’t appear, sick respondents and respondents vulnerable to serious illness will keep coming to court unless we take action.”

 

As concerns over the coronavirus ramp up, some government agencies, businesses and organizations have taken steps to try and prevent the spread of the disease by preparing for employees to telework, limiting travel and canceling gatherings.

 

In Monday’s letter, the union asked the Trump administration to consider measures such as waiving the appearance of some respondents, allowing for telephonic appearances and limiting in-court paper filings. The union is also recommending in an email to the workforce that judges keep bottles of hand sanitizer in the courtroom, use disinfecting wipes to clean surfaces and limit court attendance.

 

Any change in daily operations is critical in immigration court, which faces a pile-up of pending cases. Immigrants fighting deportation generally have a chance to make their case in court, where they can ask a judge to allow them to stay in the US by arguing they qualify for asylum or another legal option.

 

Last year’s US government shutdown, which resulted in some cases being postponed, exacerbated the long-standing issue and added to the backlog. There are more than 1 million pending cases before the immigration courts, according to Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse or TRAC, which tracks immigration court data — resulting in cases being scheduled out years in advance.

 

TRAC estimated last year that between 80,000 and 94,000 immigration court hearings may have been canceled as a result of last year’s government shutdown. The only cases that moved forward during that time were those of immigrants in detention.

 

The concerns held among immigration lawyers Monday are reminiscent of the government shutdown.

 

Immigration attorneys are worried about the effect on the backlog of cases if judges, attorneys, and other stakeholders are out because of the illness.

“If this thing gets out of control, it’s always a problem when cases are canceled, given the backlog,” Lawrence K. Le Roy, an immigration lawyer based in Newark, said in reference to coronavirus.

 

John Leschak, an immigration attorney, had a hearing scheduled Monday at the Newark immigration court for a client seeking asylum in the United States. The judge was not in court and the hearing was postponed. It’s unclear whether the reason behind the judge’s absence was related to coronavirus.

 

“It’s unfortunate because it’s a case that’s been pending for a long time,” Leschak said. “We’re between a rock and a hard place.”

 

The coronavirus is also already impacting the operations of some federal courts across the US.

 

For example, a district court in Washington state and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, which hears cases from nine western states including Washington, altered some of the procedures as the virus continues to spread. Washington has seen at least 80 cases.

 

Unlike other courts, however, immigration courts fall under the executive branch, not the judicial branch.

 

Ariane de Vogue and Kevin Bohn contributed to this story.

 

Laura A. Lynch, Esq.

Senior Policy Counsel

********************************

Thanks Laura, my friend, for keeping us up to date. And, as always, thanks to Priscilla for her great reporting on the never-ending mess and continuing outages at EOIR.

When it comes to public service and professional court administration from “Headquarters,” “today’s EOIR is the pits.” And, that’s not a knock on Chief Judge Chris Santoro who is generally known as a “straight shooter” and a “problem solver.” I think that I’ve acknowledged before that he was always kind and supportive to me and helped me through some very difficult times in my career at Arlington. I’ll always be appreciative for that.

“Reading between the lines,” he was ordered by one of his “superior bozos” in EOIR’s ludicrous “chain of command” to issue the inane order and then to rescind it when everything “hit the fan.” Typical EOIR “march ‘em up the hill, then march ‘em down again nonsense,” that actually has an adverse effect on both internal morale and the public.

On the other hand, perhaps it’s time for those who know how screwed up and “maliciously mismanaged” this system is to “come out and join the resistance,” as others in our Round Table have done, some at considerable personal sacrifice (not me, of course — I was fortunate enough to be able and ready to retire from EOIR even before the current regime took over.) I have no doubt that someone with Chief Judge Santoro’s ample and diverse skill set could find employment in the private sector.

But, this “circus-like” incident raises deeper issues.  

In what kind of “court system” are “judges” not allowed to post public notices issued by the CDC without saying “Captain May I?” The DOJ falsely claims that its “judges” are “policy officials.” Whoever heard of a “policy official” who couldn’t hang up a Government public health poster? This whole thing is an unbelievable farce! Why does it take a directive from “Headquarters” to rectify what should be a no brainer in any functioning court system? 

And, what kind of “court system” (outside the military) reports to “headquarters.” You think that the U.S. District Courts in Washington called up John Roberts to see if it was OK to cancel trials because of a public health threat? I doubt it. 

Why wasn’t NAIJ President Judge Ashley Tabaddor involved in the Coronavirus planning. She speaks for those “on the line” in contact with the public. Certainly, few issues could have a greater effect on “working conditions” than steps to prevent the spread of infectious disease.  Why is the NAIJ forced to waste time complaining and going to such lengths when competent management would have involved them in advance planning months ago?

Imagine how much better this system would operate if it were run by real judges who hired professional court administrators to work for the public good, instead of maliciously incompetent clowns carrying out Stephen Miller’s fascist agenda?

As you know, I blame the Article IIIs and Congress for letting this deadly mockery of our Constitution and American Justice continue to operate — essentially to dehumanize, abuse, and sometimes kill. I trust the younger members of the NDPA, folks like Laura and her colleaguesand the next generations to see that the life-tenured judges and legislators who looked the other way and knowingly acted as enablers as human dignity, our Constitution, and the rule of law were trampled upon by a White Nationalist regime are held fully accountable in the “court of history.”

The “J.R. Five’s” toxically improper action in Wolf v. Cook County, skirting the rules to enable the regime’s illegal, racially motivated rewriting of the “public charge” rules to go into effect has been exposed for the outrageous politically biased action it is. It allows the regime to intentionally spread panic in ethnic communities, particularly targeting Hispanics, citizens, immigrants, and the undocumented, and to intimidate those who should be seeking health care advice from doing so. Nice public health policy. As if Coronavirus and other diseases know the difference between “documented” and “undocumented” humans. It’s likely that Roberts and his tone deaf cronies will have even more “blood on their hands” before this is over.

As I said on Courtside recently, in the future, we also need more courageous, scholarly, humane, and ethical Article III Judges — folks who will read the Constitution and stand up for individual rights and for human dignity — folks who understand as MLK once said that “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” The current group of Article IIIs is a national disgrace (as a whole, although there are many notable exceptions, mostly among the U.S. District Court Judges who all too often get reversed by the CAs and the Supremes as their “reward” for “standing tall” for the rest of us and standing up for the fair application of the rule of law).

In the meantime, NAIJ President Judge Ashley Tabaddor is a national hero for standing up for the due process rights of all and having the courage to “speak truth to power” in these perilous times. Obviously, the unethical “decertification action” started by DOJ and EOIR is part of the effort to punish and silence her.  Hang in there Ashley! We in the NDPA and the Round Table support and appreciate you and your tireless efforts!

Due Process Forever! Clown Courts 🤡& Complicit Article III Courts Never!

PWS

03-11-20

2D CIR. TO NY & SIX OTHER SO-CALLED “SANCTUARY STATES:” Tough Noogies, Trump Rules!

Priscilla Alvarez
CNN Digital Expansion 2019, Priscilla Alvarez
Politics Reporter, CNN

https://apple.news/A3IAKzyGETMeEwekcWLIIkA

Priscilla Alvarez reports for CNN:

Court says Trump administration can withhold money from NYC, 7 states in ‘sanctuary cities’ fight

Updated 1:07 PM EST February 26, 2020

The Trump administration can withhold federal money from seven states, as well as New York City, over their cooperation on immigration enforcement, a federal appeals court ruled Wednesday.

The decision by the 2nd US Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower court ruling that blocked the Justice Department from withholding a key law enforcement grant the department said was available only to cities that complied with specific immigration enforcement measures.

The federal appeals court ruling comes amid an ongoing feud between the Trump administration and so-called “sanctuary cities,” which limit cooperation between local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities. Over recent weeks, the administration has stepped up its fight against sanctuary jurisdictions and taken measures like barring New York residents from enrolling in certain Trusted Traveler programs, such as Global Entry.

Judge Reena Raggi, writing on behalf of the unanimous 3-judge panel, acknowledged the divisive nature of the issue at hand, writing: “The case implicates several of the most divisive issues confronting our country and, consequently, filling daily news headlines: national immigration policy, the enforcement of immigration laws, the status of illegal aliens in this country, and the ability of States and localities to adopt policies on such matters contrary to, or at odds with, those of the federal government.”

The city of New York is a plaintiff in the lawsuit, along with New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Washington, Massachusetts, Virginia and Rhode Island.

In July 2017, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced that applicants for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants would have to comply with federal immigration enforcement. States pushed back and sued over the move.

. . . .

***********************

Read the complete article at the above link. Thanks for keeping us up to date, Priscilla! Love your timely and accessible reporting!

My “Quick Takes:”

  • This one is headed to the Supremes, as there is now a “Circuit split.”
  • Don’t expect this to have much effect on actual immigration enforcement.
    • Coercing states and localities is unlikely to foster much meaningful cooperation.
    • It’s more likely to simply channel resistance to the regime elsewhere.
    • The affected jurisdictions always have the option of just taking a “pass” on “Byrne Grants.”
  • In any event, interior apprehensions are a minuscule part of the DHS civil enforcement program.  
    • They accounted for fewer than 100,000 removals during the last fiscal year.
    • At that rate, it would take more than a century for DHS to remove the estimated 10+ million undocumented U.S residents.
  • On the other hand, this is a major “propaganda victory” for the regime. And, make no mistake, this was always about anti-immigrant propaganda not legitimate law enforcement. 
    • The Administration will be able to tout that Second Circuit Judge Reena Raggi bought their disingenuous “enforcement policy” argument “hook line and sinker.” (The DHS “Community Terrorism” program has actually been shown to inhibit legitimate law enforcement by making it much less likely that victims of domestic violence and gang crimes will report them to local law enforcement.)
    • However, more thoughtful judges in the 7th Circuit and elsewhere have exposed the weaknesses of Judge Raggi’s reasoning.
  • It’s unlikely that the Supremes will resolve this before the November election.
    • If Trump wins, the “Roberts Five” have already demonstrated their obsequiousness in the face of Trump’s war on immigrants.
    • On the other hand, a Democratic Administration would be likely to withdraw this “punishment initiative” completely and try to reach a more harmonious working relationship with state and local law enforcement on immigration issues, thus “mooting” this litigation.

PWS

02-28-20

EOIR TARGETS UNACCOMPANIED KIDS FOR DEPORATION RAILROAD!

Priscilla Alvarez
CNN Digital Expansion 2019, Priscilla Alvarez
Politics Reporter, CNN

 

Trump administration puts pressure on completing deportation cases of migrant children

By Priscilla Alvarez, CNN

Updated 6:57 PM ET, Wed February 12, 2020

 

(CNN)The Trump administration is reinforcing a tight deadline for immigration cases of unaccompanied migrant children in government custody in an effort to make quicker decisions about deportation, according to an email obtained by CNN.

The message seems designed to apply pressure on immigration judges to wrap up such cases within a 60-day window that’s rarely met and falls in line with a broader effort by the administration to complete immigration cases at a faster speed.

 

Judge Ashley Tabaddor, president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, said deadlines are “putting the judge between a rock and a hard place.”

“The only thing that can get done within 60 days is if someone wants to give up their case or go home or be deported,” Tabaddor told CNN.

 

The Executive Office for Immigration Review, which oversees the nation’s immigration court system, sent the email last month to assistant chief immigration judges, reminding them that unaccompanied children in government custody are to be considered the same as detained adults for purposes of scheduling cases.

 

While the 60-day deadline cited in the email is not new, it’s difficult to meet for cases of unaccompanied kids, in part, because of the time it takes to collect the relevant information for a child who comes to the United States alone. As a result, cases can often take months, if not years, to resolve.

 

Last year, an uptick in unaccompanied children at the US-Mexico border strained the administration’s resources. Over the course of the 2019 fiscal year, Border Patrol arrested around 76,000 unaccompanied children on the southern border, compared to 50,000 the previous fiscal year.

 

Unaccompanied children apprehended at the southern border are taken into custody by the Department of Homeland Security and referred to Health and Human Services. While in care at shelters across the country, case managers work to place a child with a sponsor in the United States, like a parent or relative.

 

Like adults and families who cross the US-Mexico border, unaccompanied children are put into immigration proceedings to determine whether they can stay in the United States.

 

The email from EOIR, dated January 30, says unaccompanied migrant children who are in the care of the government should be on a “60-day completion goal,” meaning their case is expected to be resolved within 60 days. It goes on to reference complaints received by the office of the director, but doesn’t say who issued the complaints or include a punishment for not meeting the completion goal.

 

EOIR spokeswoman Kathryn Mattingly told CNN that she could not comment on internal communications.

 

Golden McCarthy, deputy director at the Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project, which works with unaccompanied migrant children, said “it does take time to reach out to” a child’s caretaker or adults in the child’s life.

 

“We all know that many times the child doesn’t necessarily have the full picture of what happened; it does take time to reach out to caretakers and adults in their lives to understand,” McCarthy said.

 

Initiatives designed to quickly process cases have cropped up before.

 

The Obama administration tried to get cases scheduled more expeditiously but deferred to the judges on the timeline thereafter, whereas the Trump administration’s move seems to be an intent to complete cases within a certain timeframe, according to Rená Cutlip-Mason, chief of Programs at the Tahirih Justice Center and a former EOIR official.

 

The Trump administration also appears to be getting cases scheduled faster. In Arizona, for example, the Florence Immigrant and Refugee Project has begun seeing kids called into immigration court earlier than they had been before.

 

In a statement submitted to the House Judiciary Committee in January, the group detailed the cases of children, one as young as 10 years old, who appeared before an immigration judge within days of arriving to the US.

 

“I think our clients and the kids we would work with are resilient,” McCarthy, the deputy director at the project, said. “But to navigate the complex immigration system is difficult for adults to do, and so to explain to a kid that they will be going to court and a judge will be asking them questions, the kids don’t typically always understand what that means.”

 

It can also complicate a child’s case since he or she may eventually move to another state to reunify with a parent or guardian, requiring the child’s case to move to an immigration court in that state.

 

Under the Trump administration, the Justice Department has rolled out a slew of other policies — such as imposing case quotas — to chip away at the nearly one million pending cases facing the immigration court system. Some of those controversial policies have resulted in immigration judges leaving the department.

In its latest budget request to Congress, the White House called for $883 million to “support 100 immigration judge teams” to ease the backlog.

 

*************************************

How to build a 1.3 million case backlog with no end in sight:  Anatomy of “Aimless Docket Reshuffling:”

  • 2014: Obama Administration “prioritizes” unaccompanied minors, throwing existing dockets into chaos;
  • 2017: Trump Administration “deprioritizes” unaccompanied minors, creating more docket chaos;
  • 2020: Trump Administration “reprioritizes” unaccompanied minors, creating more docket chaos;
  • Result:
    • Unfairness to unaccompanied minors rushed through the system without due process;
    • Unfairness to long-pending cases continuously “shuffled off to Buffalo:”
    • Gross inconvenience to the public;
    • Demoralized judges whose dockets are being manipulated by unqualified bureaucrats for political reasons;
    • Growing backlogs with no rational plan for resolving them in the foreseeable future.

This reminds me of my very first posting on immigratoncourtside.com – from Dec. 27, 2016 —

SAVING CHILD MIGRANTS WHILE SAVING OURSELVES

By Paul Wickham Schmidt

They cross deserts, rivers, and territories controlled by corrupt governments, violent gangs, and drug cartels. They pass through borders, foreign countries, different languages and dialects, and changing cultures.

I meet them on the final leg of their trip where we ride the elevator together. Wide-eyed toddlers in their best clothes, elementary school students with backpacks and shy smiles, worried parents or sponsors trying to look brave and confident. Sometimes I find them wandering the parking garage or looking confused in the sterile concourse. I tell them to follow me to the second floor, the home of the United States Immigration Court at Arlington, Virginia. “Don’t worry,” I say, “our court clerks and judges love children.”

Many will find justice in Arlington, particularly if they have a lawyer. Notwithstanding the expedited scheduling ordered by the Department of Justice, which controls the Immigration Courts, in Arlington the judges and staff reset cases as many times as necessary until lawyers are obtained. In my experience, retaining a pro bono lawyer in Immigration Court can be a lengthy process, taking at least six months under the best of circumstances. With legal aid organizations now overwhelmed, merely setting up intake screening interviews with needy individuals can take many months. Under such conditions, forcing already overworked court staff to drop everything to schedule initial court hearings for women and children within 90 days from the receipt of charging papers makes little, if any, sense.

Instead of scheduling the cases at a realistic rate that would promote representation at the initial hearing, the expedited scheduling forces otherwise avoidable resetting of cases until lawyers can be located, meet with their clients (often having to work through language and cultural barriers), and prepare their cases. While the judges in Arlington value representation over “haste makes waste” attempts to force unrepresented individuals through the system, not all Immigration Courts are like Arlington.

For example, according to the Transactional Records Clearinghouse at Syracuse University (“TRAC”), only 1% of represented juveniles and 11% of all juveniles in Arlington whose cases began in 2014, the height of the so-called “Southern Border Surge,” have received final orders of removal. By contrast, for the same group of juveniles in the Georgia Immigration Courts, 43% were ordered removed, and 52% of those were unrepresented.

Having a lawyer isn’t just important – it’s everything in Immigration Court. Generally, individuals who are represented by lawyers in their asylum cases succeed in remaining in the United States at an astounding rate of five times more than those who are unrepresented. For recently arrived women with children, the representation differential is simply off the charts: at least fourteen times higher for those who are represented, according to TRAC. Contrary to the well-publicized recent opinion of a supervisory Immigration Judge who does not preside over an active docket, most Immigration Judges who deal face-to-face with minor children agree that such children categorically are incompetent to represent themselves. Yet, indigent individuals, even children of tender years, have no right to an appointed lawyer in Immigration Court.

To date, most removal orders on the expedited docket are “in absentia,” meaning that the women and children were not actually present in court. In Immigration Court, hearing notices usually are served by regular U.S. Mail, rather than by certified mail or personal delivery. Given heavily overcrowded dockets and chronic understaffing, errors by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) in providing addresses and mistakes by the Immigration Court in mailing these notices are common.

Consequently, claims by the Department of Justice and the DHS that women and children with removal orders being rounded up for deportation have received full due process ring hollow. Indeed a recent analysis by the American Immigration Council using the Immigration Court’s own data shows that children who are represented appear in court more than 95% of the time while those who are not represented appear approximately 33% of the time. Thus, concentrating on insuring representation for vulnerable individuals, instead of expediting their cases, would largely eliminate in absentia orders while promoting real, as opposed to cosmetic, due process. Moreover, as recently pointed out by an article in the New York Times, neither the DHS nor the Department of Justice can provide a rational explanation of why otherwise identically situated individuals have their cases “prioritized” or “deprioritized.”

Rather than working with overloaded charitable organizations and exhausted pro bono attorneys to schedule initial hearings at a reasonable pace, the Department of Justice orders that initial hearings in these cases be expedited. Then it spends countless hours and squanders taxpayer dollars in Federal Court defending its “right” to aggressively pursue removal of vulnerable unrepresented children to perhaps the most dangerous, corrupt, and lawless countries outside the Middle East: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), the institution responsible for enforcing fairness and due process for all who come before our Immigration Courts, could issue precedent decisions to stop this legal travesty of accelerated priority scheduling for unrepresented children who need pro bono lawyers to proceed and succeed. But, it has failed to act.

The misguided prioritization of cases of recently arrived women, children, and families further compromises due process for others seeking justice in our Immigration Courts. Cases that have been awaiting final hearings for years are “orbited” to slots in the next decade. Families often are spread over several dockets, causing confusion and generating unnecessary paperwork. Unaccompanied

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children whose cases should initially be processed in a non-adversarial system are instead immediately thrust into court.

Euphemistically named “residential centers” — actually jails — wear down and discourage those, particularly women and children, seeking to exercise their rights under U.S. and international law to seek refuge from death and torture. Regardless of the arcane nuances of our asylum laws, most of the recent arrivals need and deserve protection from potential death, torture, rape, or other abuse at the hands of gangs, drug cartels, and corrupt government officials resulting from the breakdown of civil society in their home countries.

Not surprisingly, these “deterrent policies” have failed. Individuals fleeing so-called “Northern Triangle” countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have continued to arrive at a steady pace, while dockets in Immigration Court, including “priority cases,” have mushroomed, reaching an astonishing 500,000 plus according to recent TRAC reports (notwithstanding efforts to hire additional Immigration Judges). As reported recently by the Washington Post, private detention companies, operating under highly questionable government contracts, appear to be the only real beneficiaries of the current policies.

It doesn’t have to be this way. We could save lives and short-circuit both the inconsistencies and expenses of the current case-by-case protection system, while allowing a “return to normalcy” for most already overcrowded Immigration Court dockets by using statutory Temporary Protected Status (known as “TPS”) for natives of the Northern Triangle countries. Indeed, more than 270 organizations with broad based expertise in immigration matters, as well as many members of Congress, have requested that the Administration institute such a program.

The casualty toll from the uncontrolled armed violence plaguing the Northern Triangle trails only those from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. TPS is a well- established humanitarian response to a country in crisis. Its recipients, after registration, are permitted to live and work here, but without any specific avenue for obtaining permanent residency or achieving citizenship. TPS has been extended among others to citizens of Syria and remains in effect for citizens of both Honduras who needed refuge from Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and El Salvador who needed refuge following earthquakes in 2001. Certainly, the disruption caused by a hurricane and earthquakes more than a decade ago pales in comparison with the very real and gruesome reality of rampant violence today in the Northern Triangle.

Regardless, we desperately need due-process reforms to allow the Immigration Court system to operate more fairly, efficiently, and effectively. Here are a few suggestions: place control of dockets in the local Immigration Judges, rather than bureaucrats in Washington, as is the case with most other court systems; work cooperatively with the private sector and the Government counsel to docket cases at a rate designed to maximize representation at the initial hearings; process unaccompanied children through the non-adversarial system before rather

3

than after the institution of Immigration Court proceedings; end harmful and unnecessary detention of vulnerable families; settle ongoing litigation and redirect the talent and resources to developing an effective representation program for all vulnerable individuals; and make the BIA an effective appellate court that insures due process, fairness, uniformity and protection for all who come before our Immigration Courts.

Children are the future of our world. History deals harshly with societies that mistreat and fail to protect children and other vulnerable individuals. Sadly, our great country is betraying its values in its rush to “stem the tide.” It is time to demand an immigrant justice system that lives up to its vision of “guaranteeing due process and fairness for all.” Anything less is a continuing disgrace that will haunt us forever.

The children and families riding the elevator with me are willing to put their hopes and trust in the belief that they will be treated with justice, fairness, and decency by our country. The sole mission and promise of our Immigration Courts is due process for these vulnerable individuals. We are not delivering on that promise.

The author is a recently retired U.S. Immigration Judge who served at the U.S. Immigration Court in Arlington Virginia, and previously was Chairman and Member of the Board of Immigration Appeals. He also has served as Deputy General Counsel and Acting General Counsel of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, a partner at two major law firms, and an adjunct professor at two law schools. His career in the field of immigration and refugee law spans 43 years. He has been a member of the Senior Executive Service in Administrations of both parties.

4

****************************

Tragically, as a nation, we have learned nothing over the past more than three years. Things have actually gotten much, much worse as we have unwisely and unconscionably entrusted the administration of our laws to a cruel, corrupt, scofflaw regime that sees inflicting pain, suffering, and even death on children and other vulnerable seekers of justice as an “end in an of itself.” They actually brag about their dishonesty, racism, selfishness, contempt for human decency, and “crimes against humanity.”

So far, they have gotten away nearly “Scot-free” with not only bullying and picking on vulnerable children and refugee families but with diminishing the humanity of each of us who put up with the horrors of an authoritarian neo-fascist state.

History will, however, remember who stood up for humanity in this dark hour and who instead sided with and enabled the forces of evil, willful ignorance, and darkness overtaking our wounded democracy.

Due Process Forever; Child Abuse & Gratuitous Cruelty, Never.

 

PWS

02-13-20

 

 

HOW TO RUIN A COURT SYSTEM: SOME OF THE “BEST & BRIGHTEST” IMMIGRATION JUDGES QUIT IN PROTEST OVER REGIME’S BIASED POLICIES AND “WEAPONIZATION” OF IMMIGRATION COURTS INTO DHS ENFORCEMENT TOOL BY DOJ POLITICOS!

Priscilla Alvarez
CNN Digital Expansion 2019, Priscilla Alvarez
Politics Reporter, CNN

https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/27/politics/immigration-judges-resign/index.html

 

Priscilla Alverez reports for CNN:

 

Immigration judges quit in response to administration policies

 

By Priscilla Alvarez, CNN

Updated 6:39 AM ET, Fri December 27, 2019

 

Washington (CNN)Lisa Dornell loved her job. For 24 years, she sat on the bench in Baltimore’s immigration court, hearing hundreds of cases of immigrants trying to stay in the United States.

“It was an honor. It was a privilege to be able to preside over so many different cases and be able to grant relief to people who needed relief,” Dornell told CNN in an interview.

But she walked away from that job in April — a decision that still invokes a wave of emotion when she recalls it. “The toxic environment made it both harder and easier to leave,” Dornell said.

Over the past year, in the heat of a border migration crisis, 45 judges have left, moved into new roles in the immigration court system — which is run by the Justice Department — or passed away, according to the department. That’s nearly double the number who departed their posts in fiscal years 2018 and 2017, when 24 and 21 judges left, respectively, according to data provided by the judges union.

The reasons why individual judges have moved on from their posts on the bench vary, but in interviews with judges who left in recent months, one theme ties them all together: frustration over a mounting number of policy changes that, they argue, chipped away at their authority.

Their departures come as the Justice Department faces a backlog that exceeds 1 million cases. The bogged-down system has led to immigration cases being pushed out years in the future, leaving many immigrants residing in the US unsure if they’ll be allowed to stay or be ordered removed.

Immigration judges accuse Justice Department of unfair labor practices

President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized the nation’s immigration system, specifically taking issue with the practice of releasing immigrants while they await their court dates. To remedy that, the administration has sought to hire more immigration judges. Most recently, the immigration judge corps hit a record high, though the Justice Department still has to contend with judges leaving over policy disagreements.

In a statement to CNN, the Justice Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review spokeswoman, Kathryn Mattingly, said the agency “continually plans for attrition, and both improvements to the hiring process and a policy of ‘no dark courtrooms’ help minimize the operational impact of (immigration judge) separations and retirements.”

The agency doesn’t track individual reasons for retirements or departures, Mattingly said.

Immigration judges — employees of the Justice Department — are charged with following the policies set by each administration.

“The nature of the job ebbed and flowed as administrations changed,” Dornell recalled. “It was always tolerable. We all work with a realization that it’s the prerogative of the administration to implement policies as they see fit.”

The Trump administration was no exception. Trump’s first attorney general, Jeff Sessions, implemented a series of changes to the immigration court system that have continued under his successor, William Barr.

The Justice Department has imposed case quotas, given more power to the director charged with overseeing the courts, reversed rulings, curtailed judges’ ability to exercise discretion in some cases and moved to decertify the union of immigration judges.

Over time, those actions prompted immigration judges, some of whom were retirement eligible and had decades of experience, to leave the department despite initial plans to stay longer.

“I felt then and I feel now that this administration is doing everything in its power to completely destroy the immigration court system, the board of immigration appeal and the immigration system in general,” said Ilyce Shugall, who served as an immigration judge in San Francisco from 2017 until March of this year. “And I just couldn’t be a part of that.”

‘It started to wear on me’

Over his nearly two-year tenure as attorney general, Sessions transformed the courts by flexing his authority to overrule decisions, hire more immigration judges and set a case quota for judges.

One of Sessions’ addresses to the workforce, in particular, resonated with judges. In a June 2018 speech in Washington, Sessions denounced the system, which he believed was encouraging migrants to make baseless asylum claims, and reminded judges of their role in cracking down on those claims.

“You have an obligation to decide cases efficiently and to keep our federal laws functioning effectively, fairly and consistently,” Sessions said. Later that day, he issued a ruling that removed asylum protections for victims of domestic violence and gang violence.

“To be honest with you, in that meeting room, there were a number of judges that cheered and clapped when he announced it,” said former immigration judge Rebecca Jamil, referring to the ruling that would follow his address. “It was grotesque to me.”

Jamil, who had been based in the San Francisco immigration court, had a docket that included migrants who had fled their home countries, claiming they were victims of domestic violence. Sessions’ decision took direct aim at those cases.

Another judge in attendance at Sessions’ speech, Denise Slavin, recalled jaws dropping. Slavin had become a judge in 1995, serving in Florida before finishing her tenure in Baltimore in April of this year.

Sessions’ address and follow-up ruling was among a series of policy changes that began to wear on judges.

“When you’ve been around that many administrations, you learn to adapt. You see a lot of different things. Nothing like this,” said James Fujimoto, a former Chicago immigration judge who started on the bench in 1990 and also retired in April.

In particular, the administration began rolling out changes that dictated the way judges were expected to proceed with cases, thereby tightening control of the immigration courts. For example, the Justice Department said it would evaluate immigration judges on how many cases they close and how fast they hear cases.

Earlier this year, the Justice Department also issued a new rule that gives more power to the director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review. It allows the Justice Department-appointed director — currently James McHenry — to step in and issue a ruling if appeals are not completed within a certain time frame.

“It started to wear at me,” said Jennie Giambastiani, a former Chicago immigration judge who joined the bench in 2002 and left this year. “The great number of cases coming in and the way it was expected we handle them.”

Judge Ashley Tabaddor, president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, told CNN that for the majority of people leaving their roles it’s a result of the “hostility and insulting working conditions.”

Tabaddor noted that there’s been a pattern of new judges either leaving to return to their old jobs or taking other jobs within the government.

“This is not what they signed up for,” Tabaddor said, referring to policies designed to dictate how judges should handle their dockets.

Judges who have since left the department expressed similar concern over those policies. Dornell called the situation “intolerable.”

Shugall recalled the challenges she had faced in trying to move forward with cases in a way she thought was appropriate. “I felt like as more and more policies were coming down, it was making it harder and harder to effectively hear cases in the way that I felt was appropriate and in compliance with the statute regulations and Constitution,” Shugall said.

At an event earlier this year, McHenry rejected criticism that judges are vulnerable to pressures from the attorney general.

“Most judges that we’re familiar with, and I don’t think that immigration judges are any exception, when they’re on the bench, they know what their role is as a judge,” he said. “We’ve had no allegations of anyone reaching down to specific judges telling them, ‘You have to rule this way; you have to rule that way.’ ”

 

Justice Department hires new judges

Earlier this month, the Justice Department announced 28 new immigration judges, bringing the number of such judges to more than 465, a record high. The majority come from government backgrounds.

It’s not unusual for administrations to hire people who’ve worked in government, but under the Trump administration, Booz Allen Hamilton, at the direction of the Justice Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review, issued a report recommending that the agency diversify the experience of immigration judges.

The Justice Department’s hiring practices have been criticized by House Democrats, who say whistleblowers have previously raised concerns about political discrimination in the hiring of immigration judges. The department has denied that political ideology has been a factor.

The direction of the nation’s immigration courts is also a source of concern among immigrant advocate groups. This month, groups filed a wide-ranging lawsuit, alleging that the Trump administration has manipulated the immigration court system to serve an “anti immigrant agenda.”

It remains to be seen what changes, if any, are in store for the court system, but some of those who have already left their posts as judges carry guilt for departing, concerned about who may fill their jobs.

“The biggest thing I contended with is who is going to replace me,” Jamil said. “I knew I was a fair judge.”

 

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I’m proud to say that all of the quoted former Immigration Judges are members of our Round Table of Former Immigration Judges, committed to preserving and advancing Due Process and judicial independence.

 

Apparently, EOIR headquarters and DOJ bureaucrats now refer to Immigration Judge decisions as “policy decisions,” thereby dropping any pretense that they are fair and impartial quasi-judicial adjudications under the law.

 

As for the ludicrous claim that this is anything approaching a legitimate independent judiciary, as one of my Round Table colleagues succinctly put it: “The political arm of DOJ’s assertion that IJs are treated independently is so much BS.”

 

Yup! Congratulations and many thanks to Judge Dornell and the others who spoke out in this article!

So, Immigration Judges, who lack the life tenure and protections of independence given to Article III Judges, put their careers and livelihoods on the line for Due Process and the rule of law, and, frankly, to save vulnerable lives that deserve saving. Meanwhile, the majority of Supreme Court Justices and far too many Article III Courts of Appeals Judges just bury their judicial heads in the sand and pretend like the outrages against Due Process, fundamental fairness, and the rule of law aren’t really happening in Immigration Court and that human lives aren’t being ruined or lost by their derelictions of duty. Has to make you wonder about their ethics, courage, and commitment to their oaths of office, as well as what the purpose of life tenure is if all it produces is complicity in the face of tyranny that threatens to destroy our Constitution and bring down our republic.

The Article IIIs are providing some rather sad examples and bad role models for today’s aspiring lawyers.

PWS

12-27-19

 

AS ARTICLE III JUDGES SHIRK DUTIES, EMBOLDENED EOIR RAMPS UP ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE IN TENT CITIES WHILE PLOTTING TO BAR PUBLIC FROM VIEWING THEIR LATEST ASSAULTS ON DUE PROCESS!

Priscilla Alvarez
CNN Digital Expansion 2019, Priscilla Alvarez
Politics Reporter, CNN

 

Priscilla Alvarez reports for CNN:

More immigration judges to be assigned to cases at tent facilities

By Priscilla Alvarez, CNN

Updated 7:13 AM EST, Fri December 06, 2019

(CNN)More immigration judges will begin conducting hearings over video conferencing at tent courts along the US-Mexico border, raising concerns among lawyers about transparency in the immigration process.

Earlier this year, the Trump administration erected facilities in Laredo and Brownsville, Texas, to serve as makeshift courts for migrants seeking asylum in the United States who have been returned to Mexico until their court date. The judges in these cases are not at the tent facility but preside by teleconference from other immigration courts several miles away.

As of mid-September, there were 19 judges from three separate immigration courts in Texas hearing cases. But the latest expansion includes the use of immigration judges assigned to a center in Fort Worth, Texas, that is closed to the public, leaving little opportunity for people to observe hearings.

“I’m just very concerned that there will be no public access to these hearings. And hearings will be operating in secret, without any transparency and notice to the public,” said Laura Lynch, senior policy counsel at the American Immigration Lawyers Association.

US court proceedings are generally open to the public.

Adjudication centers serve as a hub for immigration judges who beam into courtrooms remotely to hear cases. There are two — one in Fort Worth and another in Falls Church, Virginia. Neither is open to the public.

Immigration judges assigned to the Fort Worth Immigration Adjudication Center are expected to begin hearing cases of migrants who fall under the administration’s “Migrant Protection Protocols” program via video teleconference in January 2020, according to the Justice Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review, which oversees the nation’s immigration courts.

“Public access to hearings is governed by regulation, and EOIR’s process and policies surrounding the openness of hearings have not changed,” said EOIR spokeswoman Kathryn Mattingly.

Lynch said some attorneys representing migrants who have been waiting in Mexico for their court date began receiving notices of judges from the Fort Worth center assigned to their cases in late November. The immigration judges’ union has also taken issue with the use of the center.

“MPP is rife with issues but by assigning the adjudication centers to the tent courts takes us to a new low where public access to the court are now eliminated,” said Judge Ashley Tabaddor, president of the National Association of Immigration Judges. “This is not the way we as judges or courts should function.”

The process has already presented lawyers with a host of logistical challenges and some anticipate those will worsen as immigration judges assigned to adjudication centers begin hearing cases.

Currently, advocates and legal observers have been able to monitor proceedings from three immigration courts in Texas: Harlingen, San Antonio and Port Isabel.

US Customs and Border Protection said in a statement to CNN that access to the Laredo and Brownsville hearing facilities, which are located on the agency’s property, “will be assessed on a case-by-case basis when operationally feasible and in accordance with procedures for access to any CBP secure facility.”

Around 60,000 migrants have been subject to the administration’s policy that requires some migrants to wait in Mexico for the duration of their immigration proceedings. Given that they’re residing in Mexico, immigration lawyers based in the US have limited access to them, particularly in dangerous regions. Only a small share of migrants in the program have secured representation, according to Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, which tracks court data and released a report on access to attorneys this summer.

Some in the legal community argue that access to the tent facilities, not just the immigration courts where the judges are located, is important for that reason — to give lawyers the opportunity to connect with migrants who may need legal representation and explain the process. It’s equally important, lawyers argue, that people be allowed to observe the proceedings.

“Without the public being able to see what’s been going on in these hearings, the public has no assurance that people are being given proper due process and proper shot at fighting their asylum case,” said Erin Thorn Vela, a staff attorney in the racial and economic justice program at the Texas Civil Rights Project.

 

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Wow! Secret Courts sentencing folks to torture or death without lawyers, adequate notice, time to prepare, or any consistent application of reasonable rules. Sounds like the “Star Chamber.” Is that why we fought the American Revolution? To create our own version of the worst abuses of the Crown? Apparently.

 

As American justice and the rule of law go down the tubes, the Supremes and the Circuits have become “disinterested observers,” at best.

Thanks to Laura Lynch at AILA for forwarding this latest example of judicial irresponsibility.

Constantly Confront Complicit Courts 4 Change!

Due Process Forever!

PWS

12-06-19