1-year bar – immigrationcourtside.com

🤮👎ERROR SUPPLY: Billy The Bigot’s BIA Blows Basics Big-Time: 1) 1-Year Bar (2d Cir.); 2) Gang-Based PSG (2d Cir.); 3) Fourth Amendment (2d Cir.); 4) Retroactivity (11th Cir.); 5) CIMT (4th Cir.); 6) Categorical Approach (2d Cir.)!

Dan Kowalski @ LexisNexis Immigration Community reports on the on the latest “Medley of Deadly Mistakes” —

CA2 on One Year Filing Deadline, PSG: Ordonez Azmen v. Barr

Ordonez Azmen v. Barr

“Mario Ordonez Azmen petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to remand and dismissing his appeal of the denial of his asylum and statutory withholding claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The BIA did not adequately explain its conclusion that Ordonez Azmen’s proposed social group of former gang members in Guatemala was not particular. Nor did the BIA adequately explain its reasons for denying Ordonez Azmen’s motion to remand based on evidence of new country conditions. Finally, we hold that under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D), changed circumstances presenting an exception to the one-year deadline for filing an asylum application need not arise prior to the filing of the application, and the BIA erred when it refused to consider Ordonez Azmen’s alleged changed circumstances on the ground that the change occurred while his application was pending. We GRANT the petition, VACATE the BIA’s decision, and REMAND for reconsideration of Ordonez Azmen’s application for asylum and statutory withholding of removal and his motion to remand, consistent with this opinion.”

[Hats off to Zachary A. Albun, Albert M. Sacks Clinical Teaching & Advocacy Fellow, Harvard Immigration & Refugee Clinical Program, Harvard Law School, who writes: “The Court found the INA unambiguously provides that “material changed circumstances” excepting the one year filing deadline need not precede filing of the asylum application (i.e., you can rely on a changes that occur during proceedings). The court further held that W-G-R- & M-E-V-G- do not create a per se rule that “former gang member” PSGs lack cognizability. Another important point is that the Court relied on two unpublished BIA decisions that we’d submitted in determining it need not defer to the agency, but instead decide the case based on its own reading of the governing statute and regulations. Major credit and a huge thanks goes to my co-counsel at the University of Minnesota Federal Immigration & Litigation Clinic and the National Immigrant Justice Center, and to my colleagues and students at HIRC.”]

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CA2 on Suppression: Millan-Hernandez v. Barr

Millan-Hernandez v. Barr

“Maria Cared Millan-Hernandez petitions for review of a 2018 Board of Immigration Appeals decision dismissing her appeal of an Immigration Judge’s denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of her motion to suppress evidence. On appeal, we consider whether Millan-Hernandez provided sufficient evidence of an egregious Fourth Amendment violation to warrant an evidentiary hearing. We conclude that she did and that the agency applied an incorrect standard in determining otherwise. Accordingly, the petition for review is GRANTED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.”

[Hats off to AADHITHI PADMANABHAN, The Legal Aid Society, New York, NY (Nicholas J. Phillips, Joseph Moravec, Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York, Buffalo, NY, on the brief), for Petitioner!]

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CA11 on Retroactivity: Rendon v. Atty. Gen.

Rendon v. Atty. Gen.

“Carlos Rendon began living in the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1991. Then in 1995, he pled guilty to resisting a police officer with violence. Under immigration law this offense qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). At the time, Mr. Rendon’s sentence of 364 days in state custody did not affect his status as a lawful permanent resident. But Congress later changed the law. In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) made him deportable based on his CIMT conviction. And in 1997, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) created the “stop-time rule,” which meant people convicted of certain crimes were no longer eligible for a discretionary form of relief known as cancellation of removal. Approximately 25 years after his guilty plea, an immigration judge found Mr. Rendon removable and ruled he was no longer eligible for cancellation of removal on account of the stop-time rule. On appeal, Mr. Rendon now argues that it was error to retroactively apply the stop-time rule to his pre-IIRIRA conviction. After careful review, we conclude that Mr. Rendon is right. We reverse the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and remand for further proceedings.”

[Hats off to Anthony Richard Dominquez at Prada Urizar, PLLC!]

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CA4 on CIMT: Nunez-Vasquez v. Barr

Nunez-Vasquez v. Barr

“David Nunez-Vasquez seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) finding that he was removable because he had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”)—a conviction for leaving an accident in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 46.2–894 and a conviction for use of false identification in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–186.3(B1). We hold that neither conviction is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. We therefore grant Nunez-Vasquez’s petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order of removal, order the Government to return Nunez-Vasquez to the United States, and remand to the BIA for further proceedings.”

[Hats off to Ben Winograd, Trina Realmuto, Kristin Macleod-Ball, Nancy Morawetz and Samantha Hsieh!]

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CA2 on Antique Firearms: Jack v. Barr

Jack v. Barr

“In these tandem cases, Jervis Glenroy Jack and Ousmane Ag each petition for review of decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordering them removed based on their New York firearms convictions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (a)(2)(C). We principally conclude that the statutes of conviction, sections 265.03 and 265.11 of the New York Penal Law, criminalize conduct involving “antique firearms” that the relevant firearms offense definitions in the Immigration and Nationality Act do not. This categorical mismatch precludes the petitioners’ removal on the basis of their state convictions. We therefore GRANT the petitions, VACATE the decisions of the BIA, and REMAND both causes to the agency with instructions to terminate removal proceedings.”

[Hats off to Nicholas J. Phillips, Joseph Moravec, Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York, Buffalo, NY; Alan E. Schoenfeld, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, for Jervis Glenroy Jack, Petitioner in No. 18-842-ag., Stephanie Lopez, Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem, New York, NY; Alan E. Schoenfeld, Andrew Sokol, Beezly J. Kiernan, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, for Ousmane Ag, Petitioner in No. 18-1479-ag.!]

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Remember, unlike most so-called “civil litigation,” lives and futures are at stake in every one of these cases. It’s like sending in brain surgeons trained by the “American Academy of Morticians.” Over and over, the Trump DOJ has shown itself more interested in “upping the body count” than on fairness, due process, and just results at EOIR. Is there a “breaking point” at which the Article IIIs will finally get tired of correcting the BIA’s mistakes and doing their work for them?

Good thing the BIA isn’t sitting for the final exam in my “Immigration Law & Policy” course at Georgetown Law. Even “the curve” might not be enough to save them.

Due Process Forever!

PWS

07-15-20

LAW YOU CAN USE: Jason Dzubow, “The Asylumist,” With Tips On How To Deal With The One-Year Filing Bar To Asylum!

The One-Year Asylum Filing Deadline and What to Do About It
by JASON DZUBOW on JANUARY 18, 2018
The law requires that people who wish to seek asylum in the United States file their applications within one year of arriving here. See INA § 208(a)(2)(B). Those who fail to timely file are barred from asylum unless they meet an exception to the rule (they may still qualify for other—lesser—humanitarian benefits such as Withholding of Removal and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture).

If you arrived in the U.S. on this day, you are still eligible to apply for asylum, even if it seems like a hundred years ago.
So why do we have this rule? And what are the exceptions?

Congress created the one-year bar in 1996. Its ostensible purpose is to prevent fraud. If you really fear return to your home country, the theory goes, one year should be enough time to figure things out and get your application filed.

For most people, I suppose that this is true—they can ask questions, find help, and file for asylum within a year. But this is easier for some than for others. People who are less educated, people whose life experiences have taught them to mistrust and avoid authority, people who are isolated and socially disconnected, people who are depressed; such people might have a harder time with the one-year bar (and of course, many of these characteristics are common among asylum seekers). Others will have an easier time: Well-educated people, people who speak English, people who have a certain level of self-confidence, and people who are engaged with the community.

There are also certain populations that seem to have difficulty with the one-year rule. At least in my experience, many LGBT asylum cases were filed after the one-year period. I suspect there are several reasons for this. For one, an immigrant’s primary connection to mainstream America is her community in the U.S. But if she is afraid to reveal her sexuality to her countrymen living here, and she cannot get their help with the asylum process, she may be unable to file on time. Also, there is the coming-out process itself. People in certain countries may not have even conceptualized themselves as gay, and so the process of accepting their own sexuality, telling others, and then applying for asylum may be lengthy and difficult.

Asylum seekers like those discussed above are sometimes blocked by the one-year rule, but in these cases, the rule is not preventing fraud; it is harming bona fide applicants.

Where the rule seems more likely to achieve its intended purpose is the case of the alien who has spent years in the United States without seeking asylum, and now finds himself in removal proceedings. Such aliens often file for asylum as a last-ditch effort to remain in the U.S. (or at least delay their deportation). Many people from Mexico and Central America are in this position, and the one-year rule often blocks them from obtaining asylum (in addition, such applicants often fear harm from criminals; this type of harm does not fit easily within the asylum framework and contributes to the high denial rate for such cases).

Although there may be situations where the one-year bar prevents fraud, the vast majority of immigration lawyers—including this one—think it does little to block fake cases, and often times prevents legitimate asylum seekers from obtaining the protection they need. In short, we hate this rule, and if I ever become king, we will find other, more effective ways, to fight fraud. Until then, however, we have to live with it.

So for those who have missed the one-year filing deadline, what to do?

There are two exceptions to the one-year rule: Changed circumstances and extraordinary circumstances. See INA § 208(a)(2)(D). If you meet either of these exceptions, you may still be eligible for asylum. Federal regulations flesh out the meaning of these concepts. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.4(a)(4) & (5). First, changed circumstances–

(4)(i) The term “changed circumstances” … refer to circumstances materially affecting the applicant’s eligibility for asylum. They may include, but are not limited to: (A) Changes in conditions in the applicant’s country of nationality or, if the applicant is stateless, country of last habitual residence; (B) Changes in the applicant’s circumstances that materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum, including changes in applicable U.S. law and activities the applicant becomes involved in outside the country of feared persecution that place the applicant at risk; or (C) In the case of an alien who had previously been included as a dependent in another alien’s pending asylum application, the loss of the spousal or parent-child relationship to the principal applicant through marriage, divorce, death, or attainment of age 21.

(ii) The applicant shall file an asylum application within a reasonable period given those “changed circumstances.” If the applicant can establish that he or she did not become aware of the changed circumstances until after they occurred, such delayed awareness shall be taken into account in determining what constitutes a “reasonable period.”

It is a bit unclear how long this “reasonable period” is. A few months is probably (but no guarantee) ok, but six months is probably too long. So if there are changed circumstances in your case, the sooner you file for asylum, the better.

The regulations also define extraordinary circumstances–

(5) The term “extraordinary circumstances” … shall refer to events or factors directly related to the failure to meet the 1-year deadline. Such circumstances may excuse the failure to file within the 1-year period as long as the alien filed the application within a reasonable period given those circumstances. The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish… that the circumstances were not intentionally created by the alien through his or her own action or inaction, that those circumstances were directly related to the alien’s failure to file the application within the 1-year period, and that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances. Those circumstances may include but are not limited to:

(i) Serious illness or mental or physical disability, including any effects of persecution or violent harm suffered in the past, during the 1-year period after arrival;

(ii) Legal disability (e.g., the applicant was an unaccompanied minor or suffered from a mental impairment) during the 1-year period after arrival;

(iii) Ineffective assistance of counsel….

(iv) The applicant maintained Temporary Protected Status, lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, or was given parole, until a reasonable period before the filing of the asylum application;

(v) The applicant filed an asylum application prior to the expiration of the 1-year deadline, but that application was rejected by the Service as not properly filed, was returned to the applicant for corrections, and was refiled within a reasonable period thereafter; and

(vi) The death or serious illness or incapacity of the applicant’s legal representative or a member of the applicant’s immediate family.

Again, if you have extraordinary circumstances, you must file within a “reasonable period.” How long you have to file has not been clearly defined, so the sooner you file, the safer you will be in terms of the one-year bar.

When it comes to asylum, the best bet is to file within one year of arrival. But if you have missed that deadline, there are exceptions to the rule. These exceptions can be tricky, and so it would probably be wise to talk to a lawyer if you are filing late. It is always a shame when a strong asylum case is ruined by a one-year issue. Keep this deadline (emphasis on “dead”) in mind, and file on time if you can.

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In the outstanding tradition of former Arlington Immigration Court Judicial Law Clerks, Jason thinks creatively and writes clearly.

PWS

01-25-18

FOURTH CIRCUIT JOINS 9TH, 2d, & 6TH IN REVERSING BIA’S OVERLY RESTRICTIVE READING OF ASYLUM ELIGIBILITY – ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF A PRE-EXISTING CLAIM CAN BE A “CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCE” JUSTIFYING “LATE” ASYLUM FILING! — ZAMBRANO V. SESSIONS (PUBLISHED)!

4th Cir on changed circumstances-1yr

Zambrano v. Sessions, 4th Cir., 12-05-17 (published)

PANEL: KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and John A. GIBNEY, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY: Judge Gibney

KEY QUOTE:

“This Court agrees with the logic of the Ninth, Second, and Sixth circuits. New facts that provide additional support for a pre-existing asylum claim can constitute a changed circumstance. These facts may include circumstances that show an intensification of a preexisting threat of persecution or new instances of persecution of the same kind suffered in the past. The Court remands to the BIA and leaves the determination of whether the facts on record constitute changed circumstances which materially affect the petitioner’s eligibility for asylum to the BIA’s sound discretion.

III.
The BIA erred when it categorically held that additional proof of an existing claim

does not establish changed circumstances. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order, and remand the case to the BIA for further consideration in light of this opinion.”

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This is a very important decision for asylum applicants in the Fourth Circuit, as this situation arises frequently in Immigration Court.

With three well-reasoned Circuit decisions already in the books, why is the BIA holding out for a discredited rationale? How many individuals who weren’t fortunate enough to have Ben Winograd or an equally talented lawyer argue for them in the Court of Appeals have already been wrongfully removed under the BIA’s discredited rationale? Where’s the BIA precedent adopting this rationale and making it binding on IJ’s nationwide before more individuals are wrongfully removed? How is this “through teamwork and innovation being the world’s best administrative tribunal guaranteeing fairness and due process for all?”

The answer to the latter question is sadly obvious. While the BIA’s problems predated his tenure, the attitude of Attorney General Jeff Sessions, as demonstrated in his recent pronouncement on so-called “Immigration Court efficiency” elevates “false efficiency,” speed, and cranking out removals above fundamental fairness and Due Process. Why have an elaborate administrative court system that doesn’t put Due Process first and foremost as “real” (non-captive) courts generally do? Why not just send all removal cases to U.S. District Judges and Magistrate Judges who make Due Process and fairness “job one” and aren’t preoccupied with “jacking up” removal statistics to please political bosses?

And, I’d like to see how far the DHS/Sessions’s (they are pretty much the same these days) boneheaded, arrogant, unrealistic, and wasteful “no PD” policy would get in a “real” court system where widespread, reasonable, and prudent use of PD by prosecutors is understood and accepted as an essential part of fairness, efficiency, and responsible use of publicly-funded judicial resources. Indeed, in some of my past “off the record” conversations with Article III Judges, they were absolutely flabbergasted to discover the unwillingness of DHS to meaningfully exercise “PD” in the pre-Obama era and to learn that at DHS the “cops,” rather than the prosecutors were responsible for setting PD policies!

PWS

12-08-17

Due Process Forever!

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