"The Voice of the New Due Process Army" ————– Musings on Events in U.S. Immigration Court, Immigration Law, Sports, and Other Random Topics by Retired United States Immigration Judge (Arlington, Virginia) and former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals Paul Wickham Schmidt. To see my complete professional bio, just click on the link below.
The ABA Commission on Immigration is launching a Virtual Immigration Court Helpdesk for the Atlanta, Baltimore, Hyattsville, and Sterling Immigration Courts.
The informational flyers are attached here. Please feel free to share with your extended networks.
IN MEMORIAM: Hon. David Crosland, Judge, Former Legacy INS Acting Commissioner & General Counsel, Civil Rights Activist, Private Practitioner, Professor, Dies At 85
Hon. David Crosland American Jurist, Senior Executive, Lawyer, Teacher 1937 – 2022 PHOTO: Alabama Law
By Paul Wickham Schmidt
Courtside Exclusive
August 1, 2022
Alexandria, VA.Along with many others, I am saddened to learn of the death, over the weekend, of my former “boss” and judicial colleague, Judge David Crosland of the Baltimore Immigration Court. He was 85.
First and foremost, David was a dedicated public servant. A graduate of Auburn University and the University of Alabama School of Law, David served in the Civil Rights Division of the US Department of Justice during the tense and dangerous days of the 1960s. That was a time when speaking out for justice for African Americans in the South could be a life-threatening proposition.
Among many difficult and meaningful assignments, he helped prosecute Klansmen in Mississippi and also was assigned to prosecutions arising out of racially motivated police and National Guard killings in Detroit in 1967-68. After leaving the DOJ, he became the Director of the Atlanta Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.
At Auburn, David had studied Agriculture. He sometimes liked to regale Immigration Court interns with tales of his “days on the farm” during summers in college!
I first met Dave in 1977, when Judge Griffin Bell appointed him to be the General Counsel of the “Legacy INS.” Shortly thereafter, David selected me to be his Deputy General Counsel, thus initiating my career as a Government manager and executive. During the second half of the Carter Administration, Dave was the Acting Commissioner of Immigration, and I was the Acting General Counsel.
In those days, my hair was actually longer than Dave’s, a situation that would become reversed in later years as our respective careers progressed. Indeed, during his “ponytail and gold earring days” in private practice, I reminded him of the times in “GENCO” where he used to encourage me to “get a haircut.”
We went through lots of exciting times together including the Iranian Hostage Crisis, litigation involving Haitian asylum seekers, Nazi War Criminal prosecutions, the Mariel Boatlift, the creation of the Asylum Offices, and the beginnings of a major restructuring of the INS nationwide legal program that eventually brought all lawyers under the direct supervisory control of the General Counsel.
Following the 1980 election, Dave went into private practice and became a partner in Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver and then Crosland, Strand, Freeman & Mayock. He rejoined Government in 1997, when Attorney General Janet Reno appointed him as an Immigration Judge in Otey Mesa, CA. He later became an Assistant Chief Immigration Judge for several courts, as well as a Temporary Member of the BIA.
Our paths crossed again when we both served on the bench at the Arlington Immigration Court, roughly between 2009 and 2014. Then, David returned to Baltimore to be closer to his son and his residence in Maryland. He also served at various times as an Adjunct Professor of Law at GW Law and UDC Law.
David was a “character,” for sure. He had his own way of doing things that wasn’t always “strictly by the book.” But, he cared about the job and the people, was kind to the staff, and kept at it years after most of his contemporaries, including me, had retired.
One of the most moving tributes to David is from a member of court administrative staff who worked with him for years:
We just learned that Judge Crosland passed away this weekend at the grand age of 85 years. No funeral requested by him as his last wishes. Please keep him and his family in prayer. He was an amazing man, had a brilliant career and he was a genuinely kind person, hardworking to the end. Judge Crosland was very good to me, and he would walk me to my car after the long work days that turned into nights. Always a true gentleman, he would make me his famous lemon ice box pie! God bless Judge Crosland.
My time with Dave at the “Legacy INS” will always be with me as one of the most exciting, sometimes frustrating, but highly rewarding and formative parts of my career. Rest In Peace ☮️ my friend and colleague. You will be missed.
The lead plaintiffs claim that Fifth Amendment due process entitles them, and all members of the proposed class, to a bond hearing where the government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, dangerousness or risk of flight. As explained above, neither the INA nor its implementing regulations speak to the burden of proof at § 1226(a) bond hearings, and the BIA has held that the burden lies with the noncitizen. See Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 37, 40. But, as the lead plaintiffs point out, when faced with challenges to the constitutionality of these hearings, district courts in the First, Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have concluded that due process requires that the government bear the burden of justifying a noncitizen’s § 1226(a) detention. See, e.g., Singh v. Barr, 400 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires the Government to bear the burden of proving . . . that continued detention is justified at a § 1226(a) bond redetermination hearing.”); Diaz-Ceja v. McAleenan, No. 19-CV-00824-NYW, 2019 WL 2774211, at *11 (D. Colo. July 2, 2019) (same); Darko v. Sessions, 342 F. Supp. 3d 429, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (same); Pensamiento, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 692 (same). While jurisdictions vary on the standard of proof required, compare, e.g., Darko, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 436 (clear and convincing standard) with Pensamiento, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 693 (“to the satisfaction of the IJ” standard), the “consensus view” is that due process requires that the burden lie with the government, see Darko, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 435 (collecting cases).
The defendants concede that “a growing chorus of district courts” have concluded that due process requires that the government bear the burden of proof at § 1226(a) bond hearings. (Opp’n at 22). But the defendants also point out that some courts to consider the issue have
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concluded otherwise. In Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cty. Corr. Facility, the Third Circuit analyzed a § 1226(a) detainee’s claim that due process entitled him to a second bond hearing where “[t]he duration of [] detention [was] the sole basis for [the] due process challenge.” 906 F.3d 274, 276 (3d Cir. 2018). The Borbot court noted that the detainee “[did] not challenge the adequacy of his initial bond hearing,” id. at 276–77, and ultimately held that it “need not decide when, if ever, the Due Process Clause might entitle an alien detained under § 1226(a) to a new bond hearing,” id. at 280. But, in analyzing the detainee’s claims, the Borbot court stated that it “perceive[d] no problem” with requiring that § 1226(a) detainees bear the burden of proof at bond hearings. Id. at 279. Several district courts in the Third Circuit have subsequently concluded that Borbot compels a finding that due process does not require that the government bear the burden of proof at § 1226(a) bond hearings. See, e.g., Gomez v. Barr, No. 1:19-CV- 01818, 2020 WL 1504735, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2020) (collecting cases).
Based on its survey of the case law, the court is more persuaded by the reasoning of the district courts in the First, Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. “Freedom from imprisonment— from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citation omitted). While detention pending removal is “a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process,” such detention must comport with due process. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Although the Supreme Court has not decided the proper allocation of the burden of proof in § 1226(a) bond hearings, it has held, in other civil commitment contexts, that “the individual’s interest in the outcome of a civil commitment proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence.” See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)
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(addressing the standard of proof required for mental illness-based civil commitment) (emphasis added).
Application of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test lends further support to the lead plaintiffs’ contention that due process requires a bond hearing where the government bears the burden of proof. In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that “identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). While the court acknowledges that requiring the government to bear the burden of proof at § 1226(a) hearings would impose additional costs on the government, those costs are likely outweighed by the noncitizen’s significant interest in freedom from restraint, and the fact that erroneous deprivations of liberty are less likely when the government, rather than the noncitizen, bears the burden of proof. (See Decl. of Former Immigration Judge Denise Noonan Slavin ¶ 6, ECF 1-8 (“On numerous occasions, pro se individuals appeared before me for custody hearings without understanding what was required to meet their burden of proof. . . . Pro se individuals were rarely prepared to present evidence at the first custody hearing[.]”))
With respect to the quantum of proof required at § 1226(a) bond hearings, the court notes that “the overwhelming majority of district courts have . . . held that, in bond hearings under § 1226(a), due process requires the government to bear the burden of justifying detention by clear and convincing evidence.” Hernandez-Lara v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Acting Dir., No.
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19-CV-394-LM, 2019 WL 3340697, at *3 (D.N.H. July 25, 2019) (collecting cases). As the Hernandez-Lara court reasoned, “[p]lacing the burden of proof on the government at a § 1226(a) hearing to show by clear and convincing evidence that the noncriminal alien should be detained pending completion of deportation proceedings is more faithful to Addington and other civil commitment cases,” id. at *6, “[b]ecause it is improper to ask the individual to ‘share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual’—deprivation of liberty—is so significant,” id. (quoting Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2011)) (further citation omitted).
Moreover, on the quantum of proof question, the court finds instructive evolving jurisprudence on challenges to prolonged detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). As noted in note 2, supra, § 1226(c) mandates detention of noncitizens deemed deportable because of their convictions for certain crimes. See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 846. Although § 1226(c) “does not on its face limit the length of the detention it authorizes,” id., the Supreme Court has not foreclosed the possibility that unreasonably prolonged detention under § 1226(c) violates due process, id. at 851. Indeed, many courts have held that when § 1226(c) becomes unreasonably prolonged, a detainee must be afforded a bond hearing. See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 390 F. Supp. 3d 201, 215 (D. Mass. 2019); Portillo v. Hott, 322 F. Supp. 3d 698, 709 (E.D. Va. 2018); Jarpa, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 717. Notably, courts in this district and elsewhere have ordered § 1226(c) bond hearings where the government bears the burden of justifying continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. See Duncan v. Kavanagh, — F. Supp. 3d —-, 2020 WL 619173, at *10 (D. Md. Feb. 10, 2020); Reid, 390 F. Supp. 3d at 228; Portillo, 322 F. Supp. 3d at 709–10; Jarpa, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 721. As the Jarpa court explained, “against the backdrop of well-settled jurisprudence on the quantum and burden of proof required to pass constitutional muster in civil detention
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proceedings generally, it makes little sense to give Mr. Jarpa at this stage fewer procedural protections than those provided to” civil detainees in other contexts. See Jarpa, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 722 (citing United States v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513 (4th Cir. 2010)).
In light of the above, the court is satisfied that the lead plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that due process requires § 1226(a) bond hearings where the government must bear the burden of proving dangerousness or risk of flight. As to the quantum of proof required at these hearings, the court is persuaded that requiring a clear and convincing standard is in line with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Addington, as well as consistent with the bond hearings ordered in cases involving § 1226(c) detention.
ii. Due process claim: ability to pay and suitability for release on alternative conditions of release
The lead plaintiffs also claim that Fifth Amendment due process entitles them, and all members of the proposed class, to a bond hearing where the IJ considers the noncitizen’s ability to pay a set bond amount and her suitability for release on alternative conditions of supervision. The defendants counter that due process does not so require, and also asserts that at Mr. de la Cruz Espinoza’s bond hearing, the IJ did consider his ability to pay, (Opp’n at 26).
As an initial matter, the court considers whether the IJ at Mr. de la Cruz Espinoza’s bond hearing considered his ability to pay. According to the Complaint, there is no requirement that IJs in Baltimore Immigration Court consider an individual’s ability to pay when setting a bond amount. (Compl. ¶ 27 & n.8). The defendants assert that because Mr. de la Cruz Espinoza’s motion for bond included arguments about his financial situation, the IJ did, in fact, consider his ability to pay. (Opp’n at 26). The court is not persuaded. The fact that an argument was raised does not ipso facto mean it was considered. Neither the transcript of Mr. de la Cruz Espinoza’s bond hearing, (ECF 15-11), nor the IJ’s order of bond, (ECF 1-18), suggest that the IJ actually
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considered ability to pay. Accordingly, without clear evidence to the contrary, the court accepts the lead plaintiffs’ allegation that the IJ did not consider Mr. de la Cruz Espinoza’s ability to pay when setting bond.
The question remains whether due process requires that an IJ consider ability to pay and suitability for alternative conditions of release at a § 1226(a) bond hearing. As explained above, detention pending removal must comport with due process. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 523. Due process requires that detention “bear[s] [a] reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was] committed.” See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). Federal regulations and BIA decisional law suggest that the purpose of § 1226(a) detention is to protect the public and to ensure the noncitizen’s appearance at future proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1236.1; Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 38. But, the lead plaintiffs argue, when IJs are not required to consider ability to pay or alternative conditions of release, a noncitizen otherwise eligible for release may end up detained solely because of her financial circumstances.
Several courts to consider the question have concluded that § 1226(a) detention resulting from a prohibitively high bond amount is not reasonably related to the purposes of § 1226(a). In Hernandez v. Sessions, the Ninth Circuit held that “consideration of the detainees’ financial circumstances, as well as of possible alternative release conditions, [is] necessary to ensure that the conditions of their release will be reasonably related to the governmental interest in ensuring their appearance at future hearings[.]” See 872 F.3d at 990–91. While the Hernandez court did not explicitly conclude that a bond hearing without those considerations violates due process, see id. at 991 (“due process likely requires consideration of financial circumstances and alternative conditions of release” (emphasis added)), the court in Brito did reach that conclusion, see 415 F.
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Supp. 3d at 267. The Brito court held that, with respect to § 1226(a) bond hearings, “due process requires an immigration court consider both an alien’s ability to pay in setting the bond amount and alternative conditions of release, such as GPS monitoring, that reasonably assure the safety of the community and the alien’s future appearances.” Id. at 267. Relatedly, in Abdi v. Nielsen, 287 F. Supp. 3d 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2018), which involved noncitizens held in civil immigration
Hernandez—held that “an IJ must consider ability to pay and alternative conditions of release in setting bond for an individual detained under § 1225(b).” Id. at 338. To hold otherwise, the Abdi court reasoned, would implicate “the due process concerns discussed in Hernandez, which are equally applicable to detentions pursuant to § 1225(b).”10
The court is persuaded by the reasoning of Hernandez, Brito, and Abdi. If an IJ does not make a finding of dangerousness or substantial risk of flight requiring detention without bond (as in Mr. de la Cruz Espinoza’s case), the only remaining purpose of § 1226(a) detention is to
11
that an individual may not be imprisoned “solely because of his lack of financial resources.” See
9 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) authorizes indefinite, mandatory detention for certain classes of noncitizens. See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 842 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)).
10 The court notes that both Hernandez and Abdi reference now-invalidated precedent in both the Ninth and Second Circuits requiring the government to provide civil immigration detainees periodic bond hearings every six months. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1089 (9th Cir. 2015), abrogated by Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 852; Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015), abrogated by Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 852. But Jennings, which was decided on statutory interpretation grounds, explicitly did not include a constitutional holding. See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851 (“[W]e do not reach th[e] [constitutional] arguments.”). And, as the Hernandez court noted, “the Supreme Court’s review of our holding . . . that noncitizens are entitled to certain unrelated additional procedural protections during the recurring bond hearings after prolonged detention does not affect our consideration of the lesser constitutional procedural protections sought at the initial bond hearings in this case.” 872 F.3d at 983 n.8.
11 The defendants offer no purpose for § 1226(a) detention beyond protecting the community and securing a noncitizen’s appearance at future proceedings.
The set bond amount, then, must be reasonably related to this purpose. But where a bond amount is set too high for an individual to pay, she is effectively detained without bond due to her financial circumstances. It is axiomatic
secure a noncitizen’s appearance at future proceeding.
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Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 661–62, 665 (1983) (automatic revocation of probation for inability to pay a fine, without considering whether efforts had been made to pay the fine, violated due process and equal protection); cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (“The Constitution[’s equal protection clause] prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.”). In the pretrial detention context, multiple Courts of Appeals have held that deprivation of the accused’s rights “to a greater extent than necessary to assure appearance at trial and security of the jail . . . would be inherently punitive and run afoul of due process requirements.” See Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974)) (quotation marks omitted); accord ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 157 (5th Cir. 2018); see also Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 999 (7th Cir. 1976); accord Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 207 (11th Cir. 1997).
There is no suggestion that the IJs in Baltimore Immigration Court impose prohibitively high bond amounts with the intent of denying release to noncitizens who do not have the means to pay. But without consideration of a § 1226(a) detainee’s ability to pay, where a noncitizen remains detained due to her financial circumstances, the purpose of her detention—the lodestar of the due process analysis—becomes less clear. As the Ninth Circuit explained,
Setting a bond amount without considering financial circumstances or alternative conditions of release undermines the connection between the bond and the legitimate purpose of ensuring the non-citizen’s presence at future hearings. . . . [It is a] common-sense proposition that when the government detains someone based on his or her failure to satisfy a financial obligation, the government cannot reasonably determine if the detention is advancing its purported governmental purpose unless it first considers the individual’s financial circumstances and alternative ways of accomplishing its purpose.
Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 991.
The defendants assert that an IJ need not consider a noncitizen’s ability to pay a set bond
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amount because it had a “reasonable basis to enact a statute that grants the Executive branch discretion to set bonds to prevent individuals, whose ‘continuing presence in the country is in violation of the immigration laws,’ from failing to appear,” and that § 1226(a) passes muster under rational basis review. (Opp’n at 25–26 (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti- Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)). But the appropriate analysis for a procedural due process challenge is the Mathews balancing test, not rational basis review, which is used to analyze equal protection claims, see, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234–35 (1981), and substantive due process claims, see, e.g., Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 739 (4th Cir. 1999). And, in applying the Mathews test, the court agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that “the government’s refusal to require consideration of financial circumstances is impermissible under the Mathews test because the minimal costs to the government of [] a requirement [that ICE and IJs consider financial circumstances and alternative conditions of release] are greatly outweighed by the likely reduction it will effect in unnecessary deprivations of individuals’ physical liberty.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 993.
Accordingly, the court is satisfied that the lead plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that due process requires a § 1226(a) bond hearing where the IJ considers a noncitizen’s ability to pay a set bond amount and the noncitizen’s suitability for alternative conditions of release.
Y. . . .
*************************
Thanks and congratulations to Judge Denise Slavin for “making a difference.” It’s a true honor to serve with you and our other colleagues in the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges!Judge Slavin’s Declaration is cited by Judge Blake at the end of the first full paragraph above “17” in the quoted excerpt.
fl-undocumented-minors 2 – Judge Denise Slavin, executive vice president of the National Association of Immigration Judges in an immigration courtrrom in Miami. Mike Stocker, Sun SentinelKnightess of the Round Table
To be brutally honest about it, Denise is exactly the type of scholarly, courageous, due-process-oriented Immigration Judge who in a functioning, merit-based system, focused on “using teamwork and innovation to develop best practices and guarantee fairness and due process for all” would have made an outstanding and deserving Appellate Immigration Judge on the BIA. Instead, in the totally dysfunctional “World of EOIR,” the “best and brightest” judges, like Denise, essentially are “pushed out the door” instead of being honored and given meaningful opportunities to use their exceptional skills to further the cause of justice, establish and reinforce “best judicial practices,” and serve as outstanding role models for others. What an unconscionable waste!
It’s a great decision! The bad news: Because the Immigration Courts remain improperly captive within a scofflaw, anti-immigrant, and anti-due-process DOJ, respondents in many other jurisdictions will continue to be denied the fundamentally fair bond hearings required by Constitutional Due Process.
fl-undocumented-minors 2 – Judge Denise Slavin, executive vice president of the National Association of Immigration Judges in an immigration courtrrom in Miami. Mike Stocker, Sun Sentinel
Immigration Judge Denise Slavin recently retired after 24 years on the bench. The Asylumist caught up with her to ask about her career, her role as a leader in the National Association of Immigration Judges, and the state of affairs at the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”).
Asylumist: Tell me about how you got to be an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). What did you like and dislike about the job?
Judge Slavin: Before I became a Judge, I had some very different turns in my career. Early on, I worked for the Maryland Commission for Human Relations, where I prosecuted state civil rights complaints. I admired the hearing examiners, and I felt that I wanted to do that type of work. I knew [Immigration Judge] Larry Burman when I was in college, and he suggested I apply to the INS to become a trial attorney. I worked as a trial attorney from 1987 to 1990.
I then worked for the Department of Justice, Office of Special Investigations. This was maybe my favorite job. We investigated Nazi war criminals, and I worked on many interesting cases, including the case of John Demjanjuk. During my five years at the Office of Special Investigations, Judge Creppy became the Chief Immigration Judge. Since I knew him from my work in employer sanctions at INS, I called to congratulate him, and he suggested that I apply for an Immigration Judge position. I applied and got the job.
Judge Denise Slavin
I started work as an IJ in 1995. My first assignment was in Miami doing non-detained cases. I loved it there–the city was exotic and multicultural. It almost felt like I wasn’t living in the United States. It was also a good court for me to start my career on the bench. I hadn’t practiced in Miami as a Trial Attorney, so there were no expectations of me. Also, it is a large court with many judges to learn from.
I did non-detained cases for 10 years in Miami, but the work started to become a bit tedious. An opportunity came up and I transferred to the detained docket at Krome Detention Center. I loved working on those cases. The legal issues were cutting edge. I remember one three-month period, where our cases resulted in three published BIA decisions. For detained cases, the law develops quickly, and it was very challenging to keep up to speed.
I would have been happy to remain in Miami, but family issues brought me to Baltimore. The DHS and private-bar attorneys in Baltimore are very professional, and my colleagues were excellent mentors. All this helped make my time there very enjoyable.
Asylumist: What could DHS attorneys and the private bar do better in terms of presenting their cases? Are there any common problems that you observed as an IJ?
Judge Slavin: There are a lot of good DHS attorneys in Baltimore. DHS attorneys get a lot of credit with judges if they narrow the issues and stipulate to portions of the case. For example, it is so tedious when DHS inquires about every step the alien takes from her country to the United States. If there is no issue with the journey to the U.S., it is not worth going into all this, and it uses up precious court time. When DHS attorneys ask such questions, it would sometimes be frustrating for me as a Judge, since I do not know what they have in their file and what they might be getting at. But if there is nothing there, it is very frustrating to sit through. DHS attorneys should only explore such avenues of questioning if they think there is an issue there. When they focus on real issues, and don’t waste time sidetracking, they gain credibility with the IJs.
As for the private bar, I appreciate pre-hearing briefs on particular social groups. Also, explaining whether the applicant is claiming past persecution and the basis for that, whether there is a time bar, and nexus. Of course, this can sometimes be straightforward, but other times, it is a bigger issue and a brief is more important.
I encourage both parties to work together to reach agreement on issues whenever possible. Court time is so valuable, Judges want to spend it on the disputed issues.
Asylumist: What about lawyers who are bad actors, and who violate the rules?
Judge Slavin: IJs are prohibited from reporting attorneys directly to bar associations. Instead, we report the offending lawyer to internal EOIR bar counsel, who then makes a decision about whether or not to go to the state bar. Personally, I have been hesitant to report private attorneys because I think the system is unfair–it allows you to report a private attorney, but not a DHS attorney. Although this is unfair (and it is another reason why Immigration Courts should be Article I courts), there were times when I had to report blatant cases of attorney misconduct.
Asylumist: Looking at your TRAC statistics, your denial rates are much higher for detained cases. Some of this probably relates to criminal convictions and the one-year asylum bar, but can you talk about the difference in grant rates for detained vs. non-detained cases? Do IJs view detained cases differently? Perhaps in terms of the REAL ID Act’s evidentiary requirements (since it is more difficult to get evidence if you are detained)?
Judge Slavin: There were two detention centers in the Miami area—Krome and Broward Transitional Center–and they produced two different types of cases. At Krome, detainees mostly had convictions and had been in the U.S. for years. It is very difficult to win asylum if you have been here for that long. It’s hard to show that anyone would remember you, let alone persecute you, if you return to your country after a decade or more. BTC held newly arriving individuals who were claiming asylum. They generally had more viable claims.
As a Judge, I did account for people being detained. I didn’t want to deprive someone of the right to get a piece of evidence, but I didn’t want to keep the person detained for an extra three months at government expense to get the document. If there is no overriding reason to require corroboration, I would not require it for detained applicants. In many cases, corroboration that you would normally expect, you cannot get in the 30-day time-frame of a detained case. I have continued cases were there was needed corroboration, but I generally tried to avoid that.
Also, in adjudicating detained cases, it is important to consider the spirit of the asylum law, which is generous. But for people with convictions, we have to balance the need to protect an individual from persecution against the competing interest to protect the United States from someone who has committed crimes here. In a non-detained asylum case, the potential asylee should be given the benefit of the doubt, but–for example–in a detained case where the applicant has multiple criminal convictions, the person may not receive such a benefit of the doubt, and a Judge would rather err, if at all, on the side of caution and protect the community.
Asylumist: Again, looking at the TRAC statistics, your grant rates tend to be higher than other IJs in your local court. What do you think accounts for that? How do different IJs evaluate cases so differently?
Judge Slavin: In asylum cases, we don’t have a computer to input information and come up with an answer. The immigration bench does and should reflect the diverse political backgrounds of people in our country. I am more on the liberal side, but I will defend colleagues who are more conservative. We don’t want only middle-of-the road judges; we want the immigration bench to reflect our society.
As far as the TRAC numbers, it’s true that people who are represented by attorneys are generally more successful in court. However, if you have a bad case, most decent lawyers won’t take it. Such cases would be denied even with a lawyer. Since people with weak cases have a harder time finding lawyers, the disparity between represented and unrepresented individuals is not as dramatic as the TRAC statistics suggest.
Asylumist: One idea for reducing disparities between IJs is to hold training sessions where “easy” and “hard” judges evaluate a case and discuss how they reach different conclusions. Do you think this is something that would be helpful? What type of training do IJs need?
Judge Slavin: We have not had this type of training, but it would be interesting. EOIR has not been consistent about training. In-person trainings come and go. They do hold video training sessions, but these are horrible. Judges would get some time off the bench to watch the videos, but due to the pressing backlog, we would usually do other work while we were watching.
Also, looking at talking heads is not a good way to learn new information. In addition, the social opportunities to talk to other Judges with different backgrounds and different judicial philosophies that occur only during in-person trainings are invaluable.
The National Association of Immigration Judges (“NAIJ”) has tried to get EOIR to hold different types of trainings, such as regional conferences–where, for example, all the IJs in the Eleventh Circuit would get together–but unfortunately, EOIR has not gone for that approach.
In my experience, the more interactive trainings are more helpful. I’ve learned the most from talking with other IJs and from in-person trainings. This was one of the advantages of serving on a big court like Miami–the opportunity to interact with many other judges and see how they handled their dockets.
Another idea is to give IJs “sabbatical time” off the bench, to observe the cases of other judges. Seeing and talking to other judges about how they handle different issues is very helpful.
Asylumist: You mentioned the NAIJ, the National Association of Immigration Judges, which is basically a union for Immigration Judges. How did you get involved with the NAIJ? What did you do as a member and leader of that organization?
Judge Slavin: I had two mentors–Judge Bruce Solow and Judge John Gossart–who were both past presidents of NAIJ. They encouraged me to get involved with the organization. I ran for Vice President with Judge Dana Leigh Marks, who ran for President. I call Judge Marks my sister from another mother. I love her to death. Prior to becoming VP, I had done some secretarial-type duties for the NAIJ, like taking the minutes. I originally joined NAIJ to help improve the Immigration Court system.
As they say, bad management makes for good unions. When management is good, the number of NAIJ members falls, and when management is bad, more judges join. The situation these days is not good. In particular, the politicization of the Immigration Courts has been outrageous. This has been going on in several administrations, but has reached a peak in the current Administration.
Another issue is that we have judges doing more and more with less and less. It’s crazy. When I was in Miami and we had a thousand cases per judge, we were hysterical. When I left the court in Baltimore, I had 5,000 cases! Despite this, management at EOIR thinks that judges are not producing. The idea of this is absurd. Management simply does not recognize what we are doing, and this is bad for morale.
The previous Director of EOIR, Juan Osuna, appreciated the court and the judges, even if there were some political issues. When you have someone who does not appreciate what you are doing, and who gives you production quotas, it creates a very difficult environment.
These days, I do worry, especially for the newer judges. If you have to focus on getting cases done quickly, it will cause other problems–some cases that might have been granted will be denied if the applicant does not have time to gather evidence. Also, while many decisions can be made from the bench, for others, the Judge needs time to think things through. For me, I had to sleep on some of my cases–they were close calls. I needed time to decide how best to be true to the facts and the law. I also had to think about how my decision might affect future cases—most IJs want to be consistent, at least with their own prior decisions. To make proper decisions often takes time, and if judges do not have time to make good decisions, there will be appeals and reversals. For these reasons, production quotas will be counter-productive in the long run.
Other problems with the court system include the aimless docket reshuffling, which started with the Obama administration. IJs should determine on their own how cases are set on their dockets. Cases should be set when they are ready to go forward, not based on the priorities of DHS.
The main issue here is that DHS [the prosecutor] is very much controlling EOIR [the court]. The ex-parte communication that occurs on the macro level is unheard of–the priorities of DHS are communicated through backdoor channels to EOIR, and then EOIR changes its priorities. Have you ever heard of a state prosecutor’s office telling a state court which cases to set first? This re-shuffling affects IJs’ dockets–we would receive lists of case numbers that we had to move to the front of the queue. We had no control over which cases had to be moved. Instead, cases were advance based on DHS priorities.
Maybe one silver lining of the politicization under the current Administration is that it has helped people realize the need for an Article I court.
Asylumist: Bad management makes for good unions. What is your opinion of the leadership at EOIR today? What more could they do to support judges?
Judge Slavin: It’s hard to think about EOIR in this political environment. Former Director Juan Osuna was wonderful. He spent a lot of time minimizing damage to the court by the Department of Justice and Congress; for example, by explaining how judicial independence and due process prevented placing artificial constraints on the number or length of continuances granted. These concepts seem to elude the current leadership of EOIR, and the administration has moved to strip us of the tools we need (such as administrative closure) to control our dockets.
The court has many needs that are not being addressed. We need more and better training. We need larger courtrooms–it drives me crazy that we cannot get courtrooms the size we need; with children, families, and lawyers–we need more space.
Also, we need more judges. I retired, and a lot of people coming up behind me are getting ready to retire. It is hard to keep up with the numbers. One idea is to implement phased retirement for IJs, so judges could work two or three days per week. This was approved four years ago, but not implemented. I do not know why.
Judge Marks [former President of the NAIJ] and I talked to EOIR about hiring retired IJs back on a part-time basis. We asked about this 10 years ago, and they are finally getting around to it. That will help, and hopefully, EOIR can step up that program.
Recent changes that affected judges directly, such as limiting administrative closure, are not good for case management.
The NAIJ leadership and I have talked to EOIR Director James McHenry about some of this. He is not getting it. He is very young, and he thinks he has a new approach, but he does not know the history or background of EOIR, and he does not seem to grasp what the agency needs to do. He also does not understand how overworked judges have been for such a long time, and seems to think the problems with the court are based on lack of commitment and work ethic of the judges. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
Asylumist: How would it help if Immigration Courts became Article I courts?
Judge Slavin: Article I courts would still be part of the Executive Branch. Immigration is a plenary power, but when it comes to case-by-case adjudication, that issue disappears. The bottom line is that people are entitled to due process, and that requires judicial independence. I don’t think you can have due process without judicial independence. This is one of the hallmarks of the America legal system. Even arriving aliens are entitled to due process. If we change that, we are starting to give up who we are. If we are trying to save the U.S. from terrorists by eliminating due process for all, what are we saving? It is taking away an important tenant of our democratic system.
There is a plan to transition the Immigration Courts to Article I courts. The Bankruptcy Court did it. The plan allows for grandfathering of sitting IJs for a limited period. The sooner this is done, the easier it will be. And in fact, it must be done.
If we had Article I courts, we would eliminate aimless docket reshuffling and political priorities. Judges would control their own dockets, and this would lead to better morale and better efficiency.
Asylumist: Thank you for talking to me today.
Judge Slavin: Thank you
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We’ll said, Denise, my long-time friend and colleague!
As long as there is a DOJ and EOIR is part of it, there will be “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” and “Extreme Mission Failure” meaning that “guaranteeing fairness and Due Process for all” will be unachievable.
Ani Ucar reports for Vice News in an article featuring quotes from “Our Gang” members retired U.S. Immigration Judges Jeffrey Chase and John Gossart, as well as current (soon to be retired, perhaps?) Judge Denise Slavin:
Overwhelmed immigration courts are a national problem, and the growing backlog means an average immigration case is waiting in court for a record 717 days, as of 2018, according to Syracuse University.
But Maryland, with its more than 34,000 pending cases, has the fastest-growing backlog, largely because its sole immigration court, the Baltimore Immigration Court, is one of the most beleaguered and understaffed in the country, according to a confidential Department of Justice review obtained by VICE News.
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VICE News first obtained a heavily redacted version of the report through a records request but later obtained an uncensored version of the review, which paints a portrait of dysfunction at one of the busiest immigration courts in the country.
Completed in 2018 and covering the years 2014 to 2017, the review shows a department so understaffed that basic functions such as address changes or orders to appear in court were not processed or sent out as caseloads piled up. Failing to process key documents could deny migrants the opportunity to be heard in court. “Poor management of this core process leads to additional work for the Court and can result in respondents being ordered removed in absentia through no fault of their own,” the report says.
As the court’s caseload mounted, the number of sitting judges stayed the same, fluctuating between four and five. As a point of reference, Chicago’s immigration court, which has a comparable caseload, has twice the number of sitting judges.
NO HABLA ESPAÑOL
The court’s office had no Spanish speakers on staff, even though 84 percent of its cases involved a respondent who only spoke Spanish. The equipment in the office was dated and often nonfunctional. “The two existing HP copiers in the Baltimore Court have had numerous issues and there have been literally days when the Court is unable to use either copier,” the report said.
A lack of administrative staff meant boxes with thousands of documents were left sitting on the floor or on top of file cabinets, and the report describes “hallway space filled with files, file carts, printers and the like.”
One judge currently on the court told VICE News that as cases and administrative work piles up, the court may not be able to provide due process.
“I’m happy to be retirement-eligible, and quite frankly a lot of us are,” said Baltimore Immigration Judge Denise N. Slavin, who spoke to VICE News in her capacity as president emeritus of the National Association of Immigration Judges. “I feel like if I get pushed to a point to violate due process, or I’m being disciplined for not doing something that I thought would violate due process, I would be able to leave.”
As bad as it’s been in the Baltimore Immigration Court, it’s about to get worse. On Monday, a new policy backed by Attorney General Jeff Sessions went into effect mandating that the nation’s roughly 330 immigration judges process at least 700 cases per year. The Department of Justice has said it will hire 100new immigration judges this calendar year to help with the backlog, but current and former immigration judges say more judges without commensurate support staff will only add to the problem.
The confidential report on the Baltimore Immigration Office was performed by a court administrator at the request of the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, a branch of the DOJ. Unlike state or federal courts, immigration courts are part of the Department of Justice, and therefore part of the executive branch of government.
SURGING CASES
The review took place in November and December of last year, and focused on the time period from 2014-2017, when the Baltimore Immigration Court caseload nearly quadrupled.
Though the caseload was rising during that period, the court was shedding staff: They lost seven full-time permanent employees. “The shortage of staff in the Baltimore Court was so severe the Court did not have enough employees to manage the Court’s core processes,” the report says.
The report coincides with a 2014 surge of crossings at the U.S.-Mexico border. Baltimore’s caseload began to grow rapidly afterward. Despite having completed 33.11 percent more cases from 2015 to 2016 combined, the court’s efforts were not enough to keep pace with the mounting backlog. At the end of 2014, the court had 8,331 pending cases, and by December 2017 the pending caseload jumped to 29,184, according to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse database, or TRAC, at Syracuse University.
“It feels like you are being buried alive”
Backlogs in the immigration courts have historically been impacted by shifting migration patterns, immigration policy changes, and hiring freezes on judges and staff. But since President Trump took office in 2017, the number of pending cases in immigration courts has increased 41 percent, bringing the total to 764,561 as of August 31, 2018, according to TRAC.
“It feels like you are being buried alive,” said Los Angeles Immigration Judge Ashley Tabaddor, speaking as president of the National Association of Immigration Judges. “It’s like this tsunami of cases that just never goes away, and instead of [us] being helped, the department is just adding more pressure.”
QUOTA SYSTEM
Sessions has said the quota system will help cut down the record-high backlog, but immigration judges, both current and retired, have pushed back, saying the standard would threaten due process and judicial independence.
“There’s an overabundance of attention on efficiency and there seems to be little to no concern from higher-ups on getting the decisions right,” said retired New York City Immigration Judge Jeffrey S. Chase.
Baltimore’s immigration court is relatively small, but it has been operating with a caseload similar to that of a large immigration court. While more populous states have a number of immigration courts—there are seven courts in California, for instance, and six in New York—the Baltimore facility is the only one in Maryland.
The report describes at length how staff failed to maintain order as paperwork grew. “As of early December 2017, there were approximately 700-1,000 additional filings sitting in the Court that are made up of EOIR-28s, EOIR-33s, returned notices, general correspondence and motions that have not been processed,” the report says. (An EOIR-28 is a notice of appearance in court. An EOIR-33 is a change-of-address form.)
“How the Baltimore court manages motions still needs improvement. Poor management of this core responsibility leads to additional work for the Court, and it sends the message to the private bar and to DHS that the Court is not organized and cannot be relied on,” the report said.
The Department of Justice declined to comment on the report.
At the time of the review, the Baltimore court had 24,142 pending cases in which the respondent spoke Spanish but no Spanish-speakers on staff. At one point, the staff resorted to pulling two judges off the bench to help the front desk with translation needs, said one EOIR employee.
Other times they had to enlist the help of someone in the waiting room to interpret for people. “Sometimes they were not getting the best information or even accurate information about their case,” said the EOIR employee.
“Recruitment of a Spanish Interpreter should be a priority,” the report says, but that position has yet to be filled.
All these issues are expected to worsen with the rollout of the quota system. “We’ll have preliminary success with getting a large number of cases out and temporarily reduce the backlog, but ultimately a large number of those cases will come back on appeal, thus making the backlog even worse,” Slavin said.
At the end of the day, the taxpayer will be on the hook for the cost of the immigration policy, said retired Baltimore immigration judge F. Gossart Jr. “All this is going to be litigated at taxpayers’ expense, but it’s all in the effort to fulfill a political promise.”
Wow! An Attorney General who consistently shows bias and maliciousness combined with incompetence. What a horrible combination! And throw into the mix a complete abdication of oversight functions by the GOP-controlled Congress.
Sessions is pouring taxpayer money down the drain in an effort to actually make the system more dysfunctional and less fair. It’s the type of fraudulent, wasteful, and abusive conduct that in normal times might result in criminal prosecutions and jail sentences. We also know that he is promoting similar dysfunction in the criminal justice system with his inane and ineffective “zero tolerance” policy that has also made him the nation’s most notorious un-prosecuted child abuser. Yet, Sessions walks free, while the victims of his misconduct, many vulnerable children and women merely seeking the justice to which they are entitled, rot in his “New American Gulag” and/or suffer grossly substandard “justice” in a totally out of control charade of a “court system” where Due Process is mocked every day.
When the only thing that keeps you going is the knowledge that you can retire any day, you know that your job is really screwed up! (Hint to the un-retired but eligible: The very best time to retire is before you get to the foregoing point.)
If this isn’t your vision of America, then take Willie Nelson’s advice and “Vote ‘Em Out.”
This report (see link) was prepared and issued by the Center For Popular Democracy. Here are some key findings:
Every year, nearly 4,000 people in Washington, D.C. metropolitan area courts, Arlington, Virginia, and Baltimore, Maryland, face deportation in civil immigration court without the assistance of a lawyer. Based on original data analysis of Department of Justice records obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request, seven out of ten detained individuals in immigration court removal proceedings in Arlington, VA and eight out of ten in Baltimore, MD did not have any legal representation.
■ People without lawyers faced enormous odds in fighting their deportation cases. Among detained immigrants without lawyers, people in Arlington were only successful in their cases 11 percent of the time and unrepresented people in Baltimore only successful 7 percent of the time.
■ Having a lawyer in Arlington more than doubled a person’s chances of being able to remain in the U.S. and quadrupled a person’s chance of obtaining relief in Baltimore.
■ Between 2010 and 2015, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained nearly 15,000 people in local and county jails2 throughout the states of Maryland and Virginia. In both regions, people who did not have lawyers were more than twice as likely to remain detained during the entirety of their immigration case, even if they may have been eligible for release on bond.
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Read the entire report which has some case histories in addition to charts and graphs.
The findings are disturbing because the Arlington and Baltimore Immigration Courts generally are considered among the best in the nation in striving to provide due process. The judges in each court are committed to representation and often go out of their way to encourage and facilitate the appearance of counsel. The ICE Chief Counsel’s Offices also appreciate and support pro bono representation.
Additionally, as noted in the report, the DC-Baltimore metropolitan area has a number of great organizations dedicated to providing pro bono lawyers, as well as local practitioners, “big law” firms, and numerous outstanding law school clinics, all of which support the pro bono program.
Yet even under these generally favorable conditions, the overwhelming majority of individuals on the detained dockets in both courts appear pro se, without a lawyer. And, the results with a lawyer are very significantly better than for those forced to represent themselves.
I fear that the new program of expanded immigration detention being planned by DHS, with courts operating in obscure, out of the way locations along the Southern Border, will further impede already limited access to counsel and therefore further degrade due process in our U.S. Immigration Courts.
Frankly, I have not seen any mention of the importance of due process or facilitating access to counsel in any of the many Trump Administration pronouncements on immigration. It’s all about enforcement, detention, removals, and prosecutions. Fairness and due process, which should always be paramount concerns, appear to be ignored.
In the end, it likely will be up to the already overworked and stressed pro bono bar, human rights groups, and community-based NGOs to enforce immigrants’ rights to counsel and to full due process. And, ultimately, that’s probably going to require litigation and intervention by the Article III Courts.
Thanks to Adina Appelbaum, who worked on this report, for bringing it to my attention.
