9th Circuit on Jim Route v. Merrick Garland– Elaborating on the term “Date of Admission” Regarding Removability Due to Crimes of Moral Turpitude

By: Sophia Barba

On May 6, 2021 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a petition to review the BIA’s decision in Jim Route v. Merrick Garland. The case had been argued and submitted on April 13, 2021.

The 9th Circuit Court affirmed the decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals, which had concluded that Jim Route, the petitioner, had been:

“removable for having been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude (CIMT) within five years after the date of admission, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)”

At issue was the interpretation of Route’s “date of admission.” Namely, if a noncitizen has multiple dates of admission, which one shall apply for purposes of deciding the date of admission when analyzing removability for committing a CIMT? The BIA had relied on its prior decision under Matter of Alyazji, 25 I. & N. Dec. 397 (BIA 2011) which stated that “date of admission,” in the context of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), refers to the “date of the admission by virtue of which the alien was present in the United States when he committed his crime.”

The Circuit Court had concluded that the Route case was eligible for
deference under Chevron, and had determined that under a Chevron analysis, that the BIA’s interpretation through Alyazji was a reasonable interpretation of the statute.

The petitioner’s argument rested primarily on the fact that the BIA’s reliance of the Alyazji interpretation ignored the Compact of Free Association governing the relationship between the United States and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). The panel rejected Route’s contention, explaining that the text of the Compact clearly subjects Micronesian citizens to the removability grounds of
§ 1227(a).

Jim Route, the petitioner, is a citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia. Route entered the United States in November 2005 as a nonimmigrant. He lived and worked in Hawai‘i. In 2015, Route returned to Micronesia for a vacation with his children; they stayed for less than two months. In June 2015, Route returned to the United States and was again admitted as a nonimmigrant. In June 2018, Route was convicted of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, a class C felony in Hawai’i. Route was sentenced to 68 days’ imprisonment and four years’ probation.

For cultural context, the noncitizens from Micronesia make up a significant portion of the labor force in Hawai’i.  According to local advocates in Hawai’i, “There are an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 Micronesians in Hawaii, who began migrating here in bigger numbers in the 1990s in search of economic and educational opportunities.” (Crux)

Part of the Petitioner’s argument rested on the unique international agreement called the Compact of Free Association, which “allows citizens from the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau to live and work freely in the United States in exchange for allowing the U.S. military to control strategic land and water areas in the region.” (Crux)

According to many people living in Hawai’i, Micronesians often face hardship being treated as outsiders and targeted by locals as being unwanted laborers who allegedly take away economic opportunities from them. Some Micronesians in Hawai’i have even expressed that they experience high incidences of violence and are more targeted by police. Two days after the Ninth Circuit published its opinion declining to review the BIA’s opinion, a 16-year old Micronesian boy was shot by police in Hawai’i after allegedly committing a spree of crimes in Honolulu. Hawai’ian social media was flooded with comments that touted anti-Micronesian sentiment, illuminated a microcosm of xenophobia that is similar to sentiments carried by many on the mainland. (KCTV Channel 5)

The anti-Micronesian sentiment in Hawai’i can be compared to the treatment of Latin-American noncitizens in the contiguous territories of the United States, or even the sentiments many Europeans carry against African or Middle-Eastern migrants. The sentiment that noncitizens who arrive for economic opportunity contribute to blight, crime, and siphon opportunity from others is an oft-told narrative no matter the region. 

You can find the full opinion and summary that was published by the 9th Circuit here

BIA/DURESS DEFENSE — NEW COMMENTARY FROM JUDGE JEFFREY S. CHASE: “Former IJs and Board Members File Amicus Brief in Negusie Remand”

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2017/7/17/former-ijs-and-board-members-file-amicus-brief-in-negusie-remand

Jeffrey writes:

“An Amicus brief was recently filed with the BIA on behalf of seven former immigration judges (including myself) and a former BIA board member in the case of Negusie v. Holder.  (In addition to the former Board member, one of the included IJs also served as a temporary Board member).   The case was remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court in order for the Board to determine whether there is a duress exception to the bar to asylum which applies to those who have persecuted others on account of a protected ground.

The context for the brief is as follows.  After initially ceding a limited duress exception to the Board, DHS recently changed its position.  In now opposing such exception, DHS relies in part on its contention that the complex analysis such determinations require would overburden the currently backloggedimmigration courts.

The amicus brief on behalf of the former IJs and Board member offers three primary points in rebuttal to this portion of DHS’s claim.  First, the brief points out that the immigration courts’ present backlog is largely the result of policy decisions made by both EOIR and DHS itself.  As the brief argues, it is disingenuous for DHS to create policies that contribute to the immigration courts’ backlog, and then argue to limit immigration judge’s decision-making authority as a means of alleviating its self-created burden.  The brief adds that such “bureaucratic failures resulting in the immigration court backlog cannot be a reason to deny people their right to a fair and just outcome.”

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Read Jeffrey’s complete analysis over on his own website at the above link.

Why the “Chevron Doctrine” has gotta go:

Folks, the Supremes remanded the Negusie case in 2009 — that’s right, approximately eight years ago! Since that time, the supposedly “expert” BIA has been screwing around trying to came up with guidance.

It was obvious from the Supreme’s decision that they all had firm opinions on the correct answer (notwithstanding some very disingenuous protests to the contrary). So, why send the case back several levels in the system, all the way to a non-Article III administrative tribunal to make a decision that the BIA is either unwilling or incapable of making in a timely manner?

It’s time for the Supremes to step up to the plate and decide difficult and controversial issues when they are presented to them, not “punt” back to lesser qualified Executive agencies that lack the necessary judicial independence to make the best and fairest decisions. Why have a Supreme Court that is afraid to decide important legal issues?

In the meantime, lives are in the balance as the BIA flounders about trying to reach a decision. U.S. Immigration Judges and lower Federal Courts have had to “go it alone” on real-life cases while the BIA ruminates. Indeed, I had to decide such cases at the trial level on several occasions without any meaningful guidance from the BIA.

Moreover, the obvious unfairness of these delays is well illustrated here. During the eight years at the BIA, the Administration has changed and is now taking a much more restrictive position. But, if the BIA had done its job, the precedent, presumably more generous, would have been established years ago, and many cases would already have been finally determined thereunder.

It’s time to put an end to the absurdly “undue deference” that the Supremes give to non-Article III decision makers on questions of law under Chevron.

PWS

07-17-17