2D CIR. ZAPS BIA ON RETROACTIVITY — OBEYA V. SESSIONS

https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/immigration-law-blog/archive/2018/03/09/ca2-on-retroactivity-obeya-v-sessions.aspx

 

Dan Kowalski, Editor @ LexisNexis Immigration Community sends this item:

Obeya v. Sessions, Mar. 8, 2018 – “Clement Obeya, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of petit larceny under New York law. The government sought to remove Obeya for his conviction, treating it as a “crime involving moral turpitude.” The Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals found that Obeya was removable based on his conviction, but this Court remanded due to the agency’s failure to apply BIA precedent holding that larceny involves moral turpitude only when it is committed with the intent to deprive the owner of property permanently. On remand, the BIA again found Obeya removable, holding that his offense involved moral turpitude by applying a new rule, announced in another case that same day, expanding the types of larceny that qualify as such crimes. Obeya challenges the BIA’s retroactive application of that rule to his case. We GRANT review and REVERSE the BIA’s order.”

[Hats off to Richard W. Mark!]

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Go on over to LexisNexis at the above link for the link to the 2d Circuit’s full decision.

As Gonzo & Co. move to speed up the Deportation Railway, the current quality control problems evident at the BIA, illustrated by decisions like this, will be multiplied.

PWS

08-09-18

5TH CIR BONKS BIA: Misdemeanor Evading Arrest Under Texas Penal Code § 38.04 (2011) Is NOT A CIMT! — Laryea v. Sessions

-5thCIMT

Laryea v. Sessions, 5th Cir., 09-12-17 (unpublished — sadly)

PANEL:

DAVIS, GRAVES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM

KEY QUOTE:

“Here, examining the record of conviction, Laryea was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor, which does not involve flight using a vehicle. We hold that fleeing from a police officer, without more, does not rise to the level of moral turpitude because it is not “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.”21 Therefore, we find that the conduct involved in Laryea’s offense, “intentionally flee[ing] from a person he knows is a peace officer

attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him,” is not a CIMT.”

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The standard for crimes involving moral turpitude seems to me to be completely subjective and highly arbitrary. Hard to see how it passes constitutional muster, but it has, over many years. Interestingly, it appears that this Respondent was able to file his own petition for review. I wonder if he had “informal help.”

PWS

09-14-17

 

 

GOBBLEDYGOOK CENTRAL: After 12 Years Kicking Around The System, 9th Circuit Declines Chevron Deference To Matter of Cortez Canales, 25 I. & N. Dec. 301 (BIA 2010) & Punts Issue Back To BIA — Lozano-Arredondo v. Sessions — Why “Chevron Must Go!” — Somewhere In This Judicially-Created Mess, It’s All About A 2-Decades Old “Petty Theft” Conviction!

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/08/08/11-72422.pdf

Key quote:

“We grant Lozano-Arredondo’s petition and remand to the BIA. We hold, first, that petit theft under Idaho law does not qualify categorically as a crime involving moral turpitude. We also hold that under the modified categorical approach, the record of conviction is inconclusive. Because the effect of that inconclusive record presents an open legal question now pending before another panel of this court, our analysis ends there. On remand, once this burden of proof question is resolved, the BIA should determine whether Lozano- Arredondo’s conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude under the modified categorical approach, unless the case is resolved on other grounds.

Second, we hold the BIA erred by deciding at Chevron step one that an “offense under” § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) does not include the within-five-years element. Because the BIA “erroneously contends that Congress’ intent has been clearly

24 LOZANO-ARREDONDO V. SESSIONS

expressed and has rested on that ground, we remand to require the agency to consider the question afresh.” Delgado, 648 F.3d at 1103–04 n.12 (quoting Negusie, 555 U.S. at 523) (internal quotation marks omitted); see INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002). In light of this holding and the explanations we have given, the BIA must reconsider its interpretation of the phrase “offense under” in § 1229b(b)(1)(C).”

PANEL:  Circuit Judges William A. Fletcher, Raymond C. Fisher and N. Randy Smith

OPINION BY: Judge Fisher

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Com’ on Man! This case has been around the system since 2005 — 12 years! The conviction is now two decades old. The case depends on two legal questions.

The 9th Circuit should answer the legal questions and either 1) affirm the BIA’s final order of removal, or 2) remand the case to the BIA to apply the law that has been determined by the 9th Circuit to the facts of this case. The court’s prose is impenetrable; the court’s rationale, based on Chevron, is irrational.

It’s time for Chevron to go and for Article III Courts to do their job of deciding legal questions rather than bogging down the system with infinite delays through needless remands to have the BIA pass on difficult legal questions. That’s the Article III Courts’ Constitutional function; they have been avoiding it for years under the Supreme’s judge-made facade of Chevron and Brand X.

(Yes, I know the 9th Circuit is only following Chevron, as they are bound to do. This is something the Supremes need to address, sooner rather than later. The result in this case is pure legal obfuscation.)

Oh yeah, while we’re at it, if there is an “open legal question” before another panel of the 9th Circuit, why remand the case to the BIA which can’t resolve that? Why not send this case to the “other panel” or ask your colleagues on the other panel if they could expedite their consideration of this issue?

PWS

08-08-17

 

BIA Requests Amicus Briefing On Modified Categorical Approach & CIMT — Deadline Is July 12, 2017

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/972601/download

June 12, 2017, Amicus Invitation Amicus Invitation No. 17-06-12 AMICUS INVITATION (MODIFIED CATEGORICAL APPROACH & CIMTS) DUE [JULY 12, 2017] JUNE 12, 2017 The Board of Immigration Appeals welcomes interested members of the public to file amicus curiae briefs discussing the below issue(s): ISSUE(S) PRESENTED: (1) Is the Board precluded from applying a modified categorical analysis for an indivisible or means-based statute within the context of crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) determinations, when the requirement in question is whether the involved conduct is reprehensible, which is a subjective determination that is not an element of the state offense? (2) Do the “three basic reasons for adhering to an elements-only inquiry,” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2252-53 (2016), have force in the CIMT context? (3) Do the answers to the first two questions require modification of the Board’s decision in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 826 (BIA 2016), and if so, how? Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae: Members of the public who wish to appear as amicus curiae before the Board must submit a Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae (“Request to Appear”) pursuant to Chapter 2.10, Appendix B (Directory), and Appendix F (Sample Cover Page) of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual. The Request to Appeal must explicitly identify that it is responding to Amicus Invitation No. 17-06-12. The decision to accept or deny a Request to Appear is within the sole discretion of the Board. Please see Chapter 2.10 of the Board Practice Manual. Filing a Brief: Please file your amicus brief in conjunction with your Request to Appear pursuant to Chapter 2.10 of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual. The brief accompanying the Request to Appeal must explicitly identify that it is responding to Amicus Invitation No. 17-06-12. An amicus curiae brief is helpful to the Board if it presents relevant legal arguments that the parties have not already addressed. However, an amicus brief must be limited to a legal discussion of the issue(s) presented. The decision to accept or deny an amicus brief is within the sole discretion of the Board. The Board will not consider a brief that exceeds the scope of the amicus invitation. Request for Case Information: Additional information about the case, including the parties’ contact information, may be available. Please contact the Clerk’s Office at the below address for this information prior to filing your Request to Appear and brief. Page Limit: The Board asks that amicus curiae briefs be limited to 30 double-spaced pages.

June 12, 2017, Amicus Invitation Amicus Invitation No. 17-06-12 AMICUS INVITATION (MODIFIED CATEGORICAL APPROACH & CIMTS) DUE [JULY 12, 2017] JUNE 12, 2017 The Board of Immigration Appeals welcomes interested members of the public to file amicus curiae briefs discussing the below issue(s): ISSUE(S) PRESENTED: (1) Is the Board precluded from applying a modified categorical analysis for an indivisible or means-based statute within the context of crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) determinations, when the requirement in question is whether the involved conduct is reprehensible, which is a subjective determination that is not an element of the state offense? (2) Do the “three basic reasons for adhering to an elements-only inquiry,” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2252-53 (2016), have force in the CIMT context? (3) Do the answers to the first two questions require modification of the Board’s decision in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 826 (BIA 2016), and if so, how? Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae: Members of the public who wish to appear as amicus curiae before the Board must submit a Request to Appear as Amicus Curiae (“Request to Appear”) pursuant to Chapter 2.10, Appendix B (Directory), and Appendix F (Sample Cover Page) of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual. The Request to Appeal must explicitly identify that it is responding to Amicus Invitation No. 17-06-12. The decision to accept or deny a Request to Appear is within the sole discretion of the Board. Please see Chapter 2.10 of the Board Practice Manual. Filing a Brief: Please file your amicus brief in conjunction with your Request to Appear pursuant to Chapter 2.10 of the Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual. The brief accompanying the Request to Appeal must explicitly identify that it is responding to Amicus Invitation No. 17-06-12. An amicus curiae brief is helpful to the Board if it presents relevant legal arguments that the parties have not already addressed. However, an amicus brief must be limited to a legal discussion of the issue(s) presented. The decision to accept or deny an amicus brief is within the sole discretion of the Board. The Board will not consider a brief that exceeds the scope of the amicus invitation. Request for Case Information: Additional information about the case, including the parties’ contact information, may be available. Please contact the Clerk’s Office at the below address for this information prior to filing your Request to Appear and brief. Page Limit: The Board asks that amicus curiae briefs be limited to 30 double-spaced pages.

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PWS

06-14-17 Continue reading BIA Requests Amicus Briefing On Modified Categorical Approach & CIMT — Deadline Is July 12, 2017

9th Circuit Reverses BIA, Says CAL Fleeing From A Police Officer Not A Categorical CIMT! — Ramirez-Contreras v. Sessions — Read My Mini-Essay “Hard Times In The Ivory Tower”

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/06/08/14-70452.pdf

Here is the summary prepared by the court staff:

“Immigration

The panel granted Ramirez-Contreras’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision concluding that his conviction for fleeing from a police officer under California Vehicle Code § 2800.2 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude that rendered him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal.

In holding that Ramirez-Contreras’s conviction is not a crime of moral turpitude, the panel accorded minimal deference to the BIA’s decision due to flaws in its reasoning.

Applying the categorical approach, the panel viewed the least of the acts criminalized under California Vehicle Code § 2800.2, and concluded that an individual can be convicted under subsection (b) for eluding police while committing three traffic violations that cannot be characterized as “vile or depraved.” Therefore, the panel held that California Vehicle Code § 2800.2 is not a crime of moral turpitude because the conduct criminalized does not necessarily create the risk of harm that characterizes a crime of moral turpitude.

The panel also held that the modified categorical approach does not apply because the elements of California Vehicle Code § 2800.2 are clearly indivisible.”

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Andre M. Davis,** and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Schroeder

** The Honorable Andre M. Davis, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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HARD TIMES IN THE IVORY TOWER

by Paul Wickham Schmidt

The BIA has been having a rough time lately on its rulings concerning both “aggravated felonies” and “crimes involving moral turpitude.” The BIA appears to take an “expansive” or “inclusive” approach to criminal removal statutes, while most courts, including the Supremes, seem to prefer a narrower approach that assumes the “least possible crime” and ameliorates some of the harshness of the INA’s removal provisions.

In my view, the BIA’s jurisprudence on criminal removal took a “downward turn” after Judge Lory D. Rosenberg was forced off the BIA by then Attorney General John Ashcroft around 2002. Judge Rosenberg’s dissents often set forth a “categorical” and “modified categorical” analysis that eventually proved to be more in line with that used by higher Federal Courts all the way up to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Since the “Ashcroft purge,” the BIA has visibly struggled to get on the same wavelength with the reviewing courts on analyzing criminal removal provisions. At the same time, the BIA’s own precedents have been remarkable for their lack of meaningful dissent and absence of any type of visible judicial dialogue and deliberation. Maybe that’s what happens when you try to build a “captive court” from the “inside out” rather than competitively selecting the very best Appellate Immigration Judges from different backgrounds whose  views span the entire “real world” of immigration jurisprudence.

Just another reason why it’s time to get the United States Immigration Courts (including the “Appellate Division” a/k/a/ the BIA) out of the Executive Branch and into an independent judicial structure. No other major court system in America is run the way DOJ/EOIR runs the Immigration Courts. And, that’s not good news for those seeking genuine due process within the immigration system.

PWS

06-09-17