😎👍🏼⚖️ARLINGTON PRACTITIONER ARNEDO S. VELERA BEATS EOIR, OIL — 11th Cir. “Outs” Another Sloppy Analysis By Garland’s BIA In CIMT Case! — Hernandez Zarate v. Garland

 

https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca11-cimt-remand-hernandez-zarate-v-garland

Dan Kowalski reports for LexisNexis:

CA11 CIMT Remand: Hernandez Zarate v. Garland

Hernandez Zarate v. Garland

“The question presented in this appeal—one which has led to a circuit split—is whether a conviction for falsely representing a social security number, see 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B), is a CIMT. … The BIA explained that § 408(a)(7)(B) requires intent to deceive, and as a result Mr. Zarate’s conviction was for a CIMT. Noting that the circuits were divided on the issue, it quoted our decision in Walker v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 783 F.3d 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 2015), for the proposition that, “[g]enerally, a crime involving dishonesty or false statement is considered to be one involving moral turpitude.” The BIA did not, however, address whether a violation of § 407(a)(7)(B) is inherently base, vile, or depraved. And that, as we will later explain, is a significant omission. … Our holding today does not foreclose the possibility that a conviction for a violation of § 408(a)(7)(B) may be a CIMT. But if the BIA is going to hold that it is, it will need to do what it has so far failed to do in Mr. Zarate’s case—it will have to apply its two-pronged moral turpitude standard in toto and decide whether the statute, under the categorical approach, involves conduct that is “reprehensible,” i.e., conduct that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.” Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 833–34 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 Utah L. Rev. at 1007–08 (criticizing courts for “ignor[ing] community moral sentiments when applying the [moral turpitude] standard”). We remand to the BIA for that purpose.”

[Hats way off to Arnedo Silvano Valera!]

pastedGraphic.png

**********************

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

My colleague Hon. “Sir Jeffrey” Chase of the Round Table 🛡⚔️ offers the following cogent “instant analysis:”

Besides from what this says about the BIA being too lazy and hellbent on affirming removal orders for even the 11th Circuit’s liking, this is really interesting in its addressing the issue of applying “community moral sentiments”.What community are we talking about, and at what period of time?

There’s also a concurring opinion that does a very deep dive into the process for determining whether a statute is divisible.Could you even imagine the BIA engaging in the necessary analysis?

“Deep analysis” isn’t exactly in the “BIA playbook” under Garland. No, Garland’s “good enough for government work culture” at the DOJ tolerates the “whatever it takes to get to ‘no’” standard that was instilled by Sessions and Barr and, remarkably, still permeates much of the BIA’s work that is being rejected by the Article IIIs.

I note that the “deep dive” concurring opinion referenced by “Sir Jeffrey” was written by Senior Circuit Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat, a 92-year-old Gerald Ford appointee whose intellectual engagement and analytical work product puts the Garland BIA to shame! 

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

02-19-22

BIA SHOOTS UNREPRESENTED RESPONDENT ON “DIVISIBILITY” ANALYSIS — MATTER OF P-B-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 43 (BIA 2020) — Like Shooting Fish 🐟 In A Barrel 🛢!

MATTER OF P-B-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 43 (BIA 2020)

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1296956/download

BIA HEADNOTE:

Section 13-3407 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, which criminalizes possession of a dangerous drug, is divisible with regard to the specific “dangerous drug” involved in a violation of that statute.

PANEL: Board Panel: GREER and O’CONNOR, Appellate Immigration Judges; SWANWICK, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.

OPINION: O’CONNOR, Appellate Immigration Judge

*******************************

You think this isn’t “Theater of The Absurd?” Let’s check out Fns 5 & 6 from the opinion:

5 We recognize that the Ninth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises, utilized a modified categorical inquiry in Alvarado, 759 F.3d at 1130–33, to discern whether an alien’s conviction under section 13-3407 involved a federally controlled substance and was therefore a predicate for removal under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. However, the Ninth Circuit did not expressly analyze the divisibility of section 13-3407 in that decision, nor did the court have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s articulation of divisibility in Mathis. Moreover, the circuit recently certified a similar issue to the Arizona Supreme Court. See Romero-Millan v. Barr, 958 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2020) (asking the court to resolve whether Arizona statutes proscribing possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of a narcotic drug under sections 13-3415 and 13-3408 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, respectively, are divisible with respect to the identity of the drug involved in each offense). For these reasons, we do not consider Alvarado to be persuasive authority regarding the divisibility of section 13-3407, which, in light of Romero-Millan, we view as an unsettled issue in the Ninth Circuit.

6 We acknowledge that State v. Prescott, No. 1 CA-CR 15-0188, 2016 WL 611656, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2016), and State v. Castorina, No. 1 CA-CR 08-0816, 2010 WL 2450117, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 17, 2010), suggest that the identity of the “dangerous drug” involved in a violation of section 13-3407 is not an element of the statute. However, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona recently reviewed both cases, found that their reasoning was flawed, and concluded that Arizona case law fails to provide a “clear answer[] as to the divisibility” of section 13-3407. United States v. Sanchez-Murillo, No. CR-19-00795-PHX-SPL, 2019 WL 3858606, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 16, 2019) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Prescott or Castorina “definitively answer[s] whether the dangerous drug requirement of [section] 13-3407[] is divisible.” Gonzalez-Dominguez v. Sessions, 743 F. App’x 808, 811 (9th Cir. 2018).

So, how do you think that the unrepresented, almost certainly detained, respondent did on these issues, assuming that he even can read the BIA’s decision or have someone accurately read It to him?

The whole Immigration Court System has become a judicially and Congressionally-enabled “Due Process Farce” befitting a third word failed state that our country now resembles under the Trump kakistocracy. 

NO, those who say our democratic institutions are “holding up” under Trump are living in a parallel universe! 

PWS

07-24-20

2D CIR Raps BIA, USIJ For Applying Wrong Tests For Agfel —- NY 5th Degree Sale Of A Controlled Substance Not A “Drug Trafficking Crime” — Respondent Eligible For Cancellation — KENNARD GARVIN HARBIN v. JEFFERSON SESSIONS III

http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1865217.html

“We hold that NYPL § 220.31 defines a single crime and is therefore an “indivisible” statute. Accordingly, the agency should have applied the so-called “categorical approach,” which looks to the statutory definition of the offense of conviction, rather than the particulars of an individual’s behavior, to determine whether a prior conviction constitutes an aggravated felony. See Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986 (2015). Now applying the categorical approach, we conclude that Harbin’s conviction under the NYPL § 220.31 did not constitute a commission of an aggravated felony. Harbin’s § 220.31 conviction therefore did not bar him from seeking cancellation of removal and asylum.”

PANEL: Circuit Judges CABRANES, POOLER, and PARKER.

OPINION BY:  Judge Pooler.

*************************************************

When will they ever learn, when will they ever learn? Attempts by U.S. Immigration Judges and the BIA to “blow by” proper application of “divisibility analysis” and the “categorical approach” in an effort to maximize removals under the “aggravated felony” provisions of the INA continue to draw criticism from higher court judges. However, they probably are “less career threatening” with respect to the BIA’s relationship to their political bosses at the DOJ. Whoever heard of a due process court system being owned and operated by the chief prosecutor? And, nobody can doubt that Attorney General Jeff Sessions sees himself as the Chief Prosecutor of migrants in the United States. But, to be fair, the last Attorney General to actually attempt to let the BIA function as an an independent quasi-judicial body was the late Janet Reno. And, that was 17 years ago.

PWS

06-23-17