NO CHAOS: Matt Zapotosky Summarizes Supreme’s Travel Ban Decision — Former DOJ Immigration Litigator Leon Fresco Says Case Likely To Resolve Itself Before Argument In Fall!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/what-the-supreme-courts-travel-ban-ruling-means/2017/06/26/5e86e1cc-5a7e-11e7-9fc6-c7ef4bc58d13_story.html?utm_term=.13c35f5c2033

Zapotosky writes in the WashPost:

“The Supreme Court’s decision to allow portions of President Trump’s travel ban to take effect is a win for the administration, but the impact will be far less severe than President Trump’s initial version of the measure.

That is because the high court effectively allowed Trump to ban from coming to the United States only citizens of six majority-Muslim countries “who lack any bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” It also nudged the president to complete his promised review of vetting procedures, which might mean the issue is resolved by the time the court is set to fully consider the ban in its October term.

For now, if you are not a U.S. citizen and have a relative here, have been hired by a U.S. employer or admitted to an American university, you can still probably get a visa. But if you’re applying cold as a visitor or through the diversity visa program, you probably can’t.

. . . .

The Supreme Court wrote that the government now should be able to do its work. “We fully expect that the relief we grant today will permit the Executive to conclude its internal work and provide adequate notice to foreign governments within the 90-day life of [the order],” the justices wrote.

The court said it would take up the travel ban fully in its October term; their ruling Monday only partially lifted lower courts’ stays on the measure. By that time, the 90-day period will have run, and Fresco said the administration will be pressed to come up with good reasons for imposing a ban.

“If there is not an answer to the question on the first day of oral arguments about why this ban is still in place, that is going to make the court much more skeptical about the government’s reasons for having this ban,” Fresco said.”

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Read the complete analysis at the link.

According to this analysis, the six Justices in the majority apparently have skillfully maneuvered the Trump Administration into a “put up or shut up” situation. They have alleviated the greatest hardships caused by the ban by allowing individuals with bona fide connections to the U.S. to continue to come. At the same time, they have pressured the Trump Administration into completing its “study” before Fall and lifting the “temporary ban,” thus largely mooting the case. As Fresco points out, if the Administration attempts to continue the ban after its scheduled expiration, they will likely have to come up with a much more convincing explanation that they have provided to date. Otherwise, the whole thing is going to look like a “pretext” for a blanket “Muslim ban,” which is what the plaintiffs have been arguing all along. Actually, sounds to me like the kind of practical solution that Chief Justice Roberts sometimes devises to avoid ugly showdowns between the three branches of Government. Interesting.

PWS

06-26-17

 

BREAKING: SUPREMES GRANT CERT., ALLOW TRUMP’S TRAVEL BAN TO GO INTO EFFECT — WITH IMPORTANT EXCEPTIONS — CASE DOCKETED FOR OCT. — MIGHT BE “MOOT” BY THEN!

Here’s the Court’s complete “per curiam” (unsigned) opinion with separate concurring and dissenting opinion by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, & Alito:

SCTravelBan16-1436_l6hc

The Supreme Court handed the Trump Administration at least a partial victory on the controversial “Travel Ban 2.0” which had been enjoined by the Ninth and Fourth U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Court: 1) granted the petitions for certiorari filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the Trump Administration and scheduled the case for Oral Argument at the beginning of the October 2017 Term; and 2) granted in part the Solicitor General’s request to stay the lower courts’ injunctions pending review.

However, in partially lifting the injunctions, the Court left in effect a significant  part of those injunctions: the Travel Ban may not be applied to a) “foreign nationals who have a [pre-existing] credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States,” and b) “an individual seeking admission as a refugee who can credibly claim a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.”

The dissent would have stayed all parts of the lower courts’ injunctions. Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch, criticized the majority for having cerated a non-statutory category of individuals who can “credibly claim a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” He fears that the meaning of these exceptions will itself become a fertile ground of additional litigation before the Court can resolve the merits of these cases.

Additionally, the Court noted that since the bar on internal review of procedures relating to visa issuance was lifted on June 14, 2017, and the Government has represented that the review will be completed within 90 days, the case with respect to visa issuance to non-refugees might well be moot before the Court can get to the merits. The court instructs the parties to brief that issue.

“Quickie Analysis”

The Trump Administration can legitimately view this as a much-needed (from their standpoint) victory. All nine Justices appear to be prepared to rule that the Executive has virtually unbridled authority to bar the admission, at least temporarily, of foreign nationals with no connections to the United States.

It also appears that Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Alito would find that the Executive’s essentially unreviewable authority extends even to individuals who have a connection with the United States.

However, those challenging the Travel Ban have some reason to hope because at least six Justices seem to remain open to the possibility of engaging in some type of meaningful judicial review of Executive decisions regarding foreign nationals abroad who have established some connections to the U.S.

There may also be mootness issues with respect to some or all of the injunction with respect to refugee admissions. The new fiscal year for refugee admissions begins on October 1, 2017, before the Court will have heard argument in these cases. Before the beginning of the fiscal year, the Trump Administration must under the Refugee Act of 1980  “consult” with Congress on the number and allocation of refugee admissions for fiscal year 2018.  “Statutory consultation” was one of the things that the Trump Administration neglected to do before purporting to suspend refugee admissions and dramatically slash the number of fiscal year 2017 refugee admissions established by the Obama Administration after undertaking the required statutory consultation.

The lack of any reasonable rationale by the Trump Administration for reversing the  prior statutory determination made by the the Obama Administration after consultation with Congress was cited by the Ninth Circuit in upholding the original injunction. But, that issue should also be moot before the Court decides theses cases on the merits.

PWS

06-26-17

 

THE HILL: Professor Andy Schoenholtz Of Georgetown Law On Why Americans Should Be Grateful To The 9th Circuit For Upholding The Rule Of Law Against Executive Overreach!

 

http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/civil-rights/337955-9th-circuit-on-travel-ban-president-must-respect-congress

Professor Schoenholtz concludes:

“In fact, had the president focused on asking America’s civil servants to build on the progress achieved since 9/11 and try to find new ways of identifying security threats among those who seek visas, that work would have been accomplished by now, according to the schedule set by both the first and second EO’s.

If the Supreme Court decides at some point to hear a case regarding the EO, they will now be asked to consider not only whether the President has violated the Establishment Clause but also whether he has exceeded his statutory authority. As determined by the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century, Congress has the constitutional authority to establish the immigration laws.

It has done just that by statute. The president has broad authority to implement that statutory system, but does the president have the power to stop admitting immigrants from six countries? From sixty? From all countries? Where does this end, and where would that leave Congress and the equilibrium established by the Constitution? We should thank the Ninth Circuit for raising that issue clearly and thoughtfully.

Andrew I. Schoenholtz is a Professor from Practice at Georgetown Law and the author, with Professors Jaya Ramji-Nogales and Philip G. Schrag, of “Lives in the Balance: Asylum Adjudication by the Department of Homeland Security.”

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Read Andy’s entire analysis at the link.

I’m still somewhat skeptical that the Supremes will take this case given the problems caused by the President’s out of court statements and tweets. Future Chief Executives likely will be more “Presidential” and act with more prudence and thoughtfulness. So, why take a case that hopefully will turn out to be more or less “sui generus?” If I were the Supremes, I would let the lower courts sort through this mess and make a complete record before approaching the legal questions. But, we’ll see.  Very soon!

PWS

06-19-17

NYT: Trump, Sessions Split Brewing? — Apparently The Donald Expected AG To Be Complete Toady — Unpleasantly Suprised With Independence!

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/05/us/politics/trump-discontent-attorney-general-jeff-sessions.html?emc=edit_nn_20170606&nl=morning-briefing&nlid=79213886&te=1&_r=0

Peter Baker & Maggie Haberman report:
“WASHINGTON — Few Republicans were quicker to embrace President Trump’s campaign last year than Jeff Sessions, and his reward was one of the most prestigious jobs in America. But more than four months into his presidency, Mr. Trump has grown sour on Mr. Sessions, now his attorney general, blaming him for various troubles that have plagued the White House.

The discontent was on display on Monday in a series of stark early-morning postings on Twitter in which the president faulted his own Justice Department for its defense of his travel ban on visitors from certain predominantly Muslim countries. Mr. Trump accused Mr. Sessions’s department of devising a “politically correct” version of the ban — as if the president had nothing to do with it.

In private, the president’s exasperation has been even sharper. He has intermittently fumed for months over Mr. Sessions’s decision to recuse himself from the investigation into Russian meddling in last year’s election, according to people close to Mr. Trump who insisted on anonymity to describe internal conversations. In Mr. Trump’s view, they said, it was that recusal that eventually led to the appointment of a special counsel who took over the investigation.

Behind-the-scenes frustration would not be unprecedented in the Oval Office. Other presidents have become estranged from the Justice Department over time, notably President Bill Clinton, who bristled at Attorney General Janet Reno’s decisions to authorize investigations into him and his administration, among other things. But Mr. Trump’s tweets on Monday made his feelings evident for all to see and raised questions about how he is managing his own administration.

“They wholly undercut the idea that there is some rational process behind the president’s decisions,” said Walter E. Dellinger, who served as acting solicitor general under Mr. Clinton. “I believe it is unprecedented for a president to publicly chastise his own Justice Department.”

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Read the complete article at the link.

I certainly never would have accused Trump of rationality.

It seems it doesn’t take much to go from hero to goat with Trump — another sign of an unbalanced mind at the helm of our country. I’ve been a frequent critic of Jeff Sessions for his anti-immigrant views, white nationalist associations, and totally “gonzo” views and actions on civil rights and immigration enforcement. But, it sounds like he has been trying to do the right thing in this situation and offering the President some wise counsel.  I guess there is no surer way of getting on Trump’s “hit list” than to act with some rationality and integrity.

It’s still a problem if Sessions isn’t able to control Trump’s public behavior in litigation. The head of a law firm can’t stand by and let a client, even the big one, publicly abuse and undermine his or her partners and associates.

In private practice, you sometimes have to “fire” an unruly client. In Government, you can’t fire the President, but you can “take a walk” and let folks know why you are doing it. Ultimately, Sessions (and Rosenstein, and probably Associate AG Rachel Brand) might have to decide whether to be loyal to the President or to the Department of Justice and the integrity of our justice system.

Shouldn’t really be much of a dilemma. After all, no politico expects to serve indefinitely, and each member of this trio should be readily employable in the private sector.

PWS

06-06-17

 

NOT YOUR FATHER’S FOURTH CIRCUIT: Technology, Innovation, & A More Diverse Judiciary Change Tribunal Sitting In The Former Capital Of The Confederacy!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/after-a-ruling-on-trumps-travel-ban-all-eyes-are-on-the-4th-circuit/2017/06/02/b7a555f2-4545-11e7-bcde-624ad94170ab_story.html?utm_term=.825d55d2e2d7

Carl Tobias reports for the Washington Post.

“The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit is a court in transition. The Richmond-based appeals court was long considered the most ideologically conservative of the 12 regional circuits, the intermediate appellate tribunals across the country that are the courts of last resort for 99 percent of appeals. When a case heard in Maryland and Virginia federal district courts is appealed, it goes to the 4th Circuit. This is the court that has resolved appeals involving Maryland gun laws and Virginia transgender students’ rights, for example.

And change has come to the 4th Circuit.

This was recently on display when the entire court — all judges in active service who did not have conflicts of interest — substantially affirmed a Maryland district court’s nationwide injunction that blocked enforcement of President Trump’s revised travel ban. Notably, a majority of the judges proclaimed that the Constitution “protects Plaintiffs’ right to challenge the Executive Order that in text speaks in vague words of national security, but in context drips with religious intolerance, animus and discrimination.”

For decades, the 4th Circuit was a conservative stronghold. Seated in the former capital of the Confederacy, the court hears appeals in the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Courthouse, a building that served as the official headquarters for Confederate President Jefferson Davis. The circuit retains Southern manners. For instance, judges descend from the bench after oral arguments to shake the hands of counsel.

President George W. Bush tried to continue the court’s conservative legacy when numerous vacancies materialized in his administration. However, the White House insisted on pressing for confirmation of nominees whom many Democratic senators considered outside the mainstream, even after Democrats had captured a Senate majority in November 2006. Political machinations left four vacancies at the Bush administration’s close, enabling President Barack Obama to appoint numerous judges. The court now has nine members whom Democratic presidents appointed, five whom Republican presidents confirmed and Chief Judge Roger Gregory, whom President Bill Clinton recess-appointed and Bush confirmed.

Two recent developments in the travel ban appeal demonstrate change in the court. First, all of the active judges without conflicts heard the appeal, called an initial en banc proceeding, which is so extraordinary that the last one was decades ago. One judge, not the parties, suggested this procedure, and the court requested the litigants’ views on an en banc process, while a circuit majority favored it apparently because of the appeal’s exceptional public importance.

Another sign of change was the court’s April 27 announcement that the argument would be livestreamed. Allowing “cameras in the courtroom” has proved extremely controversial at the Supreme Court, which has never permitted live broadcast of arguments. Indeed, since-retired Justice David Souter famously declared “over my dead body.” A few lower federal courts allow broadcasts. The 9th Circuit began livestreaming all oral arguments in 2015.”

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Read the complete article at the above link.

As a U.S. Immigration Judge sitting in the Fourth Circuit, I credited the Fourth Circuit’s carefully-crafted asylum jurisprudence and overriding concern for due process and fairness for asylum seekers as reasons why asylum grant rates were relatively high in the Arlington and Baltimore Immigration Courts (of course, along with my judicial colleagues’ careful attention the what the Fourth Circuit was saying; new Fourth Circuit rulings were a frequent topic of our lunch conversations.)

Apparently, however, the word didn’t reach as far south as the Charlotte Immigration Court, where advocates regularly complain of the rights of asylum seekers being “steamrolled.” To date, the BIA has failed to step in and fix the Charlotte situation. And, I wouldn’t expect it to happen with Jeff Sessions in charge of the U.S. Immigration Courts.

PWS

06-04-17

HuffPost: Trump Calls On Supremes For Help On Travel Ban 2.0!

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-travel-ban-supreme-court_us_5930da0ae4b0c242ca229563

Nick Visser reports:

“The Trump administration on Thursday asked the U.S. Supreme Court to revive the president’s controversial executive order that intended to temporarily bar travel to the U.S. by citizens of six Muslim-majority countries.

Lawyers at the Department of Justice filed two emergency applications with the nation’s highest court asking it to block two lower court rulings that effectively halted the implementation of his second travel ban, which also halted refugees seeking to enter the U.S. The filing asks for a stay of a ruling made last week by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit and another stay of an injunction made by a judge in Hawaii.

The Justice Department has asked for expedited processing of the petitions so the court can hear the case when it begins a new session in October.

“We have asked the Supreme Court to hear this important case and are confident that President Trump’s executive order is well within his lawful authority to keep the Nation safe and protect our communities from terrorism,” Justice Department spokeswoman Sarah Isgur Flores said in a statement. “The president is not required to admit people from countries that sponsor or shelter terrorism, until he determines that they can be properly vetted and do not pose a security risk to the United States.”

The filing drew an almost immediate response from advocacy groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union, which pledged to fight the ban in court yet again.
Trump’s executive order, signed March 6, was the White House’s second travel ban attempt. It sought to bar citizens of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen from entering the United States. The watered-down order came after the bungled rollout of a similar ban, one that included Iraqis, which prompted nationwide protests and its own smack-down by a federal judge in Seattle.

In a 10-3 ruling last week, the 4th Circuit issued perhaps the biggest setback to the White House when a full panel of its judges refused to lift a nationwide injunction that halted key aspects of the revised ban.

U.S. Chief Circuit Judge Roger Gregory wrote at the time that the order “speaks with vague words of national security, but in context drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination.”

“Congress granted the President broad power to deny entry to aliens, but that power is not absolute,” Gregory continued. “It cannot go unchecked when, as here, the President wields it through an executive edict that stands to cause irreparable harm to individuals across this nation.”

Any travel ban’s chances have been harmed by Trump’s own rhetoric on the campaign trail, when he promised to completely ban Muslims from entering the country. He later backed down on those statements, but several judges cited them as evidence that the White House was targeting members of a religious group, not from any specific countries.

In one ruling, U.S. District Judge Derrick Watson said the president’s “plainly worded statements” betrayed the ban’s “stated secular purpose.” U.S. District Judge Theodore Chuang said Trump’s statements provided “a convincing case that the purpose of the second Executive Order remains the realization of the long-envisioned Muslim ban.”

Throughout the continued defeat in the courts, Trump and his administration have defiantly pledged to fight for the order and have denied the ban is intended to target members of the Islamic faith. After Watson ruled on the second order in Hawaii, the president called the decision “flawed” and slammed it as “unprecedented judicial overreach.”

“This ruling makes us look weak, which by the way we no longer are,” Trump said.

At the time, he pledged to bring the fight to the Supreme Court, a call Attorney General Jeff Sessions reiterated last month.”

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Most experts believe that the Administration has a reasonable chance of prevailing if the Court takes the case. But, I’m not sure that heaping intemperate insults on U.S. trial and appellate judges, and then asking the top U.S. judges to invoke emergency procedures to bail you out of difficulties caused to a large extent by your own inflammatory rhetoric is necessarily a winning litigation strategy. We’ll soon see how this plays out. Because the Court’s term concludes at the end of this month, expect a decision on the Government’s emergency requests by then. Even if the Court agrees to take the case, it’s unlikely that arguments on the merits will be heard until the beginning of the 2017 Term next Fall.

Thanks to Nolan Rappaport for sending me this link.

PWS

06-02-17

POLITICO LITIGATION: DOJ In “Stall Mode” In Hawaii Travel Ban Case — “Dire Emergency” Threatening The Republic Subsides As Curiously As It Arose, Leaving Experts To Ponder The Meaning Of The Administration’s Changed Strategy!

http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2017/03/donald-trump-travel-ban-ninth-circuit-appeal-236575

Josh Gerstein writes in Politico:

“When President Donald Trump’s first travel ban executive order was effectively shut down by a federal judge, the Trump administration seemed to be in a huge rush to get the policy back on track.

This time? Not so much.

It took less than a day for Justice Department lawyers to file an appeal last month after U.S. District Court Judge James Robart blocked the key parts of Trump’s directive.

A few hours later — just after midnight Eastern Time — the federal government filed an emergency motion asking the San Francisco-based 9th Circuit to allow the president to move forward with his plan to halt travel to the U.S. from seven majority-Muslim countries and to suspend refugee admissions from across the globe.

A three-judge 9th Circuit panel unanimously turned down Trump’s request, prompting the president to redraft the executive order, dropping Iraq from the roster of affected countries and exempting existing visa-holders from the directive.

But when a federal judge in Hawaii issued a broad block on the new order March 15, just hours before it was set to kick in, there was no immediate appeal. In fact, nearly two weeks later, the Justice Department is still tangling with Honolulu U.S. District Court Judge Derrick Watson and has yet to take the issue back to the 9th Circuit.

The delay has puzzled many lawyers tracking the litigation, particularly given Trump’s public warning that “many very bad and dangerous people may be pouring into our country” as a result of the courts’ interference with his first travel ban directive. A total of two months have now passed since Trump signed his first order.

“A lot of people have talked about that,” said University of Richmond law professor Carl Tobias. “It seems hard to wait on this without undercutting the argument” that the travel ban order is needed to address an urgent national security threat, he added.

Some attorneys believe the Justice Department is intentionally dragging its feet in the Hawaii case because the 9th Circuit rotates the three-judge panels assigned to motions every month, with the next swap-out due Saturday. The 9th Circuit also announces the panels publicly, although not in advance. This month’s consists of two Obama-appointed judges — Morgan Christen and John Owens — along with George W. Bush appointee Milan Smith.”

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Interesting that Gerstein reports later in his article that the 4th Circuit might “bypass” the panel stage and just send the “Maryland case” directly to the en banc court. I hadn’t picked up on that. Sounds unusual.

As I have speculated before, no matter what happens in the 4th Circuit, if this issue does get to the Supremes, it’s unlikely to be decided until some time in 2018. So, barring something pretty unusual, the Travel Ban will be “banned” for the foreseeable future.

I suspect that by then, the Administration will have discovered that it doesn’t need an Executive Order and all this hoopla to quietly and gradually “beef up” visa and refugee vetting in individual cases or groups of cases where it is warranted. They have already started that process, as I previously reported. I think the scope, method, publicity, and “in your face” tone of the two EOs are what got them into difficulty with the courts.

PWS

03/29/17

 

Oral Argument Set For May 8 In International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump — 4th Cir. Grants Gov’s Request to Expedite!

http://www.nationallawjournal.com/home/id=1202781955190/Fourth-Circuit-Expedites-Travel-Ban-Case-Sets-May-8-Hearing?mcode=1202617074964&curindex=0&slreturn=20170225010630

The National Law Journal reports:

“The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed Thursday to expedite a challenge to President Donald Trump’s travel ban executive order, setting oral arguments in the case for May 8 at the court in Richmond.
The government appealed a Maryland U.S. district court’s order last week that blocked a portion of the president’s March 6 executive order restricting travel from six majority-Muslim countries. On Wednesday, the Justice Department requested the court expedite the briefing schedule for the appeal, arguing that lower courts and the Ninth Circuit all expedited litigation surrounding both the March 6 executive order and the first order, now revoked, which was issued Jan. 28.
The government had also indicated in its request to expedite the process that it intends to file a motion to stay the injunction pending appeal. According to the court’s schedule, the government plans to file that motion Friday. The plaintiff’s response will be due March 31, with the government’s reply due April 5.
The government said the issue is “of national importance” and has national security implications, making it worthy of a speedy schedule. According to the filing, the plaintiffs disagreed with the government’s proposed schedule, and requested a May 10 deadline for their briefs. The Fourth Circuit originally issued a briefing schedule requiring the government to file its opening brief April 26, with the briefing completed by June 9.”

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PWS

03/25/17

WashPost OPINION: David Cole Lays Out The Case For Rejecting “Travel Ban 2.0” — Why Judges Should Look Behind The Language OF The EO To Determine “Intent”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/judges-shouldnt-ignore-what-we-all-know-trumps-travel-ban-is-really-about/2017/03/22/4ad23ce2-0f21-11e7-ab07-07d9f521f6b5_story.html?utm_term=.e93e1d53f89f

Cole writes:

“So does the immigration or the establishment-clause test govern? The answer should depend on the nature of the government’s action. Deference is proper when the political branches draw customary and “bona fide” immigration lines, especially when there is no suggestion of an improper purpose. It makes sense to defer to immigration decisions based on family ties or adherence to visa conditions, because it is next to impossible to regulate immigration without drawing such lines. But the Trump administration has advanced no reason immigration law should be a tool for denigrating religion.

Establishing religion has never been a proper goal of immigration law — or any law. Targeting Islam violates the rights of Americans, whatever form it takes; there is no justification for giving the government a pass because it is regulating the border. When Trump signed the first travel ban, he said, “We all know what that means.” We do, indeed. And judges, no less than the rest of us, must not blind themselves to what “we all know.”

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Curmudgeonly Observation Of The Day

As noted in his op-ed, Professor Cole wears “many hats,” one of which is as the attorney for the plaintiffs in International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, currently pending on appeal by the Government in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

I’m not saying that there is anything unethical or improper about Cole writing this article. Attorneys seem to do it all the time, although more often from the private than from the Governmental side. As long as the judge hasn’t entered a “gag order,”(very rare in civil litigation like this) it’s perfectly legit.

It’s probably just me being an “old guy” and having spent two decades toiling away on appellate and trial benches at the administrative level (certainly not the exalted level of the U.S. District Court or the Fourth Circuit). Nevertheless, as I indicated in my recent blogs about extra-judicial statements by Trump and his advisors, I continue to think it is a “bad practice” for parties and attorneys with pending cases to take the argument “out of court and into the media.”

In my judicial career I presided over a number of so-called “high profile” cases. As a judge, I never appreciated seeing articles or statements in the press by the attorneys of record or parties while the matter was pending before me (or “us” in the case of the BIA).

To me, it always seemed to indicate a curious desire by the party to have the case tried in a forum “other than the one I was presiding over.” That didn’t necessarily warm my heart or increase my respect for the party.

Of course, as I judge I had to “get over it” (in the words of my esteemed former colleague, now retired, Judge Wayne R. Iskra) along with lots of other annoying “peripheral stuff” to treat the parties fairly and make a just decision on the law and facts. But, I always wondered: “Why even put that seemingly unnecessary ‘hurdle’ in front of me.”

Sure, nothing takes the place of “real life” reflections from those involved in big cases. That’s what “after the fact” articles,  press conferences, law review pieces, books, and even movies are for. But, I think that it is most prudent for those actively involved in pending litigation to let their statements and filings in court speak for them. Surely, there are others in academia and the NGO community who could have written the same article that Cole did based on what is already in the public record.

PWS

03/24/17

 

DOJ’s Travel Ban Litigating Strategy Discussed — The Rush Appears To Be “Off!”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/03/23/trump-said-dangerous-people-might-be-pouring-in-without-his-travel-ban-but-hes-not-rushing-to-restore-it/?utm_term=.91d750428250

Matt Zapotosky reports in the Washington Post:

“Legal analysts and opponents say the Justice Department is likely pursuing a more methodical, strategic approach in hopes of a long-term victory — although in the process, the administration is hurting its case that the order is needed for urgent national security.

“If they don’t try to move the case as quickly as possible,” said Leon Fresco, deputy assistant attorney general for the Office of Immigration Litigation in President Barack Obama’s Justice Department, “it does undermine the security rationale.”

Trump’s new travel order — which suspended the U.S. refugee program for 120 days and blocked the issuance of new visas to citizens of Iran, Sudan, Somalia, Libya, Somalia and Syria for 90 days — was supposed to take effect March 16, but U.S. District Judge Derrick K. Watson in Hawaii blocked the administration from enforcing the critical sections of it. Early the next day, a federal judge in Maryland issued a similar ruling — leaving the administration with two different cases, in two different appellate circuits, that they would need to get overturned before they could begin carrying out the president’s directive. All roads seemed to lead to the Supreme Court.
But now it seems all but certain that the president’s revised entry ban will stay suspended at least into April, and possibly longer.

Lawyers for the Justice Department filed a notice of appeal in the Maryland case a day after the judge there ruled, but — unlike last time — they did not ask the higher court to immediately set aside the freeze on the new ban. They said they will do so Friday, but those challenging the ban will have a week to respond, and the Justice Department will then be allowed to file more written arguments by April 5.

The Trump administration has been content to let the court battle play out even more slowly in Hawaii, not elevating the dispute beyond a lower-court judge. The Justice Department has not filed a notice of its intent to appeal the ruling, and the next hearing in that case is set for March 29. Justice Department lawyers wrote Thursday that they would appeal to a higher court if that hearing doesn’t resolve in their favor. The courts will ultimately have to decide important questions, including how much authority they have to weigh in on the president’s national security determinations, whether Trump’s order was meant to discriminate against Muslims, and whether and how the president’s and his advisers’ own comments can be used against them.

There could be strategic reasons for pumping the brakes. Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, a professor of immigration law at Cornell Law School, said the Justice Department might be hoping for a favorable ruling from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, of which Maryland is a part, before they bring a case before the 9th Circuit, of which Hawaii is a part. A three-judge panel in the 9th Circuit unanimously rejected the administration’s bid to restore Trump’s first entry ban after it was frozen. The 4th Circuit on Thursday scheduled oral argument in its case for May 8.

And the Justice Department could be playing an even longer game, hoping that by the time the case makes its way to the Supreme Court, Neil Gorsuch will have joined the justices and brought to an end what many see as a 4-to-4 split along ideological lines, said Jonathan E. Meyer, a former deputy general counsel in the Department of Homeland Security under Obama who now works in private practice at Sheppard Mullin.”

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Even assuming that the Supremes eventually take the case, by no means a “gimme,” it probably would not be heard by the Court until some time in 2018 with a decision perhaps months after the argument. During that time, it is highly likely that the Travel Ban will remain enjoined.

From a government standpoint, it’s always prudent to 1) think carefully before taking on issues that can be litigated in U.S. District Courts which have authority to issue nationwide injunctions which require only a preliminary showing and are very difficult to “undo” (by contrast, “Removal Cases” usually can only be litigated in Circuit Courts of Appeal, which, although higher on the “judicial totem pole” than USDCs, lack authority to issue nationwide injunctions in connection with such individual case judicial review); and 2) always have “Plan B.” Here, “Plan B” might be the more stringent requirements for screening and issuing visas from countries where terrorist activity has taken place set forth in Secretary of State Tillerson’s recent instructions discussed in my previous blog:

http://wp.me/p8eeJm-xN

PWS

03/23/17

 

 

THE HILL: N. Rappaport Blasts U.S. Courts For Blasting Trump!

http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/324764-federal-courts-upend-legal-precedent-in-blocking-trumps-travel

Nolan writes:

“But the court’s objection to the travel ban, which would impose a 90-day suspension on the entry into the United States of nationals from six countries which were designated by Congress and the Obama administration as posing national security risks, is that President Trump wrote it.

. . . .

Maybe the courts should heed the advice of former Vice President Joe Biden who said last week that President Trump “deserves a chance” to lead the country.”

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PWS

02/20/17

DOJ Files Notice Of Appeal With 4th Cir. In International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump (“Travel Ban 2.0”)!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-files-notice-it-will-appeal-ruling-against-second-version-of-travel-ban/2017/03/17/6fe4b33a-0b1f-11e7-b77c-0047d15a24e0_story.html?utm_term=.94a5d77bc18d

According to the Washington Post:

“The Trump administration filed court papers Friday hoping to salvage its second version of a travel ban, after two judges in separate cases this week found it likely violated the Constitution.

The Justice Department filed legal papers in federal court in Maryland, setting up a new showdown in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, located in Richmond.

Earlier this week, federal judges in Hawaii and Maryland issued orders against the travel ban, finding it violated the First Amendment by disfavoring a particular religion. If the Justice Department had appealed the Hawaii order, the case would have gone to the same San Francisco-based appeals court that rejected an earlier version of the travel ban.”

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What’s the Government’s strategy here?

Well, we can surmise from Circuit Judge Bybee’s recent dissent that only 5 of the 29 active Circuit Judges in the 9th Circuit were willing to overrule the TRO imposed by the U.S. District Judge and upheld by a unanimous 9th Circuit panel in State of Washington v. Trump, involving “Travel Ban 1.0.” And, according to reports, none of those Judges would be on this month’s “Motions Panel” which would get the appeal from the TRO  on “Travel Ban 2.0” issued by the U.S. District Court in State of Hawaii v. Trump. That makes a Government appeal in Hawaii almost a dead bang “two-time loser” in the 9th Circuit.

So, from the Government’s standpoint, why not test the waters in a different Circuit? And, if the Administration’s position does prevail in the 4th Circuit, there then would be a “split in circuits.” That, in turn, would be a factor that normally increases the chances that the Supreme Court would agree to review the case. Generally, the Court tries to achieve nationwide uniformity on important or controversial questions of law.

PWS

03/17/17

BREAKING: Another Defeat For Travel Ban — Maryland Federal Judge Also Slams Administration — Get Full Opinion Here!

Here’s the key “Establishment Clause” portion of Judge Theodore D. Chuang’s decision in International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump:

B. Establishment Clause

Plaintiffs assert that the travel ban on citizens from the Designated Countries is President Trump’s fulfillment of his campaign promise to ban Muslims from entering the United States. They argue that the Second Executive Order therefore violates the Establishment Clause. The First Amendment prohibits any “law respecting an establishment of religion,” U.S. Const. amend. I, and “mandates governmental neutrality between religion. and religion, and between religion and nonreligion,” Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). When a law does not differentiate among religions on its face, courts apply the test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See Hernandez v. C.IR., 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989). Under the Lemon test, to withstand an Establishment Clause challenge (1) an act must have a secular purpose, (2) “its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and (3) it must not “foster’ an excessive government entanglement with religion. ‘” Id. at 612-613 (quoting

Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). All three prongs of the test must be satisfied. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987).

The mere identification of any secular purpose for the government action does not satisfy the purpose test. McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union a/Ky., 545 U.S. 844,860,865 n.13

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(2005). Such a rule “would leave the purpose test with no real bite, given the ease of finding some secular purpose for almost any government action.” Id. (“[A]n approach that credits any valid purpose . . . has not been the way the Court has approached government action that implicates establishment.” (emphasis added)). Thus, although governmental statements of purpose generally receive deference, a secular purpose must be “genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective.” Id. at 864. If a religious purpose for the government action is the predominant or primary purpose, and the secular purpose is “secondary,” the purpose test has not been satisfied. Id. at 860, 862-65; see also Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594 (finding a violation of the Establishment Clause where the “primary purpose” of the challenged act was “to endorse a particular religious doctrine”).

An assessment ofthe purpose of an action is a “common” task for courts. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 861. In determining purpose, a court acts as an “objective observer” who considers “the traditional external signs that show up in the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, or comparable official act.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)). An “understanding of official objective” can emerge from “readily discoverable fact” without ”judicial psychoanalysis” of the decisionmaker. Id.

Plaintiffs argue that the Second Executive Order fails the purpose prong because there is substantial direct evidence that the travel ban was motivated by a desire to ban Muslims as a group from entering the United States. Plaintiffs’ evidence on this point consists primarily of public statements made by President Trump and his advisors, before his election, before the issuance of the First Executive Order, and since the decision to issue the Second Executive Order. Considering statements from these time periods is appropriate because courts may

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consider “the historical context” of the action and the “specific sequence of events” leading .up to it. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594-95. Such evidence is “perfectly probative” and is considered as a matter of “common sense”; indeed, courts are “forbid[ den] … ‘to tum a blind eye to the context in which [the] policy arose.”’ McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000)); cf Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1987) (including the “historical background of the decision,” the “specific sequence of events leading up [to] the challenged decision,” and “contemporary statements of the decisionmaking body” as factors indicative of discriminatory intent), cited with approval in Edwards, 482 U.S. at 595.

One consequence of taking account of the purpose underlying past actions is that the same government action may be constitutional if taken in the first instance and unconstitutional if it has a sectarian heritage. This presents no incongruity, however, because purpose matters.

McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866 n.l4.
Specifically, the evidence offered by Plaintiffs includes numerous statements by

President Trump expressing an intent to issue a Muslim ban or otherwise conveying anti-Muslim sentiments. For example, on December 7, 2015, then a Republican primary candidate, Trump posted a “Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration” on his campaign website “calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our representatives can figure out what is going on.” J.R. 85. In a March 9, 2016 interview with CNN, Trump professed his belief that “Islam hates us,” and that the United States had “allowed this propaganda to spread all through the country that [Islam] is a religion of peace.” J.R. 255-57. Then in a March 22, 2016 Fox Business interview, Trump reiterated his call for a ban on Muslim immigration, explaining that his call for the ban had gotten “tremendous support” and that “we’re having problems with the Muslims, and we’re having problems with Muslims coming into the country.”

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into the country.” J.R. 261. On December 21, 2016, when asked whether a recent attack in Germany affected his proposed Muslim ban, President-Elect Trump replied, “You know my plans. All along, I’ve proven to be right. 100% correct.” J.R.245. In a written statement about the events, Trump lamented the attack on people “prepared to celebrate the Christmas holiday” by “ISIS and other Islamic terrorists [who] continually slaughter Christians in their communities and places of worship as part of their global jihad.” J.R. 245.

Significantly, the record also includes specific statements directly establishing that Trump intended to effectuate a partial Muslim ban by banning entry by citizens of specific predominantly Muslim countries deemed to be dangerous, as a means to avoid, for political reasons, an action explicitly directed at Muslims. In a July 24, 2016 interview on Meet the Press, soon after becoming the Republican presidential nominee, Trump asserted that immigration should be immediately suspended “from any nation that has been compromised by terrorism.” J.R. 219. When questioned whether his new formulation was a “rollback” of his call for a “Muslim ban,” he described it as an “expansion” and explained that “[p]eople were so upset when I used the word Muslim,” so he was instead “talking territory instead of Muslim.” J.R. 220. When President Trump was preparing to sign the First Executive Order, he remarked, “This is the ‘Protection of the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.’ We all know what that means.” J.R. 142. The day after the First Executive Order was issued, Mayor Giuliani appeared on Fox News and asserted that President Trump told him he wanted a Muslim ban and asked Giuliani to “[s]how me the right way to do it legally.” J.R. 247. Giuliani, in consultation with others, proposed that the action be “focused on, instead of religion … the areas of the world that create danger for us,” specifically “places where there are [sic] substantial

evidence that people are sending terrorists into our country.” J.R.247-48. These types of public

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statements were relied upon by the Eastern District of Virginia in enjoining the First Executive Order based on a likelihood of success on an Establishment Clause claim, Aziz, 2017 WL 580855, at *11, and the Ninth Circuit in concluding that an Establishment Clause claim against that Order raised “serious allegations” and presented “significant constitutional questions.” Washington, 847 F.3d at 1168.

These statements, which include explicit, direct statements of President Trump’s animus towards Muslims and intention to impose a ban on Muslims entering the United States, present a convincing case that the First Executive Order was issued to accomplish, as nearly as possible,

. President Trump’s promised Muslim ban. In particular, the direct statements by President Trump and Mayor Giuliani’s account of his conversations with President Trump reveal that the plan had been to bar the entry of nationals of predominantly Muslim countries deemed to

constitute dangerous territory in order to approximate a Muslim ban without calling it one- precisely the form of the travel ban in the First Executive Order. See Aziz, 2017 WL 580855, at *4 (quoting from a July 17,2016 interview during which then-candidate Trump, upon hearing a tweet stating “Calls to ban Muslims from entering the U.S. are offensive and unconstitutional,” responded “So you call it territories. OK? We’re gonna do territories.”). Such explicit statements of a religious purpose are “readily discoverable fact[s]” that allow the Court to identify the purpose of this government action without resort to “judicial psychoanalysis.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862. They constitute clear statements of religious purpose comparable to those relied upon in Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (lith Cir. 2003), where the court found that a Ten Commandments display at a state courthouse was erected for a religious purpose in part based on the chief justice stating at the dedication ceremony that “in order to establish justice, we must invoke ‘the favor and guidance of Almighty God. ‘” Id. at 1286, 1296 (“[N]o

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psychoanalysis or dissection is required here, where there is abundant evidence, including his own words, of the Chief Justice’s purpose.”).

Relying primarily on this record, Plaintiffs asks this Court to issue an injunction against the Second Executive Order on Establishment Clause grounds. In considering this request, the same record of public statements by President Trump remains highly relevant. In McCreary, where the Court was reviewing a third attempt to create a courthouse display including the Ten Commandments after two prior displays had been deemed unconstitutional, it held that its review was not limited to the “latest news about the last in a series of governmental actions” because “the world is not made brand new every morning,” “reasonable observers have reasonable memories,” and to impose such a limitation would render a court “an absentedminded objective observer, not one presumed familiar with the history of the government’s action and competent to learn what history has to show.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866.

The Second Executive Order, issued only six weeks after the First Executive Order, differs, as relevant here, in that the preference for religious minorities in the refugee process has been removed. It also removes Iraq from the list of Designated Countries, exempts certain categories of individuals from the ban, and lists other categories of individuals who may be eligible for a case-by-case waiver from the ban. Despite these changes, the history of public statements continues to provide a convincing case that the purpose of the Second Executive Order remains the realization of the long-envisioned Muslim ban. The Trump Administration acknowledged that the core substance of the First Executive Order remained intact. Prior to its

issuance, on February 16, 2017, Stephen Miller, Senior Policy Advisor to the President, described the forthcoming changes as “mostly minor technical differences,” and stated that the “basic policies are still going to be in effect.” J.R. 319. When the Second Executive Order was

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signed on March 6, 2017, White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer stated that “[t]he principles of the [second] executive order remain the same.” J.R. 118. The Second Executive Order itself explicitly states that the changes, particularly the addition of exemption and waiver categories, were made to address ‘judicial concerns,” 2d Order S1(i), including those raised by the Ninth Circuit, which upheld an injunction based on due process concerns, Washington, 847 F.3d at 1156.

The removal of the preference for religious minorities in the refugee system, which was the only explicit reference to religion in the First Executive Order, does not cure the Second Executive Order of Establishment Clause concerns. Crucially, the core policy outcome of a blanket ban on entry of nationals from the Designated Countries remains. When President Trump discussed his planned Muslim ban, he described not the preference for religious minorities, but the plan to ban the entry of nationals from certain dangerous countries as a means to carry out the Muslim ban. These statements thus continue to explain the religious purpose behind the travel ban in the Second Executive Order. Under these circumstances, the fact that the Second Executive Order is facially neutral in terms of religion is not dispositive. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 699-702 (1994) (holding that a facially neutral delegation of civic power to “qualified voters” of a village predominantly comprised of followers of Satmas Hasidism was a “purposeful and forbidden” violation of the Establishment Clause); cf Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 542 (1993) (holding that a facially neutral city ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice and intended to target the Santeria faith violated the Free Exercise Clause because “the Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination” and action

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targeting religion “cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality”).

Defendants do not directly contest that this record of public statements reveals a religious motivation for the travel ban. Rather, they argue that many of the statements may not be considered because they were made outside the formal government decisionmaking process or before President Trump became a government official. Although McCreary, relied upon by Defendants, states that a court considers “the text, legislative history, and implementation” of an action and “comparable” official acts, it did not purport to list the only materials appropriate for consideration? 545 U.S. at 862. Notably, in Green v. Haskell County Board of Commissioners, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered quotes from county commissioners that appeared in news reports in finding that a Ten Commandments display violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 701. Likewise, in Glassroth, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found an Establishment Clause violation based on a record that included the state chief justice’s campaign materials, including billboards and television commercials, proclaiming him to be the “Ten Commandments Judge.” 335 F.3d at 1282, 1284-85, 1297.

Although statements must be fairly “attributed to [a] government actor,” Glassman v. Arlington Cty., 628 F.3d 140, 147 (4th Cir. 2010), Defendants have cited no authority concluding

2 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 624 n.52 (2006), cited by Defendants, the Court criticized a dissent’s reliance on press statements by senior government officials, rather than the President’s formal written determination mandated by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, to provide justification for the government’s determination that applying court-martial rules to a terrorism suspect’s military commission was impracticable. Id. at 624 & n.52. It did not address what facts could be considered in assessing government purpose under the Establishment Clause, where courts have held that facts outside the specific text of the government decision may be considered. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594-95.

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that a court assessing purpose under the Establishment Clause may consider only statements made by government employees at the time that they were government employees. Simply because a decisionmaker made the statements during a campaign does not wipe them from the “reasonable memory” of a “reasonable observer.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866. Notably, the record in Glassroth also included the fact that the state chief justice, before securing election to that position, had made a campaign promise to install the Ten Commandments in the state courthouse, as well as campaign materials issued by members of his campaign committee. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1285. Because the state chief justice was the ultimate decisionmaker, and his campaign committee’s statements were fairly attributable to him, such material is appropriately considered in assessing purpose under the Establishment Clause. See id. at 1285; Glassman, 628 F.3d at 147. Likewise, all of the public statements at issue here are fairly attributable to President Trump, the government decisionmaker for the Second Executive Order, because they were made by President Trump himself, whether during the campaign or as President, by White House staff, or by a close campaign advisor who was relaying a conversation he had with the President. In contrast, Defendants’ cited case law does not involve statements fairly attributable to the government decisionmaker. See, e.g., Glassman, 628 F.3d at

147 (declining to consider statements made by members of a church that was alleged to have benefited from government action); Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1031 (lOth Cir. 2008) (declining to consider statements by the artist where the government’s display of artwork is challenged); Modrovich v. Allegheny Cty., 385 F.3d 397, 411 (3d Cir. 2004) (declining to consider statements by a judge and county residents about a Ten Commandments display where the county government’s purpose was at issue).

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Defendants also argue that the Second Executive Order explicitly articulates a national security purpose, and that unlike its predecessor, it includes relevant information about national security concerns. In particular, it asserts that there is a heightened chance that individuals from the Designated Countries will be “terrorist operatives or sympathizers” because each country is “a state sponsor of terrorism, has’ been significantly compromised by terrorist organizations, or contains active conflict zones,” and those governments are therefore less likely to provide necessary information for the immigrant vetting process. 2d Order ~ 1(d). The Order also references a history of persons born abroad committing terrorism-related crimes in the United States and identifies three specific cases of such crimes. The Order further states that more than 300 persons who entered the United States as refugees are currently the subjects of counterterrorism investigations.

Plaintiffs argue that the stated national security rationale is limited and flawed. Among other points, they note that the Second Executive Order does not identify examples of foreign nationals from Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, or Yemen who engaged in terrorist activity in the United States. They also note that a report from the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, concluded that “country of citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity” and that “few of the impacted countries have terrorist groups that threaten the West.” l.R. 158. Furthermore, they note that the 300 FBI investigations are dwarfed by the over 11,000 counterterrorism investigations at anyone time, only a fraction of which lead to actual evidence of illegal activity. Finally, they note that Secretary of Homeland Security Kelly stated that there are additional countries, some of which are not predominantly Muslim, that have vetting problems but are not included among the banned

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countries. These facts raise legitimate questions whether the travel ban for the Designated Countries is actually warranted.

Generally, however, courts should afford deference to national security and foreign policy judgments of the Executive Branch. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33-34 (2010). The Court thus should not, and will not, second-guess the conclusion that national security interests would be served by the travel ban. The question, however, is not simply whether the Government has identified a secular purpose for the travel ban. If the stated secular purpose is secondary to the religious purpose, the Establishment Clause would be violated. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864, 866 n.14 (stating that it is appropriate to treat two like acts differently where one has a “history manifesting sectarian purpose that the other lacks”). Making assessments on purpose, and the relative weight of different purposes, is a core judicial function. See id. at 861-62.

In this highly unique case, the record provides strong indications that the national security purpose is not the primary purpose for the travel ban. First, the core concept of the travel ban was adopted in the First Executive Order, without the interagency consultation process typically followed on such matters. Notably, the document providing the recommendation of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security was issued not before the First Executive Order, but on March 6, 2017, the same day that the Second Executive Order was issued. The fact that the White House took the highly irregular step of first introducing the travel ban without receiving the input and judgment of the relevant national security agencies strongly suggests that the religious purpose was primary, and the national security purpose, even if legitimate, is a

secondary post hoc rationale.

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Second, the fact that the national security rationale was offered only after courts issued injunctions against the First Executive Order suggests that the religious purpose has been, and remains, primary. Courts have been skeptical of statements of purpose “expressly disclaim(ing] any attempt to endorse religion” when made after a judicial finding of impermissible purpose, describing them as a “litigating position.” E.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. McCreary Cty., 607 F.3d 439, 444, 448 (6t~ Cir. 2010). Indeed, the Second Executive Order itself acknowledges that the changes made since the First Executive Order were to address “judicial concerns.” 2d Order S l(i).

Third, although it is undisputed that there are heightened security risks with the Designated Countries, as reflected in the fact that those who traveled to those countries or were nationals of some of those countries have previously been barred from the Visa Waiver Program, see 8 U.S.C. S 1187(a)(12), the travel ban represents an unprecedented response. Significantly, during the time period since the Reagan Administration, which includes the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, there have been no instances in which the President has invoked his authority under S1182(f) or S1185 to issue a ban on the entry into the United States of all citizens from more than one country at the same time, much less six nations all at once. Kate M. Manuel, Congo Research Serv., R44743, Executive Authority to Exclude Aliens: In Brief (2017); l.R. 405-406. In the two instances in which nationals from a single country were temporarily

stopped, there was an articulable triggering event that warranted such action. Manuel, supra, at 10-11 (referencing the suspension of the entry of Cuban nationals under President Reagan after Cuba stopped complying with U.S. immigration requirements and the revocation of visas issued to Iranians under President Carter during the Iran Hostage Crisis). The Second Executive Order does not explain specifically why this extraordinary, unprecedented action is the necessary

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response to the existing risks. But while the travel ban bears no resemblance to any response to a national security risk in recent history, it bears a clear resemblance to the precise action that President Trump described as effectuating his Muslim ban. Thus, it is more likely that the primary purpose of the travel ban was grounded in religion, and even if the Second Executive Order has a national security purpose, it is likely that its primary purpose remains the effectuation of the proposed Muslim ban. Accordingly, there is a likelihood that the travel ban violates the Establishment Clause.

Finally, Defendants argue that because the Establishment Clause claim implicates Congress’s plenary power over immigration as delegated to the President, the Court need only consider whether the Government has offered a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for its action. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 777. This standard is most typically applied when a court is asked to review an executive officer’s decision to deny a visa. See, e.g., Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring); or in other matters relating to the immigration rights of individual aliens or citizens, see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 790 (1977). The Mandel test, however, does not apply to the “promulgation of sweeping immigration policy” at the “highest levels of the political branches.” Washington, 847 F.3d at 1162 (holding that courts possess “the authority to review executive action” on matters of immigration and national security for “compliance with the Constitution”). In such situations, the power of the Executive and Legislative branches to create immigration law remains “subject to important constitutional limitations.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,941-42 (1983)).

Even when exercising their immigration powers, the political branches must choose “constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power.” Chadha, 462 U.S. at 941. Courts have therefore rejected arguments that they forgo the traditional constitutional analysis

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when a plaintiff has challenged the Government’s exercise of immigration power as violating the Constitution. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (rejecting deference to plenary power in determining that indefinite detention of aliens violated the Due Process Clause); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 941-43 (stating that Congress’s plenary authority over the regulation of aliens does not permit it to “offend some other constitutional restriction” and holding that a statute permitting Congress to overturn the Executive Branch’s decision to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United States violated constitutional provisions relating to separation of powers); Washington, 847 F.3d at 1167-68 (referencing standard Establishment Clause principles as applicable to the claim that the First Executive Order violated the Establishment Clause). Thus, although “[t]he Executive has broad discretion over the admission and exclusion of aliens,” that discretion “may not transgress constitutional limitations,” and it is “the duty of the courts” to “say where those statutory and constitutional boundaries lie.” Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1061.

Mindful of “the fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in our constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be eroded,” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have established that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim. Having reached this conclusion, the Court need not address Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on their Equal Protection Clause claim.

Read the full decision here:

https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3518169/Read-the-federal-judge-s-ruling-in-Md-on-Trump-s.pdf

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PWS 03/16/17