🌲UNDER YOUR TREE:  A GIFT 🎁 FROM “SIR JEFFREY” CHASE OF THE ROUND TABLE 🛡️— “Asylum In The Time Of M-R-M-S-“ — “One reaction to this decision would have involved explaining that the Board’s illogical holding was reached not by error but by design, in furtherance of a restrictionist agenda; asking why the current administration hasn’t changed the makeup of a BIA specifically constructed to do exactly that . . . . But such talk would be of no practical help. What those representing asylum applicants and those in government deciding those claims need now is a path to negotiate this latest obstacle and still reach the correct result.”

Four Horsemen
“Sir Jeffrey” tells us how to use “the law as a sword” to defend against the BIA’s anti-asylum precedent in M-R-M-S-. Don’t let yourself and your clients be “shredded and trampled” by BIA panels wielding deadly, hyper-technical, counterintuitive, overly restrictive asylum precedents designed to promote and support “any reason to deny!”
Albrecht Dürer, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2023/12/24/asylum-in-the-time-of-m-r-m-s-2

JEFFREY S. CHASE | OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW

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Asylum in the Time of M-R-M-S-

Introduction

In 2017, while Matter of L-E-A-1 was pending before the BIA, I attended an immigration law conference at which Professor Jon Bauer posed the following “thought experiment”:

A Nazi official threatens to kill all the Jews in a town unless a Jewish criminal, who has committed several robberies and murders and is suspected to be hiding in the area, is turned over to the authorities or turns himself in.

Is this persecution on account of religion?

The answer is obviously yes. Those in the town find themselves at risk of persecution on account of their religion. It would seem impossible for anyone possessing knowledge of our asylum laws (or just plain common sense) not to understand this.

However, with its decision in Matter of M-R-M-S-,2 the Board of Immigration Appeals has managed to create a test for nexus that would lead to the opposite conclusion.

One reaction to this decision would have involved explaining that the Board’s illogical holding was reached not by error but by design, in furtherance of a restrictionist agenda; asking why the current administration hasn’t changed the makeup of a BIA specifically constructed to do exactly that; bemoaning the fact that regulations that are more than two years overdue could have prevented this; and suggesting that the correct course of action for the Attorney General to take at this point would be to vacate this decision in anticipation of said forthcoming rulemaking.

But such talk would be of no practical help. What those representing asylum applicants and those in government deciding those claims need now is a path to negotiate this latest obstacle and still reach the correct result. I hope that some of what follows will prove helpful, and that it will encourage further thought and conversation on this topic.

Legal Strategies in light of M-R-M-S-

  1. Distinguish your case based on the facts

In M-R-M-S-, the Board chose for its precedent a case surprisingly devoid of facts. The entire factual summary consists of three sentences. A criminal cartel forced the respondents off of their land “because the cartel wanted the land for its own purpose. The cartel killed the lead respondent’s grandson for unknown reasons, although the respondents believe it was related to the cartel’s efforts to obtain their land. The cartel also forced other families off of land in the same area.”

This summary makes no mention of how family membership might have been a factor; it only says the cartel wanted the land for its own unstated purpose. It can be argued that the decision simply establishes that cases asserting mixed motives need to present more than one motive.

Instead, the Board leaped to a much broader and more damaging conclusion that wasn’t even suggested by the above facts, namely, that targeting members of a family for purposes of achieving another non-protected ground renders the family membership “incidental or subordinate,” and thus lacking the nexus required for asylum or withholding of removal protection.

Tip: Distinguish your facts from those in M-R-M-S-.

Emphasize how family or another protected ground played a significant role in the applicant being targeted for persecution. Note that merely mentioning that other family members were also harmed does not in itself establish a nexus on account of family membership.

Tip: Employ the Board’s test in Matter of S-P- when applicable.

In Matter of S-P-,3, the BIA looked at when government prosecution might actually be persecution on account of political opinion. And one of the warning signs it mentioned occurs when the punishment is clearly out of proportion to the conduct in question. So under S-P-’s test, if someone charged with jaywalking is detained at length and beaten by the police, the reasonable conclusion is that the punishment wasn’t actually about the jaywalking.

One can transpose this approach to the particular social group consisting of family by arguing that the same logic applies to gang punishment for failing to pay extortion. Particularly where the amount being sought by the gang or cartel isn’t that much, when the response to the failure to pay is to threaten to severely harm or kill a family member of the target of extortion, a reasonable conclusion under S-P- would be that this isn’t simply about the money. A gang or cartel can seek a financial goal, but at the same time can develop an animosity against a family resistant to its demands.

Moving on, the use of the word “subordinate” in the Board’s most recent holding is of interest, for the following reasons.

  1. The fall and rise of the Board’s “subordination” criteria for nexus

In its first attempt to define the “one central reason” language adopted by Congress in 2005, the BIA in Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-4 recognized in the last paragraph of page 212 of that decision that the standard did not require a central reason to be “dominant” in relation to other reasons for persecution. In fact, in a footnote, the Board further explained: “The problem in classifying one motive as “dominant” or “central” is that it renders all other motives, regardless of their significance to the case, secondary and therefore ultimately irrelevant.”

Yet two pages after rejecting a hierarchical approach to nexus, the Board defined the new standard as a reason that “cannot be incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.”

The problem with the inclusion of the word “subordinate” is obvious. It means that once an adjudicator finds a reason they consider to be the dominant one, their inquiry is over, and, as the Board itself warned, all other motives become irrelevant.

The Third Circuit, in Ndayshimiye v. Attorney General of U.S.5 rejected the Board’s standard for precisely this reason: its use of the word “subordinate” was found by the court to be no different from the “dominance” test that the Board purported to reject. To quote the Third Circuit:

This plain language indicates that a persecutor may have more than one central motivation for his or her actions; whether one of those central reasons is more or less important than another is irrelevant. The BIA acknowledged this in refusing to define a central reason within the meaning of § 208 as a “dominant” motivation. Id. at 212. The same logic forbids an interpretation that would impose a mirror image of the rejected “dominance” test: the requirement that a protected ground, even if a “central” reason for persecution, not be subordinate to any other reason.

Interestingly, following this rejection of its standard, the BIA reacted by dropping the word “subordinate” from its stated legal standard.  For example, in a subsequent (2011) precedent, Matter of N-M-, 6 the Board cited its earlier decision in  J-B-N & S-M-, but made no mention of that case’s incidental/tangential/superficial/subordinate language at all. Rather, the Board said:

In cases arising under the REAL ID Act, the “protected ground cannot play a minor role in the alien’s past mistreatment or fears of future mistreatment.” Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. at 214. Instead, a [noncitizen] must demonstrate that the persecutor would not have harmed the applicant if the protected trait did not exist.7

The italicized sentence states a “but for” causation standard which we will discuss further below. In fact, it seems to be an identical standard to that employed by the Fourth Circuit, whose approach the Board criticized in M-R-M-S-.

Years later,  in the aforementioned Matter of L-E-A- (decided in 2017), the Board amended its earlier language in J-B-N- & S-N- as follows:

The protected trait, in this case membership in the respondent’s father’s family, “cannot play a minor role”—that is, “it cannot be incidental [or] tangential . . . to another reason for harm.”8

Notice how an ellipsis is used to drop the word “subordinate” from the definition. So the Board seemed to understand for quite some time that the legal standard it enunciated could not include a dominance test (although it would then proceed to apply a dominance test in practice, as numerous circuit court reversals have demonstrated)

But now, without explaining the reason for  its sudden reversal, the Board has in M-R-M-S- reverted to its original flawed standard.  Here’s the quote:

A protected ground that is “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm” does not satisfy this standard.  Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. at 214. 9

Furthermore, the Board chose to reassert its dominance requirement in a case in which the facts mention only one reason, and a vague one at that – that “the cartel wanted the land for its own purpose.” A dominance test is meaningless where there is only one reason asserted for the persecution.

But what if the revived dominance test were to be applied to Prof. Bauer’s hypothetical? Presumably, the Board would find the dominant reason for the threatened persecution to be the Nazi authorities’ desire to bring a criminal to justice. The targeting of the suspect’s coreligionists as a means to achieve that primary objective would, under the Board’s test, become “subordinate” to that goal, and would thus render the murdering of the town’s Jews “irrelevant.” Applying the Board’s “logic,” religion would not be one central reason for the murders.

As the above example demonstrates, the Board’s test will lead to truly absurd results. It is therefore not surprising that the Board’s standard is at odds with the approach of most circuits.

  1. The reinstituted dominance test conflicts with most circuit case law

Tip: Argue the inapplicability of M-R-M-S- where it conflicts with prevailing circuit law.

While not exhaustive, the following selection of circuit court case law should provide a basis for arguing that the Board’s standard for determining nexus is inapplicable in many courts located within the jurisdiction of those circuits

Third Circuit

It should certainly be argued in cases arising within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit that the new decision’s reiteration of the exact legal standard that was rejected in Ndayshimiye (as discussed above) means that M-R-M-S- cannot be followed. The BIA actually recognized the conflict in footnote 6 of its decision, stating:

Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit generally agrees with the Board’s interpretation of the “one central reason” standard, it has rejected the requirement that a protected ground not be subordinate to another reason for harm. See Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 557 F.3d 124, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2009).

The Board thus seemed to acknowledge by way of this footnote the inapplicability of its decision in the Third Circuit.

Fourth Circuit

The BIA in M-R-M-S- does not contest that its requirement for nexus is at odds with the long-established “but for” standard employed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

In Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch,10 the Fourth Circuit explained that even though a gang threatened the petitioner for the purpose of recruiting her son, the applicant was nevertheless targeted “on account of” her family ties because her “relationship to her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened….”  The court has repeated the “why she, and not another person” test in other decisions.11

The Fourth Circuit has more recently pointed to an oft-repeated error of the Board in “incorrectly focusing on why the gang targeted Petitioner’s family, rather than on why they targeted Petitioner herself.”12  In another published decision, the Fourth Circuit stated that “‘once the right question is asked’ — that is, why was Petitioner being targeted — the conclusion is quite clear: ‘whatever [the gang]’s motives for targeting [her] family, [Petitioner herself] was targeted because of [her] membership in that family.’”13

The fact that the Board in M-R-M-S- states that it prefers the approach of the Tenth Circuit, which “does not agree with the Fourth Circuit’s approach,”14 does not change the fact that the standard enunciated in the above-captioned Fourth Circuit decisions remains the standard for nexus applicable in Immigration Courts and Asylum Offices located within that circuit’s jurisdiction.

Cases being heard remotely by an IJ located within the Fourth Circuit

A decision of the Fourth Circuit issued last year provides a strong argument for applying that court’s nexus standard in lieu of the M-R-M-S- approach in cases geographically outside of the circuit’s jurisdiction which are heard remotely by Immigration Judges sitting in Virginia, Maryland, or North Carolina.

In Herrera-Alcala v. Garland 15, the Fourth Circuit held that under a plain reading of the statute, jurisdiction is determined by the geographic location of the immigration judge at the time the judge completed the proceedings.

The BIA subsequently issued a conflicting precedential opinion, Matter of Garcia.16 But as the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Herrera-Alcala was based on its clear reading of the statutory language, the lack of a finding of statutory ambiguity would preclude deference to the Board’s view under either Chevron or Brand X.

In cases in which the Immigration Judge is sitting within the Fourth Circuit while the respondent is appearing in an immigration court elsewhere, the argument should be made that Fourth Circuit case law should apply. Claims constructed using Fourth Circuit precedent should be presented below, as in case the claim is denied by the agency, the applicant will ultimately be able to seek review before the Fourth Circuit.

Cases arising under the jurisdiction of other circuits

Fifth Circuit

Outside of the obvious examples of the Third and Fourth Circuits, be highly aware of the case law of the prevailing circuit regarding nexus. Most circuits have rejected the Board’s approach to some degree. Furthermore, the BIA misrepresented the holdings in some of the circuit decisions it cited in M-R-M-S-, a point that should be brought to the attention of judges or asylum officers.

The Fifth Circuit provides us with an example. In M-R-M-S-, the BIA cited the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Guevara-Fabian v. Garland17 as an example of a court employing an analysis of nexus consistent with its own approach.18 However, the court in Guevara-Fabian simply found that there was substantial evidence that the petitioner was targeted “because she owned a profitable business,” and not due to her family membership. This is quite different from the Board’s holding that being targeted due to one’s family membership is insufficient to establish a nexus where such family-based targeting is used as a means to achieving another non-protected goal.

Furthermore, four days after the issuance of M-R-M-S-, the Fifth Circuit published its decision in Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland.19 The facts in that case did not involve a family-based particular social group, but in addressing the subject of nexus, the court’s opinion rejected the agency’s general approach of rejecting all but the dominant reason for persecution.

Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found that in concluding threats by MS-13 were motivated “by criminal intent, personal vendettas, or monetary gain, which do not establish the required nexus,” the BIA disregarded that the petitioner “needed only to present ‘some particularized connection between the feared persecution’ and the protected ground in which his application for relief relies.” The court then referenced an earlier decision in which it had rejected the Board’s employment of an “either-or” approach to nexus in a mixed motive case, and said that the Board had acted similarly here by suggesting that Argueta was targeted for economic reasons “instead” of for a protected ground.20

So in cases arising in the Fifth Circuit, it should be argued that Guevara-Fabian did not support the Board’s approach in M-R-M-S-, as it was distinguishable on its facts, and that the court’s subsequent rejection in Argueta-Hernandez of the type of dominance approach and “either-or” test employed in M-R-M-S- puts the Board’s view of nexus in conflict with circuit law.

Sixth Circuit

On December 8 (i.e. 7 days after the publication of M-R-M-S-), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland 21. In that case, the petitioner, who suffered domestic violence at the hands of her husband, and, following his death, at the hands of his mother, claimed persecution on account of particular social groups which included  “Guatemalan Chuj [w]omen in domestic relationships who are unable to leave,” and “Guatemalan Chuj [w]omen who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship.” But the IJ found, and the Board affirmed, that the abuser acted based on a personal vendetta, and therefore found no nexus to a particular social group.

As the record contained ample evidence that “cultural expectations dictated that a Guatemalan Chuj woman in her position—both viewed as property and unable to leave by virtue of her domestic relationship—must stay with her in-laws and have nowhere else to go,” the Sixth Circuit determined there was “sufficient evidence for the BIA to conclude that Sebastian-Sebastian’s membership in these groups ‘underlay[s] all of [her persecutors’] actions.’”22 The court thus concluded that the Board’s failure to consider whether, in light of the above, the personal motives and particular social group membership were “inextricably intertwined” constituted reversible error.

The Sixth Circuit thus held (post-M-R-M-S-) that even where the primary reason for the persecution is a non-protected one (in this case, personal animosity), the fact that membership in a particular social group put and kept the asylum applicant in harm’s way is sufficient to render it sufficiently intertwined to satisfy the “one central reason” test. I believe a strong argument can be made that applying this approach to a family-based PSG would require a finding that even if the ultimate motive is extortion, if family membership is what put and kept the asylum applicant in harm’s way, there is sufficient nexus.

Seventh Circuit

In Gonzalez Ruano v. Barr,23  the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected an approach essentially the same to that underlying the Board’s decision in M-R-M-S-. The petitioner suffered persecution by a criminal cartel whose leader viewed the petitioner’s wife as “property” that he sought to “possess.” The petitioner thus argued that his familial relationship to his wife was at least one central reason for his persecution.

On review, the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the government’s argument that the persecution of the petitioner “was simply a ‘means to an end,’ making [the petitioner]’s relationship to his wife incidental.”24 The court found support in the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, adopting the Fourth Circuit’s test under which a nexus exists because the petitioner’s “relationship to his wife was the reason he, and not someone else, was targeted.”25

As the Seventh Circuit is in accord with the Fourth Circuit’s test that specifically rejects the Board’s approach to nexus (a conflict readily admitted by the Board in M-R-M-S-), the Board’s nexus standard is necessarily inapplicable in cases in which Seventh Circuit case law applies. It should be emphasized that the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez-Avalos which the Seventh Circuit positively cites is the specific decision mentioned by the Board in M-R-M-S- as an example of how the Fourth Circuit’s approach differs from its own.26

Eleventh Circuit

The Eleventh Circuit in Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.27 also applied a “but for” approach to nexus in a case involving family, determining that the persecutor’s monetary motivation did not render the petitioner’s family membership merely incidental where a criminal cartel targeted the petitioner because his father-in-law owed the cartel money. This is the exact scenario the Board rejected in M-R-M-S-, in which a family member is targeted as a means to a monetary end.

However, exactly as the Fourth Circuit had done in Hernandez-Avalos, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “In Mr. Perez-Sanchez’s case, it is impossible to disentangle his relationship to his father-in-law from the Gulf Cartel’s pecuniary motives: they are two sides of the same coin.” The court  concluded that “the family relationship was one central reason, if not the central reason, for the harm.”28

Thus, the M-R-M-S- standard is at odds with Eleventh Circuit case law as well.

Ninth and Second Circuits

The approach of these two circuits relates to the “but-for” standard. The Ninth Circuit applies a “but-for cause” test in determining nexus. As that court recently noted, to satisfy that standard, an asylum applicant “must first show that ‘the persecutor would not have harmed [her] if such motive did not exist,’… that is, but-for cause, see But-for Cause, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“The cause without which the event could not have occurred.”).29

Interestingly, in M-R-M-S-, the BIA quoted this but-for cause language from Parussimova without mentioning that the standard was in conflict with its own.30

It should therefore be argued in cases arising in the Ninth Circuit that applying that court’s “but-for cause” test would lead to a quite different result than the standard enunciated in M-R-M-S-.

The Second Circuit’s standard is less clear, but the court seems to view the “one central reason” requirement an even lower bar for establishing nexus than a but-for cause test. In Quituizaca v. Garland,31 the court noted the need to predict future persecution in withholding of removal claims, as opposed to other areas of law that employ a but-for causation test to past actions only. The court noted that where an adverse action has already occurred, there is an implication that “whatever evidence to establish but-for causation or refute it exists too.”

By contrast, the court noted that because of the predictive nature of future persecution in withholding claims, “[a] but-for standard in this context would seemingly require the applicant have insight into the motivations of the hypothetical future persecutor that sufficiently removes any doubt that the persecutor would be motivated by anything else,” adding that “[a]t a minimum, the proof that can be marshalled to rectify past conduct appears to us distinct from that which would be needed to establish a persecutor’s potential future conduct.”

While the Quituizaca decision is not even mentioned in M-R-M-S-, the Board does reference another Second Circuit case, Garcia-Aranda v. Garland,32 but essentially misrepresents that decision’s holding. In Garcia-Aranda, the facts established that although family members had also been harmed, the petitioners were targeted for persecution because of their own perceived wealth. Whether or not they were related to others who suffered harm would not change the outcome. Thus, in Garcia-Aranda, the court did not address, much less reject, the proposition that no nexus is established under a Hernandez-Avalos type of fact pattern.

A quick note regarding the Tenth Circuit

M-R-M-S- arose within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit, and the Board lauded that court’s decision in Orellana-Recinos v. Garland33 as setting forth its preferred standard for nexus.34

It is worth noting that in Orellana-Recinos, “Petitioners did not challenge, or even cite, Matter of L-E-A- in their brief to this court. And at oral argument they cited it as authority. As previously noted, they dispute only the BIA’s factual findings in their case, not the legal framework it applied.”35

  1. What about the standard applied in discrimination cases?

The Supreme Court recently addressed the question of nexus outside of the asylum context in Bostock v. Clayton County,36  a case involving employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  The Court explained in Bostock that the statutory term in question, “because of,” carries the same legal meaning as “on account of,” (i.e. the standard used in asylum cases).

The Court continued that the standard requires a court to apply the “simple” and “traditional” “but-for” test.  As the Court explained, “a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.”37

The Court recognized that the “but-for” standard is a “sweeping” one, acknowledging that “[o]ften, events have multiple but-for causes.”  The Court further observed that “[w]hen it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision.”38

This leads to the following question: if “on account of” is not a term specific to asylum, and if the Supreme Court has told us that there is a simple and traditional test for “on account of” that is none other than the “but-for” test being applied by several circuits as described above, can the BIA simply ignore this in creating its own definition for the term “on account of” applicable to asylum claims? M-R-M-S- makes no mention of Bostock. If the Board doesn’t believe that case to be applicable, why not explain its reasoning for reaching that conclusion?

Tip: There is thus an argument to be made in all jurisdictions that the Supreme Court’s standard in Bostock should be the prevailing one.

I have discussed Bostock and offered my views on its applicability to asylum in more detail here.

  1. Emphasize other BIA precedents

Even in the absence of conflicting circuit or Supreme Court case law, an Immigration Judge or asylum officer is left to sort through the several BIA precedents mentioned above. Matter of S-P- (which has not been overruled) did not conclude that because an asylum applicant faced criminal prosecution, there was nothing further to consider. Instead, the Board in that case set forth a test requiring adjudicators to continue their inquiry,  taking into account circumstantial evidence and applying common sense to see if another motive for the persecution might be inferred from the facts of record.

As noted above, Matter of N-M- set out a “but-for” standard that seems identical to the one employed by the Fourth Circuit. And even Matter of L-E-A- dropped the word “subordinate,” and thus the application of the dominance test, from its stated legal standard.

Tip: Note that these other BIA precedents remain binding as precedent.

These other cases should therefore be cited and explained, and the degree to which they conflict with M-R-M-S- should be emphasized. It can be argued that M-R-M-S-’s applicability should be limited to cases in which family members are merely mentioned in passing, without further elucidation from the record as to why family membership might have served as a reason for past or future persecution.

Conclusion

As the above hopefully demonstrates, there are plenty of bases to challenge the Board’s recent decision. In M-R-M-S-, the Board presented an approach to nexus that is at odds with the case law of the majority of circuits. The Board mischaracterized the holdings in a number of circuit court decisions, championed a decision of the Tenth Circuit in which the Board’s standard was conceded and thus not in dispute before that court, and completely ignored the Supreme Court’s analysis of the “on account of” standard without explaining why what the Court termed the traditional standard for nexus was distinguishable in the asylum context.

To reiterate, the proper thing for the Attorney General to do at this point is to certify the decision to himself, and vacate it pending anticipated rulemaking. In the meantime, it is hoped that some of the above points will receive serious consideration from asylum officers, Immigration Judges, ICE attorneys, and federal appellate courts.

Copyright Jeffrey S. Chase 2023. All rights reserved.

Notes:

  1. 27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017).
  2. 28 I&N Dec. 757 (BIA 2023).
  3. 21 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1996).
  4. 25 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2007).
  5. 557 F.3d 124, 129-30 (3rd Cir., 2009).
  6. 25 I&N Dec. 526 (BIA 2011).
  7. Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
  8. Matter of L-E-A-, supra at 44.
  9. Matter of M-R-M-S-, supra at 759 (emphasis added).
  10. 784 F.3d 944, 950 (4th Cir. 2015).
  11. See, e.g., Alvarez-Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 250 (4th Cir. 2019); Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122, 129 (4th Cir. 2017).
  12. Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213 , 222 (4th Cir. 2021).
  13. Hernandez-Cartagena v. Barr, 977 F.3d 316, 322 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451, 459 (4th Cir. 2018)).
  14. M-R-M-S-, supra at 761.
  15. 39 F.4th 233 (4th Cir. 2022).
  16. 28 I&N Dec. 693 (BIA 2023).
  17. 51 F.4th 647, 648 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam).
  18. M-R-M-S-, supra at 760.
  19. No. 22-60307 (5th Cir. Dec. 5, 2023).
  20. Id., slip op. at 16-17 (citing Rivas-Martinez v. I.N.S., 997 F.2d 1143, 1145, 1147-48  (5th Cir. 1993) (remanding to BIA for consideration of mixed motives).
  21. No. 23-3059 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2023).
  22. Id., slip op. at 22 (quoting Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 998 (6th Cir. 2009).
  23. 922 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 2019).
  24. Id. at 355-56.
  25. Id. at 356.
  26. See M-R-M-S-, supra at 761 (stating that the Tenth Circuit does not agree with the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Hernandez-Avalos, and adding its opinion that the Tenth Circuit’s is the proper approach).
  27. 935 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2019).
  28. Id. at 1158-59.
  29. Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 751 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2009).
  30. See M-R-M-S-, supra at 762.
  31. 52 F.4th 103, 112-13 (2d Cir. 2022).
  32. 53 F.4th 752, 758 (2d Cir. 2022).
  33. 993 F.3d 851 (10th Cir. 2021).
  34. M-R-M-S-, supra at 761 (stating “In our view, the Tenth Circuit’s approach is the proper way to analyze whether membership in a family-based particular social group is one central reason for harm.
  35. Id. at 857.
  36. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
  37. Id. at 1739.
  38. Id.

DECEMBER 24, 2023

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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City.  Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge and Senior Legal Advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals.He is the founder of the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges, which was awarded AILA’s 2019 Advocacy Award.Jeffrey is also a past recipient of AILA’s Pro Bono Award.He sits on the Board of Directors of the Association of Deportation Defense Attorneys, and Central American Legal Assistance.

Reprinted by permission.

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It’s very satisfying to see Jeffrey’s positive use of Matter of S-P-, a “Schmidt era” precedent in which I joined and which remains good law despite the current BIA’s often ignoring or misapplying it. It’s also a great example of the useful guidance flowing from “positive precedents” — those illustrating and promoting proper asylum grants — as opposed to the overwhelmingly negative tenor of today’s unduly restrictive BIA asylum precedents. 

As many of us often say, justice for asylum seekers and other migrants shouldn’t be this difficult in Garland’s courts. See also https://immigrationcourtside.com/2023/12/04/☠%EF%B8%8F🤯-bia-trashes-normal-legal-rules-of-causation-jettisons-4th-cir-precedent-to-deny-family-based-psg-case-the-latest-anti-asylum-znger-from-falls-church-famil/.

Even while the BIA tortures asylum law to make it more difficult to qualify, authorities in other “UN Convention nations” are moving in the opposite direction. For example, Switzerland recently joined Finland, Sweden, and Denmark in automatically granting asylum to Afghan women.  See, e.g., https://www.tortoisemedia.com/2023/12/19/switzerland-becomes-fourth-country-to-automatically-grant-asylum-to-afghan-women/. 

This approach is far more consistent with the Supreme Court’s generous guidance in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca and the BIA’s own initial implementation of that standard in Matter of Mogharrabi, both of which are routinely ignored at EOIR today. (Indeed, if someone with the exact same facts as Mogharrabi applied today, it’s highly likely that the BIA would invent a host of bogus reasons to send him packing!)  It’s also a much more practical approach that can actually “streamline” the granting of more “first instance” cases by the Asylum Office, greater consistency, and lessening the need for petitions for review and “Circuit specific” strategies. 

While there is no “silver bullet” that will eliminate overnight a backlog built over years of neglect, active mismanagement, and poor performance at EOIR and DOJ, a new, functional, well-respected BIA of asylum expert judges unswervingly committed to due process, fundamental fairness, and best practices is an absolutely necessary first step toward regaining control over our asylum system without sacrificing the legal rights of asylum seekers. The system can’t start eliminating backlog until it ceases doing those things that build unnecessary backlog in the first place. 

In the meantime, this example of “law you can use” from “Sir Jeffrey” promises to be the “gift that keeps on giving” during what is sure to be a difficult upcoming year for refugees, asylum seekers, migrants, and their dedicated attorneys and representatives!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

12-26-23

🇺🇸🗽⚖️🦸🏼‍♀️🎖RECOGNIZING AN AMERICAN HERO & DUE PROCESS MAVEN, ANNE PILSBURY! — Hon. “Sir Jeffrey” Chase’s Heartfelt Tribute — “Those of us who care about people on the wrong side of history just have to help case by case, person by person.” (Corrected Version)

Anne Pilsbury ESQUIREAmerican Legal Superhero
PHOTO: Courtesy of Jeff Chase
Anne Pilsbury ESQUIRE
American Legal Superhero
PHOTO: Courtesy of Hon. Jeffrey Chase

UPDATE & CORRECTED WITH PICTURE OF THE “REAL” ANNE PILSBURY — THANKS TO SIR JEFFREY!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2023/1/18/thanking-anne-pilsbury

JEFFREY S. CHASE | OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW

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Thanking Anne Pilsbury

“Those of us who care about people on the wrong side of history just have to help case by case, person by person.” – Anne Pilsbury, quoted in Francisco Goldman, “Escape to New York,” The New Yorker, Aug. 9, 2016.

Anne Pilsbury is well; she continues to work at Central American Legal Assistance (“CALA”), the organization she founded almost four decades ago. She was recently awarded the Carol Weiss King Award by the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild. She remains most generous in sharing her knowledge with the immigration law community in New York.

However, as of January 1, Anne has stepped down from CALA’s helm, passing the Directorship of the organization to the extremely talented Heather Axford.

It thus seems like an appropriate time to honor Anne’s extraordinary career. Her path from Washington, D.C. to Maine “country lawyer” to representing asylum-seekers in Williamsburg, Brooklyn is a fascinating one. It began with Anne’s role as plaintiff’s counsel in Hobson v. Wilson,1 a remarkable case having nothing to do with immigration law.

Hobson involved a top-secret FBI operation of the late-1960s to early-1970s called COINTELPRO, which targeted civil rights groups seeking racial equality, and another set of organizations actively opposing the Vietnam war. COINTELPRO specifically listed the Southern Christian Leadership Conference led by Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee as primary targets.

In the words of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, COINTELPRO focused on “(1) efforts to create racial animosity between Blacks and Whites; (2) interference with lawful demonstration logistics; (3) efforts to create discord within groups or to portray a group’s motives or goals falsely to the public; and (4) direct efforts to intimidate the plaintiffs.”2

Regarding the degree of those efforts, according to a 1976 Senate Select Committee Report

From December 1963 until his death in 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr. was the target of an intensive campaign by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to “neutralize” him as an effective civil rights leader. In the words of the man in charge of the FBI’s “war” against Dr. King:

No-holds were barred. We have used [similar] techniques against Soviet agents. [The same methods were] brought home against any organization against which we were targeted. We did not differentiate. This is a rough, tough business.3

Beginning her work on the case as a law student in D.C. and continuing with the case while in private practice in D.C., Anne and her co-counsel brought suit against the FBI for systemically violating their clients’ “constitutional rights, individually and through conspiracies, while plaintiffs engaged in lawful protest against government policy in the late 1960’s and in the 1970’s in the Washington area.”4   After a 17 day trial, Anne and her colleagues won the suit. In my view, that case alone earned Anne membership in the Due Process Army Hall of Fame.

During the time Hobson was being litigated, Anne moved to Maine, opening her own practice there in the town of Norway (pop. 5,000), traveling back and forth to D.C. for the Hobson trial. So then how did she end up in Brooklyn representing asylum seekers?

Anne explained to me that the government appealed the Hobson decision to the D.C. Circuit (in 1982), after which Anne began traveling to the New York City offices of the Center for Constitutional Rights, who served as her co-counsel on the appeal. And finding some time on her hands during the two-year pendency of that appeal allowed Anne to pursue her interest in helping those fleeing civil war in Central America, which was an issue very much in the news at the time. Although Anne found groups dedicated to the issue itself, she was less successful in locating organizations actually providing representation to immigrants from Central America.

Anne continued that INS was detaining Central Americans at that time in the Brooklyn Navy Yard.5 Anne learned that a local Catholic priest and nun, Father Bryan Karvelis and Sister Peggy Walsh, were visiting those detainees, sometimes paying the bond for their release; they even housed those who had nowhere to stay in the rectory of their Brooklyn church. And Sister Peggy had obtained accredited representative status, allowing her to represent individuals before the government.

In Anne’s words, after litigating against the FBI in Hobson, she naively thought that by comparison, dealing with INS “would be a piece of cake.” Between briefs in Hobson, Anne  organized a group of pro bono lawyers to represent Central Americans in applying for asylum under the brand-new 1980 Refugee Act. Anne spent the first year working out of her car, after which Father Bryan offered her space in the Transfiguration Church on Hooper Street, where CALA remains located to this day.

Anne thus began CALA with no funding, paying a secretary herself, and working without a salary for about two years. In a wonderfully ironic twist, CALA’s first funding came from Anne’s attorney fees in Hobson, thus making the FBI CALA’s first major benefactor.

Interestingly, Anne explained that it took a few years before the newly created EOIR began to hear Central American cases in earnest; in the early 1980s, the federal government somehow believed that the problems in the region would be over in a year or two.

Once they did begin hearing Central American cases, the Immigration Judges of that time denied virtually all of their asylum claims, generally doing so by incorrectly classifying the feared harm as “random violence.” In spite of the new asylum law intended to make adjudications fairer and free of political influence, it took years before Anne won her first asylum case.

And yet Anne persevered, building a model program and recruiting and mentoring outstanding lawyers. Anne also challenged EOIR’s misguided decisions and policies in the federal courts.

I want to make it clear that I had not included this next anecdote in my initial draft; it is being added at Anne’s own request. But while fighting to prevent the deportation of factory workers illegally arrested in a workplace raid, a March 1988 conference before U.S. District Court Judge Mark A. Constantino apparently became quite heated, resulting in the judge holding Anne in criminal contempt of court. That order was overturned by the Second Circuit in Matter of Pilsbury.6 The Second Circuit decision contained the following quote directed at Anne by Judge Constantino:

You go practice your shabby law somewheres [sic] else. Don’t you dare practice it in the Eastern District. You no longer will be permitted to practice in any part of this court. You will not be able to practice in this court or the immigration service. This court will see to it.7

Judge Constantino’s words turned out to be about as accurate as the Department of Justice’s belief that the turmoil in Central America would settle down after a few months. Some thirty-five years later, Anne’s impact on asylum case law has been nothing less than remarkable.

In 1994, in the case of Osorio v. INS,8 Anne prevailed in challenging the BIA’s determination that a labor union leader’s fear of persecution in Guatemala was not on account of his political opinion because, as a labor union leader, his point of dispute with the Guatemalan government was economic, not political.

In reversing the BIA’s conclusion, the Second Circuit quoted a statement made by Anne at oral argument, which became one of the most famous lines in asylum law history: that according to the BIA’s view, the Nobel Prize winning Soviet novelist and renowned dissident “Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn would not have been eligible for political asylum because his dispute with the former Soviet Union is properly characterized as a literary, rather than a political, dispute.”9

The court agreed with Anne that “Regardless of whether their dispute might have been characterized as a literary dispute, it might also have been properly characterized as a political dispute.”10 The Osorio decision remains extremely relevant today for its expansive view of what constitutes “political opinion” for asylum purposes, and for recognizing that nexus can be satisfied where the persecution is on account of mixed motives, a concept later codified by Congress.

A month earlier, in the case of Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery,11  Anne had won a Second Circuit victory for a community leader from Peru who was denied asylum by the BIA in spite of being at risk of violence for speaking out against the Shining Path.

Also in 1994, Anne prevailed before the Ninth Circuit in a case called Campos v. Nail,12 challenging an Immigration Judge’s pattern or practice of denying all motions for change of venue filed by Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers who had not established a U.S. address prior to their arrest by the INS.  In applying this policy without consideration of the individual’s circumstances, the IJ forced respondents who had long settled thousands of miles away to return at no small expense to Arizona for their hearings, or face an in absentia deportation order if unable to do so. The Ninth Circuit agreed with Anne that the policy violated the petitioners’ “statutory and regulatory rights to be assured a reasonable opportunity to attend their deportation hearings and to present evidence on their own behalf,” which “in turn interfered with the plaintiffs’ statutory and regulatory rights to apply for asylum and to obtain representation by counsel at no expense to the government.”13

Anne later won two cases before the Second Circuit creating important protections for asylum seekers in establishing their credibility before Immigration Judges. The precedent decisions in Alvarado-Carillo v. INS,14 and Secaida-Rosales v. INS15 rejected the application of an inappropriate standard relying on speculation or conjecture in rejecting an asylum applicant’s credibility, and required that such determinations be based on facts material to the claim. However, in noting how difficult keeping such gains can be, Anne pointed to the fact that both of these decisions were specifically cited with disapproval by Congress in its subsequent amendments contained in the 2005 REAL ID Act giving Immigration Judge greater leeway to deny asylum based on credibility or corroboration.

In 2006, Anne won an important case recognizing that a different standard applies when determining persecution to children. In Jorge-Tzoc v. Gonzales,16 the Second Circuit held that harm that had not been found to rise to the level of persecution to an adult “could well constitute persecution to a small child totally dependent on his family and community.” The court also cited INS’s asylum guidelines for children recognizing that “The harm a child fears or has suffered, however, may be relatively less than that of an adult and still qualify as persecution.”17

I’ve just mentioned some of the highlights from Anne’s career. From her office inside the Transfiguration Church, the entity Anne founded has assisted thousands of immigrants over the years. And CALA has very much remained focused on the community it serves; as Anne says, that is very much by choice. Among those serving on the organization’s Board of Directors are early clients of CALA, along with former staff.

The community connection is not limited to people. The CALA website lists among its staff, photo and all, “Oscar Gerardi Caceres the Cat,” an actual cat rescued by Anne (as opposed to an attorney with a cat filter), whose responsibilities are listed as “greeting clients, inspecting files, and prowling the office as our security guard.” It must be pointed out that this whimsical entry also carries a far more serious meaning, as the office cat has been named to honor the memory of three fallen leaders of the decades-long violence in Central America:  Msgr. Oscar Romero (killed in 1980 in El Salvador), Berta Caceres, an environmental activist and indigenous leader killed in Honduras in 2016, and Bishop Juan Gerardi, killed in Guatemala in 1998 right after releasing the church’s devastating truth commission report on military atrocities.

Over the years, I have left every conversation with Anne having learned something important. Anne has a casual, often direct way of speaking; her words can be simultaneously remarkably simple and deeply profound.

I offer as an example this quote of hers from the same 2016 New Yorker article quoted above:

“I never expected it to take so long for our government to wake up to what was happening in Central America, and to stop funding militaries and wars, and stop blaming immigrants for trying to save their own lives….Thirty years later, I’m no longer so optimistic, I don’t expect people here to learn from history anymore. Of course, you never stop hoping they will, when the lessons are so obvious.”

In 2006, the block of Marcy Avenue on which the Transfiguration Church sits was named “Msgr. Bryan J. Karvelis Way.” I found online remarks made by City Council Member Diana Reyna during the meeting at which the naming was voted upon. Those remarks included the following:

Brooklyn parishes, like their neighborhoods, have gone through a lot of changes over the years. But one thing remains constant: in a Diocese of Immigrants, they continue to reach out to the latest newcomers, and make a home for them. Transfiguration parish is a superb example of this, and today is a good day to celebrate its history.

In paying tribute to Father Bryan, those remarks are no doubt also a tribute to the work of Anne and CALA over the past 40 years.

Please join me in thanking Anne Pilsbury profoundly, and wishing her all of the best  her future pursuits.

Notes:

  1. 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
  2. Id. at 11.
  3. Senate Select Committee, Book III: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, S. Rep. 94-755 at 81; https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_III.pdf
  4. Hobson v. Wilson, 556 F. Supp. 1157, 1163 (D.D.C. 1982).
  5. Just to give out-of-town readers a sense of change over Anne’s career, the Brooklyn Navy Yard presently includes the largest movie studio outside of Hollywood; a large number of innovative tech start-ups, and a Wegman’s Supermarket.
  6. 866 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1989).
  7. Id. at 22.
  8. 18 F.3d 1017 (2d Cir. 1994).
  9. Id. at 1028-29.
  10. Id. at 1029.
  11. 17 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 1994).
  12. 43 F.3d 1285 (9th Cir. 1994).
  13. Id. at 1291.
  14. 251 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2001).
  15. 331 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2003).
  16. 435 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2006).
  17. Id. at 150.

Copyright 2023 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved. Republished by permission.

*********************************

Congratulations, Anne, on an amazing career — one that continues on in a different role! You are what real leadership and courage are all about! 

Building a better America, “case by case, person by person.” I used to say that to folks in court during my days on the bench. It was a “team effort” that included everyone in the courtroom.

Also, thanks to Jeffrey for such a moving and elegantly written portrait of a real American patriot. Giving thanks and recognizing those who have “paved the way” and supported our common values and ideals is an oft-overlooked value in and of itself.

The Biden Administration and Dems generally are notoriously bad in this area. That’s particularly and painfully evident when it comes to those who “held the line” on our Constitution, democracy, and human rights — at a time when many of those leaders and politicos who would benefit were nowhere to be found “in the trenches” of defending and promoting social justice in the face of the Trump/GOP onslaught.

This is my favorite quote from Jeffrey’s profile of Anne:

“I never expected it to take so long for our government to wake up to what was happening in Central America, and to stop funding militaries and wars, and stop blaming immigrants for trying to save their own lives….Thirty years later, I’m no longer so optimistic, I don’t expect people here to learn from history anymore. Of course, you never stop hoping they will, when the lessons are so obvious.”

Clearly, Biden, Harris, Mayorkas, Garland, a number of Dem politicos, Federal Judges at all levels, and many members of the so-called “mainstream media” neither learned nor heeded the obvious lessons of history. They also ignored the law in their disgraceful “rush to reject rather than protect!”

They keep “blaming the victims” for saving their own lives, ignoring our nation’s failure to live up to our humanitarian commitments, and violating our statutes and Constitutional guarantees of the right to apply for asylum and receive a fair adjudication of claims. It’s as if World War II, Hitler, the Holocaust, and its aftermath  have been “written out” of our history — mainly by the GOP but also disturbingly by some Democrats and members of the Biden Administration.

Also, many congratulations to “rising NDPA superstar” Heather Axford on her appointment as the new Director of CALA! Heather has already “creamed” the DOJ in the notable case of Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr. See, e.g., https://wp.me/p8eeJm-52n. That case is basically a compendium of why EOIR is failing, both legally and operationally. 

Heather Axford
Heather Axford
Director
Central American Legal Assistance
Brooklyn, NY

Yet, disgracefully, rather than “tapping into” the expertise and organizational talents of Heather, Anne, and their NDPA colleagues, Garland and his team are presiding over the “death spiral” of EOIR — endangering our entire U.S. justice system and threatening and degrading human lives!

I’m proud to say that Heather “got her start” practicing before the “Legacy” Arlington Immigration Court with the Law Offices of Alan M. Parra following her graduation from UVA Law! I know that Heather will carry on and build upon Anne’s humanitarian legal legacy and leadership example at CALA!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

02-19-23

  

DOJ’s IMITATION OF DHS “SERVICE CENTERS” IN VA MIGHT OFFER LITIGANTS A CHANCE AT BETTER LAW!  😎 — Hon. Jeffrey Chase Points Out How DOJ’s Efforts To “Dumb Down” 😩 Immigration Courts & Replace Judicial Decision-Making With “Rote Adjudication” Could Unintentionally Give Individuals A Better Due Process Option!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2022/8/16/the-4th-circuit-on-jurisdiction

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The 4th Circuit on Jurisdiction

On June 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a decision that might not have received the attention it deserved.  The end result of the court’s published decision in Herrera-Alcala v. Garland was to affirm an Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum based on a lack of credibility.1

But before reaching the merits, the court addressed a jurisdictional issue, and that is where our interest lies.  At his removal proceeding, the petitioner was detained at a Louisiana correctional facility, which placed him physically within the territory of the Fifth Circuit.  For some reason, the Administrative Control Court (which is where the administrative record for the case was created and maintained, and where documents were filed by the parties) having jurisdiction over that Louisiana correctional facility was in Fort Snelling, Minnesota, which is physically located within the Eighth Circuit’s jurisdiction.

However, the immigration judge who conducted the hearing remotely by video and rendered the decision was sitting at the Immigration Adjudication Center in Falls Church, Virginia, which is within the geographic jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit.  So after the BIA dismissed the petitioner’s appeal, his counsel sought review with the Fourth Circuit.  The Department of Justice moved to change venue to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the petitioner’s location was determinative. And an amicus brief filed by an immigrants’ rights group took the position that venue properly belonged in the Eighth Circuit, where the control court was located.

The Fourth Circuit resolved the question of jurisdiction using the language of the relevant statute.  Since 8 U.S.C. section 1252(b)(2) states that the “petition for review shall be filed with the court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings,” the court interpreted that to mean it is the location of the judge that determines jurisdiction.  And as the judge in this case was in Virginia, it found proper jurisdiction to be with the Fourth Circuit.

The decision yields an immediate benefit, as there are presently nineteen Immigration Judges sitting in the two Immigration Adjudication Centers that are located within the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction (in Falls Church and Richmond, VA).  Based on the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, any of the thousands of noncitizens whose cases were heard by one of these Virginia-based judges now have the option of seeking judicial review in the Fourth Circuit.

The impact of this becomes apparent when we look at the BIA’s precedent decision in Matter of L-E-A-.2  In that case, the Board held that the respondent’s family constituted a valid particular social group for asylum purposes, but then denied asylum by finding that a nexus had not been established between that family membership and the feared persecution.  In fact, the decision created an unreasonably high standard for nexus in a commonly occurring type of asylum claim.   But the decision contains a footnote recognizing that the Fourth Circuit holds a significantly different view of nexus in such cases, adding that L-E-A- did “not arise in the Fourth Circuit.”3

Although the Board doesn’t go as far as saying so, applying Fourth Circuit case law to the facts of L-E-A-  would have resulted in a grant of asylum.  As I discussed in far greater depth in this blog post in December, the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly reversed the Board on nexus, citing the latter’s error of focusing on why the persecutor targeted the group in question, instead of asking why they targeted the asylum applicant themself.  For example, if the group in question is a family, it doesn’t matter if the persecutor is targeting that family for an unprotected reason such as money, revenge, or self-preservation.  Per the Fourth Circuit, if the asylum seeker themself wouldn’t be targeted if not for their membership in that family, then nexus has been established, regardless of the reason the family is at risk in the first place.4

In addition to its more favorable take on nexus, the Fourth Circuit is also among the handful of circuits to consider verbal death threats to constitute persecution.5  This is  important, because one who has been threatened in those circuits has thus established past persecution, causing burdens of proof regarding future fear and internal relocation to then shift to the government to rebut, and further opening the possibility for humanitarian grants of asylum even where the government meets its burden of rebuttal.6

The Fourth Circuit has also imposed on Immigration Judges a strong obligation under international law to fully develop the record in hearings involving asylum claims, particularly (but not exclusively) where the respondent is pro se, and considers an IJ’s failure to meet this obligation to be “presumptively prejudicial.”7   Any attorney who is representing on appeal an asylum applicant who appeared pro se below where the IJ had been sitting in Virginia might want to review the record to see if the duties imposed by the Fourth Circuit to develop the record, which includes a “broad and robust duty to help pro se asylum seekers articulate their particular social groups,” was satisfied.8

In spite of the above-listed benefits, advocates have identified a potential downside to the ruling in Herrera-Alcala should the Fourth Circuit’s view on jurisdiction be adopted nationwide.  To illustrate this concern, I’ll use a hypothetical example arising in a circuit such as the Fourth with a body of case law favorable to asylum applicants.  Let’s imagine that after briefing and documenting the claim in line with that circuit’s law, the presiding judge in Baltimore is out sick on the day of the merits hearing.  A deserving asylum seeker could have a likely grant of asylum upended if a judge stationed in a jurisdiction with far less favorable case law is enlisted to hear the case by video under EOIR’s “No Dark Courtrooms” policy.9  While the intent behind substituting in a remote judge might be an innocent one, the impact on the asylum seeker of unexpectedly having to overcome a much tougher standard for nexus or a narrower definition of persecution could be devastating, as the Matter of L-E-A- example illustrated.

The Fourth Circuit’s view is presently limited to the Fourth Circuit.  But should it come to be the universal rule, while whether a particular circuit will accept jurisdiction over a petition for review is beyond EOIR’s control, the agency may itself still choose which circuit’s case law its own Immigration Judges should apply in individual cases before the Immigration Courts.  EOIR would do well to look to the example of USCIS, which advises its asylum officers conducting credible fear interviews that where there is disagreement among the circuits as to the proper interpretation of a legal issue, “generally the interpretation most favorable to the applicant is used when determining whether the applicant meets the credible fear standard.”10

I mentioned above the Fourth Circuit’s recognition of the duty of Immigration Judges to ensure that the record is fully developed in asylum claims.  Scholars credit that obligation to the legal requirement on nations to implement treaties in good faith.  For example, in discussing the adjudicator’s duty to develop the record in asylum cases, two leading international refugee law scholars explain the duty to implement treaties in good faith as holding states “not simply to ensuring the benefits of the Convention are withhold from persons who are not refugees, but equally to doing whatever is within their ability to ensure recognition of genuine refugees.”11

But shouldn’t that same obligation apply to not only developing the evidence of record, but also to deciding which law to apply when, as in Herrera-Alcala, there is more than one option?  If there is an obligation on our government to do everything in its ability to ensure recognition of genuine refugees, then isn’t that obligation breached where an individual sitting in a geographic area in which the law deems her deserving of asylum is then denied protection because the judge being beamed into that courtroom is sitting in a place with less enlightened precedent?

Copyright Jeffrey S. Chase 2022.  All rights reserved.

Notes:

  1. Herrera-Alcala v. Garland, Nos. 20-1770, 20-2338, ___ F.4th ___ (4th Cir. June 30, 2022).
  2. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017).
  3. Id at 46, n.3.
  4. Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213, 222 (4th Cir. 2021).
  5. See Sorto-Guzman v. Garland, No. 20-1762, ___ F.4th ___ (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2022) (restating the court’s repeated holding that “the ‘threat of death’ qualifies as persecution.”); Bedoya v. Barr, 981 F.3d 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2020) (emphasizing that “under our precedent, as we have repeatedly explained, a threat of death qualifies as past persecution”).
  6. 8 C.F.R. §§1208.13(b)(1), 1208.13(b)(3)(ii), and 1208.13(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Matter of D-I-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 2008); Matter of L-S-, 25 I&N Dec. 705 (BIA 2012).
  7. Arevalo Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d 612, 642 (4th Cir. 2021) (italics in original).
  8. Id. at 633.
  9. March 29, 2019 Memo of EOIR Director, “No Dark Courtrooms,” OOD PM 19-11.
  10. USCIS Asylum Division Officer Training Course, Credible Fear of Persecution and Torture Determinations (Feb. 13, 2017), at 17.
  11. James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (2d Ed.), Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014, at 119.

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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City.  Jeffrey is a formerImmigration Judge and Senior Legal Advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals.He is the founder of the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges, which was awarded AILA’s 2019 Advocacy Award.Jeffrey is also a past recipient of AILA’s Pro Bono Award.He sits on the Board of Directors of the Association of Deportation Defense Attorneys, and Central American Legal Assistance.

*******************

At the “Legacy INS,” the acronym for what were then called “Remote Adjudication Centers” was “The RACK” — with good reason! Once upon a time, EOIR went out of the way to emphasize the differences with, and independence from, INS —  it ran “courts” not “adjudication centers,” and it was comprised of “judges” NOT “adjudicators.”

Indeed, I can remember a past (in person) IJ National Conference where a senior DOJ official received a rather chilly reception for referring to the IJs in the room as “highly paid immigration examiners who worked for the AG.”

But, times change, and passage of time does not always bring progress. In many important ways EOIR is going backwards. Over the years, particularly 2017-2021, it probably has become more “politicized, compromised, weaponized, and subservient to immigration enforcement” than it was when it operated within the “Legacy INS.” Now, its bloated hierarchical bureaucracy, unmanageable backlogs, lousy public service, and emphasis on “productivity” and carrying out DOJ policies, looks more and more like DHS — the successor to the agency from which it declared “independence” back in 1983. What an unforgivable mess!

Star Chamber Justice
The “RACK” “processes” another “adjudication.”

Here’s a recent post with my “take” on Herrera-Alcalahttps://immigrationcourtside.com/2022/07/02/⚖%EF%B8%8Fvenue-venue-whos-got-the-venue-the-4th-circuit-herrera-alcala-v-garland/

As a “vet” of thousands of Televideo Hearings during my 13+ years on the bench at Arlington, I can definitively say that they are inferior to in person hearings, for many reasons. But, sometimes bureaucratic attempts to “depersonalize” justice, cut corners, and achieve bureaucratic goals produce unanticipated outcomes!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-28-22

🎭 HON. JEFFREY S. CHASE ASKS: CAN LIFE IMITATE ART IMITATING LIFE?  — Lessons From The Play/Movie “The Courtroom!”

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2022/8/16/can-keathley-be-applied-more-broadly

JEFFREY S. CHASE | OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW

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Can Keathley Be Applied More Broadly?

The Off-Broadway play The Courtroom is now a film; it recently screened as part of the Tribeca Film Festival.  I think it is excellent, and would highly recommend that all those interested in immigration law see it.  As you might know, the film depicts the actual immigration court case that culminated on appeal in the Seventh Circuit’s 2012 precedent decision in Keathley v. Holder.1

While there is so much artistic talent to applaud among the film’s cast (especially the excellent Kristin Villanueva as the respondent, Elizabeth Keathley), director Lee Sunday Evans, and Arian Moayed (who created the script from actual court transcripts), as a lawyer and former judge, I was particularly impressed with the legal theory employed in the case by the real-life attorney Richard Hanus.

To summarize the facts of the case, Ms. Keathley went to the Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles to obtain a state identification card while in non-immigrant status, having been admitted to the U.S. on a fiancee visa.  In processing her application, the DMV official asked (as he was required to do) whether she wanted to be an organ donor, and more consequentially, whether she wanted to register to vote.  Having just shown the DMV official her non-U.S. passport and non-immigrant visa, Ms. Keathley took the question to mean that she was eligible to vote.  And an Illinois law designed to deter discrimination in voter registration precluded the DMV official from offering her further guidance to dispel that belief.  When at her adjustment of status interview with DHS, Ms. Keathley answered honestly that she had voted in the 2006 midterm election, she soon found herself in removal proceedings before an immigration judge.

Furthermore, her situation appeared hopeless.  Section 237(a)(6)(A) of the Immigration & Nationality Act requires only a finding that a noncitizen voted in violation of any Federal, State, or local statute in order to make the individual deportable; it does not require a criminal conviction for having done so.  Ms. Keathley readily admitted that she had voted.  And of course, a federal statute, namely, 18 U.S.C. section 611, prohibits non-citizens from doing so.

But Ms. Keathley’s attorney argued that she was not in fact deportable, because there was a legal defense for her action, called “entrapment by estoppel.”  As Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing the Seventh Circuit’s decision in the case, explained, criminal defenses are relevant in removal proceedings.  He provided the example of a noncitizen who kills another in self-defense, raising the question of whether that person would then be deportable for having committed the crime of murder.  While Judge Easterbrook explained that the statute might define murder as the intentional killing of a human being, a person who kills in self defense is not guilty of murder, and would thus not be deportable.2  The same logic applies to voting.

Judge Easterbrook further explained that while its name is confusing, the defense of entrapment by estoppel can be better described as “official authorization.”  In his oral argument, Hanus offered the analogy of a police officer waving a driver through a red light; because the officer authorized the action, the driver could not be ticketed for their action.

Judge Easterbrook provided another example: if a Secret Service agent authorizes someone to distribute counterfeit currency as part of a criminal investigation, the person doing so cannot then be criminally charged for such action.

But the judge also emphasized an important requirement for the defense: the person authorizing the action must have the authority to do so.  As Judge Easterbrook pointed out, a Secret Service agent can authorize someone to pass counterfeit bills, but (choosing a seemingly random example) a high school principal, in spite of being a government employee, would have no authority over who is qualified to vote.

He continued that in Ms. Keathley’s case, while Department of Motor Vehicle officials lack the authority to specifically register non-citizens to vote, they are authorized to register people for federal elections.  In the words of Judge Easterbrook, “The power to register someone supposes some authority to ascertain whether legal qualifications have been met,” meaning that such officials “thus are entitled to speak for the government” on the subject of eligibility to vote.3

The Seventh Circuit remanded the matter, advising that “If the IJ does credit Keathley’s statements about what occurred, the Department of Homeland Security should give serious consideration to withdrawing its proposal that she be declared inadmissible and be removed from the United States. A person who behaves with scrupulous honesty only to be misled by a state official should be as welcome in this country in 2012 as she was when she entered in 2004.”4

On remand, Immigration Judge Craig Zerbe determined that the charge of removability was not sustained in light of the Seventh Circuit’s decision; Ms. Keathley’s application for adjustment of status was thus granted.  As those who saw the movie or play know, she has since become a U.S. citizen.

I hold Richard Hanus in the highest regard, and find his arguments in litigating this case to be brilliant.  I’ve also wondered if his argument might have broader applications.

With that thought in mind, I have heard of a disturbing position being taken by DHS in response to the increasing number of states legalizing marijuana, which presently remains a controlled substance under federal law.

The issue is that a noncitizen seeking to adjust their status to that of a lawful permanent resident must demonstrate that they are not inadmissible to the U.S.  (It was in this same posture that Ms. Keathley was also found inadmissible at her adjustment of status interview).   But section 212(a)(2)(C)(i) of the Act makes inadmissible not only any noncitizen who “is or has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance,” but also one who “is or has been a knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in any such controlled or listed substance…or endeavored to do so.”

Like the voting provision, this exclusion ground does not require a criminal conviction.  But while whether or not someone voted is a clearcut question, what constitutes aiding, abetting, assisting, or colluding with marijuana-related businesses that are operating legally at the state level is far less obvious.

For example, DHS has taken the position that those providing accounting and payroll services to marijuana-related businesses constitute aiding or assisting with drug trafficking within the meaning of the Act.  It’s not clear how far that theory can be extended.  What about those providing banking services?  Or the landlords renting to such businesses? Or those providing them with phones, electricity, or internet service?  And in at least one case, USCIS has applied the trafficking bar to an individual who maintained video surveillance equipment in a marijuana collective.5

My question is whether the “entrapment by estoppel” defense successfully raised in Keathley could also apply to someone such as an accountant who performed services typical of their profession for a client who happened to be in the marijuana business, and who is then charged by DHS of aiding or assisting in marijuana trafficking.  I’m posing this and all that follows as thoughts for discussion; they certainly are not an authoritative opinion.  I am curious to hear what readers think.

First, in terms of “official authorization,” legalizing states have set up agencies to closely regulate the marijuana industry. In Colorado, even non-employees providing support services that require them to be unescorted in what the state has termed “limited access areas” within marijuana-related businesses must be issued a license by the state’s Marijuana Enforcement Division.6  Would the application process and  issuance of such authorization by the relevant state agency be sufficient to trigger an entrapment by estoppel defense?

There is a question of whether a state agency can provide authorization that would carry any weight at federal level.  As noted above, the DMV official in Keathley, although working for the state, had the authority to register individuals to vote in federal as well as state elections; in the view of the Seventh Circuit, that authority carried with it an entitlement to speak to issues of eligibility.

I would here point to an August 29, 2013 memo to all U.S. Attorneys from then Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole, titled “Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement.”  Importantly, this memo refers to a “traditional joint federal-state approach to narcotics enforcement,” adding that this approach has been affected by “[t]he enactment of state laws that endeavor to authorize marijuana production, distribution, and possession by establishing a regulatory scheme for these purposes…”

The Cole Memo listed the federal government’s specific enforcement priorities as follows:

  • Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;
  • Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels;
  • Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some form to other states;
  • Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity;
  • Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana;
  • Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use;
  • Preventing the growth of marijuana on public lands and the attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; and
  • Preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property.

The memo continues by stating that outside of the above-listed priorities, “the federal government has traditionally relied on states and local law enforcement agencies to address marijuana activity through enforcement of their own narcotics laws.”

So if the federal government views state governments as partners in a “traditional” joint approach, in which the federal government limits its own enforcement to the above-listed priorities, and leaves the rest to its enforcement partners at the state level, then could someone authorized by the state to engage in activity of the type that the federal government has announced it was ceding to the state to enforce have a valid argument that state permission covered them at the federal level as well?

It also bears noting that subsequent to the Cole Memo, a division of the U.S. Department of Treasury called the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (or “FinCEN” for short) issued guidance “ to clarify Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) expectations for financial institutions seeking to provide services to marijuana-related businesses.”7

It is noteworthy that this federal government guidance does not warn that providing banking or other financial services to MRBs constitutes aiding, assisting, or abetting in the commission of a federal crime.  The guidance does require such institutions to exercise due diligence, and to file suspicious activity reports with FinCEN if it believes activity it observes might violate the federal government’s enforcement priorities.  In doing so, those institutions are actually aiding and assisting the federal government in its enforcement.

So in providing such guidance, is FinCEN “waving through” businesses who provide supporting services to marijuana-related businesses, providing that they adhere to the guidance?  Could the FinCEN guidance be interpreted by non-financial institutions for the premise that it’s OK to provide services to marijuana-related businesses as long as one keeps their eyes open for suspicious activity, and reports all suspect activity to the authorities?

Copyright 2022 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

Notes:

  1. 696 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2012).
  2. Id. at 646.
  3. Id. at 646-47.
  4. Id. at 647.
  5. Voronin v. Garland, No. 2:20-cv-07019-ODW (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2021).  Thanks to Marie Mark at the Immigrant Defense Project for flagging.
  6. 1 Code of Colorado Regulations 212-3 at Section 1-115.
  7. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “BSA Expectations Regarding Marijuana-Related Businesses,” FIN- 2014-G001, Feb. 14, 2014.

AUGUST 16, 2022

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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City.  Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge and Senior Legal Advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals.  He is the founder of the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges, which was awarded AILA’s 2019 Advocacy Award.  Jeffrey is also a past recipient of AILA’s Pro Bono Award.  He sits on the Board of Directors of the Association of Deportation Defense Attorneys, and Central American Legal Assistance.

*******************

The DHS position described by Jeffrey appears to fall on a scale somewhere between “bizarre and incredibly stupid!” But, that doesn’t mean immigrants and their lawyers shouldn’t be concerned and prepared to respond! 

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-26-22

⚔️🛡 HON. “SIR JEFFREY” S. CHASE: TIME FOR A NEW APPROACH TO CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE!👩🏽‍⚖️ WANTED: Practical Scholar/Dynamic Intellectual Leader/Fearless Independent Thinker!  — PLUS, BONUS COVERAGE: MY “MINI-ESSAY” — “Why The Chief Immigration Judge & BIA Chair Must Be ‘Working Judges’ — No More ‘JINOS’ (‘Judges In Name Only’)!”

 

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2022/7/25/correcting-course

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Correcting Course?

On July 21, we were treated to the news that our nation’s immigration courts will no longer be run by a chief judge specifically installed by the prior administration as part of its plan to undermine those courts’ independence and fairness.  The fact that this development took a year and a half to occur, evoked surprise, and was met with  accusations of wrongdoing and threats to investigate from conservative corners that read as parody says a lot about the present state of those courts.

The Chief Immigration Judge should be in charge of the hiring and training of judges, and in setting policy for the courts.  The holder of that title is the person most  responsible for creating the environment in which the Immigration Courts function.  Unfortunately, the choice to fill this position has too often been an afterthought.  And the Trump Administration succeeded in stripping the office of pretty much all authority; one of its appointees was effectively reduced to internally disclaiming “it wasn’t my decision” in response to every controversial directive issued from his office.

It is therefore extremely important for the Biden Administration to give much thought to its next appointee, and in doing so, clearly define what the position is meant to be.  And although that appointee serves at the will of the Attorney General, Merrick Garland, formerly a distinguished circuit court judge, is particularly qualified to understand the need for a  strongly independent Chief Immigration Judge willing to push back against threats to due process. He should thus afford his choice for the position the authority to do just that.  Because when courts fulfill their proper function of providing a fair reading of the law and  protecting against government error and overreach, we all benefit.

It is important to note that no Chief Immigration Judge has been chosen from the ranks of immigration law scholars.  I think this is partly because unlike their counterparts at the B.I.A., the Chief Immigration Judge is not actively involved in deciding cases; theirs is an administrative job.  However, it is high time for that view to change. Now would be an ideal opportunity to appoint someone to the position who knows the law at least as well as the judges they will oversee.

Among other reasons, that degree of knowledge is necessary to allow a chief judge to differentiate between legitimate actions taken by judges based on their good faith interpretations of the law, and alternatively false justifications disguised as legal reasoning offered by those whose real goal is to carry out a particular agenda.  The ability to clearly articulate the difference is needed to protect the former, eliminate the latter, and rebut the inevitable claims of political motivation in response to such actions.

As a brief recap, under the Trump Administration, we saw plenty of examples of improper political motive.  For instance, the Immigration Courts issued not one but two broadsheets of anti-immigrant propaganda unironically titled “Myths vs. Facts” (in spite of being devoid of the latter).   In addition, a highly respected Immigration Judge  was wrongly chastised for correctly doing his job because his concern for the due process of the non-citizen was not shared by the then powers that be. As if that wasn’t bad enough, the judicial equivalent of a “hit man” was dispatched from D.C. to Philadelphia for the sole purpose of entering an order of deportation in that case, due process concerns be damned.  The entire exercise was clearly intended as a message to other judges of the consequences of acting as anything other than a rubber stamp.

When in spite of such warnings, many Immigration Judges continued to grant asylum claims because the correct application of the law required it, the Trump Administration hired new and unqualified judges who would place loyalty to its nativist agenda above all.  One of those hires had actually written a shockingly insulting article only months before his appointment, labeling as “rebels without a clue” all of his soon-to-be colleagues who had issued scholarly, well-reasoned opinions granting asylum to female victims of domestic violence.  The author demonstrated what should have been a disqualifying lack of knowledge in broadly characterizing all such claims as falling outside the scope of our asylum laws, and in further accusing more learned judges who concluded otherwise of “grossly exceeding their authority” and engaging in a “gross violation of legal ethics.”

What was needed then was a Chief Immigration Judge willing to say “over my dead body” to these hirings and other abusive actions.  It is greatly hoped that the next chief judge will possess both the integrity and authority to do just that, with the knowledge that higher-ups within the agency will stand behind their decisions.

And since we won’t always have a former Circuit Court judge serving as Attorney General, it might be worthwhile while we do to ask for regulations (or at least some form of guidance from above) clarifying what will henceforth be expected of those filling the position, and calling on all personnel within the Department of Justice to encourage and support the independence of their colleagues charged with carrying out judicial functions.

Copyright 2022 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

JULY 25, 2022

Reprinted by permission.

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Very timely and “spot on,” Sir Jeffrey! 

Why The Chief Immigration Judge & BIA Chair Must Be “Working Judges” — No More “JINOS” (“Judges In Name Only”)!

By Paul Wickham Schmidt

July 26, 2022

Time (actually “long past time”) for dynamic change! As Chief IJ, we need an “intellectual powerhouse” who is a nationally recognized expert in immigration, human rights, constitutional law, equal justice, racial justice, and an acknowledged, widely-respected intellectual leader with the guts and the “juice” to stand up to bureaucratic meddling and political interference. That’s in addition to having a “big picture” outlook and some actual experience in legal administration.

One additional key change I would make: The Chief Immigration Judge should also function as a “working judge” hearing and deciding at least some cases on a regular basis! There is no substitute for “actual time on the bench” for understanding the Immigration Judge’s proper role. 

It puts the CJ in touch with both the DHS Counsel and the private bar on a regular basis. It also exposes BS and nonsense that’s going on in the Immigration Court system. A huge difference exists between “policy and procedural memos issued in a vacuum” from “on high” and actually having to apply them on a daily basis.

Indeed, a “sitting Chief Judge” wouldn’t have to “study” or ask for “reports” on the problems; she would know first-hand what they are from actual experience. Also, the CJ must get out in person and see what’s happening in the various courts, rather than taking an occasional “official tour” where everything tends to be a “sanitized show & tell.” An engaged Chief Judge could be “proactive rather than reactive.”

Surprising what you can find out by actually getting out of the “Executive Suites” in the Skyline Tower in Falls Church and poking around the “retail level” of the system you are administering! There is no better way of doing that than actually taking the bench and dispensing some justice!

How do I know? Well, during my six-year stint as BIA Chair (1995-2001) I was a “working appellate judge” in addition to be an engaged administrator of a dynamically growing and changing organization. I also served as a Senior Executive at EOIR and was never reticent about expressing my views on overall agency management and EOIR’s sometimes stormy relationship with other parts of the DOJ. At one point, I had the unenviable task, along with the then General Counsel of EOIR, of “barring” the then-Director from attending an en banc conference at which cases were to be discussed. 

Upon appointment, from private practice, I was one of only four “permanent” appellate judges then on the BIA. By the time I stepped down in 2001, there were more than 20 appellate judges, the staff had more than doubled, a new management structure was in place, a Clerk’s Office had been created, the Virtual Law Library established, precedents were written and formatted differently, and numerous other changes had been made. Sadly, many of the positives have been erased over the past two decades through a combination of political meddling from DOJ and subservient “management” at EOIR.

I also sat and voted on nearly every one of the more than 200 precedent decisions issued during my tenure. I authored some of them, including the landmark decision Matter of Kasinga, recognizing female genital mutation (“FGM”) as persecution for the first time. 

Additionally, I sat on three-member panels, sometimes as a “regular,” other times filling in for those who were out of the office. I took panels “on the road” to hear oral arguments across the U.S. (something now “prohibited” by the mindless “Ashcroft reforms” that accompanied his “purge” of the BIA in ‘02-03”) and to meet with the local judges, bar, and INS Counsel. It was “due process in action” — a real-life, open, accessible demonstration of how “collegial justice” should work! It put a much-needed and now totally absent “human face” on appellate justice. As those who practiced before the BIA at that time can testify, my “unmistakable signature” was on thousands of non-precedent decisions.

I also made regular unannounced visits to the BIA Attorney Advisers and the newly-established Clerk’s Office to chat about what was on folks’ minds. “Chairman alert” was a commonly heard “warning” throughout the various buildings of the Skyline Center where the BIA was located.

Sure, I didn’t get everything right, and there were some problems I couldn’t solve. But, I was always “on top” of what was happening — both legally and “operationally” — at the BIA. I didn’t have to spend lots of time asking for reports from the staff, because I knew from experience what the problems were and whether the solutions we were attempting were working or not.

Yes, my decision to actively participate in adjudication and aggressively advance my legal views put me in constant conflict with many of my more conservative judicial colleagues at the BIA. As the record shows, I got “outvoted” on a regular basis at both en banc and on panels. But, so what! That’s what being a “real judge” and having real views on justice, based on many years of experience in and out of Government, is all about!  

An unanticipated benefit: My “hands on” judicial experience was good preparation for the somewhat unexpected “next phase” of my career — when Ashcroft “exiled” me to the Arlington Immigration Court in 2003. I’ll acknowledge that there were some things about being a trial judge that couldn’t be learned from reading transcripts, writing appellate decisions, and occasionally observing hearings in person. 

In another life, at the “Legacy INS,” I had basically “created and implemented” the “modern Chief Counsel system” now in use at DHS — over some vigorous “internal opposition” to change and centralized legal control. That system provided independence from the “clients” in district office operations. Then, I basically had to face that creation in court every day for 13 years! 

But, I certainly had a good idea of what I was getting into and was able to “hit the ground running” in terms of the substance of immigration law, the “big issues,” and what good trial decisions should be and look like in writing. Indeed, my “former colleagues” on the BIA sometimes mischaracterized my “oral decisions” as “written decisions” because I used the “familiar BIA written format” and constructed them as what I found the “ideal decision” to be for appellate review during my BIA tenure. 

Interestingly, I found that as an Immigration Judge the more humane and realistic view of the law that had been an anathema to the majority of my BIA colleagues — and which helped me and my so-called “liberal” colleagues get the boot from Ashcroft and Kobach — was often accepted by both parties at the trial level. Even when appeals were taken, I did much better with my former colleagues as an IJ than I did as Chair. And, I certainly learned first-hand how deeply screwed up EOIR was and how misguided the BIA majority was on many of their precedents. That, in turn, prepared me to become an advocate for radical due process reforms at EOIR upon retirement.

It’s surprising what an administrator can learn if he or she actually “does” some of the “line work” they are administering. We need a functioning, substantively-engaged, well-informed, “real judge” for Chief IJ, not another “JINO!”

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

07-26-22

 

CIMT: PRACTICAL SCHOLAR “SIR JEFFREY” CHASE ⚔️🛡 EXPLAINS HOW A “SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL TANK” FROM 71 YEARS AGO CONTINUES TO SCREW 🔩 IMMIGRANTS!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2022/3/4/the-elusive-concept-of-moral-turpitude

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The Elusive Concept of Moral Turpitude

I’ve never understood crimes involving moral turpitude.  I confess this after reading a recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that caused me to realize that I am not alone.

In Zarate v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,1 the court was confronted with the question of whether a federal conviction for “falsely representing a social security number” constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude under our immigration laws. Not surprisingly, the Board of Immigration Appeals held that it was.  And yet, one of the most conservative circuit courts in the country chose not to defer to the Board’s judgment.

Reading the decision, it became clear that no one knows what a CIMT is.  As the court pointed out, the term was first included in our immigration laws in the late 19th century.  That fact immediately brought to mind the character of Lady Bracknell from The Importance of Being Earnest (first performed in 1895), who, upon learning that a character had been found as a baby in a satchel at a train station, responded: “To be born, or at any rate bred, in a handbag, whether it has handles or not, seems to me to display a contempt for the ordinary decencies of family life that reminds one of the worst excesses of the French Revolution.  And I presume you know what that unfortunate movement led to?”  If that snippet is any indicator, it seems to have been quite the era for the passing of moral judgment.

The Eleventh Circuit went on to explain that by 1914, a legal dictionary defined the term to mean “an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which one owes to society, and as applied to offenses includes only such crimes as manifest personal depravity or baseness.”  This standard becomes all the more elusive when one asks the obvious follow-up question “In whose view?”  Lady Bracknell’s?  Vladimir Putin’s?  Or someone occupying an indeterminate middle point between those extremes?

It seems pretty obvious in reading the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion that the term “crime involving moral turpitude” is unconstitutionally vague.  It’s nearly impossible to argue that the term provides sufficient clarity up front of the consequences of committing certain crimes when, as the Eleventh Circuit emphasized, no less an authority than former circuit judge Richard Posner remarked “to the extent that definitions of the term exist, ‘[i]t’s difficult to make sense of . . . [them].’”2

However, there is one huge obstacle preventing courts from simply brushing the term aside: in 1951, the Supreme Court nixed that idea in a case called Jordan v. De George.3   In its decision, the majority of the Court’s justices held that the term “conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.”  Of course, the Court provided no workable definition (if it had, courts today wouldn’t still be exhibiting so much confusion).  But the majority did make one highly consequential pronouncement to support its shaky conclusion, claiming “The phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent conduct.”

Jordan v. De George also contains a remarkable dissenting opinion written by Justice Robert H. Jackson, and joined by two of his colleagues (Justices Black and Frankfurter).

Interestingly, prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Jackson briefly served as Attorney General under Franklin D. Roosevelt.  And readers of Prof. Alison Peck’s excellent book on the history of the U.S. Immigration Court will know that as Attorney General, Jackson tried to dissuade Roosevelt from moving the INS to the Department of Justice due to the harsh consequences it would impose on immigrants, a move that Roosevelt nevertheless undertook in May 1940.4

Sitting on the high court 11 years later, Justice Jackson expressed his frustration with a majority opinion that would punish the petitioner (who had resided in the U.S. for 30 years) “with a life sentence of banishment” because he was a noncitizen.  Justice Jackson pointed out that Congress had been forewarned by one of its own at a House hearing on the Immigration Act of 1917 that the term would cause great confusion, yet provided no additional clarifying language in enacting the statute.5

In the record of the same House hearing, Jackson found reason to believe that Congress meant the term to apply to “only crimes of violence,” quoting language to that effect from a witness, NYC Police Commissioner Arthur H. Woods, whose testimony (according to Jackson) “appears to have been most influential” on the subject.6

After further demonstrating the futility of finding any clear meaning for the term, Jackson stated in his dissent that the majority “seems no more convinced than are we by the Government’s attempts to reduce these nebulous abstractions to a concrete working rule, but to sustain this particular deportation it improvises another which fails to convince us…”7

In Jackson’s view, the elusiveness of the term left whether a conviction was for a CIMT or not to the view of the particular judge deciding the matter.  He added  “How many [noncitizens] have been deported who would not have been had some other judge heard their cases, and vice versa, we may only guess. That is not government by law.”8

Turning to the specific crime before him, which involved the failure to pay federal tax on bootlegged liquor, Jackson noted that those who deplore trafficking in liquor “regard it as much an exhibition of moral turpitude for the Government to share its revenues as for respondents to withhold them.”  On the flip side, Jackson wryly observed that “Those others who enjoy the traffic are not notable for scruples as to whether liquor has a law-abiding pedigree.”9  Just for good measure, the justice added: “I have never discovered that disregard of the Nation’s liquor taxes excluded a citizen from our best society…”10

Given the term’s requirement of passing moral judgment on criminal acts, Jackson emphasized (perhaps most importantly) that “We should not forget that criminality is one thing— a matter of law—and that morality, ethics and religious teachings are another.”11

In spite of the wisdom (and wit) of Jackson’s dissent, here we are over 70 years later, with the 11th Circuit left to deal with De George in reviewing the case of someone who falsely used a Social Security number.  In Zarate, counsel explained at oral argument that the reasons for his client’s action was to work and support his family, and to have medical coverage to pay for his son’s surgery.12  Counsel also argued that the crime lacked the level of immorality required for a CIMT finding, explaining that those using a false number still pay the required amount of Social Security withholding to the government, and yet are not eligible to receive Social Security benefits themselves in return unless they first obtain lawful immigration status.

The Eleventh Circuit issued a thoughtful opinion.  The court understood that it was bound by De George’s view that fraud always involves moral turpitude, a stance repeatedly reinforced by courts since.  But the court noted that “under the categorical approach the crime Mr. Zarate committed does not include fraud as an element or ingredient.”

Surveying BIA decisions on the topic all the way back to 1943, it found that over the years, the Board has concluded that not all false statements or deception constitute fraud.  The court cited a Second Circuit unpublished opinion distinguishing between deception and fraud, as the latter generally requires “an intent to obtain some benefit or cause a detriment.”13  And the court referenced the Seventh Circuit’s observation that the statute in question covers false use of a Social Security number not only to obtain a benefit, but also “for any other purpose.”  That court added “It is not difficult to imagine some purposes for which falsely using a social security number would not be “inherently base, vile, or depraved.”14

In the end, the Eleventh Circuit sent the matter back to the BIA to consider whether under the categorical approach, any and all conduct covered by the statute would involve behavior that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.”  The court’s decision certainly provided the Board a path to conclude otherwise.

I of course have no insight into how the Board will rule on remand.  However, it seems worth adding some observations on the BIA’s problematic approach to CIMT determinations in recent years.

First, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the importance of the categorical approach in reaching the proper outcome.15  However, Kansas attorney Matthew Hoppock obtained through FOIA the PowerPoint of a presentation from the 2018 EOIR Immigration Judges training conference titled “Avoiding the Use or Mitigating the Effect of the Categorical Approach,” which was presented by a (since retired) Board Member, Roger Pauley.16  By virtue of binding Supreme Court case law, judges are required to apply the categorical approach.  So why is the BIA, a supposedly neutral tribunal, training EOIR’s judges to find ways around employing this approach, or to try to reduce its impact?

This concern was further confirmed in an excellent 2019 article by Prof. Jennifer Lee Koh detailing how the BIA has repeatedly fudged its application of the categorical approach in CIMT cases.17  Prof. Koh concluded that the BIA’s approach has involved “The Board’s designation of itself as an arbiter of moral standards in the U.S., its unwritten imposition of a “maximum conduct” test that is at odds with the categorical approach’s “minimum conduct” requirement, and its treatment of criminalization as evidence of moral turpitude” which, not surprisingly, has resulted in BIA precedents expanding the number of offenses judged to be CIMTs.18

Even where the rule is applied correctly, another major problem remains.  As Justice Jackson correctly stated, criminality is one thing, moral judgment quite another.  And while immigration judges are expected to be experts in the law, they are not the standard bearers for what society views as base or vile.

This returns us to a question asked earlier: if not the judge, then who should be arbiter of moral standards?  At the conclusion of its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit cited to a law review article by Prof. Julia Simon-Kerr which criticized how courts have “ ignored community moral sentiments when applying the standard.”19  The article’s author observed that instead of keeping the standard “up to date with the ever-evolving and often-contested morals of a pluralistic society,” courts have to the contrary “preserved, but not transformed, the set of morally framed norms of the early nineteenth century that first shaped its application.”20  In other words, it seems present-day judges too often continue to channel Lady Bracknell, rather than trying to gauge the moral sensibilities of their particular time and place.

If courts were to truly adapt to evolving societal standards, should decisions such as De George remain binding?  Or should they be deemed to have provided guidance based on the morals of their time, subject to current reassessment?

Copyright 2022 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

Notes:

  1. No. 20-11654 (11th Cir. Feb. 18, 2022) (Published).
  2. Quoting Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 831 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring).
  3. 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
  4. Alison Peck, The Accidental History of the U.S. Immigration Courts: War, Fear, and the Roots of Dysfunction (University of California Press, 2021) at p. 97.
  5. The warning was provided by Adolph J. Sabath, who served in the House from 1907 to 1952, was an immigrant himself, and is described in his Wikipedia page as “a leading opponent of immigration restrictions and prohibition.”
  6. Jordan v. De George, supra at 235.
  7. Id. at 238.
  8. Id. at 239-40.
  9. Id. at 241.
  10. Id.
  11. Id.
  12. Petitioner was represented by Fairfax, VA attorney Arnedo Silvano Valera.
  13. Ahmed v. Holder, 324 F.App’x 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2009).
  14. Arias v. Lynch, supra at 826.
  15. Judge Gerald Tjoflat even authored a concurring opinion tutoring the BIA to properly conclude that the statute is not divisible, ensuring the application of the categorical approach on remand.
  16. The materials can be found at: https://www.aila.org/infonet/eoir-crimes-bond.
  17. Jennifer Lee Koh, “Crimmigration Beyond the Headlines,” 71 Stan. L. Rev. Online 267, 272 (2019).
  18. Id. at 273.
  19. Julia Simon-Kerr, “Moral Turpitude,” 2012 Utah L. Rev. 1001, 1007-08 (2012).
  20. Id.

MARCH 4, 2022

Reprinted by permission.

****************** 

“Brilliant,” as our friend and colleague Dan Kowalski says!

There is another way in which the Supremes’ prior constitutional abdication continues to pervert the constitutional guarantee of due process today.

As Jeffrey cogently points out NOBODY — Congress, the Article IIIs, the BIA, Immigration Judges, certainly not respondents  — REALLY understands what “moral turpitude” means. Consequently, the only way to properly adjudicate cases involving that issue is through an exhaustive search and parsing of Circuit law, BIA precedents, and often state court decisions. 

The problem: No unrepresented immigrant — particularly one in detention where a disproportionate share of these cases are heard — has any realistic chance of performing such intricate, arcane research into all too often conflicting and confusing sources. 

Therefore, in addition to the problem that originated in DeGeorge when the Supremes’ majority failed to strike down a clearly unconstitutional statute, the failure to provide a right to appointed counsel in such cases — many involving long-time lawful permanent residents of the U.S. — is a gross violation of due process. It basically adds insult to injury!

As long as migrants continue to be intentionally wrongly treated as “lesser persons” or “not persons at all” by the Supremes and other authorities under the Due Process Clause — a process known as “Dred Scottification” — there will be no equal justice under law in America!   

Better, more courageous, practical, and scholarly, Federal Judges — from the Supremes down to the Immigration Courts — won’t solve all of America’s problems. But, it certainly would be an essential start!

For more on the 5th Circuit’s decision in  Zarate, see https://immigrationcourtside.com/2022/02/19/😎👍🏼⚖%EF%B8%8Farlington-practitioner-arnedo-s-velera-beats-eoir-oil-11th-cir-outs-another-sloppy-analysis-by-garlands-bi/

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

03-04-22

🗽⚖️HON. JEFFREY CHASE: GARLAND BIA’S “DOUBLE STANDARD” — “STRICT COMPLIANCE” FOR RESPONDENTS, “GOOD ENOUGH FOR GOVERNMENT WORK” FOR DHS & DOJ — MORE “MILLER LITE” THAN DUE PROCESS! — “Somehow, the Board chose to ignore this clear and obvious reading twice affirmed by the highest court in the land.” — Matter of LAPARRA Analyzed & Excoriated! — As Garland’s Failures @ DOJ Mount, Why Aren’t More Folks Demanding Change?

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2022/1/31/stuck-on-repeat

JEFFREY S. CHASE | OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW

Blog Archive Press and Interviews Calendar Contact

Stuck on Repeat

The first three lessons learned from the BIA’s recent decision in Matter of Laparra1 are: (1) the Board knows only one tune; (2) that tune is the “Falls Church Two-Step,” and (3) the tune does not improve with repeated listening.

As background, Congress in 1996 passed a statute creating a document called a Notice to Appear, or “NTA” for short, which is used to commence removal proceedings before the Immigration Court.  Congress defined an NTA to require that it include the time and place of the first hearing; the document is, after all, called a “notice to appear.”

However, for many years, the Department of Homeland Security cut a corner by leaving that crucial information out of hundreds of thousands of NTAs.  The courts (which are not part of DHS, the entity issuing the NTA) would later send a different document telling the person when and where to appear.  That second document might be sent weeks, months, or even years later.

As an aside, in other areas of immigration law, EOIR has applied a literal approach to interpreting statutory terms.  An unfortunate example is found in the asylum context, where the BIA felt a strong need to add “particularity” and “social distinction” requirements for particular social group recognition, creating significant obstacles for asylum seekers.  Yet the government’s defense of those terms has been based on the argument that every word in the term “particular social group” must be accorded a very literal meaning.

However, when it comes to the term “Notice to Appear,” the Board inexplicably doesn’t seem to think meaning should matter.  According to the online version of the Cambridge English Dictionary, “notice” is defined as “(a board, piece of paper, etc. containing) information or instructions.”  A “Notice to Appear” would therefore be a piece of paper containing information or instructions about when and where to appear.  However, that is exactly the information or instructions that DHS saw fit to leave out of this particular document.  The BIA nevertheless long stood firm in its conviction that a document which provides as much  information or instruction about an upcoming hearing as a take-out menu from L&B Spumoni Gardens meets the legal definition of a “Notice to Appear.”

Not surprisingly, this government shortcut was successfully challenged by noncitizens wishing to seek a path to legal status in this country called cancellation of removal.  One can’t apply for cancellation of removal unless they’ve been present in the U.S. for ten years,2 but  once one is served with a Notice to Appear, the accrual of time towards that ten years stops.3  So whether or not what ICE was handing out met the definition of an NTA would determine whether hundreds of thousands of people would be eligible to apply for legal status.  In a case called Pereira v. Sessions,4 the Supreme Court resoundingly held that an NTA without the time and place of hearing was not an NTA, and therefore did not stop the noncitizen from accruing time to reach the 10 years of presence necessary to apply for cancellation of removal.

The BIA’s response was to issue a precedent decision, Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez,5 in which it held that in spite of the Supreme Court’s clear view to the contrary, the combination of the non-NTA and a later-sent document that is also not an NTA containing the missing information together form a valid NTA, which stops the noncitizen from continuing to accrue time towards the ten years.

The matter again reached the Supreme Court, where, at oral argument, Justice Gorsuch referred to the case as “Pereira groundhog day,” and actually asked counsel for the government why it was pursuing the case in light of the Court’s 8-1 decision in Pereira.6  In its 2021 decision in that case, Niz-Chavez v. Garland,7 the Court held that an NTA must be a single document containing all of the required information, and that the two-step method endorsed by the Board does not constitute one valid NTA, and thus will not stop the accrual of time.

Although Pereira and Niz-Chavez involved what is known as the “stop-time rule” described above, the question of proper service of an NTA also arises in other contexts.  For those who missed their initial removal hearing and were ordered removed as a result, the Supreme Court decisions seemed to offer a new opportunity.

The reason is because the statute provides for in absentia removal orders only where the noncitizen failed to appear for their hearing “after written notice required under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a) of this title has been provided” to the noncitizen or their lawyer.8  Section 1229(a) is the section of the law that lists the requirements for an NTA to actually be an NTA; it was the specific section interpreted by the Supreme Court in Pereira and Niz-Chavez.  Pursuant to those decisions, no one who was issued an NTA lacking a time and place of hearing received proper notice under section 1229(a) of the Act, which specifically requires that the time and place information be provided in a single document.  Where notice was not proper, the law allows the filing of a motion to rescind an in absentia order, and further permits the motion to be filed at any time.9

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed this issue of proper notice in a published decision issued in September, Rodriguez v. Garland.10  The decision cited the Supreme Court’s holding in Niz-Chavez, and determined that a single document containing all of the required information (including the time and place) is required in the in absentia context as well.  The Fifth Circuit made clear that where the NTA did not contain the time and place, it could not be cured by the mailing of a subsequent notice for in absentia purposes.

Anyone unable to guess the BIA’s response has not been paying attention.  The BIA issued Matter of Laparra in order to say that the recipient of an in absentia removal order did in fact receive proper notice pursuant to section 1229(a) even if their NTA lacked a time and place of hearing, as long as the court subsequently sent an entirely different paper days, months, or years later containing the missing information.

How did the BIA believe it could reach this same conclusion yet again in spite of the Supreme Court decisions to the contrary?  Please try to follow along as we review the Board’s explanation.

First, the Board emphasized that the statute governing in absentia orders (8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5)(A)) states that such order may be entered “after written notice required under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 239(a) has been provided.”  The Board emphasized the words “written notice,” which it distinguished from “a written notice,” which the Supreme Court interpreted to indicate a single document.11  The Board’s position seems to be seriously undermined by the fact that “written notice under paragraphs (1) or (2) of section 239(a)” is subsequently referred to twice more in the same section of the law as “the written notice.”

The Board employed a novel approach here.  It dropped a footnote in which it admitted to the two subsequent mentions of “the written notice.”  But the Board then said that it reads those two subsequent uses of “the” as simply referring back to the initial “written notice” (without the definite article).12  And apparently, because they are referring to the first mention of “written notice,” the definite article “the” can just be ignored in those other two usages.  Why is that?  To explain, the Board cited a Supreme Court decision in a non-immigration case decided in 2015, Yates v. U.S.13

Yates involved a fisherman apprehended at sea with a catch containing a large number of undersized fish.  However, by the time the ship reached shore, only fish of legal size remained on board.  After a long delay, Yates was charged and convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, prohibiting tampering with a “tangible object” in order to impede a federal investigation.

Fish would meet the dictionary definition of “tangible objects.”  However, in a decision authored by the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Supreme Court employed a canon of statutory interpretation called noscitur a sociis, under which aid in determining a term’s meaning can derive from the meaning of surrounding terms used in the same section of law.14  As the term “tangible object” in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 is preceded by “makes a false entry in any record, document…,” the Court determined that “tangible object” was meant to refer to items containing records or documents.  So tampering with an external hard drive would be covered by the statute; tampering with a fish would not.

This approach has been employed by the BIA (using the closely-related concept of ejusdem generis) in its 1985 decision in Matter of Acosta15  to determine that the term “particular social group” should be defined by an immutable characteristic, the same common denominator found in the surrounding terms of race, religion, nationality, and political opinion.  It bears noting that what the Board did in Laparra bears no similarity to the manner in which the canon was applied in either the Board’s earlier usage in Acosta or by the Supreme Court in Yates.  In Laparra, there was no comparison to the meaning of surrounding terms; instead, the Board seemed to make a random decision to ignore two usages of the definite article.  The only similarity I can see to Yates is that what the Board did seems fishy.

However, even if we do as the Board would like and look only at the first usage of “written notice” contained in section 1229(a)(1), there is still a fatal flaw in the remainder of the Board’s argument.  As noted above, the statute in that first usage requires not just any written notice, but specifically, written notice under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a), i.e., the section titled “Notice to appear.”  Paragraph (1) of that section begins: “In removal proceedings under section 1229a of this title, written notice (in this section referred to as a “notice to appear”)…”  A notice to appear!  Paragraph (1) thus clearly refers to a single document, which as the Supreme Court has now told us twice, must contain the time and place of hearing.

Paragraph (2) of that same section says that “in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings,” then a written notice shall be provided specifying the new time and place of the proceeding, and the consequences of a failure to appear.

The meaning of paragraph (2) was by no means a matter of first impression for the Board to interpret in Laparra as it saw fit.  In its decision in Pereira, the Supreme Court said:

If anything, paragraph (2) of § 1229(a) actually bolsters the Court’s interpretation of the statute. Paragraph (2) provides that, “in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of [removal] proceedings,” the Government shall give the noncitizen “written notice . . . specifying . . . the new time or place of the proceedings.” § 1229(a)(2)(A)(i). By allowing for a “change or postponement” of the proceedings to a “new time or place,” paragraph (2) presumes that the Government has already served a “notice to appear under section 1229(a)” that specified a time and place as required by § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Otherwise, there would be no time or place to “change or postpon[e].”16

We know that the BIA is well aware of this; the above language from Pereira was specifically quoted in the six-judge dissenting opinion in Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez, under the heading “Plain Language.”17

Also, in its later decision in Niz-Chavez, the Court stated that “the government could have responded to Pereira by issuing notices to appear with all the information §1229(a)(1) requires—and then amending the time or place information if circumstances required it.  After all, in the very next statutory subsection, §1229(a)(2), Congress expressly contemplated that possibility.”18

Thus, the Supreme Court left no doubt in its two decisions that paragraph (2) involves a change in the time and place of hearing that was previously included in the NTA, as the statute requires.  Paragraph (2) in no way, shape, or form allows ICE to serve the noncitizen with the L&B Spumoni Gardens menu and then have the immigration court send a second paper that provides a time and place for the first time.

Somehow, the Board chose to ignore this clear and obvious reading twice affirmed by the highest court in the land.  Instead, it focused on only one word – the “or” in “paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).”19  The Board then pretended (can we find a more appropriate word than this?) not only that the “or” somehow allowed paragraph (2) to be read as if paragraph (1) didn’t exist, but also as if the words “any change or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings” could somehow be read as “change or postponement?  What a poor choice of words!  What we really meant to say was, ‘the absolutely very first time and place ever set.’  Wasn’t that obvious?  We feel so foolish.  Please just interpret this any way you see fit.”

The Board did acknowledge the Fifth Circuit’s contrary view in Rodriguez, but attributed it to that court’s failure to focus on the “paragraph (1) or (2)” language.20  Apparently, in the Board’s view, had the Fifth Circuit also focused on that word “or,” it would have reached the same twisted conclusion as the Board.  Perhaps realizing how unrealistic this might seem, the Board quickly pointed out that “[i]n any event, Rodriguez does not apply here because this case arises in the First Circuit.”21

Speaking of other circuits, it bears noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently stated for the second time in a published decision that the BIA’s analysis was “more akin to the argument of an advocate than the impartial analysis of a quasi-judicial agency.”21  I believe that the same can be said of the Board’s decision in Laparra.  It will be interesting to see if this issue reaches the Supreme Court for a third time.  If so, one should wonder why the Board might expect a different result.

Notes:

  1.  28 I&N Dec. 425 (BIA Jan. 18, 2022).
  2. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A).
  3. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1), often referred to as the “stop-time rule.”
  4. 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018).
  5. 27 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2019) (en banc).
  6. Transcript of Supreme Court Oral Argument in Niz-Chavez, https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2020/19-863_k5gm.pdf, at pp. 25-26, 63-64.
  7. 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021).
  8. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A).
  9. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
  10. 15 F.4th 351 (5th Cir. 2021).
  11. Matter of Laparra, supra at 431.
  12. Id. at 431-32, n.6.
  13. 574 U.S. 528 (2015).
  14. Id. at 543.
  15. 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233-34 (BIA 1985).
  16. Pereira v. Sessions, supra at 2114.
  17. Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez, supra at 538.
  18. To be clear, the government is capable of providing all required information in a single NTA.  EOIR had provided DHS access to schedule Master Calendar hearings through the agency’s Interactive Scheduling System (ISS), which was employed between those agencies until May 2014.  And in a memo issued shortly after the Supreme Court’s Pereira decision, then EOIR Director James McHenry stated that EOIR had begun providing hearing dates to DHS in detailed cases, and was working to again provide it access to ISS for scheduling non-detained cases.
  19. Matter of Laparra, supra at 430.
  20. Id. at 436: “The court reasoned that section 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) requires ‘notice’ under ‘section 239(a),’ which Niz-Chavez held must be a single document in the form of a notice to appear. However, the court based this reasoning on a recitation of section 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) that omitted the disjunctive phrase ‘paragraph (1) or (2)’ from the statute and relied solely on a reference to ‘section 239(a).’”
  21. Id.
  22. Nsimba v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., No. 20-3565, ___ F.4th ___ (3d Cir. Dec. 22, 2021) (slip. op. at 10).

Copyright 2022 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

Republished by permission.

*************************

As Jeffrey points out, the legal and practical problems with notice at EOIR and DHS are chronic, well-documented, and consequential! Yet, given a golden opportunity to make a new start while complying with due process and establishing “best practices” Garland has miserably failed!

Instead of appointing a BIA consisting of “practical scholar expert judges” and competent, professional judicial administrators to clean up this awful mess it’s “same old, same old” under Garland’s poor leadership. Indeed, not only has Garland chosen to retain the very folks who created and aggravated the notice problems, he has actually made it worse! How many times do I have to say it: EOIR is supposed to be a “court of law,” not a highly bureaucratic, “headquarters bloated,”  “agency” modeled on and “operating” (a term I use lightly with EOIR) like the very worst aspects of the “Legacy INS.” For Pete’s sake, even DHS has done a somewhat better job of automating files than EOIR!

As recently exposed by Tal Kopan in the SF Chronicle, under Garland’s new wave of  “Aimless Docket Reshuffling,” and “mindless deterrence gimmicks” EOIR has unconscionably created entire dockets made up of probable “defective notice cases” to “gin up” illegal, bogus “in absentia” removal orders! https://immigrationcourtside.com/2022/01/20/tal-kopan-sf-chron-no-due-process-here%e2%98%b9%ef%b8%8f-garlands-despicable-star-chambers-cheered-engineered-in-absentia-deportation-orders/

Tal Kopan
Tal Kopan
Washington Reporter, SF Chronicle. She exposes Garland’s mismanagement of EOIR!

At best, these bogus orders require burdensome motions to reopen, rescheduling, and “restarts” that unnecessarily build backlog. They also generate more bogus statistics and false narratives, more endemic problems at EOIR that Garland has ignored or aggravated.

At worst, improper in absentia orders generate improper arrests, detention, and illegal removals of individuals who were clueless about their actual hearing dates!

Having “supervisors and managers” supposedly in charge of operating a fair hearing system engineer and then “cheer” the absence of any hearings at all shows the depths to which EOIR has plunged under Garland’s poor leadership. But, perhaps that shouldn’t surprise us! It comes from an AG who has failed after nearly a year to re-establish a fair hearing system for asylum applicants at the border and who mounts ethically-challenged defenses of Stephen Miller’s complete eradication of asylum at the border based on a bogus, pretextual rationale rejected by almost all migration and public health experts! Why is this acceptable performance from an alleged Democratic Administration?

Judge Merrick Garland
Judge Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney General
Official White House Photo
Public Realm. Appointed by a Democrat, he runs the DOJ largely with Trump holdovers, no accountability, and as if Stephen Miller were still looking over his shoulder. The result corrodes the “retail level” of justice in our Immigration Courts and threatens to de-stabilize our entire legal system!

No wonder Garland is building the already incredible 1.6 million case EOIR backlog at a ”new record” pace! 

The speculation on Biden’s Supreme Court pick is “sucking all the air out of the room.” But, Garland’s disgraceful failure to counter the Trump AGs’ “packing” of the BIA with unsuitable judges and filling EOIR “senior management” with unqualified individuals who lack the requisite expertise and consistently tilt in favor of DHS Enforcement and against Due Process, fundamental fairness, immigrants’ rights, and best practices will have more immediate corrosive effects on racial justice in America and individual human lives than any court in America outside the Supremes! 

And, unlike the Supremes, Garland “owns” all the picks for the “Supreme Court of Immigration!” Rather than standing up for progressive reforms, and giving  new progressive judicial talent a chance to shine, he has chosen to enable and empower regressive forces and to frustrate progressive experts, further undermine the rule of law, and thwart best practices!

I’m not the only observer to recognize Garland’s failure of leadership, accountability, and progressive values at DOJ. See, e.g., Biden must fix riven guardrails of democracy, https://edition.pagesuite.com/popovers/dynamic_article_popover.aspx?guid=3686d1bd-1c2f-402e-afe8-ad86040534f8&v=sdk

Indeed, just this week, Garland’s DOJ put on another stunning display of professional incompetence by botching the plea bargain in the Ahmaud Arbery case so badly that a Federal Judge took the highly unusual step of rejecting it! https://ktar.com/story/4865811/plea-deal-in-hate-crime-case-in-the-killing-of-ahmaud-arbery/

But, even these somewhat “understated” critics of Garland don’t fully grasp the catastrophic consequences for our entire justice system and our democracy of Garland’s unwillingness and/or inability to prioritize the creation of a progressive due-process/equal-justice-oriented judiciary of experts to replace his regressive, oppressive, deadly, and beyond dysfunctional immigration judiciary at DOJ!

As Jeffrey cogently relates, “same old, same old” failed approaches by “holdover judges” doesn’t “cut it!” Sessions and Barr recognized the cosmic importance of the immigration judiciary and the imperative to “weaponize it for evil” and to use their limited time in office to maximize and  further a White Nationalist agenda developed and promoted by Stephen Miller. It’s a pity that Garland has failed to act on the legal and moral imperatives to “mine and realize EOIR’s ‘counter-potential’ for good!”  

That potential was memorialized in the long-forgotten “EOIR vision of yore:” “Through teamwork and innovation, be the world’s best administrative tribunals guaranteeing fairness and due process for all!” Remarkably, that “noble due process vision” was once displayed in bold letters on EOIR’s internal website. Now, folks like Garland are too embarrassed and spineless to even admit that such a goal ever existed.

For my equally critical if less scholarly analysis of the Laparra travesty, see https://immigrationcourtside.com/2022/01/19/garlands-bia-sidesteps-supremes-again-statutorily-defective-notice-is-good-enough-for-in-absentia-deportation-matter-of-laparra/.

Funny how right-leaning supposed “textualists” and “strict constructionists” have difficulty following clear statutory commands when the result might favor the individual while holding the Government accountable for intentionally violating the law. Also, strange how an Administration that got into office in no small measure by promoting its competence and strong commitment to humane values and equal justice for all, particularly racial justice, continues to fail on all counts! Go figure! 

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

02-01-22

🏴‍☠️👎🏽🤮 AIMLESS DOCKET RESHUFFLING (“ADR”) ON STEROIDS! — EOIR Dysfunction Shows What Happens When “Captive Court System” Kowtows To Political Handlers Rather Than Serving The Public! — Jason Dzubow, The Asylumist, Reports!

 

Jason Dzubow
Jason Dzubow
The Asylumist

https://www.asylumist.com/2021/12/01/cancel

-culture-in-immigration-court/

Cancel Culture in Immigration Court

December 1, 2021

For “respondents” (non-citizens in removal proceedings) and their lawyers, Individual Hearings in Immigration Court are a big deal. Evidence must be gathered. Affidavits have to be prepared, checked, and re-checked. Witnesses must be identified, convinced to attend the hearing, and prepared for trial. Respondents practice their testimony. In most cases, the noncitizen has been waiting for many months or years for the trial date. The result of the trial determines whether the applicant can remain in the United States or must leave. When a respondent receives asylum, he is permitted to stay in the U.S. If he loses, he may be deported to a country where he faces danger. In many cases, respondents have family members here or overseas who are counting on them, and the outcome of the case affects the family members as well as the respondent. All of this provokes anxiety and anticipation. In short, Individual Hearings are life-changing events that profoundly effect respondents and their families.

So what happens when the Individual Hearing is canceled?

pastedGraphic.png

“Sorry boys and girls, the ‘nice’ list is too long. We’ll reschedule Christmas for next year… or maybe the year after that.”

The first thing to know is that cancellations are common. Cases are canceled weeks, days or even minutes before the scheduled time. Indeed, we often cannot be sure that a case will actually go forward until the hearing begins.

Why does this happen?

There are many reasons, some more legitimate than others. The most common reason these days is the pandemic. Sometimes, courts close due to potential exposures. That is understandable, but as far as I can tell, these represent a small minority of Covid cancellations. I have had 50% or more of my Individual Hearings canceled over the last year and a half, and none of those was caused by a Covid exposure. I suspect that the large majority of these cancellations are due to reduced capacity to hear cases–since judges and staff are often working from home. Indeed, most pandemic cancellations seem to occur a week or two before the Individual Hearing. By that time, we’ve already completed and submitted the evidence, witness list, and legal brief, and have usually started prepping the client for trial. The client is also psychologically gearing up for the big event.

And then we check the online system and find that the case is off the docket.

What’s so frustrating about these cancellations is that we’ve been living with the pandemic since early 2020. The Immigration Courts should have adjusted by now. If cases need to be canceled, why not do that several months in advance? At least that way, applicants would not build up hope, only to have that dashed when the case is cancelled at the last minute. Also, it wastes attorney time–since we will have to submit updated country condition evidence (and perhaps other evidence) later, re-prep witnesses, and potentially prepare new legal briefs, if the law changes (which is more common than you’d like to think). For attorneys who charge hourly, this additional work will involve additional costs to the applicants. So all around, last minute cancellations are harmful, and it’s hard to understand why they are still so frequent.

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“I’m double booked today, so let’s put off your heart surgery until 2023.”

Besides the pandemic, court cases are cancelled for a host of other reasons: Immigration Judges (“IJs”) are out sick, hearings get bumped to accommodate “priority” cases or sometimes cases are “double booked,” meaning that they are scheduled for the same time slot with the same IJ, and so only one can go forward. To me, all these are weak excuses for canceling individual hearings. Most courts have several judges, and so if one judge is out sick, or if a priority case must be scheduled at the last minute, another judge should be able to help out (in all but the most complicated cases, judges need little time to prepare for a hearing, and so should be able to adjudicate a case on short notice). Also, there is no excuse for double-booking cases. IJs should have a sense of their schedules and simply not overbook. In addition, all courts are overseen by Assistant Chief Immigration Judges (“ACIJs”), who should be available to hear cases if need be. Finally, given the ubiquity of video conferencing equipment and electronic records, judges can adjudicate cases remotely, and so there should almost always be a judge available to fill in where needed.

Of course, there are times when case cancellations are unavoidable, due to inclement weather, for example. But in an ideal world, these should be rare.

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“Oy vey! I have to give priority to a better-looking couple. Let’s reschedule this wedding for later. Are you free in 2024?”

If the delay caused by case cancellations was measured in weeks or even months, the problem would not be so severe. But in many cases, hearings are postponed for one or two years–or even longer! This is obviously distressing for the applicant, as the long-anticipated end date is pushed back to who-knows-when. It is particularly devastating for applicants who are separated from family members. The long postponements are also a problem for the case itself, as evidence becomes stale and must be replaced with more up-to-date information, and laws change, which can require a new legal brief. In short, these delays often force the applicant (and the applicant’s lawyer) to do significant extra work on the case, and this can add additional costs in terms of legal fees.

It seems obvious to me that courts do not fully appreciate the damage caused by last minute cancellations. If judges and staff (and management) knew more about the harm these cancellations cause, perhaps they would make a greater effort to ensure that hearings go forward, and that any delayed hearings are rescheduled as quickly as possible.

*************

Readers of “Courtside” are familiar with the “toxic culture” of EOIR — actively encouraged by some Attorneys General, enabled and abetted by others.

The real problem here is that Immigration Courts are “led” by “managers” beholden to political agendas rather than the public they should serve. Also, since far too many EOIR “managers” and Immigration Judges have never represented individuals in Immigration Court, they are basically clueless as to the human and practical effects of their actions on individuals as well as on the dedicated, often pro bono or “low bono” lawyers who must guide their desperate and often re-traumatized clients through this morass.

At a time when the need for pro bono assistance has never been greater, the disgraceful dysfunction,  mismanagement, and “studied user unfriendliness” of EOIR under Garland is actually discouraging attorneys from donating their time and endangering their emotional well-being! Could there be any worse public policy?

With so many extraordinarily talented, creative, courageous, independent legal minds out there in the private/NGO/academic sector of human rights/immigration/racial justice/due process this “intentional mediocrity (or worse)” is inexcusable. Yet, this massive failure of the U.S. justice system at the most basic level gets scant attention outside of Courtside, LexisNexis, ImmigrationProf Blog, Jeffrey S. Chase Blog, The Asylumist, and a few other specialized websites. 

This “leading disintegrator of American justice and cosmic threat to our entire democracy” is largely “shoved under the carpet” by “mainstream media,” leaders of the legal profession (outside of immigration/human rights), politicians, policy makers, and the general public. Will they only “wake up” when it is too late and their own rights and futures have been diminished, dehumanized, and de-personified as if they were “mere migrants, not humans?”

In other words, who in America will always be immune from the “Dred Scottification of the other” now practiced, tolerated, and often even encouraged at the highest levels of our government? Don’t think it couldn’t happen to you! If immigrants, asylum seekers, and migrants in the U.S. are not “persons” under the Fifth Amendment, what makes YOU think that YOUR “personhood” will be honored by the powers that be! 

In defense of today’s IJs, they actually have remarkably little control over their own dockets which are incompetently “micromanaged” from on high or by non-judicial “administrators.” Sound like a formula for an incredible, largely self-created, 1.5 million case backlog?

Cutting to the chase, the Immigration Courts are controlled by the Attorney General, a political official and a chief prosecutor to boot. Beyond that, no Attorney General has actually had to experience practice before the totally dysfunctional and intentionally user unfriendly “courts” he or she runs. 

Foreign Service Officers must initially serve as consuls — the basic operating level of an embassy. Hotel managers usually start by working the front desk, where the “rubber meets the road” in the industry.

But, we enthrone those who are supposed to be the best, wisest, and fairest in the legal profession as Attorneys General and Article III Judges without requiring that they have had experience representing individuals at the “retail level” of our legal system — the U.S. Immigration Courts.

It doesn’t make sense! But, what does figure is that a system run by those without expertise and relevant experience, haphazardly “supervised” by Article III Judges who almost invariably exhibit the same blind spots, indifference to injustice, and lack of practical knowledge and expertise as those they are “judicially reviewing”  has devolved into the worst court system in America. It’s an oppressive catastrophe where “liberty and justice are not for all” and survival is often more about the mood, mindset, or personal philosophy of the judge, or the “whim of the day” of DOJ politicos, than it is about the facts of the case or the most fair and reasonable applications of the law by experts! Is this really the way we should be determining who lives and who dies, who thrives and who will struggle just to survive?

These “courts” are not fair and impartial courts at all. They are places where service to the public comes last, poor leadership and mismanagement are tolerated and even rewarded, backlogs are out of control, due process, fundamental fairness, scholarship, and best practices scorned, and precious lives and human dignity routinely are ground to dust and scattered to the wind.

We deserve better from our legal system!

Once, there was a court system with a dream of a better future for all in America — a noble, if ambitious, vision, if you will: “through teamwork and innovation, become the world’s best administrative tribunals, guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.”😎

Now, sadly, that enlightened vision has disintegrated into a nightmare of dedicated dockets, biased precedents, endless backlogs, sloppy work, due process denying gimmicks, bogus statistics, mediocre judicial selections, secrecy, customer unfriendliness, dishonest blame shifting, and ridiculous Aimless Docket Reshuffling.  ☠️

Amateur Night
Attorney General Merrick Garland’s “limited vision” for EOIR is a continuing nightmare for those sentenced to appear and practice before his stunningly dysfunctional and “highly user unfriendly” Immigration “Courts.” Isn’t it high time to insist that those given responsibility for stewardship over America’s largest — and probably most consequential — Federal “Court” system actually have represented humans before those “courts?”
PHOTO: Thomas Hawk
Creative Commons
Amateur Night

Where there once was the promise of “light at the end of the tunnel,” now there is only “Darkness on The Edge of Town:”

Well lives on the line where dreams are found and lost
I’ll be there on time and I’ll pay the cost
For wanting things that can only be found
In the darkness on the edge of town
In the darkness on the edge of town

—- Bruce Springsteen

 😎Due Process Forever!

PWS

12-15-21

🌎ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES ARE ENTITLED TO PROTECTION — BIDEN ADMINISTRATION RECOGNIZES PROBLEM, BUT FAILS TO ACT ACCORDINGLY — Bannon & Far Right Neo Fascists 🏴‍☠️ Plan To Leverage Lies, Hate, Fear, & Loathing To Destroy Civilization! ☹️ — Round Table’s 🛡⚔️ Jeffrey Chase & The Guardian’s 🖋 Zoe Williams Sound The Alarm!⏰

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2021/11/22/white-house-issues-report-on-climate-change-and-migration\

JEFFREY S. CHASE | OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW

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White House Issues Report on Climate Change and Migration

On October 21, the White House issued a Report on the Impact of Climate Change on Migration which contains a few noteworthy passages relating to the law of asylum.

On page 17, the White House report acknowledges that existing legal instruments for addressing displacement caused by climate change are limited.  Encouragingly, the report advises that “the United States should endeavor to maximize their application, as appropriate” to such displaced individuals.

The report next cites both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol and their application to climate-induced displacement, referencing recent UNHCR guidance on the topic.  The report then offers three examples in which climate change issues might arise in the asylum context.

First, the report recognizes that where “a government withholds or denies relief from the impacts of climate change to specific individuals who share a protected characteristic in a manner and to a degree amounting to persecution, such individuals may be eligible for refugee status.”

Secondly, the report acknowledges that “adverse impacts of climate change may affect whether an individual has a viable relocation alternative within their country or territory.”  This language relates to the regulatory requirement that in order to have a well-founded fear of persecution, an asylum applicant could not avoid persecution by relocating within their country of nationality “if under all the circumstances it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.”1

The applicable regulations instruct that:

adjudicators should consider, but are not limited to considering, whether the applicant would face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial ties. Those factors may, or may not, be relevant, depending on all the circumstances of the case, and are not necessarily determinative of whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate.2

While the regulatory language is broad and non-exhaustive, the specific mention of climate change factors in the White House report is most welcome, as such circumstances might not otherwise jump out at immigration judges and asylum officers as being relevant to the relocation inquiry.

Thirdly, the White House report states that “[c]limate activists, or environmental defenders, persecuted for speaking out against government inaction on climate change may also have a plausible claim to refugee status.”

Although not specifically cited in the White House report, UNHCR issued guidance on the topic in October 2020.3  Practitioners should file both the White House report and the UNHCR guidance with EOIR and DHS in appropriate cases, as the latter clearly served as an influence for the former, and provides greater detail in its guidance.4  For instance, in discussing how climate change factors can influence internal relocation options, the UNHCR document at paragraph 12 makes clear that the “slow-onset effects of climate change, for example environmental degradation, desertification or sea level rise, initially affecting only parts of a country, may progressively affect other parts, making relocation neither relevant nor reasonable.”  This detail not included in the White House report is important; it clarifies that the test for whether relocation is reasonable requires a long view, as opposed to limiting the inquiry to existing conditions, and specifically flags forms of climate change that might otherwise escape an adjudicator’s notice.

Also, in paragraph 10, the UNHCR document’s take on the White House report’s third example is somewhat  broader, stating that “[a] well-founded fear of being persecuted may also arise for environmental defenders, activists or journalists, who are targeted for defending, conserving and reporting on ecosystems and resources.”5  UNHCR’s inclusion of journalists as potential targets, and its listing of “defending, conserving, and reporting” as activities which a state might lump into the category of “speaking out” and use as a basis for persecution, should be brought to the attention of adjudicators.

Given how early we are in the process of considering climate change issues in the asylum context, the above-cited language in the White House report is important, as it provides legitimacy to theories still unfamiliar to the ears of those adjudicating, reviewing, and litigating asylum claims.  It is hoped that EOIR and DHS will immediately familiarize its employees who are involved in asylum adjudication with the report.  And as EOIR and DHS consider next steps in developing guidance and training, it is hoped that they will consider a collaborative approach, including in the discussion those outside of government who have already given the topic a great deal of thought.6

Copyright 2021 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

Notes:

  1.  8 CFR 208.13(b)(2)(ii).
  2. Id.
  3. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Legal considerations regarding claims for international protection made in the context of the adverse effects of climate change and disasters, 1 October 2020, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5f75f2734.html, at para. 12.
  4. Although UNHCR’s views on interpreting the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol are not binding on the U.S. Immigration Courts, they have been found by the BIA to be “useful tools in construing our obligations under the Protocol.”  Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).  See also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438-39 (1987).
  5. Id. at para. 10.

See, e.g. “Shelter From the Storm: Policy Options to Address Climate Induced Displacement From the Northern Triangle,” https://www.humanrightsnetwork.org/climate-change-and-displaced-persons.

NOVEMBER 22, 2021

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The Need For Full-Fledged Asylum Hearings

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<img src=”https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/593d84191e5b6ca18cb547ee/1576527959952-C9MO449EII0SH3V1X9M7/Screen+Shot+2019-12-16+at+3.24.24+PM.png” alt=”Screen Shot 2019-12-16 at 3.24.24 PM.png” />

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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City.  Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge and Senior Legal Advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals.He is the founder of the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges, which was awarded AILA’s 2019 Advocacy Award.Jeffrey is also a past recipient of AILA’s Pro Bono Award.He sits on the Board of Directors of the Association of Deportation Defense Attorneys, and Central American Legal Assistance.

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https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/11/climate-refugees-far-right-crisis?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other

Failing to plan for climate refugees hands a cheap victory to the far right

Zoe Williams

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The climate crisis could cause mass displacement as land is left uninhabitable – nations have to work together to plan for this

Thu 11 Nov 2021 03.00 EST

Last modified on Thu 11 Nov 2021 03.02 EST

As scientists wrestle to predict the true impact and legacy of Cop26, one speech, given at a rally organised by Global Justice Now, insisted upon a perspective not data-driven but moral. Lumumba Di-Aping, a South Sudanese diplomat and former chief negotiator for the G77, said: “The first resolution that should be agreed in Glasgow is for annex I polluters to grant the citizens of small island developing states the right to immigration.”

It was a tactful way of putting it: annex I nations are those with special financial responsibilities in tackling the climate crisis. They have these special responsibilities because their early industrialisation created so much of the carbon burden. A more pugilistic diplomat might have said “the people who created this disaster have to offer sanctuary to those displaced by it”, but then, he wouldn’t be a diplomat.

Di-Aping went on to note article 3 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.” “Small island states,” he concluded, “should not be drowned alive like Zealandia.”

. . . .

As old debates around the climate crisis and whether or not it is anthropogenic give way to consensus, new ambiguities and uncertainties are constructed around refugees: can they really be called the victims of environmental degradation? We will grapple with any other explanation – they’re actually economic migrants, or they’re the victims of civil strife, or they fell foul of a dictatorship, the one-bad-man theory of geopolitics – rather than trace these proximal causes back to their roots. Most political efforts, currently, are geared towards building a positive picture of a sustainable future; the alternative is despair or denial, neither of which are generative forces for change. A coherent, practical plan detailing the probable scale of displacement and figuring out a just distribution of the climate diaspora will look radical and unsettling.

One group is extremely comfortable on that territory, however: the far right. Steve Bannon sent a chill down the spine in 2015 when he talked about a “Camp of the Saints-type invasion into … Europe”. He made the reference again and again, until finally onlookers were forced to read the source: Jean Raspail’s racist novel of 1973, which one contemporary reviewer called “a major event … in much the same sense that Mein Kampf was a major event”. The title comes from a passage in the Book of Revelation about the coming apocalypse – civilisation collapses when the hordes arrive from the four corners of the Earth to “surround the camp of the saints and the beloved city” – and Raspail took up the idea; it was inevitable, he said, that “numberless disinherited people of the south would set sail one day for this opulent shore”.

Through Bannon and others, this idea has replicated, mutated and engulfed others, to become the “great replacement theory” of white supremacists, which Paul Mason describes in his recent book How to Stop Fascism as the toxic political view that “immigration constitutes a ‘genocide’ of the white race”. Feminists help it along by depressing the birth-rate, and cultural Marxists bring the mood music, by supporting both migrants and feminists.

Other far-right movements are sucked into the vortex of this wild but coherent theory, and yet more are spawned or shaped by it: the cosmic right (embodied in Jake Angeli, the QAnon figure in the animal-skin cap who stormed the Capitol in January, then went on hunger strike in prison because the food wasn’t organic), or the eco-minded white supremacists who make this explicit – you can be a humanitarian or an environmentalist. Choose one.

As fanciful and irrational as many far-right arguments are, they have a rat-like cunning. They find these spaces that are untenanted by mainstream debate – there will be climate refugees and they must be accommodated – and they run riot in them. Nations who ignore Lumumba Di-Aping aren’t doing anything to avert the consequences he describes: their silence merely creates an open goal for the professed enemies of a peaceful and prosperous future.

  • Zoe Williams is a Guardian columnist

*********

Read Zoe’s complete article at the link.

Usually White House Reports and other quasi-academic “White Papers” produced  at public expense are accompanied by major press releases and momentary hoopla. Then, they are rapidly consigned to the “Dustbin of History.”

They are widely ignored by politicos and bureaucrats who all too often are pursuing policies with little or no empirical basis, but designed to appease or “fire up” some voting block or to further the institutional self-preservation upon which bureaucracies thrive, expand, and prosper, even at the expense of the well-being of the governed!

This report, however, is one that deserves to be the basis for policy action! Too bad it isn’t!

Obviously, an Administration that failed to restore existing refugee and asylum systems, continues to subject migrants to due process denying “star chambers,” thinks “die in place” is an acceptable and effective refugee policy, and wrongly views asylum as a “policy option” rather than a well-established legal and human right, is playing right into the hands of Bannon, Miller, and their 21st Century nihilist movement! It’s also an Administration that didn’t learn much from World War II and the Cold War.

And, on future inevitable and predictable forced migrations, the world isn’t going to get much leadership from a rich nation that can’t even deal fairly, generously, and efficiently with today’s largely predictable, potentially very manageable, refugee situations. Many are situations that our nation either created or played a significant role in creating. See, e.g., environmental migration.

There is actually “room at the inn” for everyone and creative ways for nations to work together to resettle refugees of all types while prospering and working together for the benefit of humanity. Sure, they contradict the nationalist myths upon which many past and current refugee and migration restrictions are based.

Clearly, the realistic, constructive, humane solutions necessary for survival aren’t going come from the racist far right! And, currently the Biden Administration’s failure to stand up for the legal, moral, and human rights of asylum seekers and other referees isn’t doing the job either! Constructive, democratic, moral leadership and courage, oh where, oh where, have you gone?

We can’t deport, imprison, prosecute, wall, threaten, mythologize, abuse, and hate our way out of forced migration situations. It’s going to take dynamic, courageous folks who can get beyond past failures and lead the way to a better future for humanity!

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

11-24-21

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: BIDEN ADMINISTRATION PROPOSES LESS DUE PROCESS THAN TRAFFIC COURT FOR LIFE OR DEATH ASYLUM CASES! 🤮👎

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2021/10/6/the-need-for-full-fledged-asylum-hearings

JEFFREY S. CHASE | OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW

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The Need For Full-Fledged Asylum Hearings

It has been said that Immigration Judges hear death penalty cases under traffic court conditions.1  The death penalty cases are of course asylum claims, which, if wrongly denied, can result in the applicant being returned to their death.

The Biden Administration recently published proposed regulations seeking to revise the system for hearing the asylum claims of those arriving at the southern border.  Any positives envisioned in the proposal are greatly outweighed by the damage the rules will do to the right to immigration court review.  If enacted as drafted, traffic court conditions would be far preferable to the meager access to review that would remain for many asylum seekers.

To provide some context: presently, arriving asylum seekers who after screening by USCIS asylum officers are found to have established a sufficient risk of harm proceed directly to Immigration Court, where they have a full hearing on their claim before an Immigration Judge.  In those proceedings, asylum seekers may freely submit  documents, call witnesses, and elicit testimony.

This was as Congress intended it.   In creating the present credible fear screening system in 1996, Congress made clear that those passing the screening, in the words of then Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY), “will be provided a full – full – asylum hearing.”2  This sentiment was echoed by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), who stated that those who establish credible fear “get a full hearing without any question,”3 and Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX), who emphasized that those with a credible fear of persecution “can go through the normal process of establishing their claim.”4

Under the proposal, those who pass the preliminary screening (known as a credible fear interview) will instead have their full asylum claim heard by an asylum officer.  This could be a positive development if the rules continued to assure the right to a full court proceeding to those not granted at this initial stage.

Unfortunately, the proposed rules would reduce Immigration Judges to reviewers of transcripts of the asylum office interviews.   Additional evidence (including testimony)  that was not provided at the Asylum Office will only be allowed if deemed to be “non-duplicative” and necessary to complete the record.  If an Immigration Judge determines that the applicant (who may not have been represented by a lawyer) provided sufficient evidence to the asylum officer, the claim may be decided entirely on the record from that initial non-court interview.

It bears noting that the Immigration Judges making these determinations remain subject to the completion quotas imposed under the prior administration.  While Immigration Judges must be guided by the requirements of due process and fairness in making such decisions, it would be remiss not to point out that for newly hired judges still on probation, the ability to exclude new evidence and essentially rubber stamp the asylum officer’s decision offers the prospect of a very quick completion for quota purposes.  Judges should not be put in the position of choosing between the dictates of justice and their own job security.

As the drafters of the proposed rules are well aware, Immigration Judges have long decided cases that were first heard by Asylum Officers.  The outcomes of those cases offer strong reason to question the logic of what is now being proposed.  EOIR’s Statistical Yearbook for 2016 (the last year such stats were made available) shows that 83% of cases referred by asylum officers were granted asylum that year by Immigration Judges conducting de novo hearings.5

Having heard referred cases as an Immigration Judge, as well as having represented asylum applicants at the Asylum Office, I have no doubt that the right to a full de novo court hearing, in which attorneys are free to offer documents, briefs, and present testimony as they see fit, is the reason for that large disparity.  The current system itself recognizes this; it is why Asylum Officers are limited to granting clearly meritorious cases, and must refer the rest to courts better equipped to delve into the intricacies of a highly complex field of law.  Immigration Judges also enjoy greater decisional independence than asylum officers, who require supervisory approval of their decisions,6 are more susceptible to political pressure, and are more limited in the legal theories they may rely on.

As to the criteria for supplementing the record, whether evidence is duplicative or necessary is a fuzzy concept.  For example, the law accords  greater deference to government sources, such as State Department reports, and at times, Immigration Judges may find other evidence deserving of “little evidentiary weight.”  Thus, sometimes duplicative evidence is necessary to persuade a judge who may otherwise not be sufficiently swayed by a single report.  But that need might not become apparent until the hearing is concluded, whereas decisions to exclude additional testimony and documentary evidence are made much earlier, at the outset of the proceeding.

There are constitutional considerations as well.  In a 2013 decision, Oshodi v. Holder, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that limiting an asylum seeker’s testimony to events that were not duplicative of the written application, on the belief that the written record would suffice for deciding veracity, was a violation of the asylum seeker’s due process rights.  Yet the proposed regulations seek to codify what according to Oshodi the Constitution specifically forbids.  The court in Oshodi stated that “the importance of live testimony to a credibility determination is well-recognized and longstanding.”  Having heard live testimony as a judge, I can vouch for this.  I decided many cases in which an in person demeanor observation was instrumental to my credibility finding.

I will also state from experience that critical “Eureka” moments arise unexpectedly in the course of hearing testimony.  A question from counsel, or sometimes from the judge, will elicit an answer that unexpectedly gives rise to a new line of questioning, or even a legal theory of the case.  An example is found in last year’s Second Circuit decision in Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr.  In that case, the Second Circuit found that a woman’s act of resisting rape by an MS-13 gang member could constitute a political opinion based on one sentence not contained in the written application, and uttered for the first time at the immigration court hearing: when asked why she resisted, the petitioner responded: “Because I had every right to.”  From that single sentence, the Second Circuit  found that the resistance transcended mere self-protection and took on a political dimension.  Under the proposed rules, the attorney would likely never have been able to ask the question that elicited the critical answer.  At asylum office interviews, attorneys are relegated to sitting in the corner and quietly taking notes.  Furthermore, I have been told by former asylum officers that the concept of imputed political opinion was not available to them as a basis for granting asylum, a fact that pretty much guarantees it will not be covered in an asylum office interview.

The proposed limitations on Immigration Judge review are not necessary to increase efficiency.  Whatever cases asylum officers grant pursuant to their new up front review will significantly reduce the Immigration Court case load.  And even an imperfect transcript from those interviews in claims referred to the court will provide attorneys for both sides the opportunity for advance conferencing to narrow down the issues in dispute, a practice which significantly reduces hearing times and which should be greatly encouraged.

According to the website of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, at a traffic court hearing, “you or your attorney may ask the officer questions. You may testify, bring witnesses or present evidence on your behalf.”7  The Biden Administration cannot provide less rights than these to those facing the life and death consequences inherent in asylum claims.

Those interested may submit their comments on the new regs by October 19.

Copyright 2021 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

Notes:

  1. See, e.g., Dana Leigh Marks, “Immigration Judge: Death Penalty Cases in a Traffic Court Setting,” CNN, June 26, 2014, https://www.cnn.com/2014/06/26/opinion/immigration-judge-broken-system/index.html
  2. 104 Cong. Rec. S4457, S4461, https://www.congress.gov/104/crec/1996/05/01/CREC-1996-05-01-pt1-PgS4457.pdf.
  3. Id. at 4492.
  4. 104 Cong. Rec. S4592, S4608, https://www.congress.gov/104/crec/1996/05/02/CREC-1996-05-02-pt1-PgS4592.pdf.
  5. See EOIR FY 2016 Statistics Yearbook, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/fysb16/download, at p. K-3.  Figure 17 is a chart showing the Immigration Court grant rate of affirmative cases referred by the USCIS Asylum Offices.  The chart shows a grant rate of 72% in FY 2012, steadily increasing each year to 83% in FY 2016.
  6. Per the USCIS website: A supervisory asylum officer reviews the asylum officer’s decision to ensure it is consistent with the law. Depending on the case, the supervisory asylum officer may refer the decision to asylum division staff at USCIS headquarters for additional review. https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/the-affirmative-asylum-process. Immigration Judges require no supervisory review before rendering their decisions.

OCTOBER 6, 2021

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Linda Kenepaske

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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City.  Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge and Senior Legal Advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals.He is the founder of the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges, which was awarded AILA’s 2019 Advocacy Award.Jeffrey is also a past recipient of AILA’s Pro Bono Award.He sits on the Board of Directors of the Association of Deportation Defense Attorneys, and Central American Legal Assistance.

REPUBLISHED BY PERMISSION

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Thanks, “Sir Jeffrey!”

Like many of our colleagues, I granted the majority of “referred” asylum cases, most without ICE appeal. It wasn’t that the Asylum Office did a bad job. The records were often poor or incomplete (as too many individuals attempted to represent themselves at the AO). With the additional information and elucidation from counsel provided at a full hearing, the merits of the case came into focus.  

There were a few cases where the parties stipulated to the record before the AO, and just asked me for a legal ruling. This procedure would be available in appropriate cases, without any regulations changes, and should be encouraged for the parties, particularly ICE. Obviously, the key is that both parties must agree that the record before the AO was adequate. 

Additionally, at the time, the AO could not grant withholding or CAT, so an inordinate number of one-year filling denial cases were in the referrals. As Jeffrey suggests, this could be fixed without eliminating the right to a full hearing upon referral. 

Also, as I have said many times, instituting a new system that reduces the right to a full hearing, without first making badly needed major structural, personnel, training, and leadership changes at both the AO and EOIR is simply insane and another serious breach of trust by the Biden Administration! 

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

10-07-21

  

‘SIR JEFFREY” CHASE: Garland’s “First Steps” To Eradicate Misogyny & Anti-Asylum Bias @ EOIR Are Totally Insufficient Without Progressive Personnel Changes — Regulations Will Only Be Effective If Drafted By Progressive Human Rights Experts Of Which There Currently Are NONE @ DOJ Save For Some Immigration Judges In The Field Whose Expertise, Intellectual Integrity, & Moral Courage Has Been Ignored By Team Garland! — There Will Be No Gender, Racial, Or Immigrant Justice @ Justice As Long As Garland Mindlessly Lets “Miller’s Club Denial” Operate @ BIA! — Progressives Must Turn Up The Heat On Garland To Reform & Remake EOIR With Qualified Expert Judges & Dynamic, Independent, Progressive Leaders!

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2021/6/21/first-steps

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

The latest from the Hon. “Sir Jeffrey:”

JEFFREY S. CHASE | OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW

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First Steps

On June 16, Attorney General Merrick Garland finally, mercifully vacated three decisions that formed a key part of the Trump administration’s unrelenting attack on the law of asylum.1  Matter of A-B-,  issued by Jeff Sessions in June 2018, took aim in particular at victims of domestic violence.2  Matter of L-E-A-, issued the following year by William Barr, sought to undermine protection for those targeted by gangs due to their familial ties.3  And on January 14, 2021, six days from the end of the Trump Administration, acting A.G. Jeffrey Rosen issued a second decision in A-B-, gratuitously criticizing the method for determining nexus in asylum claims employed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, while conveniently evading that court’s review of the original decision in the case through remand.4

Garland’s action restores the law to where it stood prior to June 11, 2018, but only for the time being.  Proposed rules on the subject (which Garland referenced) are due by October 30, when they will first be subjected to a period of public comment.  If final rules are eventually published, it will occur well into next year.

As we sigh in collective relief and celebrate the first steps towards correcting our asylum laws, let’s also take note of the imperfect place in which the case law stands at present.

As to domestic violence claims, the BIA’s 2014 decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- (which Matter of A-B- had vacated) has been restored as binding precedent.5  That decision was issued at a time when (as now) regulations addressing particular social groups were being contemplated by DHS and EOIR.6  While A-R-C-G- was an extremely welcome development, the Board used it to recognize a rather narrowly-defined group: “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.”  In a footnote to the decision, the Board declined to address the argument of several amici (including UNHCR) that a particular social group may be defined by gender alone.  Although A-R-C-G- led to many grants of asylum, some immigration judges relied on the limited scope of the group’s definition to deny claims involving slightly broader variations, in particular, where the victim was not legally married, but nevertheless in a domestic relationship that she was unable to leave.  While the BIA reversed some of those denials in unpublished decisions, it declined to speak to the issue through binding precedent.

As to Matter of L-E-A-, Garland’s recent action returns us to the BIA’s original opinion in that case.7  While the decision acknowledged that families constitute particular social groups (a point that was not in dispute, having been universally recognized for some 35 years and stipulated to by DHS), the BIA still denied asylum by invoking a legally incorrect standard for establishing nexus that it has continued to apply in all family-based asylum claims.

For these reasons, the content of the forthcoming regulations will be extremely important in determining the future of asylum in this country.  While a return to the test for social group cognizability expressed in the BIA’s 1985 precedent in Matter of Acosta tops most regulation wish lists, I will focus the discussion here on a couple of more specific items necessary to correct the shortcomings of Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of L-E-A-.

First, the regulations need to explicitly recognize that a particular social group may be defined by gender alone.  In its 2002 Gender Guidelines, UNHCR identified women “as a clear example of a social subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics, and who are frequently treated differently than men,” and whose “characteristics also identify them as a group in society, subjecting them to different treatment and standards in some countries.”8  However, over the nineteen years since those guidelines were issued, the BIA has consistently avoided considering the issue.

The peril of defining gender-based groups in the more narrow manner employed by the BIA has been addressed by two distinguished commentators, who explain that such practice results in “constant re-litigating of such claims,” sometimes creating “an obstacle course in which the postulated group undergoes constant redefinition.”9  And of course, that is exactly what has happened here, as A-R-C-G- gave way to A-B-, which led to differing interpretations among different courts until Garland’s recent reset.  The above-mentioned commentators further decried the “nitpicking around the margins of the definition” resulting from the narrow approach when the true reason for the risk of persecution to the applicant “is simply her membership in the social group of ‘women.’”10  Regulations recognizing gender alone as a particular social group would thus provide clarity to judges and asylum officers, eliminate the wastefulness of drawn out litigation involving “nitpicking around the margins,” and bring our laws into line with international standards.

But as L-E-A- demonstrates, recognition of a group alone does not guarantee asylum protection.  In order for a group’s recognition to be meaningful, the regs must also address an ongoing problem with the BIA’s method for determining nexus, or whether persecution is “on account of” the group membership.

The BIA is accorded deference by Article III courts when it reasonably interprets immigration laws, provided that the meaning of the language in question is ambiguous.  However, the “on account of” standard included by Congress in defining the term “refugee” is quite clear; its meaning is long established, and in fact, is not particular to immigration law.

The Supreme Court referenced this standard last year in a non-immigration case, Bostock v. Clayton County.  The Court explained that the test

incorporates the “‘simple’” and “traditional” standard of but-for causation…. That form of causation is established whenever a particular outcome would not have happened “but for” the purported cause….In other words, a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.11

In a 2015 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied this exact test in the asylum context to conclude that persecution was on account of family, determining that the petitioner’s “relationship to her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened with death if she did not allow him to join Mara 18.”12  But for some reason, the BIA has felt entitled to reject this established standard outside of the Fourth Circuit in favor of its own excessively restrictive one.

Had the proper test for nexus been employed in L-E-A-, asylum would have been granted.  Under the facts of that case, once the familial relationship is removed from the equation, the asylum-seeker’s risk ceases to exist.  However, the BIA instead imposed an incorrect test for nexus requiring evidence of an “animus against the family or the respondent based on their biological ties, historical status, or other features unique to that family unit.”13

As a former circuit court judge, Garland is particularly qualified to recognize the error in the Board’s approach, as well as the need to correct its course.  The problem is compounded by the particular composition of the BIA at present.  For example, of the ten immigration judges who were promoted to the BIA during the Trump administration, nine denied asylum more than 90 percent of the time (with the tenth denying 85 percent of such claims).  Three had an asylum denial rate in excess of 98 percent.14

This matters, as those high denial rates were achieved in part by using faulty nexus determinations to deny asylum in domestic violence claims, even before the issuance of Matter of A-B-.  This was often accomplished by mischaracterizing the abuse as merely personal in nature, referencing only the persecutor’s generally violent nature or inebriated state.  The analysis in those decisions did not further examine whether gender might also have been one central reason that the asylum seeker, and not someone else, was targeted.

One BIA Member appointed under Trump recently found no nexus in a domestic violence claim by concluding that the persecutor had not targeted the asylum seeker because of her membership in the group consisting of “women,” but rather because she was his woman. There is no indication in the decision that the Board Member considered why the persecutor might view another human being as belonging to him and lacking the same rights he seems to enjoy.  Might it have been because of her gender?

Without a correction through published regulations, there is little reason to expect different treatment of these claims moving forward.  Let’s hope that the Attorney General views his recent action as only the first steps on a longer path to a correct application of the law.

Copyright 2021, Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

Notes:

  1. Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021) (“A-B- III”); Matter of L-E-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 304 (A.G. 2021) (“L-E-A- III”).
  2. 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (“A-B- I”).
  3. 27 I&N Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019) (“L-E-A- II”).
  4. 28 I&N Dec. 199 (A.G. 2021) (“A-B- II”).
  5. 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014).
  6. The regulations under consideration at that time were never issued.
  7. 27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017) (“L-E-A- I”).
  8. UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (May 2002) at para. 30.
  9. James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, Second Edition (Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 442.
  10. Hathaway and Foster, supra.
  11. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020).
  12. Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 950 (4th Cir. 2015).
  13.  L-E-A- I, supra at 47.
  14. See TRAC (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse) Immigration Judge Reports https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judgereports/.Republished with permission.

 

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Without progressive intervention, this is still headed for failure @ EOIR! A few things to keep in mind.

    • Former Attorney General, the late Janet Reno, ordered the same regulations on gender-based asylum to be promulgated more than two decades ago — never happened!
    • The proposed regulations that did finally emerge along the way (long after Reno’s departure) were horrible — basically an ignorant mishmash of various OIL litigation positions that would have actually made it easier for IJs to arbitrarily deny asylum (as if they needed any invitation) and easier for OIL to defend such bogus denials.
    • There is nobody currently at “Main Justice” or EOIR HQ qualified to draft these regulations! Without long overdue progressive personnel changes the project is almost “guaranteed to fail” – again!
    • Any regulations entrusted to the current “Miller Lite Denial Club” @ the BIA ☠️ will almost certainly be twisted out of proportion to deny asylum and punish women refugees, as well as deny due process and mock fundamental fairness. It’s going to take more than regulations to change the “culture of denial” and the “institutionalized anti-due-process corner cutting” @ the BIA and in many Immigration Courts.
    • Garland currently is mindlessly operating the “worst of all courts” — a so-called “specialized (not) court” where the expertise, independence, and decisional courage is almost all “on the outside” and sum total of the subject matter expertise and relevant experience of those advocating before his bogus “courts” far exceeds that of the “courts” themselves and of Garland’s own senior team! That’s why the deadly, embarrassing, sophomoric mistakes keep flowing into the Courts of Appeals on a regular basis. 
    • No regulation can bring decisional integrity and expertise to a body that lacks both! 
    • Any progressive who thinks Garland is going to solve the problem @ EOIR without “outside intervention” should keep this nifty “five month snapshot of EOIR under Biden” in mind:
      • Progressive judges appointed to BIA: 0
      • Progressive judges appointed to Immigration Court: 0
      • Progressives installed in leadership positions @ EOIR permanently or temporarily: 0
      • Billy Barr Selected Immigration Judges Appointed: 17
      • “Miller Lite” holdover individuals still holding key positions @ EOIR: many (only two removed to date)
      • Number of BIA precedents decided in favor of respondent: 2
      • Number of BIA precedents decided in favor of DHS: 9

That’s right, folks: Billy Barr and Stephen Miller have had more influence and gotten more deference from Garland at EOIR than have the progressive experts and advocates who fought tirelessly to preserve due process and to get the Biden Administration into office. How does that a make sense? 

Miller Lite
“Miller Lite” – Garland’s Vision of “Justice @ Justice” for Communities of Color — Finally vacating two grotesquely wrong anti-female, anti-asylum precedents hasn’t ended the “Miller Lite Unhappy Hour” for migrants and their advocates at Garland’s foundering DOJ!

Progressives, advocates, and NGOs must keep raising hell until we finally get the “no-brainer,” long overdue, obvious, personnel, legal, structural, institutional, and cultural changes at EOIR that America needs! Waiting for Judge Garland to get around to it is like “Waiting for Godot!” Perhaps worse — I don’t recollect that anyone died waiting for Godot!

🇺🇸Due Process Forever! The BIA Denial Club, Never!🏴‍☠️

PWS

06-22-21

🛡⚔️👍🏼“SIR JEFFREY” CHASE — Garland’s Immigration “Judges” Pull The Ol’ “Bait & Switch” — They Only Are “Judges” When “OIL” Is Trying To Convince Ethically & Legally Challenged Article III Courts To “Defer” To EOIR Decisions — Otherwise, They Are Expected To Act Like DOJ ”Grundoons” Mindlessly Carrying Out The Executive’s Agenda Cloaked In Quasi-Judicial Disguise!

Grundoon
Grundoon
From Walt Kelly’s “Pogo”
SOURCE: Pininterest

Grundoon: A diapered baby groundhog (or “woodchunk” in swamp-speak). An infant toddler, Grundoon speaks only gibberish, represented by strings of random consonants like “Bzfgt”, “ktpv”, “mnpx”, “gpss”, “twzkd”, or “znp”. Eventually, Grundoon learns to say two things: “Bye” and “Bye-bye”. He also has a baby sister, whose full name is Li’l Honey Bunny Ducky Downy Sweetie Chicken Pie Li’l Everlovin’ Jelly Bean. [From the Walt Kelly comic strip “Pogo.”]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pogo_(comic_strip)

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2021/4/29/the-dojs-contradictions

Contact

The DOJ’s Contradictions

In a recent blog post, I discussed the difficulty in establishing asylum based on a political opinion expressed against MS-13.  In the specific case discussed, the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the Immigration Judge’s finding that the asylum-seeker had expressed a political opinion to MS-13 members.1  In reversing the Immigration Judge, the BIA specifically stated as to MS-13 that “the gangs are criminal organizations, and not political or governmental organizations and gang activities are not political in nature.”  The BIA has repeatedly expressed this same view (using this or similar boilerplate language) in its decisions denying asylum.  In the particular case discussed in my blog post, a split panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals could not find enough evidence of record to compel the majority to overturn the BIA’s conclusion.

The BIA is of course a part of the U.S. Department of Justice; its judges are appointed by and employed by the Attorney General.  Former Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein was one of the Department officials to make the following point to a class of new Immigration Judges in March 2019:

Immigration judges appointed by the Attorney General and supervised by the Executive Office for Immigration Review are not only judges. First, you are not only judges because you are also employees of the United States Department of Justice. It is a great honor to serve in this Department. In the courtyard just outside the entrance to this Great Hall, high up on the interior wall of the Main Justice building, there is a depiction of the scales of justice and an inscription that reads, “Privilegium Obligatio.” It means that when you accept a privilege, you incur an obligation. In this Department, our duty is in our name. We are the only cabinet agency with a name that articulates a moral value.

Justice is not measured by statistics. Our employees learn from day one that their duty is to gather the facts, seek the truth, apply the law, and respect the policies and principles of the Department of Justice.

The second reason that you are not only judges is that in addition to your adjudicative function – finding facts and applying laws – you are a member of the executive branch. You follow lawful instructions from the Attorney General, and you share a duty to enforce the law.2

The clear message being conveyed is “Don’t get any big ideas of judicial independence and neutrality; you work for ‘Team Justice,’ and you will behave accordingly.”  Am I alone in thinking that the motto cited by Rosenstein, “when you accept a privilege, you incur an obligation,” here comes across as a boss reminding new employees where their loyalties lie rather than as a commitment to truth and justice?

As wrong as this message is when conveyed to judges who are supposed to enjoy the independence and neutrality to rule against the Department of Justice and the Attorney General when the facts and law compel such an outcome, let’s examine this view for the consistency of its application as to all DOJ employees.  Presumably, the Board’s official stance that MS-13 is not a political organization and that its activities are criminal and not political in nature enjoys the Department’s seal of approval.  In fact, other Department of Justice attorneys, working for the Office of Immigration Litigation, defend that view when the BIA”s decisions are reviewed on appeal by the Circuit Courts.  I’m not aware of any Attorney General action to certify a BIA decision expressing this view in order to correct the Board’s position on this issue, or even to remand to the Board for further consideration of its position in light of other conflicting views within the Department.

Regarding such conflicting views, I was recently made aware of a criminal indictment drafted by the U.S. Attorneys’ Office in the Eastern District of New York.3  The indictment was filed in December, 2020, while the Trump Administration was still in office.  The opening paragraph of the indictment states that MS-13 is a transnational criminal organization engaged in terrorist activity, and that its members use violence “in order to obtain concessions from the government of El Salvador, achieve political goals and retaliate for government actions against MS-13’s members and leaders.” (emphasis added).

The indictment contains a specific section titled “Political Influence in El Salvador.”  The indictment states that a unit of MS-13, the Ranfla Nacional, “gained political influence as a result of the violence and intimidation MS-13 exerted on the government and population of El Salvador.”  It continued that the organization exercised leverage on the Salvadoran government through its control on the level of violence.  The indictment states that in 2012, MS-13 exercised its leverage to negotiate a truce with the ruling FMLN party and its rival 18th Street “to reduce homicides in El Salvador in return for improved prison conditions, benefits and money.”  According to the indictment, MS-13 also negotiated a similar agreement with the rival ARENA party, promising to deliver votes in return for benefits.  The indictment states that over time, “the Ranfla Nacional continued to negotiate with political parties in El Salvador and use its control of the level of violence to influence the actions of the government in El Salvador.”

The indictment also contains a section explaining the purpose of the Ranfla Nacional.  The second specific goal listed is: “Influencing the actions of governments in El Salvador and elsewhere to implement policies favorable to MS-13.”

The attorneys who made the above claims in an indictment filed in Federal District Court are also employees of the U.S. Department of Justice.  They are also members of the executive branch, following lawful instructions from the Attorney General, and sharing a duty to enforce the law.   In the Second Circuit case I recently discussed, other Department of Justice attorneys in their brief to the court defended the Board’s decision by depicting MS-13 as “an institution that is entirely non-governmental – that is…a group of criminals who, in fact, reject the rules set out by the government.”  Noticeably absent from the same brief was any mention that this “rejection of the rules set out by government” includes strategies to pressure said government into undertaking specific actions, as well as its entering into negotiations and ultimately agreements with political parties, the terms of which include MS-13’s delivering votes in return for the parties’ commitment to enacting beneficial policies.

So how can it be that attorneys in one office of the Department of Justice argue that MS-13 as an organization is engaged in exerting political influence to achieve its political goals, and at the same time, another group of attorneys within the same Department of Justice can sign orders sending victims of the same MS-13 to their death by employing a boilerplate sentence that MS-13 is not a political organization and its activities are not political in nature?  And that the decisions of that latter group are then defended by a third group of Department attorneys on appeal who make no mention of the conflicting arguments?  Let’s remember that, according to Rosenstein, these attorneys were taught from day one that their duties as Department of Justice employees include gathering the facts and seeking the truth.

In 1997, a very different BIA wrote the following in a decision that, although still binding as precedent, seems long forgotten:

immigration enforcement obligations do not consist only of initiating and conducting prompt proceedings that lead to removals at any cost. Rather, as has been said, the government wins when justice is done. In that regard, the handbook for trial attorneys states that “[t]he respondent should be aided in obtaining any procedural rights or benefits required by the statute, regulation and controlling court decision, of the requirements of fairness.” Handbook for Trial Attorneys § 1.3 (1964). See generally Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. FERC, 962 F.2d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1992)(finding astonishing that counsel for a federal administrative agency denied that the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility holds government lawyers to a higher standard and has obligations that “might sometimes trump the desire to pound an opponent into submission”); Reid v. INS, 949 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1991)(noting that government counsel has an interest only in the law being observed, not in victory or defeat).4

This matter deserves the immediate attention of Attorney General Merrick Garland.  The ability of asylum seekers to receive a fair review of their claims based on accurate information is a matter of life and death.  At this early stage of the Biden Administration, it is critical that the Department send a clear message that the “obligation” mentioned in its motto is to serve an ideal of justice that is independent of the particular politics of those temporally in charge.

Copyright 2021 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

Notes:

  1. Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson, No. 17-2284, ___ F.3d ___ (2d Cir., Feb. 26, 2021).
  2. https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-opening-remarks-investiture-31-newly.
  3. E.D.N.Y. Docket No.: 20-CR-577 (JFB).  The Department of Justice’s Press Release can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/ms-13-s-highest-ranking-leaders-charged-terrorism-offenses-united-states.
  4. Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722, 727 (BIA 1997).

APRIL 29, 2021

Reprinted by permission.

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As most outside the nativist world know, the BIA’s position that Northern Triangle gangs aren’t political in nature and action is absurd! For Pete’s sake, these guys negotiate “peace treaties”  with governments, control large swaths of territory, manipulate “public death rates” for political gain, aid or punish political candidates and police, collect taxes, control jobs, and have economic policies. Sure sounds like a quasi-governmental, clearly political entity to me. Somewhere, there is a dissent of mine in an old published CAT case saying approximately that.

At least at one point, gangs in El Salvador controlled more jobs than did the Salvadoran Government! No competent, unbiased group of adjudicators (not to mention supposed “experts”) could have reached the BIA’s ridiculous, clearly politicized conclusions!

Sadly, to date, Judge Garland has followed in the footsteps of his dilatory Dem predecessors by destroying lives, promoting injustice, and blowing the Dems’ best chance to build a progressive, due process oriented, human rights advancing judiciary that also would help resolve America’s failure to come to grips with the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention and its key role in our legal immigration system as well as being a prerequisite to achieving racial justice in America.

Supposedly, these are the goals of the Biden Administration. Unfortunately, Garland, Monaco, and Gupta haven’t gotten the message, although it has been “delivered” time after time by numerous experts and advocates!

A few historical notes:

  • I was on the en banc BIA that decided Matter of S-M-J-, cited by Jeffrey. It was written by Judge Michael J. Heilman, a fellow Wisconsinite who once had worked for me at the “Legacy INS” General Counsel, following service as a State Department consular officer. That case “originated” on a three-member panel of Heilman, the late Judge Lauri Steven Filppu, and me. It reflects the “government wins when justice is done” message that I had incorporated into INS attorney training years earlier, as well as fealty to UN Handbook standards encouraged by the Supremes in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, and the “best practices” that bygone BIA was consciously and aggressively advancing.
  • Former DAG Rod Rosenstein was once a respected career prosecutor who served Administrations of both parties. Then, he “sold out” to the Trump Administration and its neo-fascists. Although that probably should have ended his legal career, he’s currently enjoying life in “big law” while those victims harmed and wronged by the illegal and unethical policies (or, in some cases their survivors) he furthered continue to suffer.

Radical progressive due process reforms @ EOIR, starting with wholesale personnel changes and revocation of restrictionist, racist, misogynist policies and practices is long overdue. Nearly two months into his tenure Judge Garland has yet to demonstrate awareness of the need for immediate, decisive action. Meanwhile the bodies continue to pile up and the “adverse decisions” from the Article IIIs bearing his name and tarnishing his reputation continue to roll in! 

Actually, Judge, each wrong decision from the BIA represents a human life ruined, often irrevocably. Is that the type of “impact” on American justice that you intend to leave as your “legacy?”

 

Tower of Babel
EOIR HQ, Falls Church, VA (a/k/a “The Tower of Babel”)
By Pieter Bruegel The Elder
Public Domain

🇺🇸⚖️🗽🧑🏽‍⚖️👨🏻‍⚖️Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-01-21

“SIR JEFFREY” CHASE ⚔️🛡 KICKS OFF 2021: Misuse of CDC Authority🤮 Part Of The Scofflaw Regime’s White Nationalist Agenda☠️🏴‍☠️ — Why Have the Federal Courts Let Bogus Pretexts “Overrule” Truth & The Rule of Law?🤥

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
Trump Regime Emoji
Trump Regime

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2021/1/3/the-next-level-shamelessness-of-the-covid-security-regs

The Next-Level Shamelessness of the COVID Security Regs

On December 23, EOIR and USCIS published final rules designed to brand most people a “security risk,” and thus ineligible for asylum.  The rules won’t become effective until January 22 (i.e. after the Biden Administration is in office), so will presumably be pulled back before they hurt anyone other than the reputations and careers of those responsible for their publication.  Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to refute the present administration’s claimed justification for such a rule.  First, there will certainly be other bad administrations in our future, and as we’ve seen with the present one, they might look to the past for inspiration.

Furthermore, even without the rule going into effect, individual immigration judges will still be faced with interpreting the clause it invokes on a case-by-case basis.  I’m hoping the following analysis will prove useful, as I’m pretty sure it wasn’t covered in the judges’ training.

But most importantly, the assaults of the past four years on facts and reason have taught us the need to constantly reinforce what those presently in charge hope to make us forget: that there are laws passed by Congress; that the Judiciary has created strict rules governing their interpretation, and that executive agencies are not free to simply ignore or reinvent the meaning of those laws to their own liking.

The regulations in question seek to take advantage of the present pandemic to render any asylum seeker who either exhibits symptoms of the virus, has come in contact with it, or has traveled from or through a country or region where the disease is prevalent ineligible for asylum.  The administration seeks to justify this by claiming that there are reasonable grounds for regarding the above a danger to the security of the United States.

The “danger to the security of the United States” bar to asylum1 which the new regulations reference derives from Article 33(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which serves as the international law basis for our asylum laws.  That treaty (which is binding on the U.S.) states that the prohibition against returning refugees shall not apply to those “whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”

However, Article 33(2) applies to those who have already been recognized as refugees, and have then committed crimes in the country of refuge, which is not the class to whom the new regulations would apply.  The bases for excluding those seeking refugee status for reasons arising prior to their arrival are found under Article 1D through 1F of the 1951 Convention.  The prohibitions found there cover three groups: those who are already receiving protection or assistance (Article 1D); those who are not considered to be in need of protection (Article 1E); and those “categories of persons who are not considered to be deserving of international protection (Article 1F).2   Individuals posing a danger to the community fall into the final category.

No ground contained in the 1951 Convention excludes those in need of protection for health-related purposes.  To understand why, let’s look closer at the Convention’s use of the word “deserving” as it relates to refugee protection.  In 1997, UNHCR published a note providing additional insight into the Article 1F “exclusion grounds.”  Explaining that “the idea of an individual ‘not deserving’ protection as a refugee is related to the intrinsic links between ideas of humanity, equity, and the concept of refuge,” the note explains that the primary purpose of the clauses “are to deprive the perpetrators of heinous acts and serious common crimes, of such protection.”  The note explains that to do otherwise “would be in direct conflict with national and international law, and would contradict the humanitarian and peaceful nature of the concept of asylum.”

The European Council on Refugees and Exiles covered this same issue in its 2004 position paper on Exclusion from Refugee Status.  At page 8, the ECRE stated that the “main aim” of Article 1F was not “to protect the host community from serious criminals,” but rather to preserve the integrity of the international refugee system by preventing it from being used to “shelter serious criminals from justice.”  These sources make it extremely clear that the intent was certainly not to exclude someone who might have been exposed to a virus.

In including six exceptions to eligibility in our asylum statute,3 Congress followed the lead of the 1951 Convention, as all six domestic clauses fall within the three categories listed in paragraph 140 of the UNHCR Handbook as listed above.  Of the six grounds listed under U.S. law, the last one, regarding persons firmly resettled in another country prior to arrival in the U.S., is covered by the Convention categories of those already receiving assistance or not in need of assistance.

The remaining five exceptions under U.S. law fall within the category of those not considered to be deserving of protection (Article 1F).  The statute lists those categories as: (i) persecutors of others; (ii) persons posing a danger to the community of the U.S. by virtue of having been convicted of a particularly serious crime; (iii) persons whom there are serious reasons to believe committed serious nonpolitical crimes prior to their arrival in the U.S.; (iv) persons whom “there are reasonable grounds for regarding…as a danger to the security of the United States,” and (v) persons engaged in terrorist activity.

Agencies may only apply their own interpretation to the term “as a danger to the security of the United States” to the extent such term is ambiguous.  But the courts have instructed that in determining whether a statute is in fact ambiguous, traditional tools of construction must be employed, including canons.4  The Supreme Court has recently applied one such canon, ejusdem generis, for this  purpose.5   In its decision, the Court explained that “where, as here, a more general term follows more specific terms in a list, the general term is usually understood to ‘ “embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.”’”6

Former Attorney General Barr himself recently applied the ejusdem generis canon to the term “particular social group,” stating that pursuant to the canon, the term “must be read in conjunction with the terms preceding it, which cabin its reach…rather than as an “omnibus catch-all” for everyone who does not qualify under one of the other grounds for asylum.”7

A very similar canon to ejusdem generis  is noscitur a sociis (the “associated words” canon).  Whereas ejusdem generis requires a term to be interpreted similarly to more specific terms surrounding it in a list, noscitur a sociis applies the same concept to more specific terms across the same statute.8

In 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A), the more general term “danger to the security of the United States” is surrounded by the more specific terminology describing the accompanying grounds of asylum ineligibility.  When thus “cabined” by the more specific classes of persecutors of others, those convicted of serious crimes, and those engaged in terrorist activities, it is clear that Congress intended a “risk to security” to relate to similar types of criminal activity, and not to health grounds.  As the intent of Congress is clear, the term “threat to the security of the United States” is not open to any interpretation the agencies might wish to apply to it.  Yet in its published rule, EOIR and USCIS here create the type of “omnibus catch-all” that the Attorney General himself has elsewhere declared to be impermissible.

The rule is further at odds with circuit case law in its application to those who simply “may” pose a risk.  The Third Circuit has found the statutory language of the clause in question to unambiguously require that the asylum-seeker pose an actual, rather than merely a possible, threat to national security.9  Even if it were assumed that COVID could somehow fit into the category of security risk, simply having traveled from or through an area where the virus is prevalent doesn’t establish that the individual presents an actual risk.

There is also the issue of the transient nature of the risk. In the same decision referenced above, the Third Circuit relied on the Refugee Act’s legislative history to conclude “that Congress intended to protect refugees to the fullest extent of our Nation’s international obligations,” allowing for exceptions “only in a narrow set of circumstances.”10  This is obviously a correct reading where exclusion can lead to death, rape, or indefinite imprisonment.  The other classes deemed undeserving of asylum are defined by more permanent characteristics.  In other words, the attribute of being a terrorist, a persecutor, or a serious criminal will not wear off in two weeks time.  To the contrary, any risk posed by one exposed to COVID-19 is likely to pass within that same time frame.  Wouldn’t the “fullest extent” of our obligations call for simple quarantining for the brief period in question?

These issues were all raised in comments to the proposed regs.  And of course, dubious reasons were employed to dismiss these arguments.  For example, the agencies acknowledged the need for the danger posed be an actual rather than a merely possible one.  But somehow, that requirement was dismissed by the inadequate excuse that the danger posed by a pandemic is “unique.”

The rule stands as one of the final examples of the extremes this administration will go to in order to circumvent our asylum laws and turn away those entitled to avail themselves of our immigration courts in order to determine if they are entitled to protection.  As demonstrated here, the degree to which this administration veered from the actual intent of the statute in interpreting the security bar wouldn’t have been much greater if it attempted to deny asylum to those wearing white after Labor Day.11  The law must not be twisted or ignored by executive branch agencies when it conflicts with an administration’s policy objectives.

Notes:

  1. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A).
  2. UNHCR Handbook at ❡ 140.
  3. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A).
  4. See, e.g., Arangure Jasso v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 338-39 (6th Cir. 2018).
  5. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1625 (2018).
  6. Ibid (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 (2001); National Assn. of Mfrs. v. Department of Defense,138 S.Ct. 617, 628–629 (2018)).
  7. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581, 592 (A.G. 2019).
  8. Thanks to Prof. Jaclyn Kelley-Widmer for sharing her expertise on these terms. See Jaclyn Kelley-Widmer and Hillary Rich, “A Step Too Far: Matter of A-B-, Particular Social Group, and Chevron,” 29 Cornell J. of Law and Public Policy 345, 373 (2019).
  9. Yusupov v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 518 F.3d 185, 201 (3d Cir. 2008).
  10. Id. at 203-204.
  11. If it had done so, EOIR would undoubtedly have defended the move through the traditional, completely acceptable, totally normal method of issuing a “Myths vs. Facts” sheet. The document might contain the following entry: “Myth: EOIR issued a rule banning asylum to anyone wearing any color at any time. Fact: That’s completely absurd! Only those wearing white (which technically might not even be a color) are banned, and even then, only after Labor Day. As Pantone lists 1,867 colors, white consists of .05 percent of all colors one could wear. And that’s only if white is in fact a color. And, again, only after Labor Day.”

Copyright 2021 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

Republished by permission.

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Jeffrey’s article points out how deeply the corruption and racism of the regime have penetrated into the Federal Bureaucracy, even infecting supposedly “professional and apolitical” agencies like CDC. Fixing this will be a formidable task for the Biden-Harris Administration. 

But, there is a larger issue here: Why has the Supremes’ GOP majority “lapped up” the transparent pretexts for unconstitutional actions presented by the regime’s ethics-challenged DOJ lawyers? While an impressive array of U.S. District Court Judges, from both parties, have generally courageously stood tall for the rule of law against White Nationalist abuses, not so the GOP majority of the Supremes!  

Let’s go back to the beginning of the regime. After a string of lower Federal Court defeats, “ethics-free” DOJ lawyers massaged and slightly watered down Trump’s “Muslim Ban” and repackaged it as a bogus “national security” measure. But, even as these disingenuous lawyers were advancing this bogus pretext in court, Trump was reassuring his White Nationalist base that this was indeed the “Muslim Ban” he had promised to his supporters. 

https://www.cato.org/blog/dozen-times-trump-equated-travel-ban-muslim-ban

Nevertheless, the Supremes’ GOP majority “bought into” the patently (and demonstrably) bogus “national security” pretext, hook, line, and sinker:

Of the Supreme Court’s decision on Muslim ban 3.0, Omar Jadwat, director of the ACLU’s Immigrants’ Rights Project, said, “This ruling will go down in history as one of the Supreme Court’s great failures. It repeats the mistakes of the Korematsu decision upholding Japanese-American imprisonment and swallows wholesale government lawyers’ flimsy national security excuse for the ban instead of taking seriously the president’s own explanation for his action.”

 

“It is ultimately the people of this country who will determine its character and future. The court failed today, and so the public is needed more than ever. We must make it crystal clear to our elected representatives: If you are not taking actions to rescind and dismantle Trump’s Muslim ban, you are not upholding this country’s most basic principles of freedom and equality.”

https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban 

In doing so, the GOP Supremes’ associated themselves with a long line of racially biased pretexts used by courts to uphold invidious discrimination that violated our Constitution

  • Internment of Japanese-Americans (but not German-Americans) is about national security.
    • Truth: Dehumanize, punish, and dispossess Japanese Americans on the West Coast;
  • Poll taxes are about raising revenue.
    • Truth: Preventing African-Americans from voting;
  • Literacy tests (“grandfathering” ignorant White guys) are about insuring an informed electorate.
    • Truth: Excluding African-American voters;
  • Separate is equal.
    • Truth: Insuring that African-Americans will be educationally disadvantaged;
  • Voter ID laws are about election integrity.
    • Truth: Designed by a primarily White GOP ruling class to suppress African American, Latino, and other minority voters who tend to support Democrats;
  • Gerrymandering to favor the GOP can be solved through the political process.
    • Truth: Gerrymandering is intended by the GOP to rig the political process so that voters of color will never achieve political representation proportional to their numbers.

These are just a few of the obvious examples of how the “legal power structure” has often been on the “wrong side of history.” Sadly, it continues with today’s GOP Supremes’ majority which often embraces obvious pretexts and bogus “right wing legal gobbledygook” to systematically dump on vulnerable minorities and others whose political power and humanity they refuse to recognize.

Finally, to reinforce what Jeffrey and others have said, we have a legal obligation to protect refugees. Article 33 of the Convention to which we are party, now incorporated into the INA, is mandatory, not “optional” or “discretionary.” 

As I pointed out before, refugees more often than not arrive in times of international crisis and turmoil. “Tough times” or internal problems (in this case aggravated and magnified by a maliciously incompetent regime) are NOT a legal (not to mention moral) basis for us to jettison our legal obligation to offer them protection.

Had the Supremes courageously and unanimously stood up for the Constitution, rule of law, and simple human decency against the regime’s obvious lies, false narratives, overt racism, religious bigotry, and general disregard for the rule of law (now in full, foul bloom every day), the last four years might have been very different. Lives lost forever could have been saved. 

Folks, here we are, two decades into the 21st Century. Yet, we have a highly “un-representative” Supremes’ GOP majority that has willingly promoted the anti-democracy antics of, and carried water for, a patently corrupt White Nationalist regime seeking to “Dred Scottify” tens of millions of persons of color, religious minorities, and those “suspected” of not supporting the GOP.

Even if many would like to, this is not something that can simply be swept under the table (again). Failure of the Supremes majority to stand up for the individual rights and human dignity of all persons in America is something that will haunt us until it is fixed or we disappear as a nation!

Lousy judging has a huge cost for humanity and democracy. We need and deserve better from the highest levels of our privileged, yet too often ineffective and feckless in the face of tyranny, life-tenured judges!  

Better Judges for a Better, Fairer America.🇺🇸 Make Equal Justice Under Law ⚖️ A Reality Rather Than an Ongoing, Judicially-Enabled,  Charade! 

Due Process Forever!⚖️🗽🇺🇸

PWS

01-04-21

  

⚖️👨🏻‍⚖️👩‍⚖️CHANNELING THE OUTRAGE AT THE FLRA’S OVERT UNION, DUE PROCESS, AND FIRST AMENDMENT BASHING! — Read Jeffrey S. Chase’s Penetratingly Indignant Analysis Of This Sham Decision — Regime’s Larger Plan To Abolish Unions, Politicize, & “Dumb Down” Career Civil Service Should Be D.O.A. In Biden-Harris Administration! 

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/11/6/the-outrageous-decision-to-decertify-the-ijs-union&source=gmail-imap&ust=1605304468000000&usg=AOvVaw15nn5hFuo-vhDvBl2kSJF4

JEFFREY S. CHASE | OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW

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The Outrageous Decision to Decertify the IJ’s Union

Our attention is understandably focused elsewhere right now.  However, it must be mentioned that on the eve of Election Day, a panel decision of the Federal Labor Relations Authority decertified the National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) as a union.  While this might seem to be a minor issue at the moment, it is not.   At stake is the integrity of the nation’s Immigration Courts and the life-changing decisions its judges make.

The NAIJ was formed in 1971, and was certified as the recognized collective bargaining representative of Immigration Judges in 1979, 41 years ago.  It weathered a similar decertification effort in 2000.  Then as now, the agency argued that Immigration Judges are managers, and thus ineligible to unionize.  Under federal labor law, one is classified as a manager if their position “influences policy.”  20 years ago, both the initial decision of the Regional Director and the appeal to the FLRA resoundingly dismissed that notion.  In its September 2000 decision, the FLRA agreed with the finding below that IJs are not involved in creating agency policy.  The FLRA then noted that “unlike decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the decisions of  Immigration Judges are not published, do not constitute precedent, are binding only on the parties to the proceedings, and are subject to de novo review. The RD accordingly concluded that the decisions of the Judges do not influence and determine the Agency’s immigration policy, in contrast to the decisions of the Board.”

In two decades, the only change to the above is that while the IJ’s findings of law remain subject to de novo  review, their findings of fact are now reviewed for clear error.  Of course, facts are entirely case-specific, and thus have no influence whatsoever on policy.  So as before, rather than create or influence policy, IJs implement established policy. Yet EOIR once again sought decertification.  At the hearing in January, EOIR stipulated that the judges’ duties and responsibilities had not changed since the prior decision.  As reported in an article covering the hearing, EOIR’s Director, James McHenry, testified  that Immigration Judges are not supervisors, adding that they “are at the bottom of the org chart so they don’t supervise anything,” and further noted that “they cannot hire or fire anyone.”  Nevertheless, he argued that because an Immigration Judge’s decision becomes a final ruling binding the agency if not appealed, Immigration Judges influence policy.

The Regional Director dismissed the claim based on the above arguments and testimony.  But there was always a sense that the administration had something up its sleeve.  That “something” turned out to be two Trump appointees,  FLRA Chairperson Colleen Duffy Kiko, and FLRA Member James T. Abbott.  They have jointly issued a series of decisions overturning decades of precedent to erode the rights of federal employees’ unions, a result clearly favored by the administration that appointed them.  The two stayed true to form in decertifying the NAIJ.  The FLRA’s lone Democratic appointee, Ernest DuBester, issued a scathing opinion  in the NAIJ’s case, which concluded with the following language:

This is the antithesis of reasoned decision making. Based upon the conclusory nature of the majority’s analysis, along with the facetious manner in which it reconciles its decision with Authority precedent precluding collateral attacks on unit certifications, it is abundantly clear that the majority’s sole objective is to divest the IJs of their statutory rights. Once again, I refuse to join a decision “so fundamentally adverse to the principles and purposes of our Statute.”

By deciding in this matter, the decision violates the FLRA’s own rules regarding when such reversals of past holdings are allowed. Moreover, not that it matters to Chairperson Kiko and Member Abbott, but if allowed to stand, their decision ignoring the NAIJ’s 41 years as a certified union and reversing its own precedent without any reasoned basis will accomplish the following damage.

First, Immigration Judges would lose their voice, collective bargaining rights, ability to be individually defended by their union representative, and their ability to push back against the relentless attack on their independence, neutrality, and ability to fulfill their proper function as a check against executive branch overreach.  Second, NAIJ officers have remained the only Immigration Judges able to allow the public to peek behind the scenes at these tribunals, by speaking at law schools and conferences (with the exception of management level judges who may be permitted to state the party line, sometimes by reading it from index cards).  As several leading scholars explained in an article in Slate:  “Judges and asylum officers are being instructed to decide cases in ways that many contend are contrary to law. A virtual gag rule has been placed on them in the context  of law schools and the broader public. This denies information to coming generations of lawyers and eliminates public discourse on some of the most critical civil rights issues of our time.”

But of great importance is a point I raised last year in an article I wrote for Law360 on the decertification effort: the administration’s citing to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Lucia v. SEC:

while irrelevant to the management inquiry, the citing of Lucia points to another motive of the DOJ.  In a leaked internal memo, the Justice Department indicated its interpretation of the decision as a basis to bypass the Merit System Protection Board, allowing the Administration to more easily terminate ALJs whose decisions don’t align with its political views.  Such actions would constitute a troubling attempt by the executive branch to influence case outcomes.  Similarly, decertifying the NAIJ would simplify the removal of IJs whose decisions are at odds with the administration’s stated immigration goals by eliminating the present collective bargaining agreement’s right to an independent arbitrator in matters concerning IJ discipline and termination.

Just prior to the FLRA’s decision, an executive order  creating a schedule of career federal employees who can be more easily fired for purely political reasons (such as issuing decisions not in line with the administration’s views).  By ruling that IJs influence agency policy (contrary to its prior decision), the FLRA has put the Immigration Judges squarely in the crosshairs of the new executive order.  To be clear: Immigration Judges whose neutral and independent application of the law would lead them to issue decisions the administration doesn’t like would be subject to easy termination. And of course, having just lost their union, those judges will have lost their best means of challenging such termination. Then, the hiring of their replacements would become even more nakedly partisan.

While it seems as I write this there will be a new administration come January, that doesn’t render this issue irrelevant.  First, the earlier decertification effort in 2000 occurred under a Democratic administration.  Second, leaving the above ruling in place would allow it be used as a weapon in the ways described by any subsequent administration.  Whatever one’s political leanings or views on immigration, we should all be able to agree that decisions of such importance should be rendered by fair, neutral judges by applying law to facts, protected from rank political pressures.

The creation of an Article I Immigration Court is ultimately the most durable way to guarantee the independence of these vital tribunals, but the evisceration or protections caused by allowing this decision to stand is too egregious to ignore even in the short term.  It is therefore hoped that readers will amplify the news of the decision and all it means.  It is hoped those with the capacity to do so will provide amicus or other legal support for further actions by the NAIJ to legally challenge the FLRA decision.  And the decision must be brought to the attention of an incoming Biden administration, which has so much damage to correct

There also needs to be consequences for those who abandoned their obligation of fairness and neutrality under the present administration.  FLRA Member DuBester is to be applauded for continuing to strongly voice his defense of justice in the dissent.  But perhaps a Biden administration can assess whether Kiko and Abbott might be better suited for other work.

Copyright 2020 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved. reprinted with permission.

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Thanks for speaking out so forcefully and articulately, my friend,

I am confident that the Biden-Harris Administration will correct this egregious miscarriage of justice. As “Good Government” folks, I’m also confident that they they will constructively address the disgraceful dysfunctional mess at EOIR that threatens to topple the American justice system. We will finally have “problem solvers” leading our Government! That will make a positive difference for all Americans.

Due Process Forever!

PWS

11-09-20

🏴‍☠️☠️👎🏻🤮CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HOW AMERICA IS DISGRACED BY A CORRUPT, RACIST, WHITE NATIONALIST REGIME THAT HAS LAUNCHED A COWARDLY & ILLEGAL ATTACK DESIGNED TO KILL ASYLUM SEEKERS — Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase, “Taking a Sledgehammer to Asylum”

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Retired Immigration Judges

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/6/23/taking-a-sledgehammer-to-asylum

Taking a Sledgehammer to Asylum

The Trump Administration has repeatedly acted to damage our country’s asylum laws.  Its latest move, expressed in 161 pages of proposed regulations, does so with a sledgehammer.  The proposal claims that “as an expression of a nation’s foreign policy, the laws and policies surrounding asylum are an assertion of a government’s right and duty to protect its own resources and citizens, while aiding those in true need of protection from harm.”  Note how “aiding those in true need of protection from harm” comes last.  The proposal supports the preceding statement with a case that not only had nothing to do with asylum, but predated by eight years the enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act, which continues to serve as our country’s law of asylum.

It was necessary to reach back so far because the Refugee Act actually stands for the opposite proposition, placing the protection of those in need above foreign policy considerations.  The Refugee Act replaced our Cold War-influenced refugee preferences with an obligation to provide protection to those from any country fearing persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

The Department of Justice tried to limit the impact of this monumental change at its outset by interpreting the new legal standard as restrictively as possible.  In 1987, the Supreme Court rejected the Department’s interpretation of the term “well-founded fear,” finding that the meaning the Department applied to the term was not the one intended by Congress.  The Court found it clear that the primary purpose of Congress was to bring U.S. law into conformity with the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees.  It therefore looked for guidance to UNHCR and legal scholars, and concluded that the standard passed by Congress allowed for as little as a ten percent chance of persecution in order to merit asylum.

More than three decades later, District Court Judge Emmet G. Sullivan put a stop to the Department’s attempt to exclude victims of domestic violence and gang violence from asylum protection at the credible fear stage.  In a lengthy, detailed decision whose reasoning the Sixth Circuit recently adopted for full asylum determinations, the court reiterated that Congress, and not the Attorney General, creates our asylum laws, and that Congress intended for those laws to conform to the Protocol’s more expansive view.

It was because of that more expansive view that the Protocol, and its predecessor, the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, avoided the type of strict definitions the proposed regulations seek to impose.  One renowned scholar explained the drafters’ intent “to introduce a flexible concept which might be applied to circumstances as they might arise; or in other words, that they capitulated before the inventiveness of humanity to think up new ways of persecuting fellow men.”1  It is this built-in flexibility that the latest proposal takes exception to.

Of course, it is still Congress, and not the executive branch, that enacts our asylum laws.  And should the present proposal become a final rule before this administration is done, it will be the reassertion of that reality by the courts that will save those seeking refuge here.

I plan to address the different sections of the proposals in installments.  I begin with the proposal to redefine “political opinion.”

The last few months have taught us that, under the Trump Administration, everything is political.  Even the decision to wear a mask and self-isolate out of consideration to our neighbors has been cast as an expression of political opinion.  The virus itself was first depicted as a Democratic hoax; once its existence could no longer be denied, it had to be given a nationality and portrayed as part of a foreign plot.  This is a virus we are talking about.

The Administration saw political allies in armed and angry mobs who somehow portrayed temporary rules designed to protect us all by slowing the spread of disease as a denial of their basic human rights.  And then the same administration branded as political enemies those protesting the very real and systemically ingrained deprivation of their basic human rights solely because of the color of their skin.  The irony is not lost in this very same government that politicizes everything now imposing a very narrow, strict view of what can be called political opinion for asylum purposes.

Regulations may define or clarify laws, but may not rewrite them.  And the courts need only defer to the Department’s interpretation where the language of the law itself is ambiguous.  Courts may go to great lengths and employ all tools of construction at their disposal before deeming a statute ambiguous.

Looking to the Refugee Act, the courts will find that  in the 40 years since its passage, the only amendment relating to its definition of political opinion expanded the meaning of that term.  In 1996, the Republican-controlled Congress amended the refugee definition to read that coercive abortion and sterilization procedures constitute persecution on account of the victim’s political opinion.  Neither the wording of the statute nor its application by the BIA require any inquiry into the motives or beliefs of the victim of the coercive family planning policy.  In other words, a woman need not declare in an online manifesto that she will become pregnant as a statement of protest against an oppressive government’s policy.  One at risk of abortion for any pregnancy by law fears persecution on account of her political opinion.

The proposed regulations acknowledge this.  However, they fail to reconcile how the rest of the proposed language on this topic, the first attempt ever to restrict by either statute or regulation what may constitute a political opinion, is consistent with Congress’s adoption of such an expansive view of political opinion to allow even an accidental pregnancy to satisfy the term’s definition.

The Department provides a weak justification for interjecting itself into the matter in the first place, claiming that the evolving state of case law makes it just too difficult for immigration judges to apply the law consistently.  Any pretense of providing clarification vanishes upon attempting to decipher the proposed guidance on the topic.  Under the proposed rule, immigration judges, asylum officers, and the BIA will be precluded from granting asylum based on a political opinion “defined solely by generalized disapproval of, disagreement with, or opposition to criminal, terrorist, gang, guerilla, or other non-state organizations absent expressive behavior in furtherance of a cause against such organizations related to efforts by the state to control such organizations or behavior that is antithetical to or otherwise opposes the ruling legal entity of the state or a legal sub-unit of the state.”  What could be clearer than that?

As its sole example of the confusion that purportedly warrants the administration stepping in, the proposal cites two recent decisions.  The first (which we can assume the administration doesn’t like) is the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, holding that in resisting rape by an MS-13 member, the asylum applicant expressed “her opposition to the male-dominated social norms in El Salvador and her taking a stance against a culture that perpetuates female subordination and the brutal treatment of women.”

The other case referenced was a 15 year old Fourth Circuit decision, Saldarriaga v. Gonzales, which the Department describes as holding that “disapproval of a drug cartel is not a political opinion.”  In its attempt to demonstrate that immigration judges sitting in the jurisdictions of the Second and Fourth Circuits might reach different results, the Department conveniently omits a much more recent Fourth Circuit decision, Alvarez Lagos v. Barr, which found unrefuted evidence that the Barrio 18 gang imputed an anti-gang political opinion to the asylum-seeker’s nonpayment of extortion and flight to the U.S.  Including that decision would have cleared up the purported confusion used to justify the new rules, so the proposal simply ignored it.

But even accepting the Department’s view that different circuits might take different views on this topic, and that somehow, it’s the responsibility of someone like Stephen Miller, as opposed to the Supreme Court, to resolve such conflict, would applying that garbled definition cited above (and no, it does not become clearer with repeated reading) change the outcome of Hernandez-Chacon?  Because in the view of the court, the asylum applicant in that case did not simply express a generalized disapproval of a gang.  Her opposition to systemic injustice perpetuating brutality against women, who are viewed as a subordinate class, is an expression of something much larger, in which the government is implicated.

Grasping at additional straws, the Department also pointed to one sentence in a BIA decision from 1996, Matter of S-P-, stating the need in that case to examine whether the persecutors were motivated at least in part by their belief that the asylum applicant held political views “antithetical to the government.”  This, according to the administration, is proof that only views antithetical to the government can be political opinion.  However, in that case, the asylum seeker had been arrested, detained for six months, interrogated, and tortured by the government, specifically, government soldiers.  So in determining whether such persecution was on account of the applicant’s political opinion, in that particular case, the Board obviously focused on whether those soldiers thought the victims views were anti-government.  The sentence in no way intended to state that under all circumstances must political opinion be one that is directly aimed at the government.  By analogy, the BIA didn’t say that only women can be members of particular social groups because in one gender-based case, it analyzed whether the social group elements were “fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman.”  See Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 366 (BIA 1996).  The point is, the Board used the language necessary to decide the case before it, and for the Department to now pretend otherwise is disingenuous.

Note:

  1.  Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law 193 (1966).

Copyright 2020 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

Republished with permission.

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A nation’s inhumanity to others, allowing unqualified individuals like Stephen Miller to make policy, and moral cowardice will have severe future consequences. 

PWS

06-24-20