THE “GOOD GUYS” FINALLY WIN ONE @ THE SUPREMES: Judicial Review Exists For Application Of Law To Settled Facts In Immigration Cases (Here “Equitable Tolling”) — GUERRERO-LASPRILLA v. BARR (7-2, Justice Breyer, Majority Opinion)

 

GUERRERO-LASPRILLA v. BARR, No. 18-776, 03-23-20

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-776_8759.pdf

MAJORITY: BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.

DISSENT:  THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined as to all but Part II–A–

SYLLABUS BY REPORTER OF DECISIONS: 

The Immigration and Nationality Act provides for judicial review of a final Government order directing the removal of an alien from this country. 8 U. S. C. §1252(a). Section 1252(a)(2)(C) limits the scope of that review where the removal rests upon the fact that the alien has committed certain crimes. And §1252(a)(2)(D), the Limited Review Provision, says that in such instances courts may consider only “con- stitutional claims or questions of law.”

Petitioners Guerrero-Lasprilla and Ovalles, aliens who lived in the United States, committed drug crimes and were subsequently ordered removed (Guerrero-Lasprilla in 1998 and Ovalles in 2004). Neither filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings “within 90 days of the date of entry of [the] final administrative order of removal.” §1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Nonetheless, Guerrero-Lasprilla (in 2016) and Ovalles (in 2017) asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen their removal proceedings, arguing that the 90-day time limit should be equitably tolled. Both petitioners, who had become eligible for dis- cretionary relief due to various judicial and Board decisions years after their removal, rested their claim for equitable tolling on Lugo- Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F. 3d 337, in which the Fifth Circuit had held that the 90-day time limit could be equitably tolled. The Board denied both petitioners’ requests, concluding, inter alia, that they had not demonstrated the requisite due diligence. The Fifth Circuit denied their requests for review, holding that, given the Limited Review Pro-

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*Together with No. 18–1015, Ovalles v. Barr, Attorney General, also on certiorari to the same court.

vision, it “lack[ed] jurisdiction” to review petitioners’ “factual” due dil- igence claims. Petitioners contend that whether the Board incorrectly applied the equitable tolling due diligence standard to the undisputed facts of their cases is a “question of law” that the Provision authorizes courts of appeals to consider.

Held: Because the Provision’s phrase “questions of law” includes the ap- plication of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts, the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ claims of due diligence for equitable tolling purposes. Pp. 3–13.

(a) Nothing in the statute’s language precludes the conclusion that Congress used the term “questions of law” to refer to the application of a legal standard to settled facts. Indeed, this Court has at times re- ferred to the question whether a given set of facts meets a particular legal standard as presenting a legal inquiry. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U. S. 319, 326 (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law”); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 528, n. 9 (“[T]he appealable issue is a purely legal one: whether the facts alleged . . . support a claim of violation of clearly established law”); cf. Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U. S. 373, 376 (“The effect of admitted facts is a question of law”). That judicial usage indi- cates that the statutory term “questions of law” can reasonably encom- pass questions about whether settled facts satisfy a legal standard. The Court has sometimes referred to such a question as a “mixed ques- tion of law and fact.” See, e.g., U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U. S. ___, ___. And the Court has often used the phrase “mixed questions” in determining the proper standard for appellate re- view of a district, bankruptcy, or agency decision that applies a legal standard to underlying facts. But these cases present no such question involving the standard of review. And, in any event, nothing in those cases, nor in the language of the statute, suggests that the statutory phrase “questions of law” excludes the application of law to settled facts. Pp. 4–5.

(b) A longstanding presumption, the statutory context, and the stat- ute’s history all support the conclusion that the application of law to undisputed or established facts is a “questio[n] of law” within the meaning of §1252(a)(2)(D). Pp. 5–11.

  1. A “well-settled” and “strong presumption,” McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, 496, 498, “favor[s] judicial review of administrative action,” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 251. That presumption, which can only be overcome by “‘“clear and convincing evidence” ’ ” of congressional intent to preclude judicial review, Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U. S. 43, 64, has consistently been applied to immigration statutes, Kucana, 558 U. S., at 251. And thereis no reason to make an exception here. Because the Court can rea- sonably interpret the statutory term “questions of law” to encompass the application of law to undisputed facts, and given that a contrary interpretation would result in a barrier to meaningful judicial review, the presumption indicates that “questions of law” does indeed include mixed questions. Pp. 6–7.

  2. (2) The Limited Review Provision’s immediate statutory context belies the Government and the dissent’s claim that “questions of law” excludes the application of law to settled facts. The Provision is part of §1252, which also contains §1252(b)(9), the “zipper clause.” The zip- per clause is meant to “consolidate judicial review of immigration pro- ceedings into one action in the court of appeals.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 313. The zipper clause’s language makes clear that Con- gress understood the statutory term “questions of law and fact,” to in- clude the application of law to facts. One interpretation of the zipper clause at the very least disproves the Government’s argument that Congress consistently uses a three-part typology, such that “questions of law” cannot include mixed questions. And another interpretation— that “questions of law” in the zipper clause includes mixed questions— directly supports the holding here and would give the term the same meaning in the zipper clause and the Limited Review Provision. Pp. 7–8.

  3. (3) The Provision’s statutory history and relevant precedent also support this conclusion. The Provision was enacted in response to INS v. St. Cyr, in which the Court interpreted the predecessor of §1252(a)(2)(C) to permit habeas corpus review in order to avoid the serious constitutional questions that would arise from a contrary in- terpretation, 533 U. S., at 299–305, 314. In doing so, the Court sug- gested that the Constitution, at a minimum, protected the writ of ha- beas corpus “ ‘as it existed in 1789.’ ” Id., at 300–301. The Court then noted the kinds of review that were traditionally available in a habeas proceeding, which included “detentions based on errors of law, includ- ing the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes.” Id., at 302 (emphasis added). Congress took up the Court’s invitation to “provide an adequate substitute [for habeas review] through the courts of ap- peals,” id., at 314, n. 38. It made clear that the limits on judicial review in various §1252 provisions included habeas review, and it consoli- dated virtually all review of removal orders in one proceeding in the courts of appeals. Congress also added the Limited Review Provision, permitting review of “constitutional claims or questions of law.” Con- gress did so, the statutory history strongly suggests, because it sought an “adequate substitute” for habeas in view of St. Cyr’s guidance. If “questions of law” in the Provision does not include the misapplication of a legal standard to undisputed facts, then review would not includean element that St. Cyr said was traditionally reviewable in habeas. Lower court precedent citing St. Cyr and legislative history also sup- port this conclusion. Pp. 8–11.

  4. (c) The Government’s additional arguments in favor of its contrary reading are unpersuasive. More than that, the Government’s inter- pretation is itself difficult to reconcile with the Provision’s basic pur- pose of providing an adequate substitute for habeas review. Pp. 11– 13.

  5. No. 18–776, 737 Fed. Appx. 230; No. 18–1015, 741 Fed. Appx. 259, va- cated and remanded.,

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Congrats to Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, admittedly frequent “pincushions” here at “Courtside” for often voting to uphold injustice and authoritarianism in immigration cases, for “seeing the light” and voting with the “forces of justice” on this one. Justices Thomas and Alito, perhaps predictably, continue to side with the “forces of darkness and oppression.”

As to the impact, just offhand I would hazard a guess that most Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) cases involving those whose crimes make them mandatorily ineligible for asylum and withholding involve the application of law (Is it “torture?” Will the government “acquiesce?” Is it “probable?”) to established facts (“Individuals are frequently beaten, starved, and raped in detention while the government looks the other way”). Immigration Judges, driven by inappropriate “production quotas,” officially sanctioned anti-migrant attitudes, and intentionally misleading “politicized precedents” where the migrant always loses no matter how strong their case, too often get these questions wrong. Sometimes, “dead wrong!” 

Also, given the delays in Immigration Courts, most resulting from politically-motivated “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” within EOIR or just plain administrative incompetence under an overwhelming, largely self-created backlog, the issue of “equitable tolling” regularly comes up. Since the DOJ politicos and the OIL litigators “hate equitable tolling,” the BIA almost always strains to deny such claims no matter how well-documented and meritorious. Indeed, I suspect that the unavailability of effective judicial review by “real courts” has contributed to the disturbingly low quality of the BIA’s work in cases like this.

However welcome, and it certainly is, this is just a “limited fix” in what remains a blatantly unconstitutional and dysfunctional “court” system (where the courts are not actually fair and impartial tribunals) that threatens lives and American institutions every day it is allowed to continue to operate by the Supremes and the other Article IIIs, not to mention a feckless Congress.

Due Process Forever!

PWS

03-23-20

PROFILE IN JUDICIAL COWARDICE: ARTICLE III’S DERELICTION OF DUTY LEAVES BRAVE ASYLUM APPLICANTS AND THEIR COURAGEOUS ATTORNEYS DEFENSELESS AGAINST RACIST ONSLAUGHT BY TRUMP ADMINISTRATION! – “NDPA” Stalwarts Laura Lynch & Leidy Perez-Davis Blog Daily About What’s REALLY Happening At The Border As A Result Of JUDICIAL MALFEASANCE By Life-Tenured Federal Appellate Judges Who Were Supposed To Protect Our Rights, But Are Failing To Do So!

Laura Lynch
Laura Lynch
Senior Policy Counsel
AILA
Leidy Perez-Davis
Leidy Perez-Davis
Policy Counsel
AILA

Here’s their blog from the “front lines” of the New Due Process Army’s battle to save lives in South Texas, updated daily:

https://thinkimmigration.org/blog/2019/09/16/due-process-disaster-in-the-making-a-firsthand-look-at-the-port-courts-in-laredo-and-brownsville/

 

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It’s beyond disgusting! Life-tenured judges who should know better becoming “Modern Day Jim Crows!” What truly horrible, negative “role models” for younger attorneys fighting for the rights of the most vulnerable and to uphold our Constitutional system.

Speaking of good role models (in addition, of course, to Laura and Leidy, who are among the “best ever”), Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg should be congratulated for having the courage to speak out forcefully in Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant on the “right side of history” and against their colleagues’ disgraceful dereliction of duty and betrayal of their oaths to uphold the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

And, there have been few greater enemies of the U.S. Constitution and the true “rule of law” than Trump and his band of political, bureaucratic, and judicial sycophants!

Due Process Forever, Cowardly Judging Never!

PWS

09-20-19

 

 

 

 

PROFESSOR CORI ALONSO-YODER EXPLAINS NIELSEN v. PREAP (Indefinite Immigration Detention)

https://www.gwlr.org/defining-the-in-nielsen-v-preap-the-court-relies-on-language-arts-to-justify-detention-of-immigrants/

Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. ___ (2019) (Alito, J.).
Response by Cori Alonso-Yoder
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. On the Docket (Oct. Term 2018)
Slip Opinion | SCOTUSblog

Defining “the”: In Nielsen v. Preap the Court relies on language arts to justify detention of immigrants

What does “when” mean? Is it evident what the definition of “the” is? If you are generally comfortable that these words are clear and unlikely to generate controversy, please spare a few moments to consider the Court’s recent opinion in Nielsen v. Preap.1

At issue in the case was the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1226, a provision that addresses the detention and apprehension of noncitizens.2The titular respondent, Mony Preap, represented a class of individuals certified in the District Court for the Northern District of California whose case was joined to a separate class action out of the Western District of Washington (collectively, “the respondents”). Preap, a lawful permanent resident of the U.S., was detained by immigration officials in 2013, seven years after he had been released from criminal custody. Preap’s claim on behalf of the class challenged the government’s denial of an opportunity to seek bail under § 1226(c)(1), the so-called mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. Under that provision, the Secretary of Homeland Security (“the Secretary”) “shall take into custody” certain categories of individuals who fall within four subsections set out at § 1226(c)(1)(A)–(D). Further, § 1226(c)(2) limits the opportunity of those described in section (c)(1) to seek release on bail to only a small category of individuals whose release is necessary for witness protection or cooperation with an investigation.3

Perhaps the only point on which all parties to Preap agreed was that the (c)(2) exception was not at issue here. Instead, Preap et al. argued that § 1226(c) was wholly inapplicable to them, and that their immigration proceedings should instead be viewed under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) which establishes the Secretary’s discretionary detention authority while also providing that she “may release the alien on . . .bond . . .or [] conditional parole.”4 While the respondents did not dispute that they fell under one of the categories set out at § 1226(c)(1)(A)–(D) (describing individuals who have committed certain crimes, who have engaged in certain terrorist activities, or who share certain family relationships with those who have engaged in terrorist activities), they argued before the lower courts that the description of whom is governed by § 1226 includes additional modifying language outside of the (A) through (D) subparagraphs.

Namely, the respondents argued that those subsections flow to and incorporate the remainder of the statutory language at (c)(1) which states that, “[t]he [Secretary] shall take into custody any alien who – [sets forth the classifications at (c)(1)(A)–(D)] when the alien is released.”5 Because the respondents were not detained until years after they were released from criminal custody, they contended that—and the lower courts up through the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed—they were not governed by § 1226(c). This decision resulted in a circuit split with four other Courts of Appeals, leading the Supreme Court to grant review.

In a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Alito, the Court applies a theory of statutory construction heavily reliant on grammar and dictionary definitions to hold that the Ninth Circuit’s reading of § 1226(c) is not supported in the plain language of the statute. In a highly pedantic analysis likely to evoke images of AP English for some, the Court concludes, “[s]ince an adverb cannot modify a noun, § 1226(c)(1)’s adverbial clause ‘when . . .released’ does not modify the noun ‘alien,’ which is modified instead by the adjectival clauses appearing in subparagraphs (A)–(D).”6 Confident that the “‘rules of grammar govern’ statutory interpretation ‘unless they contradict legislative intent or purpose’”7 the Court proceeds to the dictionary to support its construction of § 1226(c). In holding that the respondents are brought under the authority of § 1226(c) the Court looks to the Webster’s definition of “describe” to discern its meaning. In so doing, the Court finds that the provision at (c)(2) narrows the opportunities for individuals “described” in (c)(1) to be considered for release to the exception for witness protection. The Court then finds support in Merriam-Webster’s definition of “the” to establish that (c)(1)’s reference to “when the alien is released” refers to the definite categories listed in (A)–(D), thereby refuting the respondents’ argument that this phrase functions as an additional modifier on whom (c)(1) reaches.8

Yet, when it comes to deciphering the meaning of the temporal aspect of that key phrase, the Court slams the dictionary shut. Instead, in a part of the decision joined only by a plurality of the Court, Justice Alito concludes that the meaning of “when” in “when the alien is released” was intended by Congress to set a temporal starting point, not a statute of limitation, establishing the earliest possibility during which the Secretary could detain a noncitizen (any time after release from criminal custody, but no sooner).

What the plurality of the Court declines to look up, the dissent is pleased to crack open. Writing for the four dissenting judges, Justice Breyer looks to the Ninth Circuit’s understanding of “when” to include the definitions “[a]t the time that,”9 or “just after the moment that.”10 But the dissent discards these meanings of “when” and their connotations of immediacy, relying instead on Oxford English Dictionary’s recognition that the word “only ‘[s]ometimes impl[ies] suddenness.’”11

Instead, the dissent largely avoids the debate on grammar, and focuses its discussion on the constitutional implications of the majority’s approach.12 Invoking his dissent in last term’s Jennings v. Rodriguez, Justice Breyer reaffirms his concern that immigration detention without the possibility for periodic bond review violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.13Drawing on Jennings and on the Court’s opinion in Zadvydas v. Davis,14 Justice Breyer would read a six month limit (as interpreted in Zadvydas and found in comparable parts of the immigration statute) into the meaning of the government’s authority to detain these individuals “when they are released.” In this way, Breyer would bring the individuals set out at §§ (A)–(D) within the ambit of § 1226(c)(1) only if they are detained within six months of release from criminal custody. Breyer explains that to interpret the statute otherwise would create a constitutional question that must be avoided. “The issue may sound technical,” Justice Breyer observes, but “[t]hese are not mere hypotheticals.”15 While the majority focuses on grammar and avoiding a potential burden to the government, the dissent is concerned about the immediate harms to individuals facing unreviewable prolonged detention for possibly minor offenses.

Having recently returned from providing legal services to immigrant detainees with the Southern Poverty Law Center’s Southeast Immigrant Freedom Initiative (SIFI), Justice Breyer’s concerns are particularly salient for me. In rural Georgia, SIFI staff work with individuals detained at the Stewart Detention Center.16 While SIFI aims to meet the needs of nearly two thousand individuals cycling in and out of the facility at any given time, the program’s pro bono legal representation is narrowly focused on securing bond or parole for eligible individuals. This narrow scope is still incredibly fraught, with routine denials of applications for bond and parole.17Even where immigrants appearing before the Stewart Immigration Court in Lumpkin, Georgia are afforded an opportunity for a bond hearing, only 34% of applications for release were granted between 2007 and 2018.18 Nationwide, the number is higher, but still less than 50%.19

As Justice Breyer observes, his outcome would not provide guaranteed release on bail, it would simply afford a noncitizen the opportunity to demonstrate why he should be released. The immigration court is then free to approve or (more likely) deny the application. The Preap majority declines to provide this opportunity, interpreting the statute to foreclose the possibility for these individuals to even try for release. The Court’s majority takes care to avoid deciding the constitutional issues that the dissent so gamely tackles head on. The result, long term detention of several categories of individuals without the opportunity for judicial review, should be justified with some stronger stuff than the mere diagramming of sentences.


Ana Corina “Cori” Alonso-Yoder is the Practitioner-in-Residence and Clinical Professor of Law with the Immigrant Justice Clinic at the American University Washington College of Law. Professor Alonso-Yoder’s commentary on immigration law and immigrants’ rights has been featured by ABC News, The Atlantic, Washington Monthly, and The National Law Journal & Legal Times among others.


    1. No. 16-1363 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2019).
    2. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012).
    3. Id. § (c)(2).
    4. Id. §§ (a)(2)(A)–(B).
    5. Id. § (c)(1) (emphasis added).
    6. Preap, slip op., at 2 (syllabus of the Court).
    7. Id. at 14 (majority opinion). Here the Court quotes A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts140 (2012) (which in turn cites Costello v. INS, 346 U.S. 120, 122–26 (1964)).
    8. Preap, slip op. at 14 ((“‘the’ is ‘a function word . . . indicat[ing] that a following noun or noun equivalent is definite or has been previously specified by context’” (quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1294 (11th ed. 2005))).
    9. Id. at 15 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing American Heritage Dictionary, at 1971).
    10. Id. (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, at 2602).
    11. Id. (citing Oxford English Dictionary 209 (2d. ed. 1989)).
    12. Perhaps as an expression of his view on the level of grammatical expertise required to decide this case, Breyer refers to the individuals who fall under § 1226’s mandatory detention scheme as “‘ABCD’ aliens.” Id. at 3.
    13. Id. at 12 (citing U.S. Const. amend. V; Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. ___ (2018) (dissenting opinion)).
    14. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
    15. Preap, slip op. at 4 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
    16. See Southeast Immigrant Freedom Initiative (SIFI),Southern Poverty Law Center, https://www.splcenter.org/our-issues/immigrant-justice/southeast-immigrant-freedom-initiative-en.
    17. See Syracuse University, Report on Immigration Bond Hearings and Related Decisions for Lumpkin Immigration Court, TRAC Immigration Project, https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/bond/.
    18. Id.
    19. Id. (searching bond data from all immigration courts between 2005 and 2018 which reflects that of 73,785 only 35,449 or roughly 48%, were granted).

Recommended Citation
Cori Alonso-Yoder, Response, Defining “the”: In Nielsen v. Preap the Court relies on language arts to justify detention of immigrants, Geo. Wash. L. Rev. On the Docket (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.gwlr.org/defining-the-in-nielsen-v-preap-the-court-relies-on-language-arts-to-justify-detention-of-immigrants/.

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Thanks, Cori, for this very clear and understandable analysis of this important case involving so-called “civil” immigration detention.

PWS

04-03-19

 

PROFESSOR CORI ALONSO-YODER ANALYZES SUPREME’S JENNINGS V. RODRIGUEZ

https://www.gwlr.org/jennings-v-rodriguez-against-the-backdrop-of-executive-enforcement-and-legislative-inaction-the-court-revisits-the-issue-of-prolonged-immigration-detention

Mar. 5, 2018


Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. ___ (2018) (Alito, J.).
Response by Cori Alonso-Yoder
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. On the Docket (Oct. Term 2017)
Slip Opinion | New York Times | SCOTUSblog

Jennings v. Rodriguez: Against the Backdrop of Executive Enforcement and Legislative Inaction, the Court Revisits the Issue of Prolonged Immigration Detention

Today marks President Trump’s deadline to Congress for addressing the question of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, known as DACA. In the months since the Administration announced the end of the DACA program, the debate on immigration reform has expanded from the initial ultimatum to create a legislative alternative to the program, to new issues of restriction on current legal immigration, including the elimination of certain family-based categories and the repeal of the visa lottery system. After months of opportunity to address these questions, congressional efforts to reform immigration appear stalled beyond salvation, in no small part due to a clear lack of direction from the President himself. As a result, DACA seems destined to expire today due to inaction from leaders at the legislative and executive levels.

Onto this backdrop, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez1 on February 27th. Writing for a five-to-three majority on issues related to immigration detention, Justice Samuel Alito reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision granting semiannual bond hearings to certain categories of immigrant detainees. Only Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy joined the Alito opinion in full, with Justices Gorsuch and Thomas declining to endorse the plurality’s view of a jurisdictional question in the case (for which Justice Thomas authored a concurrence). In the dissent, Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg signed onto Justice Breyer’s passionate and lengthy opinion arguing for bail provisions to be extended to these detainees.

At issue in Jennings are conditions of detention and related questions of bond eligibility for individuals falling within three statutory categories, all of whom have been detained longer than six months. Lead plaintiff, Alejandro Rodriguez, represents the class as a whole as well as the category of individuals detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (individuals who have been convicted of certain crimes or engaged in terrorist activities). The class also includes individuals detained under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (asylum seekers), and under § 1225(b)(2)(A) (applicants for admission who are not clearly entitled to be admitted, otherwise known as “arriving aliens”).

In its opinion, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s construction of §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) as requiring a six-month periodic review to save the statutory framework from constitutional nullification. Relying on the Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis2 and the canon of constitutional avoidance, the lower court reasoned that a six-month bond review must be interpreted into the relevant provisions in order for the framework to survive constitutional scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Court found this interpretation “implausible,” holding that the clear language of those statutory provisions is susceptible to only one interpretation that does not contemplate a periodic custody review, and that the canon of constitutional avoidance only applies where more than one plausible interpretation of the statute is available.3 The Court also distinguished its decision in Zadvydas by underscoring the ambiguity of the potential length of detention in the statute at issue in that case. By contrast, in Jennings the Court reasons that Congress left no room for similar interpretation in this case, having explicitly provided for conclusion of detention of these individuals only in certain circumstances clearly expressed in the relevant statutes.

The majority proceeds to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s construction of the detention statutes, but declines to reach the Fifth Amendment and Due Process arguments raised by the respondents. Instead, the Court remands the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings to consider the constitutional merits of those claims, while simultaneously suggesting that a class action may not be the appropriate vehicle for those individualized claims.

The opinion of the Court is striking because the dissenting justices feel no such compunction to reserve the constitutional questions. In fact, Justice Breyer’s opinion rests almost exclusively on Due Process and, to a lesser extent, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, spending little time relative to the majority in interpreting the relevant statutory provisions. Instead, Justice Breyer points to numerous factors to argue why the majority’s reading of the detention statutes cannot survive constitutional scrutiny and must be reconstructed to include a bond provision. Among these factors, he notes the sheer number of individuals detained under §§ 1225 and 1226, the increasingly lengthy terms of their detention, and the high likelihood of success on the merits for many within these categories in their claims for immigration relief.

Regarding the number of detainees affected by this decision, the dissent notes that nearly 20,000 individuals, 7500 asylum seekers, and 12,220 noncitizens who have completed terms of confinement for criminal convictions, fall within two of the three categories of detainee considered by the Court. The dissenting opinion also cites the length of detentions at issue, noting that they are now considerably longer than six months, and distinguishing this from the short-term detention of immigrant detainees addressed by the Court in Demore v. Kim.4 In concluding that the respondents should have access to a more flexible opportunity to apply for bond, the dissent is also persuaded by statistics showing that nearly two-thirds of the asylum seekers and 40% of those detained following criminal confinement ultimately prevail in applications to remain in the United States.

Also present in the dissent, but not in the opinion of the Court, is limited reference to increased immigration enforcement by the Trump Administration. While the politics of enforcement are not met head on, Justice Breyer’s dissent alludes to current events by citing President Trump’s Executive Order5 directing parole of detainees only under certain limited circumstances.6

As the lower court is left to address the constitutional questions, the Breyer dissent proves instructive by reaching elements of those arguments that the Court declines to take up in its majority opinion. Among the issues previewed in the dissent that are likely to arise on remand is the Government’s assertion that many of the respondents in Jennings cannot claim the protection of the Fifth Amendment because “the law treats arriving aliens as if they had never entered the United States; hence they are not held within its territory.”7 The dissent roundly dismisses this interpretation as “of course, false,”8 but the question will become an increasingly important one for the courts to address, especially as Jennings continues its trajectory through the federal appellate courts.

Indeed, the unsettled nature of the Jennings decision foreshadows a future in which the courts are likely to wrestle with increased calls to address these issues of detention and enforcement. For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) gives Customs and Border Protection Agents broad powers of search and seizure without a warrant to enforce immigration laws within a broad reach of an international border,9 generally held to reach within 100 miles of the U.S. interior.

In addition, the Trump Administration has signaled an intent to aggressively enforce the nation’s existing immigration laws, while also expanding the reaches of the law to further restrict legal immigration. Along with Executive Order No. 13,767, cited in the Jennings dissent, the Trump Administration also published Executive Order No. 13,768, “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States.”10 Taken together (and issued the same day within the first week of the new administration), these two Executive Orders enshrined the campaign promises of the new President to act aggressively and expansively to secure the border and enforce immigration law within the interior of the United States.

According to Immigration and Customs Enforcement data, these efforts have proven effective, with immigration officials charting an increase of 42% in administrative arrests.11 Meanwhile, the immigration courts’ backlogs continue to grow, expanding from approximately 212,000 cases at the beginning of fiscal year 2006 with a median wait pending time of 198 days, to approximately 437,000 cases in fiscal year 2015 with a median pending time of 404 days.12 These numbers reflect a judiciary crippled by backlog and increased enforcement even before the injection of the new administration’s revamped and expanded priorities for enforcement. In the current climate of legislative inaction, it is likely the courts will continue to be the explainers and problem solvers for a system desperately in need of reform. As with questions of immigration reform, the Jennings remand means that we are likely to be revisiting these issues again not long from now.


Ana Corina “Cori” Alonso-Yoder is the Practitioner-in-Residence and Clinical Professor of Law with the Immigrant Justice Clinic at the American University Washington College of Law. Professor Alonso-Yoder’s commentary on immigration law and immigrants’ rights has been featured by ABC News, The Atlantic, Washington Monthly, and The National Law Journal & Legal Times among others.


  1. Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15–1204, slip op. (U.S. Feb. 27, 2018).
  2. 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (requiring a custody review hearing after six months of detention in order to avoid unconstitutional indefinite detention where an individual cannot be removed from the United States).
  3. Jennings, slip op. at 12–13.
  4. 538 U.S. 510, 530 (2003) (noting that the detention at issue in that case “lasts roughly a month and a half”).
  5. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017).
  6. Jennings, slip op. at 25 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
  7. Id. at 7.
  8. Id.
  9. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2012).
  10. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017).
  11. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, ICE Impact in FY 2017 (2018), https://www.ice.gov/topics/fy2017.
  12. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-17-438, Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges (2017).

Recommended Citation Cori Alonso-Yoder, Response, Jennings v. Rodriguez:Against the Backdrop of Executive Enforcement and Legislative Inaction, the Court Revisits the Issue of Prolonged Immigration Detention, Geo. Wash. L. Rev. On the Docket (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.gwlr.org/jennings-v-rodriguez-against-the-backdrop-of-executive-enforcement-and-legislative-inaction-the-court-revisits-the-issue-of-prolonged-immigration-detention.

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Thanks for a great article, Cori!

Here are links to previous posts on Jennings:

https://wp.me/p8eeJm-2e8

https://wp.me/p8eeJm-2cL

https://wp.me/p8eeJm-1wI

The third of these posts illustrates how Constitutionally required bond hearings change and save lives and how the majority’s short-shrifting of Constitutional Due Process could actually cost lives.

PWS

03-07-18

JUSTICE BREYER IS RIGHTFULLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE “DREDSCOTTIFICATION’” OF IMMIGRANTS AS SHOWN IN THE LEGALLY & MORALLY BANKRUPT VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY IN JENNINGS V. RODRIGUEZ!

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/03/justice-alito-just-signaled-the-supreme-courts-conservatives-might-not-consider-immigrants-to-be-people.html

Mark Joseph Stern reports for Slate:

“Tuesday’s Supreme Court decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez was widely viewed as an anticlimax. The case involves a group of immigrants being held in custody without any hope of bail. They argue that their indefinite detention violates due process, but the majority declined to resolve the constitutional question, sending the case back down to the lower court. In a sense, the plaintiffs are back where they started.

Justice Stephen Breyer, however, saw something far more chilling in the majority’s opinion. Taking the rare and dramatic step of reading his dissent from the bench, Breyer cautioned that the court’s conservative majority may be willing to strip immigrants of personhood in a manner that harkens back to Dred Scott. The justice used his impassioned dissent to sound an alarm. We ignore him at our own peril.

Jennings involves three groups of noncitizen plaintiffs: asylum-seekers, immigrants who have committed crimes but finished serving their sentences, and immigrants who believe they’re entitled to enter the country for reasons unrelated to persecution. A high percentage of these types of immigrants ultimately win the right to enter the U.S. But federal law authorizes the government to detain them while it adjudicates their claims in case it secures the authority to deport them instead.

The detention of these immigrants—often in brutal facilities that impose inhuman punishments—has, in practice, dragged on for months, even years. There is no clear recourse for detained immigrants who remain locked up without a hearing. In 2001’s Zadvydas v. Davis, the court found that a similar scheme applied to “deportable aliens” would almost certainly violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. To avoid this constitutional problem, the court construed the law as limiting detention to six months.

But in Jennings, the court’s five-member conservative majority interpreted another federal law to permit indefinite detention of thousands of aliens, with no apparent concern for the constitutional problems that reading creates. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority, revealed from the outset of his opinion that he dislikes Zadvydas, dismissing it as a “notably generous” holding that avoided the constitutional issue in order to secure due process for immigrants. Unlike the Zadvydas court, Alito has no interest in protecting the constitutional rights of noncitizens. Instead, he read the current statute as stingily as possible, concluding that it did, indeed, allow the government to detain all three groups of immigrants indefinitely.

Oddly, Alito then chose not to address whether this interpretation of the statute rendered it unconstitutional. Instead, he sent the case back down to the lower courts to re-examine the due process question. But in the process, the justice telegraphed where he stands on the issue by attempting to sabotage the plaintiffs on their way out the door. In the lower courts, this case proceeded as a class action, allowing the plaintiffs to fight for the rights of every other similarly situated immigrant. The government didn’t ask the Supreme Court to review whether it was proper for it to litigate the plaintiffs’ claims as a class. But Alito did it anyway, strongly suggesting that the lower court should dissolve the class and force every plaintiff to litigate his case by himself.

Alito’s antics infuriated Breyer, who dissented along with Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor. (Justice Elena Kagan recused, presumably because she worked on the case as solicitor general.) Using Zadvydas as a jumping-off point, he interpreted the statute to require a bail hearing for immigrants after six months’ confinement—provided they pose no risk of flight or danger to the community. “The Due Process Clause foresees eligibility for bail as part of ‘due process,’ ” Breyer explained. By its own terms, that clause applies to every “person” in the country. Thus, the Constitution only permits the government to detain these immigrants without bail if they are not considered “persons” within the United States.

That is essentially what the government argued, asserting that immigrants detained at the border have no rights. This theory justifiably fills Breyer with righteous disgust. “We cannot here engage in this legal fiction,” he wrote. “No one can claim, nor since the time of slavery has anyone to my knowledge successfully claimed, that persons held within the United States are totally without constitutional protection.” Breyer continued:

Whatever the fiction, would the Constitution leave the government free to starve, beat, or lash those held within our boundaries? If not, then, whatever the fiction, how can the Constitution authorize the government to imprison arbitrarily those who, whatever we might pretend, are in reality right here in the United States? The answer is that the Constitution does not authorize arbitrary detention. And the reason that is so is simple: Freedom from arbitrary detention is as ancient and important a right as any found within the Constitution’s boundaries.

Unfortunately, Breyer is not quite right that “no one” could claim, at least since “the time of slavery,” that noncitizens held in the U.S. “are totally without constitutional protection.” Just last October, Judge Karen L. Henderson of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit argued exactly that. In a stunning dissent, Henderson wrote that a pregnant, undocumented minor held in custody was “not entitled to the due process protections of the Fifth Amendment” because “[she] has never entered the United States as a matter of law … ” (The Due Process Clause protects women’s rights to abortion access.) In fact, the minor had entered the country and lived here for several months. But because she entered illegally, Henderson asserted that she had no constitutional rights. That’s precisely the “legal fiction” that Breyer rejected. It’s shockingly similar to the theory used to justify slavery and Dred Scott.

Do the Supreme Court’s conservatives agree with Henderson that undocumented immigrants detained in the U.S. have no constitutional protections? Breyer seems to fear that they do. In a striking peroration, Breyer reminded his colleagues that “at heart,” the issues before them “are simple”:

We need only recall the words of the Declaration of Independence, in particular its insistence that all men and women have “certain unalienable Rights,” and that among them is the right to “Liberty.” We need merely remember that the Constitution’s Due Process Clause protects each person’s liberty from arbitrary deprivation. And we need just keep in mind the fact that … liberty has included the right of a confined person to seek release on bail. It is neither technical nor unusually difficult to read the words of these statutes as consistent with this basic right.

We should all be concerned that Breyer found it necessary to explain these first principles to the court. So many rights flow from the Due Process Clause’s liberty component: not just the right to be free from arbitrary detention and degrading treatment, but also the right to bodily integrity and to equal dignity. Should the court rule that undocumented immigrants lack these basic liberties, what’s to stop the government from torturing them, executing them, or keeping them imprisoned forever?

If that sounds dramatic, consider Breyer’s somber warning about possible starvation, beatings, and lashings. The justice plainly recognizes that, with Jennings, the court may have already taken a step down this dark and dangerous path.”

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As an appellate judge, I remember being infuriated by the callous attitude of some of my “Ivory Tower” colleagues and some trial judges who tended to minimize and sometimes trivialize human pain and suffering to arrive at nonsensical legalistic definitions of what constituted “persecution” or “torture.”

They simply didn’t want to recognize truth, because it would have resulted in more people being granted relief. In frustration, I occasionally privately suggested to staff that perhaps we needed an “interactive session” at the Annual Immigration Judges Conference (back in the days when we used to have such things) where those jurists who were immune to others’ pain and suffering would be locked in a room and subjected to some of the same treatment themselves. I imagine they would have been less stoic if it were happening to them rather than to someone else.

I doubt that any of the five Justices who joined the tone-deaf majority in Jennings would last more than a few days, not to mention years, in the kind of intentionally cruel, substandard, and deplorable conditions in which individuals, the majority of whom have valid claims to remain here under U.S. and international law, are detained in the “New American Gulag.” So, why is there no obvious Constitutional Due Process problem with subjecting individuals to so-called “civil” immigration detention, without recourse, under conditions that no human being, judge or not, should be forced to endure?

No, “Tone-Deaf Five,” folks fighting for their lives in immigration detention, many of whom lack basic legal representation that others take for granted,  don’t have time to bring so-called “Bivens actions” (which the Court has pretty much judicially eliminated anyway) for “so-called “Constitutional torts!” Come on man, get serious!

Privileged jurists like Alito and Thomas speak in undecipherable legal trivialities and “pretzel themselves up” to help out corporate entities and other members of the privileged classes, yet have no time for clear violations of the Constitutional rights of the most vulnerable among us.

A much wiser, more humble, and less arrogant “judge” than Justice Alito and friends once said “Most certainly I tell you, inasmuch as you did it to one of the least of these my brothers, you did it to me.” When will the arrogant ever learn, when will they ever learn? Maybe not until it happens to them! Harm to the most vulnerable among us is harm to all of us! We should all be concerned that Justice Alito and his fellow judicial “corporate elitists” have “dissed” the Due Process Clause of our  Constitution which protects everyone in America, not just corporations, gun owners, and over-privileged, under-humanized jurists! 

Based upon recent statistics, approximately one person per month will die in the “DHS New American Gulag” while this case is “on remand” to the lower courts. How would Alito, Roberts, Thomas, Kennedy, and Gorsuch feel if it were their loved ones who perished, rather than some faceless (to them) “alien” (who also happens to be a human being)? Dehumanizing the least among us, like the Dred Scott decision did, de-humanizes all of us! For that, there is no defense at the bar of history and humanity.

PWS

03-01-18

Justice Gorsuch Thinks It’s Great That The “government can lose in its own courts.” — I Agree! — But, The Guy Who Appointed Him Might Not!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/gorsuch-stresses-rule-of-law-system-where-government-can-lose-in-its-own-courts/2017/06/03/6d85cdc4-487b-11e7-a196-a1bb629f64cb_story.html?utm_term=.16cabc457759

Robert Barnes reports for the Washington Post:

“CAMBRIDGE, Mass. — With legal challenges to the Trump administration’s initiatives multiplying in federal courts, new Supreme Court Justice Neil M. Gorsuch extolled the virtues of judicial independence and praised a legal system in which “government can lose in its own courts” Friday night.

It was the first public appearance off the bench for President Trump’s choice for the high court, who joined Justice Stephen G. Breyer at the Harvard Marshall Forum. Both are former Marshall scholars who did graduate work in the United Kingdom, and spoke at an event commemorating the 70th anniversary of George C. Marshall’s plan to rebuild Europe after World War II.

The event was about as noncontroversial as it could be, even if one of the first questions to Gorsuch concerned a naked sex doll the future justice observed when he had tea with an Oxford dean.

Trump last week made good on his pledge to political opponents to “see you in the Supreme Court,” asking the justices to revive his plan to temporarily ban entry to citizens of six mostly Muslim countries. A string of judges and appeals courts have concluded the president’s executive orders have more to do with his campaign pledge to ban Muslims from entering the country than an immediate threat to the country’s security.

Trump has bitterly denounced those rulings, as well as a decision to stop his proposal to cut federal funds from cities that protect illegal immigrants. During the campaign, he criticized a federal judge who ruled against him in a suit involving his for-profit universities because he said the judge’s Mexican ancestry made him prejudiced.

Jeffrey Rosen, a legal scholar and writer who is also president of the National Constitution Center, did not ask Gorsuch and Breyer about those controversies or any matter before the court.

But Gorsuch and Breyer talked in broad terms about independence and respect for the judicial branch’s decisions.

Gorsuch said he is grateful for the tradition that “judges can safely decide the law according to their conscience, without fear of reprisal.”

It is a remarkable thing, he said, “that government can lose, in its own courts, and accept the judgment of those courts without an army to back up the judgments. Just nine old people in polyester black robes that we have to buy at the uniform supply store…that is a heritage that is very special.”

As he did at his confirmation hearing, Gorsuch downplayed divisive decisions and stressed unanimity and acceptance of court’s decisions. Only about 5 percent of cases are appealed, he said, and “our court” accepts only 80 or so a year, a relative handful.

“Nine justices appointed by six presidents over a 30-year period,” Gorsuch said. “And we’re unanimous about 40 percent of the time.”

Of course, it is the closely divided cases at the appeals courts and the Supreme Court that are its most important. But Gorsuch and Breyer stressed the independence judges have to make controversial decisions.”

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Read the complete story at the link.

Even today, in the wake of tragedy in London, Trump couldn’t resist an inappropriate tweet taking a cheap shot at the U.S. Courts. Nor could he stop himself from trying to promote panic and throwing darts at the Mayor of London. He’s certainly the embodiment of the “Ugly American.”

One of the major differences between the U.S. and the many countries I dealt with on a daily basis over the past 21 years in various courts is the true independence of the Article III judiciary in the U.S.

By contrast, Trump’s demeanor, behavior, temperament, and the folks he surrounds himself with are very reminiscent of third-world dictators.

PWS

06-04-17