🔥BURNED AGAIN! — Garland’s BIA Torched By 2d Cir. For Multiple Errors In Legal Standards Relating To Asylum,Withholding, & CAT! — Ojo v. Garland

 

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/cc2301b5-aa22-4767-9199-a8061927397c/1/doc/19-3237_complete_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/cc2301b5-aa22-4767-9199-a8061927397c/1/hilite/

Ojo v. Garland, 2d C ir., 02-09-22, published 

PANEL: CHIN, BIANCO, AND MENASHI, Circuit Judges.

OPINION: JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judge

DISSENTING OPINION: MENASHI, Circuit Judge

SUMMARY BY COURT:

Olukayode David Ojo, a native of Nigeria, seeks review of a September 27, 2019 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming an April 15, 2019 decision of an immigration judge, which denied asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. See In re Olukayode David Ojo, No. A088-444-553 (B.I.A. Sept. 27, 2019), aff’g No. A088-444-553 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Apr. 15, 2019).

We grant Ojo’s petition for review and vacate the agency’s denial of Ojo’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection because those determinations were permeated with several legal and procedural errors. First, insofar as Ojo’s request for asylum was rejected as untimely, the agency applied the wrong legal standard to his claim of changed circumstances and the agency’s alternative discretionary determination failed to indicate the requisite examination of the totality of the circumstances. Second, with respect to Ojo’s application for withholding of removal, the agency erred when it incorrectly categorized his federal conviction for wire fraud and identity theft as “crimes against persons,” and concluded that they fell within the ambit of “particularly serious crimes” without evaluating the elements of the offenses as required under the agency’s own precedent. Finally, with respect to his CAT claim, the agency erred in concluding that Ojo lacked a reasonable fear of future persecution or torture in Nigeria due to his status as a criminal deportee without even addressing the declaration of his expert supporting his claim.

Accordingly, the petition for review is GRANTED, the BIA’s decision is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE MENASHI dissents in a separate opinion.

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The majority opinion is 51 pages; Judge Menashi’s dissent another 35 pages. That’s 86 pages of Article III time trying to straighten out the BIA’s sloppy work and mis-application of basic legal concepts. 

It would be in everyone’s best interests if Garland jettisoned his “Miller Lite holdover BIA” and replaced them with real appellate judges — experts in human rights and asylum law with reputations for careful practical, due-process-focused scholarship — Judges like his sole BIA appointment to date, Judge Andrea Saenz.

It’s painfully obvious that the out of control problems in immigration law will NOT be solved with the BIA currently in place. They lack the expertise, temperament, and background to get “the retail level of our justice system” back on track. 

As this case, among others, illustrates, Garland’s failure to institute long overdue personnel and quality control reforms at EOIR is continuing to “bleed over” into the Article IIIs, occupying an increasing amount of their time. It also creates astounding inconsistencies among Circuits and among panels in the same Circuit. Garland’s “personal court system” is dysfunctional on multiple levels and is sowing more dysfunction throughout our justice system!

Garland and his lieutenants, including “above the fray” Solicitor General Liz Prelogar, also should take a look at the OIL “defense” in this case. It’s basically this: 

“The respondent is a bad guy. So, it doesn’t matter if the BIA applies the wrong legal standards because they have discretion to deport any bad guy for any reason or even for the wrong reason. Even if the BIA didn’t do its job, you, Court of Appeals, should do it for them because, as we said, this is one bad dude who needs deporting. Did we mention that he’s a bad guy?”

The combined abysmal performance of EOIR and OIL, enhanced by the lack of leadership and engagement from Garland and his senior managers, is eroding the foundations of the U.S. legal system at an alarmingly rapid rate!

The majority was written by Judge Joseph F. Bianco, a recent Trump appointee; the dissenter, Judge Steven Menashi, is also a Trump appointee whose rise from right-wing “campus troll” to the Federal Bench was controversial. See, e.g., https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/12/20858813/steven-mensashi-ethnonationalism-trump-nominee.

I will say that at least he thought about, analyzed, and explained his views in much greater detail than the so-called “subject matter experts” at the BIA.

The answer is to replace the ongoing “EOIR Clown Show” 🤡 with real expert judges, at both the trial and appellate levels, who will consistently get these right in the first (or second) instance. That would “move” dockets (without violating rights), reduce the burdens on the Article IIIs, and promote (rather than actively undermine) consistency. It would also produce a consistent body of judicial scholarship on due process, racial justice, and best judicial practices in immigration, human rights, and fundamental Constitutional law that would help guide and solve systemic problems in the overall Federal legal system.

Why not bring in the talent and creative problem solving to turn a disgraceful, deadly, resource-wasting failure into a model judiciary? It’s a question that Garland has yet to answer!

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

02-10-22

2D CIR. JOINS 9TH IN REJECTING BIA’S PRECEDENT, MATTER OF MENDEZ, 27 I. & N. Dec. 219 (BIA 2018) (Holding Misprision of Felony is a CIMT) – Mendez v. Barr

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/75dbe12d-c0a1-497d-848e-59f07e9aa4b2/3/doc/18-801_complete_opn.pdf

Mendez v. Barr, 2d Cir., 05-27-20, published

PANEL: PARKER, CHIN, and SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: Judge Barrington D. Parker

DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Richard Sullivan

KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY:

Tomas Mendez was admitted to the United States in 2004 as a lawful

17  permanent resident. In 2010, he was convicted of misprision of a felony in

18  violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4. That section makes it a crime for one with knowledge

19  of the commission of a federal felony to conceal it and not promptly report it to

20  the appropriate authorities. 18 U.S.C § 4.

21  In 2016, upon returning from a trip abroad, the Department of Homeland

22  Security charged him, based on his misprision conviction, as inadmissible under

23  § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, because he was a

24  noncitizen convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). The

25  immigration judge sustained the charge, and the Board of Immigration Appeals

2

1  (“BIA”) affirmed. The BIA concluded that the violation of § 4 meant that he had

2  committed a CIMT. Matter of Mendez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 219, 225 (BIA 2018).

3  The BIA defines a CIMT as crime that is “inherently base, vile, or

4  depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and duties owed

5  between persons or to society in general.” Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60, 63

6  (2d Cir. 2006).1 For decades, the BIA never considered misprision a CIMT. Matter

7  of Sloan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 840, 842 (BIA 1966) (holding misprision does not

8  constitute a CIMT).

9  However, in 2002, the Eleventh Circuit held in Itani v. Ashcroft that a

10  conviction under § 4 is categorically a CIMT “because it necessarily involves an

11  affirmative act of concealment or participation in a felony, behavior that runs

12  contrary to accepted societal duties and involves dishonest or fraudulent

1 Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases all internal quotation marks, alterations, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted.

3

1  activity.” 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002).2 Following the Eleventh Circuit’s

2  lead, the BIA did an about face and determined in a case arising in the Ninth

3  Circuit that misprision was a CIMT. In re Robles-Urrea, 24 I. & N. Dec. 22, 25 (BIA

4  2006).

5  The Ninth Circuit rejected the BIA’s conclusion. The court held that

6  because § 4 required only knowledge of the felony and did not require an intent

7  to defraud, or conceal, or to obstruct justice, the statute encompassed conduct

8  that was not inherently base or vile. Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 710-12

9  (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[n]othing in the statute

10  prohibiting misprision of a felony references the specific purpose for which the

11  concealment must be undertaken,” let alone a purpose sufficient to qualify

12  misprision as a categorical CIMT. Id. at 710.

2 In 2017, the Fifth Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit to hold that misprision is categorically a CIMT. Villegas-Sarabia v. Sessions, 874 F.3d 871, 878 (5th Cir. 2017). We respectfully decline to follow the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit’s approach. We believe that neither Itani nor Villegas-Sarabia satisfactorily supports the assertion that specific intent, or intent to defraud, can be read into § 4, especially when Congress did not include such a requirement and has shown elsewhere in the criminal code that it knows how to include such a requirement if it so chooses. The Eleventh Circuit in Itani reasoned only “that misprision of a felony is a crime of moral turpitude because it necessarily involves an affirmative act of concealment or participation in a felony, behavior that runs contrary to accepted societal duties and involves dishonest or fraudulent activity.” 298 F.3d at 1216. We are reluctant to adopt this reasoning because, “any crime, by definition, runs contrary to some duty owed to society” and “[i]f this were the sole benchmark for a crime involving moral turpitude, every crime would involve moral turpitude.” Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 709 (9th Cir. 2012). We are also unpersuaded by Villegas-Sarabia, where the Fifth Circuit relied almost exclusively on Itani’s reasoning.

4

1  Mendez moved to terminate removal proceedings and for cancellation of

2  removal, arguing that misprision is not a CIMT. Relying on the BIA’s decision in

3  Robles-Urrea, the IJ found Mendez removable as charged. The IJ also pretermitted

4  Mendez’s application for cancellation of removal, concluding that because his

5  2010 misprision conviction constituted a CIMT, it stopped the clock for

6  calculating length of residency and prevented him from establishing the required

7  seven years of continuous residency. In February 2018, the BIA issued a

8  precedential decision in this case. Matter of Mendez, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 219. It

9  reaffirmed its holding that misprision is a CIMT and declined to follow the Ninth

10  Circuit’s rejection of its reasoning in Robles-Urrea.

11  Mendez petitions for review. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252

12  (a)(2)(D). Mendez argues that a conviction for misprision is not a CIMT because

13  it does not categorically involve conduct that is inherently base, vile, or

14  depraved. He also argues that, contrary to the BIA’s contention, its decision is

15  not entitled to Chevron deference. We agree on both points.

16  DISCUSSION

17  The dispositive issue is whether misprision is a CIMT. Because the BIA has

18  no particular expertise in construing federal criminal statutes (as opposed to the

19  INA), we owe no deference to its construction of § 4. United States v. Apel, 571 5

1  U.S. 359, 369 (2014); Mendez v. Mukasey 547 F.3d 345, 346 (2d Cir. 2008).

2  Accordingly, we review de novo the BIA’s conclusion that Mendez’s conviction

3  under § 4 is a conviction for a CIMT. Rodriguez, 451 F.3d at 63.

. . . .

*******************************

There is a “Circuit split:” The 5th & 11th Circuits agree with the BIA’s decision in Matter of Mendez; the 9th and 2d Circuits reject it. That means it’s likiely to eventually be up to the Supremes to decide who’s right.

 

PWS

05-27-20

 

2D CIR. FAULTS BIA’S INCORRECT ANALYSIS OF SALVADORAN WOMAN’S GANG-BASED POLITICAL OPINION ASYLUM CLAIM — Decision Reveals Much Deeper Problems With Politicized & Weaponized Immigration Courts, Lack Of Basic Expertise, Analytical Failures, Systemic Anti-Asylum Bias, Lack Of Due Process & Fundamental Fairness That Article III Courts Are Failing To Effectively Address — Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr — Bonus “PWS Mini-Essay” — “WHY ‘NIBBLING AROUND THE EDGES’ BY ARTICLE IIIs WON’T SOLVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL & HUMAN RIGHTS DISASTERS IN OUR IMMIGRATION COURTS NOR WILL IT RELIEVE THE ARTICLE IIIs FROM RESPONSIBILITY”

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/7536540c-4285-4262-84b6-e0454e2e1b83/1/doc/17-3903_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/7536540c-4285-4262-84b6-e0454e2e1b83/1/hilite/

Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, 2d Cir., 01-23-20, published

PANEL: WESLEY, CHIN, and BIANCO, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: Judge Chin

KEY QUOTE: 

2. Political Opinion

To demonstrate that persecution, or a well‐founded fear of

persecution, is on account of an applicantʹs political opinion, the applicant must show that the persecution ʺarises from his or her own political opinion.ʺ Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 2005). Thus, the applicant must ʺshow, through direct or circumstantial evidence, that the persecutorʹs motive to persecute arises from the applicant’s political belief.ʺ Id. (emphasis added). The

See Vega‐Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2016) (ʺVega‐Ayalaʹs general reference to the prevalence of domestic violence in El Salvador does little to explain how ʹSalvadoran women in intimate relationships with partners who view them as propertyʹ are meaningfully distinguished from others within Salvadoran society.ʺ). But see Alvarez Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 252‐55 (4th Cir. 2019) (remanding for agency to consider whether ʺgroup of unmarried mothers living under the control of gangs in Honduras qualifies as a ʹparticular social group,ʹʺ where record contained evidence that gang in question did ʺindeed target victims on the basis of their membership in a socially distinct group of unmarried mothersʺ).

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 5

persecution may also be on account of an opinion imputed to the applicant by the persecutor, regardless of whether or not this imputation is accurate. See Delgado v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 2007) (ʺ[A]n imputed political opinion, whether correctly or incorrectly attributed, can constitute a ground for political persecution.ʺ (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Chun Gao v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 2005)). The BIA has explained that persecution based on political opinion is established when there is ʺdirect or circumstantial evidence from which it is reasonable to believe that those who harmed the applicant were in part motivated by an assumption that [her] political views were antithetical to those of the government.ʺ Matter of S‐P‐, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 494 (B.I.A. 1996); see also Vumi v. Gonzalez, 502 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2007).

Here, Hernandez‐Chacon contends that if she is returned to El Salvador she will be persecuted by gang members because of her political opinion ‐‐ her opposition to the male‐dominated social norms in El Salvador and her taking a stance against a culture that perpetuates female subordination and the brutal treatment of women. She argues that when she refused to submit to the violent advances of the gang members, she was taking a stance against a culture of male‐domination and her resistance was therefore a political act.

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There is ample evidence in the record to support her claim.6 Gangs control much of El Salvador, including the neighborhood in which Hernandez‐ Chacon lived. The law enforcement systems that would normally protect women ‐‐ police, prosecutors, judges, officials ‐‐ do not have the resources or desire to address the brutal treatment of women, and the Salvadoran justice system ʺfavors aggressors and assassinsʺ and ʺpunish[es] victims of gender violence.ʺ Cert. Adm. Rec. at 147. Yet, Hernandez‐Chacon testified that when the first gang member tried to rape her, she resisted ʺbecause [she had] every right to.ʺ Id. at 193. Three days later, when the same man and two other gang members attacked her, she again resisted, to the point where they beat her until she lost consciousness. She argues that the men targeted her for the second attack ‐‐ and beat her so brutally ‐‐ because she had resisted the advances of an MS gang member and they believed she needed to be punished for her act of defiance. Her now husband likewise stated in his affidavit that Hernandez‐ Chacon will be attacked if she returns to El Salvador because ʺ[s]he has managed to fight them off twice, but that just makes them angrier and if she shows her face again, I think they could kill her.ʺ Id. at 269.

At oral argument, the government forthrightly conceded that it was a ʺpermissibleʺ inference that Hernandez‐Chacon was persecuted for her feminist political ideology, though it argued that the record did not compel that result.

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 6

 

While the IJʹs decision was thorough and thoughtful overall, her

analysis of Hernandez‐Chaconʹs political opinion claim was cursory, consisting of the following:

[Hernandez‐Chacon] has also claimed that she had a political opinion. I cannot conclude that her decision to resist the advances of an individual is sufficient to establish that she has articulated a political opinion. In trying to analyze a political opinion claim, the Court has to consider the circumstances under which a respondent not only possessed a political opinion, but the way in which the circumstances under which she articulated that political opinion. In this case she did not advance a political opinion. I find that she simply chose not to be the victim and chose to resist being a victim of a criminal act.

Id. at 153‐54.

The BIA dismissed Hernandez‐Chaconʹs political opinion argument

in a single sentence, in a footnote, rejecting the claim ʺfor the reasons stated in the [IJʹs] decision.ʺ Id. at 5 n.3. The analysis of both the IJ and the BIA was inadequate. See Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 548‐49 (granting petition for review and remanding case to agency where IJ failed to undertake the ʺcomplex and contextual factual inquiryʺ necessary to determine if persecution was on account of political opinion). We have three areas of concern.

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First, the agency concluded that Hernandez‐Chacon ʺdid not advance a political opinion.ʺ Cert. Adm. Record at 154. But this Circuit has held that the analysis of what constitutes political expression for these purposes ʺinvolves a ʹcomplex and contextual factual inquiryʹ into the nature of the asylum applicantʹs activities in relation to the political context in which the dispute took place.ʺ Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 548). We have held, for example, that resisting corruption and abuse of power ‐‐ including non‐governmental abuse of power ‐‐ can be an expression of political opinion. See Castro, 597 F.3d at 100 (noting that ʺopposition to government corruption may constitute a political opinion, and retaliation against someone for expressing that opinion may amount to political persecutionʺ); Delgado, 508 F.3d at 706 (holding that refusing to give technical assistance to the FARC in Columbia can be expression of political opinion); Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 542, 546‐48 (holding that retaliation for opposing corruption of local officials can constitute persecution on account of political opinion); Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1029‐31 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that ʺunion activities [can] imply a political opinion,ʺ and not merely economic position). The Fourth Circuit has recently recognized that the refusal to acquiesce to gang violence can constitute

‐21‐

an expression of political opinion. See Alvarez Lagos, 927 F.3d at 254‐55 (where record contained evidence that gang in question would view refusal to comply with demand for sex as ʺpolitical opposition,ʺ refusal to acquiesce to gang violence and flight to United States could demonstrate imputed anti‐gang political opinion that constitutes protected ground for asylum). Here, the agency did not adequately consider whether Hernandez‐Chaconʹs refusal to acquiesce was ‐‐ or could be seen as ‐‐ an expression of political opinion, given the political context of gang violence and the treatment of women in El Salvador.

Second, the IJ concluded that Hernandez‐Chacon ʺsimply chose to not be a victim.ʺ Cert. Adm. Rec. at 154. But even if Hernandez‐Chacon was motivated in part by her desire not to be a crime victim, her claims do not necessarily fail, as her political opinion need not be her only motivation. See

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (ʺThe applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.ʺ (emphasis added)); Osorio, 18 F.3d at 1028 (ʺThe plain meaning of the phrase ʹpersecution on account of the victimʹs political opinion,ʹ does not mean persecution solely on account of the victimʹs political opinion.ʺ); see also Vumi, 502 F.3d at 158 (remanding to

‐22‐

agency where BIA failed to engage in mixed‐motive analysis). While Hernandez‐Chacon surely did not want to be a crime victim, she was also taking a stand; as she testified, she had ʺevery rightʺ to resist. As we have held in a different context, ʺopposition to endemic corruption or extortion . . . may have a political dimension when it transcends mere self‐protection and represents a challenge to the legitimacy or authority of the ruling regime.ʺ Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 547‐48. Here, Hernandez‐Chaconʹs resistance arguably took on a political dimension by transcending mere self‐protection to also constitute a challenge to the authority of the MS gang.

Third, the agency did not consider whether the gang members imputed a political opinion to Hernandez‐Chacon. This Circuit has held that ʺan imputed political opinion, whether correctly or incorrectly attributed, can constitute a ground of political persecution within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act.ʺ Vumi, 502 F.3d at 156 (citations omitted); see Chun Gao, 424 F.3d at 129 (in case of imputed political opinion, question is ʺwhether authorities would have perceived [petitioner] as [a practitioner of Falun Gong] or as a supporter of the movement because of his activitiesʺ). Here, the IJ erred in her political opinion analysis by only considering whether Hernandez‐

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Chacon ʺadvance[d]ʺ a political opinion. Cert. Adm. Rec. at 154. The IJ failed to consider whether the attackers imputed an anti‐patriarchy political opinion to her when she resisted their sexual advances, and whether that imputed opinion was a central reason for their decision to target her. See Castro, 597 F.3d at 106 (holding that to properly evaluate a claim of political opinion, IJ must give ʺcareful consideration of the broader political contextʺ). In fact, as the gang members attacked her the second time, one of them told her that because she would not ʺdo this with him in a good way, it was going to happen in a bad way,ʺ Cert. Adm. Rec. at 186, which suggests that the gang members wanted to punish her because they believed she was taking a stand against the pervasive norm of sexual subordination.

We note that the Fourth Circuit recently granted a petition for review in a case involving a woman in Honduras who was threatened by a gang in similar circumstances. The Fourth Circuit concluded that if, as the petitioner alleged, the gang had imputed to her ʺan anti‐gang political opinion, then that imputed opinion would be a central reason for likely persecution if she were returned to Honduras.ʺ See Alvarez Lagos, 927 F.3d at 251. The court held that the IJ erred by not considering the imputed political opinion claim, that is,

‐24‐

whether the gang believed that the petitioner held an anti‐gang political opinion. Id. at 254. Likewise, here, the agency did not adequately consider Hernandez‐ Chaconʹs imputed political opinion claim.

Accordingly, we hold that the agency erred in failing to adequately consider Hernandez‐Chaconʹs claim of persecution or fear of persecution based on actual or imputed political opinion.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition is GRANTED with respect to Hernandez‐Chaconʹs political opinion claim and the case is REMANDED to the BIA for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

*******************************

Heather Axford
Heather Axford
Senior Staff Attorney
Central American Legal Assistance
Brooklyn, NY

 

To state the obvious:

  • Many more women from El Salvador should be getting mandatory relief under CAT based on “torture with government acquiescence,” regardless of “nexus” which is not a requirement in CAT cases. Indeed, in a properly functioning and fair system these could probably be “blanket grants” provided the accounts are credible and documented (or they could be the basis for a TPS program for women fleeing the Northern Triangle, thus reducing the burden on the Immigraton Courts);
  • Compare the accurate account of the horrible conditions facing women inEl Salvador set forth by the Immigration Judge and the Second Circuit in this case with the fraudulent and largely fictionalized account presented by unethical Attorney General Sessions in his Matter of A-B– atrocity. Here are some excerpts from Judge Chin’s opinion which shows the real horrors that women face in El Salvador as opposed to he largely fictionalized version fabricated by Sessions:

 

In her decision, the IJ reviewed relevant country conditions in El Salvador, including the prevalence of violence against women and ʺthe dreadful

‐9‐

practice of El Salvadorʹs justice system to favor aggressors and assassins and to punish victims of gender violence.ʺ Id. at 147. The IJ relied on the declaration of Aracely Bautista Bayona, a lawyer and human rights specialist, who described ʺthe plight of women in El Salvador,ʺ id.,3 and recounted the following:

One of ʺthe most entrenched characteristics of Salvadoran society is machismo, a system of patriarchal gender biases which subject women to the will of men. Salvadorans are taught from early childhood that women are subordinate.ʺ Id. Salvadoran society ʺaccepts and tolerates men who violently punish women for violating these gender rules or disobeying male relatives.ʺ Id. Indeed, in El Salvador, ʺfemicide remain[s] widespread.ʺ Id. at 148; see also U.S. Depʹt of State, Bureau of Democracy, H. R. and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 for El Salvador (2015) (ʺCountry Reportʺ). Gangs in El Salvador view women as the property of men, and gang violence against women outside the gang ʺmanifest[s] itself in a brutality that reflects these extreme machismo attitudes.ʺ Cert. Adm. Rec. at 148.

3

page10image3393429872

The IJ noted that Bayona had ʺfor more than two and a half decades worked and advocated for the rights of women, children, adolescents and youth in the migrant population in El Salvador.ʺ Cert. Adm. Rec. at 138.

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ʺEl Salvador has the highest rate in the world [of femicide] with an average of 12 murders for every 100,000 women.ʺ Id. at 148‐49. As an article on El Salvadorʹs gangs concluded, ʺin a country terrorized by gangsters, it is left to the dead to break the silence on sexual violence . . . , to the bodies of dead women and girls pulled from clandestine graves, raped, battered and sometimes cut to pieces. They attest to the sadistic abuse committed by members of street gangs.ʺ Id. at 149 (quoting El Salvadorʹs Gangs Target Women and Girls, Associated Press, Nov. 6, 2014).

As the State Department has found, rape, sexual crimes, and violence against women are significantly underreported because of societal and cultural pressures on victims and fear of reprisal, and the laws against rape ʺare not effectively enforced.ʺ Country Report at 7. Police corruption in El Salvador is well‐documented, including involvement in extra‐judicial killings and human rights abuses. See id. at 1. The judicial system is also corrupt. While the law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, ʺthe government d[oes] not implement the law effectively, and . . . officials, particularly in the judicial system, often engage[] in corrupt practices with impunity.ʺ Id. at 6. ʺLike Salvadoran society as a whole, law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges

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discriminate against women, reduce the priority of womenʹs claims, and otherwise prevent women from accessing legal protections and justice. This results in impunity for aggressors, which reinforces aggressorsʹ perception that they can inflict violence without interference or reprisal.ʺ Cert. Adm. Rec. at 300‐ 01.

The IJ observed that Hernandez‐Chaconʹs experiences were ʺgenerally consistent with the background materials she has submitted in regards to pervasive brutal attacks by El Salvadoran gangs.ʺ Id. at 149‐50.

. . . .

There is ample evidence in the record to support her claim [of political; persecution].6 Gangs control much of El Salvador, including the neighborhood in which Hernandez‐ Chacon lived. The law enforcement systems that would normally protect women ‐‐ police, prosecutors, judges, officials ‐‐ do not have the resources or desire to address the brutal treatment of women, and the Salvadoran justice system ʺfavors aggressors and assassinsʺ and ʺpunish[es] victims of gender violence.ʺ Cert. Adm. Rec. at 147. Yet, Hernandez‐Chacon testified that when the first gang member tried to rape her, she resisted ʺbecause [she had] every right to.ʺ Id. at 193. Three days later, when the same man and two other gang members attacked her, she again resisted, to the point where they beat her until she lost consciousness. She argues that the men targeted her for the second attack ‐‐ and beat her so brutally ‐‐ because she had resisted the advances of an MS gang member and they believed she needed to be punished for her act of defiance. Her now husband likewise stated in his affidavit that Hernandez‐ Chacon will be attacked if she returns to El Salvador because ʺ[s]he has managed to fight them off twice, but that just makes them angrier and if she shows her face again, I think they could kill her.ʺ Id. at 269.

 

At oral argument, the government forthrightly conceded that it was a ʺpermissibleʺ inference that Hernandez‐Chacon was persecuted for her feminist political ideology, though it argued that the record did not compel that result.

 

Here are some additional thoughts about the larger problem exposed by this case:

WHY “NIBBLING AROUND THE EDGES” BY ARTICLE IIIs WON’T SOLVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL & HUMAN RIGHTS DISASTERS IN OUR IMMIGRATION COURTS NOR WILL IT RELIEVE THE ARTICLE IIIs FROM RESPONSIBILITY

By Paul Wickham Schmidt

Exclusive for Courtside

Jan. 29, 2020

The Second Circuit’s decision in Hernández-Chacon v. Barr exposes deep fundamental constitutional flaws in our Immigration Court system. While the instructive language on how many women resisting gangs could and should be qualifying for asylum (and many more should be getting relief under the CAT) is refreshing, the remedy, a remand to a failed and constitutionally defective system, is woefully inadequate. 

Indeed, just recently, a fellow Circuit, the Seventh, ripped the BIA for contemptuously disobeying a direct court order. Maybe the Board will pay attention to the Second Circuit’s directive in this case, maybe they won’t. Maybe they will think of a new reason to deny as all too often happens on Circuit Court remands these days. 

I actually have no doubt that the Immigration Judge involved in this case, who recognized the dire situation of women in El Salvador, and grated CAT withholding, will “do the right thing” and grant asylum with the benefit of Judge Chin’s opinion. But, today’s BIA has a number of dedicated “asylum deniers” in its ranks; individuals who as Immigration Judges denied approaching 100% of the asylum claims coming before them, some of them notorious with the private bar for particular hostility to claims from women from the Northern Triangle.

That appeared to be their “selling point” for AG Billy Barr in elevating them to the BIA: Create the same reliable “Asylum Free Zone” at the BIA that has been created by these judges and others like them in other parts of the country. It’s a great way to discourage bona fide asylum claims, which. appears to be the key to the “Barr plan.”

One might ask what Billy Barr is doing running something purporting to be a “court system” in the first place. Outrageous on its face! The short answer: Article III complicity and dereliction of Constitutional duty! But, I’ll get to that later.

What if a panel of “Three Deniers” gets the case on remand? Will Ms Hernandez-Chacon finally get justice? Or, will she and her pro bono lawyer Heather Axford once again have to appeal to the Second Circuit just to force the BIA to finally “get the basics right?”

Individual case remands, even published ones, fail to address the serious underlying issues plaguing our Immigration Courts and threatening the very foundations of our justice system: 1) lack of fundamental knowledge of asylum law on the part of the BIA and the Immigration Courts; 2) an unconstitutional system run, and sometimes staffed, by biased, unethical anti-asylum zealots who consistently send out false or misleading messages; and 3) the inherent unfairness in a system that denies adequate access to counsel and permits the use of coercive detention and outright statutory and constitutional abrogation to consistently harm asylum seekers and others seeking justice.

I. Glaring Lack Of Asylum Legal Competence & Expertise

The Second Circuit noted three major errors in the BIA’s analysis: 1) failing to recognize that the respondent was advancing a “political persecution” argument; 2) misuse  of the concept of “victimization” as a pretext for denying a potentially valid asylum claim; and 3) failure to recognize and address the respondent’s “imputed political opinion.”

None of these mistakes is new. Advocates would tell you that the BIA and Immigration Judges make them all the time.

Nor is getting these things right “rocket science.” Really, all it would take is a body knowledgeable in and committed to the fair and generous interpretation of asylum law intended by the 1951 Convention from which our law stems and reinforced by the Supreme Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca in 1987. The correct view has also been reflected in the Second Circuit’s own published jurisprudence, which the Board again ignored in this case.

For example, the Second Circuit instructed the BIA “that that the analysis of what constitutes political expression for these purposes ʺinvolves a ʹcomplex and contextual factual inquiryʹ into the nature of the asylum applicantʹs activities in relation to the political context in which the dispute took place.ʺ Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 548).” 

This is hardly a new concept.  For example, Yueqing Zhang was published in 2005, a decade and a half ago, and reinforced by the Second Circuit on several occasions since then. Yet, both the BIA and Immigration Judges continue to ignore it when it suits their purposes. So, why would the Second Circuit believe that the Immigration Courts had suddenly “gotten religion” and would now pay attention to their admonitions on asylum law? 

As pointed out by the Second Circuit, the “mere victim” rationale, often insidiously used by the BIA and some Immigration Judges as an “easy handle” to summarily deny asylum claims, is a disingenuous hoax. All successful asylum applicants are “victims” even if not all “victims” necessarily qualify for asylum. Refugees, entitled to asylum, are a very large subset of “victims.” In this and many other cases, the BIA totally “blew by” the well established, statutorily required “mixed motive” analysis that is “Asylum Law 101.”

Also, the BIA’s failure to recognize and consider the well-established doctrine of “imputed political opinion” is inexcusable in a supposedly “expert” tribunal.

The “Article III blowoff” documented in this case is virtually inevitable in a system where the “judges” at all levels, are subject to arbitrary, unethical, and unconstitutional “performance quotas” and receive “performance evaluations” influenced by biased political officials with an interest in the outcome of cases. Indeed, former Attorney Session essentially told “his” judges that it’s “all about production.” Fairness, Due Process, and scholarship that individuals are entitled to before a tribunal simply don’t enter into the equation.

The Immigration Judge in this case has an outstanding reputation and actually did a careful job in many respects. A competent appellate tribunal would have caught the judge’s mistake on political opinion and remanded for further consideration. The case never should have reached the Second Circuit (think efficiency and why the Immigraton Courts have built unmanageable backlogs).

Moreover, an error like this by a competent and careful judge indicates the need for further positive guidance to judges on recognizing valid asylum claims. Why hasn’t the BIA published precedents reinforcing the very points made by Judge Chin in his Hernández-Chacon opinion and showing how they apply to granting asylum in real life, recurring situations, particularly those involving women from the Northern Triangle?

Instead, and in direct contradiction of the law and controlling jurisprudence, Attorney General Sessions in Matter of A-B- gave an unethical, misogynistic, and intentionally factually distorted suggestion that most women’s claims arising from persecution at the hands of gangs and abusive partners in the Northern Triangle should be “denied” on any available ground, whether warranted or not. Some Immigration Judges have correctly viewed this as “mere dicta.” But, others have viewed it as a potentially “career enhancing tip” about how “the big boss” wanted asylum seekers from the Northern Triangle treated: like dirt, or worse.

Dehumanization has always been a “key part of the plan” for Sessions, his acolyte Stephen Miller, and others of like mind in this Administration. Why have the Article III courts enabled, and in some cases approved, this neo-fascist approach to the law and humanity? That’s a great question to which the answer is not obvious. What’s the purpose of life tenure in office if it doesn’t promote courage to stand up for the rights of vulnerable individuals against invidious  intentional Government tyranny ands systemic abuses?

By ignoring the “pattern or practice” of failure by the BIA and the Immigration Courts to institutionalize the Second Circuit’s many years of prior commands for fair asylum adjudication, while ignoring the glaring, intentional barriers to fair judicial performance put in place by the political controllers of this system, the Second Circuit and the other Article IIIs simply advertise their own fecklessness and also, to some extent, intellectual dishonesty.

II. Institutional Bias Against Asylum Seekers

Both Attorney General Barr and his predecessor Jeff Sessions are biased “cheerleaders” for DHS enforcement; they are totally unqualified to act in a quasi-judicial capacity or to supervise quasi-judicial adjudicators. Their participation in and interference with fair and impartial decision making is a clear violation of Due Process and a mockery of judicial and legal ethics.

A private lawyer who so blatantly “thumbed his or her nose” at prohibitions on conflicts of interest undoubtedly would face discipline or disbarment. Yet, the Second Circuit and their fellow Circuits, as well as the Supremes, have failed to act on these obvious ethical improprieties by the DOJ and its leadership that have a direct negative impact on constitutional Due Process.

Under Trump, Attorneys General have issued number of anti-asylum “precedents” reversing prior law and practice. New Immigration Judges are selected by the Attorney General almost exclusively from the ranks of prosecutors and other Government attorneys. Those with private sector experience or experience representing migrants and asylum seekers are systematically excluded from the judiciary. How is this a fair system?

The Administration and DOJ spew forth an endless stream of anti-immigrant and anti-asylum, propaganda. They also use “performance work plans”and “numerical quotas” to drum into “judges” their responsibility to follow and implement “agency policies” rather than fairly and impartially consider the cases coming before them. This message certainly does not encourage fair and impartial adjudication. The “default message” clearly is “deny, deny, deny.”

One very fundamental problem resulting from this institutional bias against asylum seekers: The BIA’s (and now AG’s) “precedents” providing guidance to Immigration Judges fail to set forth rules and circumstances for granting asylum in meritorious cases. The need for such rules should be obvious from the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca (directing the BIA to implement a generous interpretation of “well-founded fear” standard for asylum) and the BIA’s initial response to Cardoza in Matter of Mogharrabi (directing that asylum could be granted even where the objective chance of persecution is “significantly less than . . . probable”). Most, if not all, Circuit Courts of Appeals followed suit with a series of decisions criticizing the BIA for an “overly restrictive reading” of asylum law, not true to Cardoza and their own precedent in Mogharrabi, in many unpublished cases.

But, quite intentionally in my view, the BIA and Attorney General have now strayed far from these judicial admonitions and abandoned the BIA’s own precedent in Mogharrabi. Instead, today’s administrative “precedents” read like a “how to course” in denying asylum claims. Indeed, from examining these one-sided precedents (no individual has prevailed in an “Attorney General precedent” under this Administration — DHS wins every time), one comes away with the pronounced view that asylum could almost never be granted by an Immigration Judge, no matter how great the harm or compelling the circumstances.

I once participated in an academic conference attended by Circuit Court of Appeals Judges from across the country. Most were astounded to learn how many asylum cases were actually granted by Immigration Judges. From their review of unfailingly negative BIA decisions (skewed, of course, by the Government’s inability to appeal from the BIA, another problem with the current system) they had the impression that asylum was denied nearly 100% of the time (which actually does happen in some Immigration Courts these days, as noted above).

The only way to describe this is “gross institutional corruption” starting at the top with the DOJ and the Attorney General. Even now, under these intentionally restrictive rules, more than 30% of asylum cases are granted at merits hearings before Immigration Judges, although with the lack of effective positive guidance from the BIA those rates are highly inconsistent among judges.

Within the last decade, the majority of cases were actually being granted as the system was slowly progressing toward toward realizing the “spirit of Cardoza and Mogharrabi” However, that progress intentionally was reversed by improper political pressure to deny more Central American cases (a message that actually began under the last Administration and has been “put on steroids” by the current Administration).

III. An Inherently Unfair System

Notwithstanding the need for careful record building and detailed fact-finding as described by the Second Circuit, individuals are not entitled to appointed counsel in Immigraton Court. Through use of intentionally coercive and inhumane detention and “gimmicks” like “Remain in Mexico” the Administration strives to deny fair access to pro bono counsel and to prevent individuals from preparing and documenting complex cases.

The Article IIIs recognize the complexity of asylum cases, yet fail to “connect the dots” with the intentional systemic impediments to fair preparation and presentation thrown up by the government. The “hostile environment” for aliens and their counsel intentionally created in Immigration Court by the DOJ also works to discourage individuals from pursuing claims and getting representation.

The whole system is essentially a judicially-enabled farce. Does the Second Circuit, or anybody else, seriously think that Ms. Hernandez-Chacon would have gotten this far without the time-consuming and outstanding assistance of her pro bono lawyer, Heather Axford, of Central American Legal Assistance in Brooklyn, NY? She’s one of the top asylum litigators in the nation who used to appear before me in Arlington at the beginning of her amazing career!

How many of those “detained in the middle of nowhere,” told to “Remain in Mexico,” or, worse yet, orbited to “failed states” by Border Agents under bogus “Safe Third Country Agreements” have access to someone like Heather Axford? (It doesn’t take much imagination after reading the truth about how women are treated in El Salvador to see the outright fraud committed by the Trump Administration in entering into bogus “Safe Third Country” agreements with El Salvador and other dangerous, failing states). About none! How can the courts allow a system to keep out grinding out systemic abuse to vulnerable human beings without insisting that the essentials for fair hearings be put in place and maintained?

IV.  Conclusion

When obvious legal, analytical, and institutional problems remain unfixed more than a decade after they surfaced, the system is broken! The current Immigration Court system is patently unfair and unconstitutional. By ignoring the glaring systemic unfairness, Article III Courts become part of the problem and subject themselves to charges of fecklessness and dereliction of duty.

It’s long past time for the Article IIIs to take decisive actions to end the national disgrace and humanitarian disaster unfolding in our Immigration Courts daily. History is watching your actions and will be your judge! 

Due Process forever; Complicit courts never!

AS SESSIONS DISEMBOWELS DUE PROCESS, THE REAL LEGAL PROBLEMS LEADING TO UNFAIR HEARINGS FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS AND OTHERS CONTINUE UNABATED & UNADDRESSED IN U.S. IMMIGRATION COURT – 2d Cir. Delivers A “Double Shot” Rebuke To Misapplication Of Credibility Rules By Immigration Judges & BIA Judges Who Should Know Better — HONG FEI GAO V. SESSIONS

GAO-2D CIR 16-2262_16-2493_opn

Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 2d Cir., May 25, 2018, published

PANEL: WINTER and CHIN, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN, Judge.*

  • Edward R. Korman, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

    OPINION BY: JUDGE CHIN

    SUMMARY OF HOLDING (From Decision):

    These petitions for review heard in tandem challenge two decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the ʺBIAʺ), affirming decisions by two Immigration Judges (ʺIJsʺ), denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (ʺCATʺ) to two petitioners seeking relief from religious persecution in China on adverse credibility grounds. During removal proceedings, petitioners testified regarding the medical attention they received for injuries they sustained from police beatings. The IJs and the BIA relied substantially on the omission of that information from petitionersʹ initial applications and supporting documents to determine that petitioners lacked credibility.

    On appeal, petitioners principally challenge the agencyʹs adverse credibility determinations. In light of the totality of the circumstances and in the context of the record as a whole, in each case we conclude that the IJ and BIA erred in substantially relying on certain omissions in the record. Accordingly, we grant the petitions, vacate the decisions of the BIA, and remand the cases to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

     

KEY QUOTE:

For cases filed after May 11, 2005, the effective date of the REAL ID Act, Pub L. No. 109‐13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005), ʺan IJ may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as theʹtotality of the circumstancesʹ establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible,ʺ Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The agency may base a credibility finding on an asylum applicantʹs ʺdemeanor, candor, or responsivenessʺ; the ʺinherent plausibilityʺ of his account; the consistency among his written statements, oral statements, and other record evidence; and ʺany inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicantʹs claim, or any other relevant factor.ʺ 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Even where the agency ʺrelies on discrepancies or lacunae that, if taken separately, concern matters collateral or ancillary to the claim, the cumulative effect may nevertheless be deemed consequential.ʺ Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (quoting Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 402 (2d Cir. 2006)). To resolve the instant appeals, we first clarify the following principles that govern credibility determinations based on omissions following the REAL ID Act.

First, although the REAL ID Act authorizes an IJ to rely on ʺanyinconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination,ʺ even one ʺcollateral or ancillaryʺ to an applicantʹs claims, id. at 167, the Act does not give an IJ free rein. The REAL ID Act does not erase our obligation to assess whether the agency has provided ʺspecific, cogent reasons for the adverse credibility finding and whether those reasons bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.ʺ Id. at 166 (quoting Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 74); accord Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010) (ʺThe REAL ID Act did not strip us of our ability to rely on the institutional tools that we have developed, such as the requirement that an agency provide specific and cogent reasons supporting an adverse credibility determination, to aid our review.ʺ). Thus, although IJs may rely on non‐material omissions and inconsistencies, not all omissions and inconsistencies will deserve the same weight. A trivial inconsistency or omission that has no tendency to suggest a petitioner fabricated his or her claim will not support an adverse credibility determination. See Latifi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (remanding where we found ʺany potential discrepancies that might exist to be far from ʹsignificant and numerous,ʹ but rather insignificant and trivialʺ); accord Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044 (noting thatʺtrivial inconsistencies that under the total circumstances have no bearing on a petitionerʹs veracity should not form the basis of an adverse credibility determinationʺ); Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2007) (faulting IJ forʺfail[ing] to distinguish between material lies, on the one hand, and innocent mistakes, trivial inconsistencies, and harmless exaggerations, on the other handʺ).3

Second, although ʺ[a] lacuna in an applicantʹs testimony or omission in a document submitted to corroborate the applicantʹs testimony . . . can serve as a proper basis for an adverse credibility determination,ʺ Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n.3, we also recognize that ʺasylum applicants are not required to list every incident of persecution on their I–589 statement,ʺ Lianping Li v. Lynch, 839 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Pavlova, 441 F.3d at 90); see also Secaida‐Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that an applicantʹsʺfailure to list in his or her initial application facts that emerge later in testimony will not automatically provide a sufficient basis for an adverse credibility findingʺ), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; accord Pop v. INS, 270 F.3d 527, 531‐32 (7th Cir. 2001) (ʺWe hesitate to find that one seeking asylum must state in his or her application every incident of persecution lest the applicant have his or her credibility questioned if the incident is later elicited in direct testimony.ʺ); Abulashvili v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2011). Because of this tension, although we have noted in dictum that an inconsistency and an omission are ʺfunctionally equivalentʺ for adverse credibility purposes, Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n.3, in generalʺomissions are less probative of credibility than inconsistencies created by direct contradictions in evidence and testimony,ʺ Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2014). Cf. Lianping Li, 839 F.3d at 150 (upholding adverse credibility determination where petitionerʹs ʺasylum application did not simply omit incidents of persecution. . . . [but rather] described the same incidents of persecution differentlyʺ).

An example of a trivial inconsistency that is entitled to little if any weight is the difference between Gaoʹs hearing testimony that he was interrogated by the police ʺfour timesʺ and his application statement that he was interrogated ʺseveral times.ʺ The BIA correctly held that this ʺdiscrepancyʺ did not support an adverse credibility determination. Likewise, the difference between September 1, 2010 and September 4, 2010 as the date when Shao contacted his cousin is a trivial discrepancy.

Although the federal evidentiary rules do not apply in immigration proceedings, Aslam v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), it is nonetheless instructive to analogize the use of omissions in adverse credibility determinations to the use of a witnessʹs prior silence for impeachment. In the latter context, we have indicated that ʺ[w]here the belatedly recollected facts merely augment that which was originally described, the prior silence is often simply too ambiguous to have any probative force, and accordingly is not sufficiently inconsistent to be admitted for purposes of impeachment.ʺ United States v. Leonardi, 623 F.2d 746, 756 (2d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). In addition, the probative value of a witnessʹs prior silence on particular facts depends on whether those facts are ones the witness would reasonably have been expected to disclose. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 (1980) (ʺCommon law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted.ʺ(emphasis added)). In the immigration context, in assessing the probative value of the omission of certain facts, an IJ should consider whether those facts are ones that a credible petitioner would reasonably have been expected to disclose under the relevant circumstances.

Finally, the REAL ID Act requires IJs to evaluate each inconsistency or omission in light of the ʺtotality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors,ʺ8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That requirement is consistent with our well‐established rule that review of an agencyʹs adverse credibility determination ʺis conducted on the record as a whole.ʺ Tu Lin, 446 F.3d at 402; see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (an applicantʹs testimony must be considered ʺin light of . . . the manner in which it hangs together with other evidenceʺ (citation omitted)); accord Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040 (ʺ[T]he totality of the circumstances approach also imposes the requirement that an IJ not cherry pick solely facts favoring an adverse credibility determination while ignoring facts that undermine that result.ʺ). Thus, ʺan applicantʹs testimonial discrepancies ‐‐ and, at times, even outright lies ‐‐ must be weighed in light of their significance to the total context of his or her claim of persecution.ʺ Zhong v. U.S. Depʹt of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 127 (2d Cir. 2007). An IJ must also ʺʹengage or evaluateʹ an asylum applicantʹs explanations for apparent inconsistencies in the record.ʺ Diallo v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Latifi, 430 F.3d at 105); see also Cao He Lin v. U.S. Depʹt of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 403 (2d Cir. 2005) (ʺAbsent a reasoned evaluation of [petitionerʹs] explanations, the IJʹs conclusion that his story is implausible was based on flawed reasoning and, therefore, cannot constitute substantial evidence supporting her conclusion.ʺ).

II. Application
In light of the foregoing principles, we conclude that in both cases, the IJs and the BIA erred by substantially relying on certain inconsistencies and omissions that had no tendency to show that petitioners fabricated their claims when considered in light of the totality of the circumstances and in the context of the record as a whole. Because we cannot confidently predict that the IJs would have adhered to their adverse credibility determinations absent these erroneous bases, we remand for further evaluation.

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So, while Jeff Sessions is busy with a “nuclear attack” on asylum law and Constitutional Due Process, some U.S. Immigration Judges and BIA Appellate Immigration Judges are equally busy just mis-applying well-established legal standards to screw asylum seekers.

Rather than looking at the record as a whole, as required by law, and giving asylum seekers the “benefit of the doubt,” too many Immigration Judges and BIA Judges are playing “gotcha” with the law — using minor or irrelevant variances in testimony or minor gaps in proof to justify bogus adverse credibility findings and asylum denials. Obviously, as backlogs stretch out, the problems inherent in “fly-specking” an applicant’s testimony about events many years in the past increases. That’s one of the reasons why Sessions’s insane bid to shove more properly administratively closed removal cases back onto “active dockets,” and to discourage the further removal of “low priority” cases from active dockets, is totally and intentionally destructive to an already failing court system.

The REAL ID ACT was effective in 2005, well over a decade ago. So, its proper application is not “rocket science.” It’s “Immigration Judging 101.”

Yet unfair applications of the law to wrongfully discredit and deny asylum seekers persists in the Immigration Courts and seems to breeze through at least some BIA “Panels” without critical review or analysis. I put “Panels” in quotes because all too often these days the appellate review is conducted by a “Panel of One” judge.

And since the BIA Appellate Immigration Judges now come almost exclusively from Government backgrounds, they are very likely to share some of the same “blind spots” as to the reality of presenting an affirmative asylum application in Immigration Court. If any of them have done it (and most haven’t), it was decades ago when conditions and the law were very different. They all too often draw inferences and reach conclusions that any competent immigration practitioner would know are way out of line with reality.

How are these endemic problems affecting fairness and Constitutional Due Process in the Immigration Courts, and potentially destroying and endangering lives of asylum applicants, solved by cranking up judicial productivity, trying to reverse long-standing precedents that aid asylum seekers pursuing legal protections, and making biased public anti-asylum statements? How is justice and Due Process served by gratuitously attacking immigration lawyers and disingenuously seeking to eliminate laws that provide the already meager and inadequate protections that asylum seekers now have? Yet this is precisely what Sessions’s program is!

The Immigration Court system needs reform to guarantee unbiased, high quality, fair treatment of asylum seekers and other individuals fighting for their very lives. Jeff Sessions is dedicated to the eradication of Due Process and turning the Immigration Courts into a “Death Railroad” for asylum seekers and other migrants. He must be stopped before he destroys our entire U.S. justice system — apparently his ultimate aim.

Join the New Due Process Army and stand up to Jeff Sessions and the other bullying, scofflaw, White Nationalists in the Trump Regime.

PWS

06-01-18

 

“GOOD ENOUGH FOR GOVERNMENT WORK” – 2d CIR. GIVES “CHEVRON DEFERENCE” TO BIA’S Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 516 (B.I.A. 2015) – Migrants Have No Right to Advance Notice Of Required Corroboration! – Wei Sun v. Sessions

CA2-WeiSunvSessions

Wei Sun v. Sessions, 2d Cir., 02-23-18, published

PANEL: LEVAL, LIVINGSTON, and CHIN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: Judge Chin

KEY QUOTE/SUMMARY:

Petitioner Wei Sun (“Sun”) seeks review of a June 26, 2015 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying him asylum for religious persecution in China. Sun entered the United States on a visitor visa in 2007 and subsequently filed a timely application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and 1231(b)(3), respectively, and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), see 8 C.F.R. § 208.16. The IJ and the BIA denied Sun’s petition on the ground that he failed to meet his burden of proof because of an absence of corroborating evidence.

The BIA interpreted the corroboration provision of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005), as not requiring an IJ to give a petitioner specific notice of the evidence needed to meet his burden of proof, or to grant a continuance before ruling to give a petitioner an opportunity to gather corroborating evidence. On appeal, Sun argues that an IJ must give a petitioner notice and an opportunity to submit additional evidence when the IJ concludes that corroborating evidence is required, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2011). We conclude that the REAL ID Act is ambiguous on this point, and that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable and entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.

ANOTHER KEY QUOTE:

Moreover, the test is not whether the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is plausible or “better” than the agency’s, as Sun suggests. Pet. Br. at 21. Rather, the test is whether the statute is “silent or ambiguous” and if so, then whether “‘the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute,’ which is to say, one that is ‘reasonable,’ not ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.'” Riverkeeper Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44).

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So, here’s what Chevron really says:

“As long as the agency has a minimally plausible interpretation, we couldn’t care less if it’s the best interpretation of the law.”

But, why shouldn’t high-ranking Federal Judges who are being paid to tell us what the law is be required to opine on what is the “best” interpretation? What are they being paid for? Sure sounds to me like a “doctrine of judicial task avoidance.” 

And, of course, given a choice of possible interpretations these days, the BIA almost invariably chooses that which is most favorable to DHS and least favorable to the respondent.

Why shouldn’t a respondent, particularly one seeking potentially life or death relief like asylum, have notice of what the Immigration Judge expects him to produce to corroborate his otherwise credible testimony? For Pete’s sake, even the “Legacy INS” and the USCIS, hardly bastions of due process, gave applicants for benefits the infamous “Notice of Intent to Deny” (“NID”) setting forth the evidentiary defects and giving the applicant an opportunity to remedy them before a final decision is made.  Seems like a combination of fundamental fairness and common sense.

There now is a conflict between the Ninth and Second Circuits, both of which get lots of Petitions to Review final orders of removal. Consequently, the issue is likely to reach the Supremes, sooner or later. Interestingly, Justice Gorsuch was a critic of Chevron deference, specifically in immigration cases, when he was on the 10th Circuit. We’ll see how he treats Chevron now that he is in a position to vote to modify or overrule it.

Here’s my previous post on Justice Gorsuch and Chevron:

https://wp.me/p8eeJm-eT

PWS

02-25-18