⚖️ “HON. SIR JEFFREY OF CLAIRVOYANCE” — The Day After His Blog On “Ineffective Assistance,” The 3rd & 10th Cirs “Blow Out” Garland EOIR’s Inept Approach!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
Dan Kowalski
Dan Kowalski
Online Editor of the LexisNexis Immigration Law Community (ILC)

Dan Kowalski reports for LexisNexis Immigration Community:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca3-on-ineffective-assistance-saint-ford-ii#

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/211729p1.pdf

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/211729po.pdf

“The need for effective assistance of counsel applies in immigration law just as it does in criminal law. Aliens, many of whom do not speak English and some of whom are detained before their immigration hearings, can be particularly susceptible to the consequences of ineffective lawyers. Petitioner Arckange Saint Ford paid a lawyer to represent him in removal proceedings, but Saint Ford’s requests for relief from deportation were denied after the lawyer failed to present important and easily available evidence going to the heart of Saint Ford’s claims. Saint Ford retained new counsel, and his new lawyer asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen his case because of his former attorney’s ineffective assistance. The Board declined to do so. Because Saint Ford presents a meritorious ineffective-assistance claim, we will vacate the Board’s decision and remand. … AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring Arckange Saint Ford will get a second shot at seeking withholding of removal—that’s what matters. The majority is remanding because of his former counsel’s deficient performance at Saint Ford’s removal hearing. I agree with that and concur in full. But former counsel was not the only one who made significant missteps at the hearing. The Immigration Judge did as well. I therefore would have granted Saint Ford’s initial petition for review and remanded on that basis. I write separately to explain these errors in the hope that similar ones will not be made at Saint Ford’s new hearing. [Emphasis added.]”

“The opinion and judgment filed on May 16, 2022 [34 F.4th 201 (3d Cir. 2022)] are hereby vacated. The Clerk is directed to file the amended opinion and re-enter the judgment contemporaneously with this order.” – Saint Ford v. Atty. Gen.

[Hats off again to Robert Andrew Painter!]

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https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010110752008.pdf

https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/unpub-ca10-mtr-remand-singh-v-garland#

“Singh argues the BIA committed legal error in denying his motion to reopen because it failed to cite or apply the prejudice standard from Matter of Lozada and its progeny—i.e., that the alien “show a reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been different,” Molina, 763 F.3d at 1263 (internal quotation marks omitted)— and instead applied an elevated standard of prejudice from Matter of F-S-N-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (B.I.A. 2020)—i.e., that the alien “overcome” a prior adverse credibility determination. We agree. … The BIA applied an incorrect legal standard in deciding whether Singh had been prejudiced by his attorney’s alleged ineffective assistance because it required him to “overcome” the adverse credibility determination to show prejudice. The BIA therefore abused its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen. See Qiu, 870 F.3d at 1202 (“[C]ommitting a legal error . . . is necessarily an abuse of discretion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). On remand, the BIA should consider whether there is “a reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance.” Mena-Flores, 776 F.3d at 1169 (internal quotation marks omitted).”

[Hats off to Jessica K. Miles of El Paso!]

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Wrong legal standards, mistakes at both trial and appellate levels, sloppy work, unfair results in “life or death” cases. Why is this “acceptable quasi-judicial performance” in the Biden Administration? Why isn’t Garland being held accountable for his life-threatening, ongoing, anti-due-process “clown show” @ EOIR?🤡☠️

EOIR Clown Show Must Go T-Shirt
“EOIR Clown Show Must Go” T-Shirt Custom Design Concept
Lady Injustice
“Lady Injustice” has found a home at Garland’s dysfunctional EOIR!
Public Realm

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

10-13-22

🤮INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE/DEFECTIVE COURTS — 3rd Cir. Exposes Massive Due Process Failure @ Garland’s EOIR! — St. Ford v. A.G.

 

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/211729p.pdf

From Judge Roth’s opinion:

The need for effective assistance of counsel applies in immigration law just as it does in criminal law. Aliens, many of whom do not speak English and some of whom are detained before their immigration hearings, can be particularly susceptible to the consequences of ineffective lawyers.

 

Petitioner Arckange Saint Ford paid a lawyer to represent him in removal proceedings, but Saint Ford’s requests for relief from deportation were denied after the lawyer failed to present important and easily available evidence going to the heart of Saint Ford’s claims. Saint Ford retained new counsel, and his new lawyer asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen his case because of his former attorney’s ineffective assistance. The Board declined to do so. Because Saint Ford presents a meritorious ineffective-assistance claim, we will vacate the Board’s decision and remand.

And concurring Judge Ambro had a harsh assessment of the IJ, the BIA, and most of all A.G. Garland, who has been remarkably “tone deaf” about correcting the grotesque expertise and due process problems in his “wholly owned, astoundingly dysfunctional” Immigration “Courts:”

Arckange Saint Ford will get a second shot at canceling the Government’s order of removal—that’s what matters. The majority is remanding because of his former counsel’s deficient performance at Saint Ford’s removal hearing. I agree with that and concur in full.

But former counsel was not the only one who made significant missteps at the hearing. The Immigration Judge did as well. I therefore would have granted Saint Ford’s initial petition for review and remanded on that basis. I write separately to explain these errors in the hope that similar ones will not be made at Saint Ford’s new hearing.

. . . .

Here, though it was reasonable to request Saint Ford corroborate his testimony about the identity and motive of his harassers, the IJ did not tell him what corroboration she needed or give him a chance to present that evidence. There is no indication she engaged in the Abdulai inquiry as required before skipping straight to “hold[ing] the lack of corroboration against [Saint Ford].” Id. (alterations adopted). She went from first to third across the pitcher’s mound. Our Abdulai inquiry is there to ensure these important corners aren’t cut.

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What’s wrong with this picture? Going on two decades after the enactment of the REAL ID Act, this IJ gets basic corroboration wrong on a life or death asylum case. Then, she compounds the error by failing to apply a two-decades old circuit precedent. The case sails through the BIA. Then, Garland’s OIL defends the indefensible. “Corner cutting” has become institutionalized, permitted, and even encouraged in today’s broken  EOIR!

Meanwhile, it’s left to Circuit Judge Ambro to do the jobs of Garland, his failed BIA, and an IJ badly in need of remedial training! This is an expert tribunal? This is justice? This is due process? Gimmie a break! 

This is squarely on Garland! He enables and defends defective, due-process-denying decisions by EOIR. His grotesque failure to appoint and empower a BIA that will end this nonsense and insist on competent legal performance from ALL Immigration Judges in these life or death cases is disgraceful!

Cases like this also “give lie” to the bogus claims that today’s EOIR is comprised of “experts” who can be trusted to remedy due process defects, model best practices, or (perhaps most absurdly) insure that the rights of all respondents, including the unrepresented, are protected. Why is a Dem Administration running a “due process denial machine?” Why is OIL defending the indefensible? Why is Garland still the AG, despite showing little interest and scant skill in creating a due process/fundamental fairness oriented tribunal at the “retail level” of our staggering justice system! 

You don’t have to be a “rocket scientist” to trace the disrespect for the Constitutional, statutory, and human rights of migrants, largely individuals of color, to hate crimes, misogyny, curtailment of voting rights, and disrespect for equal justice and racial justice throughout our nation. The stunningly poor performance of the U.S. Immigration Courts under Garland also sets an unfortunate tone for the staggering and highly politicized Federal Court system from bottom to top!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-19-22

👎🏽GARLAND’S BIA BLOWS ANOTHER: “Divide and conquer is a good military strategy but a bad judicial one. Judges must consider how related facts weave together into a narrative,” Says 3rd Circuit In Cha Lang v. Att’y Gen.

 

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/203353p.pdf

Key quote from opinion by Circuit Judge Bibas:

Divide and conquer is a good military strategy but a bad judicial one. Judges must consider how related facts weave to- gether into a narrative.

Chinese officials caught Cha Liang practicing his faith, so they beat, jailed, and then threatened him. When he sought asy- lum, the Board of Immigration Appeals minimized the threats and physical abuse as discrete incidents. But Liang’s twenty- minute beating and fifteen days in jail made the later threats more menacing. Because the Board should not have ignored this context, we will grant the petition and remand.

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  • Perhaps unwittingly, Judge Bibas’s use of a military analogy for EOIR “judging” is very, very apt! After four years of corrupt, White Nationalist, Stephen Miller inspired “leadership” and “judicial selections,” far, far too many judges and others at today’s EOIR view immigrants and their attorneys as “the enemy.” By contrast, they think of their “partners” at DHS as their “comrades in arms” against Stephen Miller’s fabricated “alien invasion” — a euphemism for “replacement theory” and other racist tropes that were seldom far below the surface of Trump-era immigration policies and actions.
  • It’s tempting to blame this entire mess on theTrump regime. But, sadly, manifestations of this problem were present well before 2017.
  • I remember an Immigration Judge Conference where, strangely, a recently appointed IJ, a former government prosecutor, was given an “instructor slot” at small group training. This Judge proceeded to repeatedly refer to the the DHS as “we” and the respondents and their lawyers as “them” as he enthusiastically described Government litigation “victories” while ignoring or downplaying Circuit Court decisions that had found serious flaws in EOIR judging and DHS legal positions.
  • That individual went on to a “judicial career” at EOIR that consistently demonstrated a disturbing and inappropriate inability to view those humans coming before the Immigration Court and their lawyers as anything other than “the enemy!”  So, the ethical, cultural, and quality control problems at EOIR are very deep-seated.
  • Remember, this is a broken agency that once, but no more, was supposed to stand for “through teamwork and innovation, become the world’s best administrative tribunals guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.”
  • As the recent “John Gruden Episode” in the NFL shows, “corrosive culture” remains a huge problem in professional football. Similarly, EOIR’s “culture of denial with a heavily dose of racism, misogyny, and xenophobia” remains every bit as much of a problem as those plaguing the NFL. Disingenuously “minimizing threats” to asylum seekers, as in this case, is “business as usual” at Garland’s anti-immigrant, anti-asylum EOIR. 
  • While the response of the NFL’s leadership has obviously been not fully effective, it’s still much better than Garland’s “what me worry, hear nothing, see nothing” approach to the crippling problems at his dysfunctional EOIR.

    Alfred E. Neumann
    Garland’s inept approach to the ongoing due process disaster at his EOIR has been perplexing, to say the least!
    PHOTO: Wikipedia Commons
  • Gruden actually was promptly forced out when the full extent of his misconduct finally surfaced. By contrast, with overwhelming public evidence of systemic failure, Garland has catastrophically failed to replace the problematic judges and inept senior leaders at EOIR with better-qualified, progressive, practical scholar-expert judges unswervingly committed to due process, fundamental fairness, and equal justice!
  • Although not cited by the 3rd Circuit, the BIA and the IJ also ignored the leading BIA precedent of Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23 (BIA 1998) (Panel: Hurwitz, Rosenberg, Schmidt) on the importance of considering harm cumulatively.
  • The concurring opinion by Judges Jordan and Ambro on past persecution as a “mixed question of fact and law” subject to a “two-step review process” is also well worth a read, particularly for those practicing in the 3rd Cir.

 

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

10-13-21

FINALLY, 3D CIR. BLASTS THROUGH JURISDICTIONAL BS & TELLS U.S. DISTRICT COURT TO GIVE SOME MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW TO SOME OF THOSE CAUGHT UP IN “LET ‘EM DIE IN MEXICO!” – But, Is It Too Little, Too Late For Most Of The 60,000 Poor Souls Illegally Condemned By The Regime To Deadly Misery On The Mexican Side of the Border? — E.O.H.C.; M.S.H.S. v. Sec. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security  

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/192927p.pdf

 

E.O.H.C.; M.S.H.S. v. Sec. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 3d Cir., 02-13-20, published

PANEL: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: Judge Bibas

KEY QUOTE:

This case raises the age-old question: “If not now, when?” Mishnah, Pirkei Avot 1:14. For aliens who are challenging their removal from the United States, the answer is usually “later.” But not always. And not here.

. . . .

Immigration claims ordinarily proceed from an immigra- tion judge through the Board of Immigration Appeals to the court of appeals by petition for review of a final removal order. Review by district courts is not the norm. But neither is this case. Most of the claims here cannot await a petition for re- view. By the time appellants are ordered removed to Guatemala (if ever), it will be too late to review their claims about their return to Mexico in the meantime. Only their statutory right-to-counsel claim will still be redressable. So the INA does not bar review of the remaining claims. And there is federal-question jurisdiction over the Flores claim. Because the United States is a party to the Flores Settlement Agreement, the contract claim is governed by federal common law and so arises under federal law. In short, the District Court has juris- diction over most of the claims. We will thus affirm the dis- missal of the statutory right-to-counsel claim and otherwise re- verse and remand for the District Court to address the merits.

 

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The court actually makes one highly questionable assumption: That folks returned to Mexico will survive long enough to challenge the inevitable denial of their asylum claims in Barr’s biased “kangaroo courts.” The court fails to recognize/articulate the real driving force behind “Let ‘Em Die In Mexico:” Kill off the asylum applicants, make it impossible for them to raise their claims in the U.S. legal system by denying reasonable access, and/or demoralize individuals so that they will give up and accept their fate, even where it likely means death or torture. That’s what our “justice system” has become under the regime.

Perhaps, Article III Courts are starting to take notice of what Let ‘Em Die in Mexico is really about. The dead can’t get judicial review, at least in this world. We can only hope!

 

Too bad the awareness hasn’t extended to the 9th Circuit and their truly abominable, not to mention cowardly, decision in Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan.

 

Article III Courts twiddle and fiddle, hem and haw, while real people die!

Due Process Forever; Complicit Courts Never!

 

PWS

 

09-14-20

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

THIRD CIRCUIT FINALLY EXPOSES THE BIA AS A BIASED, UNPROFESSIONAL, UNETHICAL MESS, THREATENING INDIVIDUALS WITH TORTURE &/OR DEATH IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:  In Sharp Contrast To Recent “Go Along To Get Along” Actions By The Supremes, 9th, 5th, 11th, and 4th Circuits, Circuit Judges McKee, Ambro and Roth Stand Up & Speak Out On BIA’s Unbelievably Horrible Performance: “I think it is as necessary as it is important to emphasize the manner in which the BIA dismissed Quinteros’ claim that he would be tortured (and perhaps killed) if sent back to El Salvador. For reasons I will explain below, it is difficult for me to read this record and conclude that the Board was acting as anything other than an agency focused on ensuring Quinteros’ removal rather than as the neutral and fair tribunal it is expected to be. That criticism is harsh and I do not make it lightly.”

NELSON QUINTEROS, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 3rdCir., 12-17-19, published

PANEL:  Circuit Judges McKee, Ambro and Roth

OPINION BY: Judge Roth

CONCURRING OPINION: Judge McKee, Joined By Judges Ambro & Roth

LINK TO FULL OPINION:  https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/183750p.pdf

READ THE FULL CONCURRING OPINION RIPPING THE BIA HERE:

McKEE, Circuit Judge, with whom Judges Ambro and Roth join, concurring.

I join my colleagues’ thoughtful opinion in its entirety. I write separately because I think it is as necessary as it is important to emphasize the manner in which the BIA dismissed Quinteros’ claim that he would be tortured (and perhaps killed) if sent back to El Salvador. For reasons I will explain below, it is difficult for me to read this record and conclude that the Board was acting as anything other than an agency focused on ensuring Quinteros’ removal rather than as the neutral and fair tribunal it is expected to be. That criticism is harsh and I do not make it lightly.

The BIA’s puzzling conclusions concerning Quinteros’ New York Yankees tattoo, although not the sole cause of my concern, illustrate the reasons I feel compelled to write separately. I will therefore begin by discussing the BIA’s decision-making process concerning this tattoo.

As Judge Roth notes, Quinteros testified that his New York Yankees tattoo would identify him as a former gang member.1 He also produced corroborating testimony to that effect from an expert witness and a study from the Harvard Law School International Rights Clinic. The first Immigration Judge to consider this evidence—which was apparently undisputed by the government—did so carefully and ultimately concluded that Quinteros “[h]as shown a clear likelihood that he would be killed or tortured by members of MS-13 and 18th Street gangs.”2 This finding was affirmed by the BIA upon its first review of Quinteros’ case,3 and affirmed again by the second IJ after we remanded for consideration in light of

1 Maj. Op. at 4-5.
2 JA125. The IJ also found the expert testimony convincing: “Dr. Boerman’s testimony persuasively illustrates how the Respondent could be mistaken for a gang member, since most gang members have tattoos, and there is a large number of MS-13 members in El Salvador . . .” Id.
3 JA130 (“We adopt and affirm the Immigration Judge’s decision.”).

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Myrie.4 Thus, two IJs and a Board member had previously examined and accepted this finding. Yet, for reasons that are not at all apparent, the BIA suddenly reversed that conclusion upon this fourth review.

In an explanation that is both baffling and dismaying, the BIA now claims: “Apart from his own testimony and the testimony of his expert witness, the record is devoid of any objective evidence establishing that a person with a New York Yankees tattoo without any other gang identifying marks will be identified as a . . . gang member and subjected to torture.”5 I am at a loss to understand what the BIA is referring to by requiring “objective” evidence. The IJ whose order was being reviewed had held that Quinteros was credible, stating: “Based on a review of the totality of evidence, the Court finds that Respondent’s testimony was consistent with the record and he was forthright with the Court regarding his past membership in MS-13 gang. Thus, the Court finds Respondent credible.”6 Moreover, there was nothing to suggest that Quinteros’ testimony lacked credibility regarding any aspect of his fear of MS-13 or how gang members would interpret his tattoo, and neither IJ suggested anything to the contrary.7

The BIA properly states the applicable standard of review of an IJ’s credibility finding is “clear error,”8 but nowhere does it suggest any basis for finding such error in either IJs’ determination. I am therefore unable to ascertain any justification for the BIA’s sudden reversal after the three previous cycles of review all arrived at the opposite conclusion. I also remain baffled by the BIA’s usage of “objective evidence.” The firsthand testimony of the victim of any crime is probative evidence if it is credible9—the issue is

4 JA14.
5 JA5 (emphasis added).
6 JA12.
7 See JA 14 (second IJ’s conclusion that Quinteros was credible); JA118 (first IJ’s conclusion that Quinteros was credible); see also Pet. Br. 41-42.
8 See BIA Opinion at JA2 (citing C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)).
9 For example, in statutory rape cases, fully half of the states (including Pennsylvania, where Quinteros is being held) have abolished their rules requiring corroboration. The victim’s

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the credibility of the witness. Once a witness’s testimony is found to be credible, it cannot arbitrarily be rejected merely to achieve a particular result. Even more salient, the BIA’s rejection of Quinteros’ credible testimony is inconsistent with controlling precedent and the regulations governing CAT relief.10 Those regulations state: “[t]he testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.”11 Thus, it is clear that corroborative evidence may not be necessary. In this case, where the testimony of the applicant is credible and is not questioned in any way, there is no reason to need corroboration.

Accordingly, Quinteros’ testimony should have been sufficient proof of any dispute about his tattoo even if he could be described as lacking objectivity. Moreover, there was nothing offered to suggest that the expert witness or the report of the Harvard Clinic was anything less than objective. It is impossible to discern from the record why the BIA refused to accept that external evidence. Moreover, given its apparent disregard for these three distinct, previously accepted pieces of evidence, I seriously doubt whether any evidence would have been capable of changing the agency’s analysis. Thus, it is the BIA’s own objectivity that concerns me here.

The agency’s discussion of the location of Quinteros’ tattoo heightens these concerns. First, the BIA expressed

account, if credible, is sufficient. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3106 (2018) (“The testimony of a complainant need not be corroborated in prosecutions under [Pennsylvania criminal law]. No instructions shall be given cautioning the jury to view the complainant’s testimony in any other way than that in which all complainants’ testimony is viewed.”); Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Regarding Necessity for Corroboration of Victim’s Testimony in Prosecution for Sexual Offense, 31 A.L.R. 4th 120 § 4[a] (1984).

10 See, e.g., Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 591 (3d Cir. 2011) (accepting as objective evidence the testimony of the petitioner alone); Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 134 (3d Cir. 2005) (accepting as “objective” the “[e]vidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant . . .”). 11 8 C.F.R. § 208.16.

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skepticism because the record does not contain a photograph of the tattoo, “or a description of its size and design.”12 It faulted Quinteros for not establishing that the tattoo is “publicly visible,” and stated, “[t]he record simply indicates that he has a tattoo on his right arm.”13 Yet, the Government never contested the existence of the tattoo and, as I have explained, Quinteros’ testimony about it was accepted as credible by the IJ.

Then the BIA objected that Quinteros never “clearly specified the location of his New York Yankees tattoo and his expert witness did not know its location.”14 However, two sentences later, the BIA states that “[t]he Record . . . simply indicates that he [Quinteros] has a tattoo on his right arm.”15 Therefore, not only was there never a dispute about the existence of the tattoo, there was also no dispute as to its location, and the BIA’s abortive suggestions to the contrary are simply inconsistent with a fair and neutral analysis of Quinteros’ claim. Finally, even if one sets that all aside, I can find no reasonable basis for the BIA to suppose that the specific design of the tattoo or testimony about its size was even necessary. Whatever its exact appearance, it was uncontested that it was a New York Yankees tattoo. And as noted by Judge Roth, the record had established that awareness of gang use of tattoos is so prevalent in El Salvador that individuals are routinely forced by police and rival gangs to remove their clothing for inspection of any tattoos that may be present.16 It therefore pains me to conclude that the BIA simply ignored evidence in an effort to find that Quinteros’ tattoo would not place him in peril as it was underneath his clothing.17

12 JA5.
13 JA5.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Maj. Op. at 22; see also JA61, 90-91, 162. Overlooking so obvious an inference of danger—arising from the undisputed existence of Quinteros’ tattoo—contradicts our directive that “the BIA must provide an indication that it considered such evidence, and if the evidence is rejected, an explanation as to why . . .” Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 268, 272 (3d Cir. 2014). 17 JA5.

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As troubling as the mishandling of Quinteros’ evidence might be standing alone, the BIA’s errors here are not an isolated occurrence. There are numerous examples of its failure to apply the binding precedent of this Circuit delineating the proper procedure for evaluating CAT appeals.18 Indeed, that framework has been mishandled, or simply absent, from several BIA opinions in the two years since we explicitly emphasized its importance in Myrie.19

As Judge Roth explains, Myrie instituted a two-part inquiry for evaluating whether a claim qualifies for relief under CAT. She describes the steps required and the points which must be addressed;20 we normally accept the BIA’s well- reasoned conclusions on each of these points, however,

“[t]he BIA must substantiate its decisions. We will not accord the BIA deference where its findings and conclusions are based on inferences

18 For our particular decisions on this topic, see Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2017); Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2011).
19 Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516 (requiring the BIA to follow the process we have delineated, as, “[i]n order for us to be able to give meaningful review to the BIA’s decision, we must have some insight into its reasoning.”) (quoting Awolesi v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 2003)). Among the examples of BIA error, see Serrano Vargas v. Att’y Gen., No. 17-2424, 2019 WL 5691807, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 4, 2019) (finding it “unclear” whether the BIA followed our precedent); Guzman v. Att’y Gen., 765 F. App’x. 721 (3d Cir. 2019) (finding ultimately non-determinative an incorrect application of the Myrie and Pieschacon-Villegas standards which had been summarily affirmed by the BIA); Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 759 F. App’x. 127, 130 (3d Cir. 2019) (requiring the appeals court to read between the lines of the BIA opinion to understand whether the conclusion satisfied the Myrie test); Antunez v. Att’y Gen., 729 F. App’x. 216, 223 (3d Cir. 2018) (concluding the BIA applied the wrong standard of review under Myrie).

20 Maj. Op, at 21.

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or presumptions that 21 are not reasonably grounded in the record.”

In other words, the BIA cannot act arbitrarily. We expect that it will “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its actions, including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”22 Here, as already seen, the BIA’s conclusions fell far short of that low bar. According deference would therefore be to compound a mistaken application of law.

The BIA’s misapplication of Myrie here is consistent with other examples. Beginning with the first prong of Myrie’s first question (what will happen if a petitioner is removed to his or her country of origin), the BIA ignored evidence in the record. I have already discussed much of its tattoo analysis.23 Similarly, the BIA simplistically concluded that because Quinteros left El Salvador when he was a boy, he would not be recognized by El Salvadorian gangs upon his return.24 That conclusion was clearly contradicted in the record by credible and undisputed evidence that Quinteros knows “at least 70” current or former gang members in the United States who were deported to El Salvador and would recognize him there.25 The BIA was required to at least review the evidence Quinteros offered and provide a non-arbitrary reason for rejecting it.26

21 Kang v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Sheriff v. Att’y Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 589 (3d Cir. 2009)).
22 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).

23 JA5.
24 JA4. The BIA strangely maintains in the face of the evidence presented that “[Quinteros] has not clearly articulated exactly how anyone in El Salvador will remember or recognize him . . .” id.
25 JA63-64.
26 Huang, 620 F.3d at 388 (“The BIA simply failed to address any evidence that, if credited, would lend support to [Petitioner’s case], and thus the decision does not reflect a consideration of the record as a whole.”).

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And the errors do not stop there. Because it had not substantively addressed the testimony offered above, the BIA was left without substantive findings on which to determine Question II of the Myrie framework: does what will likely happen to a petitioner amount to torture? As Judge Roth makes clear, the BIA is required to conduct both steps of the Myrie analysis.27 By declining to reach clear findings of what would happen upon removal, the BIA prevented itself from then being able to determine whether those results met the legal standard for torture. The Myrie framework cannot be so easily evaded.

Lastly, to briefly reiterate Judge Roth’s important observations regarding Myrie’s second prong,28 a proper inquiry must “take[] into account our precedent that an applicant can establish governmental acquiescence even if the government opposes the [group] engaged in torturous acts.”29 This is only logical, as few countries admit to torturing and killing their citizens, even when privately condoning such conduct. Thus, if we simply took countries at their word, there would barely be anywhere on the globe where CAT could apply. We have previously made clear that this is the proper inquiry to determine acquiescence and have remanded based on the BIA’s failure to look past the stated policies of a given government.30 Other Circuit Courts of Appeals have done the same.31 The BIA is thus on notice that results, not press

27 Maj. Op, at 23 (citing Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516).
28 Maj. Op, at 24-25.
29 Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 312 (2011).
30 See, e.g., Guerrero v. Att’y Gen., 672 F. App’x 188, 191 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam); Torres-Escalantes v. Att’y Gen., 632 F. App’x 66, 69 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
31 Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 363 (9th Cir. 2017); Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1140 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is success rather than effort that bears on the likelihood of the petitioner’s being killed or tortured if removed”); Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 510 (9th Cir. 2013) (“If public officials at the state and local level in Mexico would acquiesce in any torture [petitioner] is likely to suffer, this satisfies CAT’s requirement that a public official acquiesce in the torture, even if the federal government . . . would not similarly acquiescence.”); De La Rosa v. Holder,

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releases or public statements, are what drive the test for

acquiescence under Myrie.
III.

In Quinteros’ case, as has happened before, “[t]he BIA’s opinion frustrates our ability to reach any conclusion . . .”32 In Cruz, we stated that “the BIA’s cursory analysis ignored the central argument in [Petitioner’s] motion to reopen that he was no longer removable for committing a crime of moral turpitude.”33 In Kang, we disapproved when “[t]he BIA ignored overwhelming probative evidence . . . its findings were not reasonably grounded in the record and thus . . . . [t]he BIA’s determination was not based on substantial evidence.”34 In Huang, we complained when “[t]he BIA’s analysis [did] little more than cherry-pick a few pieces of evidence, state why that evidence does not support a well-founded fear of persecution and conclude that [petitioner’s] asylum petition therefore lacks merit. That is selective rather than plenary review.”35 There are simply too many additional examples of such errors to feel confident in an administrative system established for the fair and just resolution of immigration disputes.36 Most disturbing,

598 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is not clear . . . why the preventative efforts of some government actors should foreclose the possibility of government acquiescence, as a matter of law, under the CAT.”).

32 Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 248 (3d Cir. 2006).
33 Id.
34 Kang, 611 F.3d at 167.
35 Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 388 (3d Cir. 2010).
36 See, e.g., Huang Bastardo-Vale v. Att’y Gen., 934 F.3d 255, 259 n.1 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc) (castigating the BIA for its “blatant disregard of the binding regional precedent . . .”); Mayorga v. Att’y Gen., 757 F.3d 126, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2014) (reversing a BIA decision without remand and observing that “[i]deally the BIA would have provided more analysis, explaining why it accepted the IJ’s (erroneous) reasoning . . .”) (alteration in original); Quao Lin Dong v. Att’y Gen., 638 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding the BIA “erred by misapplying the law regarding when corroboration is necessary . . .”); Gallimore v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that “[t]he BIA’s analysis in all likelihood rests on an historically inaccurate premise . . . . the

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these failures gravely affect the rights of petitioners, such as Quinteros, who allege that they will face torture or death if removed to their country of origin.

Although the BIA is “[n]ot a statutory body . . .”37 it has been described as “[t]he single most important decision-maker in the immigration system.”38 I doubt that any court or any other administrative tribunal so regularly addresses claims of life-changing significance, often involving consequences of life and death. It is therefore particularly important that the opinions of the BIA fairly and adequately resolve the legal arguments raised by the parties and render decisions based only upon the record and the law.

I understand and appreciate that the BIA’s task is made more difficult by the incredible caseload foisted upon it, and the fact that BIA members (and IJs for that matter) are horrendously overworked.39 But administrative shortcomings

BIA’s opinion fails adequately to explain its reasoning and, in any event, appears incorrect as a matter of law.”). Nor is this a concern of recent vintage, the BIA has been on notice for well over a decade. See, e.g., Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he BIA in this case has failed even to provide us with clues that would indicate why or how [petitioner] failed to meet his burden of proof. As a result, ‘the BIA’s decision provides us with no way to conduct our . . . review.’”) (quoting Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 555 (3d Cir. 2001)); Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 555 (“[T]he availability of judicial review (which is specifically provided in the INA) necessarily contemplates something for us to review . . . . the BIA’s failure of explanation makes [this] impossible . . .”) (emphasis in original).

37 Anna O. Law, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 23 (2010) (citing unpublished internal history of the BIA).
38 Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Refugee Protection in the United States Post September 11, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 323, 353 (2005).

39 See Am. Bar Ass’n, Comm’n on Immigration, 2019 Update Report: Reforming the Immigration System: Proposals to Promote Independence, Fairness, Efficiency, and

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can never justify denying the parties a fair and impartial hearing, or excuse allowing adjudications to devolve into a mere formality before removal.

I would like to be able to feel comfortable that the lopsided outcomes in immigration proceedings40 reflect the merits of the claims for relief raised there rather than the proverbial “rush to judgment.” Thus, on remand, I can only hope that Quinteros’ claims are heard by more careful and judicious ears than he was afforded in this appearance.

Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases, Vol. 1, 20-21 (2019), available at https://www.naij- usa.org/images/uploads/newsroom/ABA_2019_reforming_th e_immigration_system_volume_1.pdf (noting the continued heavy caseload of the BIA, with an increasing number of appeals likely in the near future, and a resulting tendency to dispose of cases with single-member opinions that address only a single issue in the case).

40 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 359-61 (2007) (reporting that between 2001 and 2005, the BIA’s rate of granting asylum fell by up to 84%, with some categories of applicants receiving asylum only 5% of the time).

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It’s about time! But, this is long, long, long, long overdue! Way overdue! It’s long past time for “harsh criticism” of the BIA’s unconstitutional and inexcusable behavior. Forget about treading on the feelings of the BIA judges. Start thinking about the lives of the individuals they are harming and potentially torturing and killing! It’s time for the “Article IIIs” to “can the legal niceties” and take some action to halt the abuses before more innocent lives are lost!

 

Refreshing as it is in some respects, this concurring opinion vastly understates the overwhelming case against the BIA being allowed to continue to operate in this unprofessional, unethical, and unconstitutional manner. In the end, the panel also makes itself complicit by sending the case back for yet another unwarranted remand for the BIA to abuse this individual once again. For God’s sake, grant the protection, which is the only possible legally correct result on this record. CAT is mandatory, not discretionary!

 

Interestingly, while the panel was hatching this remand, the BIA in Matter of O-F-A-S-, 27 I&N Dec. 709 (BIA 2019) was essentially “repealing CAT by intentional misconstruction” and running roughshod over almost every CAT precedent and principle described by the panel. How many times can the regime “poke the Article IIIs in the eyes with two sharp sticks” before the latter take some notice? You’re being treated like fools, cowards, and weaklings, and the rest of us are daily losing whatever respect we once had for the role of life-tenured Federal Judges in protecting our republic and our individual rights!

 

Clearly, the intentionally skewed outcomes in asylum and other protection cases are a result of the regime’s illegal and unconstitutional White Nationalist “war on asylum,” particularly directed against vulnerable women, children, and individuals of color.  Many of these individuals are improperly and unconstitutionally forced to “represent” themselves, if they are even fortunate enough to get into the hearing system. It’s modern day racist Jim Crow with lots of gratuitous dehumanization to boot. And, it’s being enabled by feckless Article III appellate courts.

 

Judge McKee and his colleagues need not “wonder” if the skewed results of this system are fixed. The public pronouncements by overt White Nationalists like Session, Barr, Miller, “Cooch Cooch,” and Trump himself make their disdain for the law, the Constitution, individuals of color, and the Federal Courts crystal clear. There is no “mystery” here! Just look at “Let ‘Em Die In Mexico” or the preposterously fraudulent “Safe Third Country Agreements” that have effectively eliminated Due Process and U.S. protection laws without legislation.

 

Read the truth from the National Association of Immigration Judges or one of the many other experts in the field who have exposed the unconstitutional operations of the Immigration Courts and the need for immediate action to end the abuse and restore at least a semblance of Due Process! Of course, these aren’t fair and impartial adjudications as required by the Constitution. They haven’t been for some time now. No reasonable person or jurist could think that “kangaroo courts” operating under the thumb of enforcement zealots like Sessions and Barr could be fair and impartial as required by the Constitution!

 

And the “backlogs” adding to the pressure on the BIA and Immigration Judges are overwhelmingly the result of “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” by the DOJ, which went into “overdrive” during this regime. The regime then “pulls the wool” over the eyes of the Article IIIs and the public by deflecting attention from their own “malicious incompetence” while shifting the blame to the victims – the respondents and their attorneys. How cowardly and dishonest can one get? Yet, the Article IIIs fail time after time to look at the actual evidence of “malicious incompetence” by the Trump regime that has been compiled by TRAC and others!

 

Sessions and Barr have made it clear that the only purpose of their weaponized and “dumbed down” Immigration “Courts” is to churn out removal orders on the “Deportation Express.” “Reflect on the merits?” Come on, man! You have got to be kidding! There is nothing in this perverted process that encourages such care or reflection or even informed decision making. That’s why judges are on “production quotas!” It’s about volume, not quality. Sessions actually said it out loud at an Immigration Judges’ so-called “training session!” In the unlikely event that the respondent actually “wins” one, even against these odds, Sessions, Whitaker, and Barr have all shown how they can unconstitutionally and unethically simply reach down and change results to favor the DHS.

 

As the bogus denials pile up, even though country conditions are not materially improving in most “sending” countries, the Trump Regime, EOIR, DOJ, and DHS use these unfair results to build their false narrative that the artificially inflated denial rates reflect the lack of merits of the claims.

 

Would Court of Appeals Judges or Justices of the Supremes subject themselves or their families to “Immigration Court Justice” in any type of meaningful dispute? Of course not! So, why is it “Constitutionally OK” for often unrepresented individuals on trial for their lives to be subjected to this system? It clearly isn’t! So, why is it being done every day?

 

End the dangerous, unethical, and immoral “Judicial Task Avoidance.” Time for the Article IIIs to step up to the plate, stop enabling, stop remanding, stop looking the other way, and rule this entire system unconstitutional, as it most certainly is. Stop all deportations until Congress creates an independent Immigration Court system that complies with Due Process! Assign a “Special Master” to run EOIR without DOJ interference. Those few cases where the public health or safety is actually at risk should be tried before U.S. Magistrate Judges or retired U.S. District Judges until at least temporary Due Process fixes can be made to the Immigration Courts.

 

Sound radical? Not as radical as sentencing vulnerable individuals to death, torture, or other unspeakable harm without any semblance of Due Process — subjecting individuals to a “crapshoot for their lives.” And, that’s what we’re doing now because Article III Courts don’t have the guts to do their job and “just say no” – once and for all — to EOIR’s daily charade that mocks our Constitution and our humanity!

 

Due Process Forever!

A maliciously incompetent regime and complicit courts, never!

PWS

12-17-19