🇺🇸⚖️👨🏾‍⚖️ PROF. CARL TOBIAS (U. RICHMOND LAW) HAS SOME VERY NICE THINGS TO SAY ABOUT OUTGOING 4TH CIRCUIT CHIEF JUDGE ROGER GREGORY!

Chief Judge Roger Gregory
Judge Roger Gregory
U.S. Court of Appeals
Fourth Circuit

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/07/09/judge-roger-gregory-tenure-4th-circuit/

Tobias writes in WashPost:

On Saturday, Roger Gregory concluded his tenure as chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit. Judge Gregory has ensured the court expeditiously, inexpensively and fairly decided several thousand appeals annually.

President Bill Clinton nominated Judge Gregory in June 2000, but GOP senators ignored the nomination, so Clinton granted him a recess appointment that December. President George W. Bush nominated Judge Gregory in May 2001, and he won confirmation. Judge Gregory was the court’s initial Black jurist, becoming its first Black chief judge in July 2016.

Gregory ensured efficacious implementation of administrative tasks, notably investitures for new active, and retirements for senior, jurists on the 15-member appeals court, plus the nine districts’ many trial court, magistrate and bankruptcy judges. He facilitated professional development of 150 judges and 1,600 court staff.

Judge Gregory also discharged complex, delicate responsibilities, namely investigating and resolving ethics complaints and claims of discrimination, which involved jurists and court personnel. Other complicated, sensitive duties were maintaining the court’s effective disposition of substantial appeals and collegiality as it transitioned from the most conservative to a more progressive appellate court. A crisis arising in Judge Gregory’s tenure was the coronavirus pandemic. He expeditiously organized the 4th Circuit response, skillfully navigating public health dangers and politicization of remedies for those risks.

Judge Gregory exhibited diligence, wisdom and appreciation, showing respect for history, customs and norms, as well as the 1,750 dedicated public servants who assiduously help the court efficaciously resolve large cases. Individuals across the 4th Circuit are indebted to Judge Gregory for his exceptional administration.

Carl Tobias, Richmond

The writer is the Williams chair in law at the University of Richmond School of Law.

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Very well-deserved tribute! Thanks for writing it! 

The totally dysfunctional U.S. Immigration Courts need leadership like that provided by Judge Gregory. Perhaps, Judge Garland could call Judge Gregory and get him to take over and straighten out EOIR, America’s worst important “court” system. Sadly, to date, Garland has shown little interest in making good on the constitutional guarantee of due process for all persons in the U.S., including immigrants!

Judge Gregory, the first African-American judge on the Circuit, is succeeded by Chief Judge Albert Diaz a 2010 Obama appointee. Judge Diaz becomes the first Hispanic to serve as the Circuit’s Chief Judge!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

07-10-23

⚖️NDPA SUPERSTAR BEN WIN-OGRAD WINS A BIGGIE IN 4TH ON IJ CONDUCT — Tinoco Acevedo v. Garland

Ben Winograd
Ben Winograd, Esquire
Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center
Falls Church, VA

Dan Kowalski reports for LexisNexis Immigration Community!

CA4 on IJ Conduct: Tinoco Acevedo v. Garland

Tinoco Acevedo v. Garland

“Petitioner Rodolfo Josue Tinoco Acevedo appeals an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his application for cancellation of removal. Because the BIA failed to address whether Tinoco Acevedo’s case should be remanded to a new immigration judge (“IJ”) under Matter of Y-S-L-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 688 (BIA 2015), we grant Tinoco Acevedo’s petition for review, vacate the order of removal, and remand to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. … Rather than opine as to the exact grounds on which the BIA decided that the applicant was entitled to a new hearing before a new IJ in Matter of Y-S-L-C-, we remand for the BIA to interpret its precedent and address Tinoco Acevedo’s argument in the first instance. …  we grant Tinoco Acevedo’s petition for review, vacate the order of removal, and remand for the BIA to consider whether Tinoco Acevedo is entitled to a new hearing before a different IJ because the initial IJ’s conduct—both during and following the hearing—failed to satisfy the high standard expected of IJs under Matter of Y-S-L-C-. PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED.”  [Note: The IJ was Roxanne C. Hladylowycz.]

[Hats off once again to IRAC superlitigator Ben Winograd!]

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Daniel M. Kowalski

Editor-in-Chief

Bender’s Immigration Bulletin (LexisNexis)

cell/text/Signal (512) 826-0323

@dkbib on Twitter

dan@cenizo.com

Free Daily Blog: www.bibdaily.com

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Yet another example of the BIA not being familiar with and applying their own precedents where they could be favorable to the respondent. Any old boilerplate BS will do as long is the result is “dismiss and remove.”

It’s one thing for the BIA to articulate “high standards” for IJ conduct in Matter of Y-S-L-C-. It’s quite another to consistently enforce them where the lives of migrants are at stake!

It was a particularly bad idea for the BIA to spring this haphazard “good enough for government work” approach when Ben Winograd is appellate counsel. Winograd knows the BIA and 4th Circuit precedents better than most BIA judges. And, unlike the latter, he’s willing to stand up for immigrants’ legal rights!

It would be better for Garland and American justice — not to mention those seeking justice in Immigration Court, too often in vain — if brilliant, due-process-oriented “practical scholars” like Ben Winograd replaced the “holdover BIA judges” who aren’t up to the job of “guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.” Remarkably, there was a time in the past when that long disregarded judicial essential was the “vision” of EOIR.

Ironically, the Article III Judges of this 4th Circuit panel (Chief Judge Gregory, Circuit Judges Motz and Wynn) understand the critical requirements for EOIR judging better than AG Garland! That’s a problem (although, concededly, outside the “World of EOIR” Garland has had his best week as AG)!

This opinion was written by Chief Judge Roger Gregory. He continues to be a leader among Article III Judges who take due process and immigrants’ rights seriously! He’s also someone who “gets” the clear connection between immigrant justice (or, in too many cases lack thereof) and racial justice.

With the Chief Immigration Judge position now vacant, Judge Garland has a golden opportunity to appoint a “Judge Gregory clone” to that critical  position. See, e.g., https://immigrationcourtside.com/wp-admin/post.php?post=30193&action=edit. That would also be a wise course for Garland to take to replace the current glaringly inadequate leadership at his failing BIA! How about Chief Appellate Immigration Judge/Chairman Ben Winograd?

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-13-22

👎🏽ANOTHER 4TH CIRCUIT PUTDOWN FOR GARLAND — AO & IJ COMPLETELY BOTCH “REASONABLE FEAR REVIEW” — OIL COMPOUNDS PROBLEM BY ADVANCING SEMI-FRIVOLOUS DEFENSES!

Dan Kowalski reports for LexisNexis:

Tomas-Ramos v. Garland

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/201201.P.pdf

https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca4-on-nexus-tomas-ramos-v-garland#

“After Adan de Jesus Tomas-Ramos, a citizen and native of Guatemala, reentered the United States illegally in 2018, a removal order previously entered against him was reinstated. But because Tomas-Ramos expressed a fear of returning to Guatemala, an asylum officer conducted a screening interview to determine whether he reasonably feared persecution or torture in his home country. The asylum officer determined that Tomas-Ramos failed to establish a reasonable fear of such harm, and so was not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) concurred with that determination. Tomas-Ramos now petitions for review of the IJ’s order on two grounds. He first contends that the IJ’s finding that he lacked a reasonable fear of persecution or torture was erroneous. We agree. The primary ground for the IJ’s decision was that there was no “nexus” between the harm Tomas-Ramos faced and a protected ground. But the agency incorrectly applied the statutory nexus requirement. Instead, the record compels the conclusion that Tomas-Ramos was persecuted on account of a protected ground, in the form of his family ties. And in light of that error, we cannot determine that the other reason given by the IJ for her decision – that Tomas-Ramos could avoid harm by relocating – was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, vacate the agency’s decision, and remand for further proceedings.”

[Hats off to Michael D. Lieberman, Simon Y. Sandoval-Moshenberg, Stacy M. Kim, Paul F. Brinkman, and Michael A. Francus!]

 

Daniel M. Kowalski

Editor-in-Chief

Bender’s Immigration Bulletin (LexisNexis)

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    • DOJ’s error-studded performance (or lack thereof) in this case is disgraceful!
    • I guarantee that there are plenty of other unjust, legally defective reasonable fear and credible fear decisions where these came from. Just most folks never get any meaningful judicial review.
    • Both the IJ and the AO got the basics of nexus and the applicable 4th Circuit case law totally wrong here. How are is this acceptable performance from what are supposed to be “expert” courts? Why hasn’t Garland brought in real experts, committed to due process and best practices, to take charge and straighten out this mess?
    • Disturbingly, the Biden Administration wants to turn this type of clearly inadequate procedure with poorly trained officers and judges and incorrect applications of the law loose on the merits determinations for all asylum seekers at the border!
    • Rather than being a check on bad judges, Garland’s OIL continues to “defend the indefensible” with arguments that don’t meet “the straight-face test.” Aren’t ethical codes equally applicable to Government lawyers?
    • Worse yet, Garland continues to unethically defend the scofflaw behavior of the Biden Administration by using a Stephen Miller era “COVID pretext” to deny most asylum seekers at the Southern Border any process, even the pathetic one used here!
    • The “wheels have come off” @ Garland’s DOJ and he’s driving on the axel hubs! When is someone going to pull him over and make him fix it?
    • Believe it or not, these are life or death cases! ☠️ Why is Garland allowed to treat the lives and rights of migrants and those associated with them so frivolously?
    • The IJ’s attempt to bar the R’s attorney from participating in the “credible fear” review is ridiculous! It shows the deep problems in Garland’s broken system which too often is deaf to due process, hostile to attorneys, and immune from common sense and best practices! Why would the “default” for regulatory silence be “no participation” rather than a “strong presumption that attorneys can fully participate?” What kind of “court” bars attorneys from speaking for their clients? Why would any judge not want to listen to attorneys, who are there to help them make correct decisions? The IJ’s conduct here was particularly egregious given that she had already made a clearly wrong decision before cutting off the attorney’s attempt to point out her errors! What a complete farce that Garland has failed to address!
    • This is another case where Circuit Judge Allison Jones Rushing, a Trump appointee with solid conservative credentials, once thought to be a possible contender for the “ACB seat,” joined her colleagues (Judge Harris and Chief Judge Gregory) to overturn a wrong, anti-immigrant decision by EOIR. Her approach in this and another recent case shows more sensitivity to due process, scholarship, and the rights of individual immigrants than many decisions emanating from Biden’s Immigration Courts under Garland.
    • I’m not suggesting that Judge R is necessarily going to become a leading defender of due process for immigrants. But, based on these somewhat random “snippets,” she seems more “reachable” and open to sound arguments on the issues than some other Trump appointees, points worth keeping in mind for NDPA advocates!
    • She’s also young. So, she will be reviewing immigration cases and making law for decades to come.

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

02-02/22

⚖️4TH CIR. — CHIEF CIRCUIT JUDGE ROGER GREGORY (DISSENTING) CASTIGATES COLLEAGUES ON GRANTNG “CHEVRON DEFERENCE” TO BIA!

Chief Judge Roger Gregory
Chief Judge Roger Gregory
U.S. Court of Appeals
Fourth Circuit

Pugin v. Garland, 4th Cir., 12-01-21, published, 2-1 (Chief Judge Gregory, dissenting)

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/201363.P.pdf

GREGORY, Chief Judge, dissenting:

The majority concludes that because the phrase “in relation to obstruction of justice”

in § 1101(a)(43)(S) is ambiguous, the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) renewed interpretation of this provision is due Chevron deference. The majority also concludes that the BIA’s interpretation of “reasonably foreseeable”—in the context of before an investigation or proceeding—is reasonable. Because, in my view, the phrase is not ambiguous, the BIA is not due Chevron deference. However, even if § 1101(a)(43)(S) is ambiguous, the BIA’s conclusion that a formal nexus to an ongoing investigation is not required—based solely on the express exception in § 1512 and the catchall provision that it wrongly interpreted—is unreasonable. Thus, I disagree that Petitioner’s conviction of “Accessory After the Fact to a Felony,” under § 18.2–19 of the Virginia Code, is a categorical match with the generic offense of § 1101(a)(43)(S). For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. . . .

************************

Of interest:

  • The “previous interpretation” discussed here, that the BIA subsequently “ditched” in favor of a more pro-DHS one, is Matter of Espinoza- Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. 889 (B.I.A. 1999), a “Schmidt Era” en banc decision written by Judge Ed Grant in which I joined.
  • 64 pages of arcane discussion and citations from three Circuit Court of Appeals’ Judges who cannot agree on the result shows the continuing disingenuous absurdity of a system that claims that “unrepresented” immigrants receive due process — many of these cases require not only lawyers, but great lawyers with expertise in immigration, criminal law, and statutory interpretation to achieve fair resolution;
  • Both the majority and the dissent “talk around” a major problem in the misapplication of “Chevron deference” to the BIA: In recent years, the BIA invariably adopts “any interpretation” offered by the DHS over better interpretations offered by respondents and their lawyers — this is a “rigged system” if there ever was one. For Article III Courts to “legitimize” the bogus application of Chevron by a non-expert tribunal that views itself as an extension of DHS Enforcement is a disgraceful dereliction of judicial duty!

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

12-02-21

🏴‍☠️BIA CONTINUES TO SPEW FORTH ERRORS IN LIFE OR DEATH ☠️ ASYLUM CASES, SAYS 4TH CIR. — “Three-In-One” — Improperly Disregarding Corroborating Evidence; Incorrect Legal Standard On Past Persecution; Wrong Nexus Finding! — Arita-Deras v. Wilkinson

Four Horsemen
BIA Asylum Panel In Action
Albrecht Dürer, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
Kangaroos
“Oh Boy! Three material mistakes in one asylum case! Do you think our superiors in the enforcement bureaucracy will give us extra credit on our ‘move ‘em out without due process quotas?’ Being a Deportation Judge sure is fun!”
https://www.flickr.com/photos/rasputin243/
Creative Commons License

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/191978.P.pdf

Arita-Deras v. Wilkinson, 4th Cir., 03-05-21, Published

PANEL:  GREGORY, Chief Judge, and AGEE and KEENAN, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: Judge Barbara Milano Keenan

KEY QUOTE: 

Maria Del Refugio Arita-Deras, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for review of a final order of removal entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board).1 The Board affirmed an immigration judge’s (IJ) conclusion that Arita-Deras was not eligible for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Board: (1) agreed with the IJ that Arita-Deras failed to support her claims with sufficient corroborating evidence; (2) found that Arita-Deras failed to prove that she suffered from past persecution because she had not been harmed physically; and (3) concluded that Arita-Deras failed to establish a nexus between the alleged persecution and a protected ground.

Upon our review, we conclude that the Board improperly discounted Arita-Deras’ corroborating evidence, applied an incorrect legal standard for determining past persecution, and erred in its nexus determination. Accordingly, we grant Arita-Deras’ petition and remand her case to the Board for further proceedings.

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After eight years of bouncing around the system at various levels THIS “Not Quite Good Enough For Government Work” error-fest is what we get from EOIR! As I keep saying, no wonder they are running a 1.3 million case backlog, clogging the Circuit Courts with incredibly shoddy work, and in many cases sending vulnerable refugees back to death or torture under incorrect fact findings and blatantly wrong legal interpretations!

Again, nothing profound about this claim; just basic legal and analytical errors that often flow from the “think of any reason to deny” culture. EOIR just keeps repeating the same basic mistakes again and again even after being “outed” by the Circuits!

This case illustrates why the unrealistically high asylum denial numbers generated by the biased EOIR system and parroted by DHS should never be trusted. This respondent, appearing initially without a lawyer, was actually coerced by an Immigration Judge into accepting a “final order” of removal with a totally incorrect, inane, mis-statement of the law. “Haste makes waste,” shoddy, corner cutting procedures, judges deficient in asylum legal knowledge, and a stunning lack of commitment to due process and fundamental fairness are a burden to our justice system in addition to being a threat to the lives of individual asylum seekers.

Only when she got a lawyer prior to removal was this respondent able to get her case reopened for a full asylum hearing. Even then, the IJ and the BIA both totally screwed up the analysis and entered incorrect orders. Only because this respondent was fortunate enough to be assisted by one of the premier pro bono groups in America, the CAIR Coalition, was she able to get some semblance of justice on appeal to the Circuit Court! 

I’m very proud to say that a member of the “CAIR Team,” Adina Appelbaum, program Director, Immigration Impact Lab, is my former Georgetown ILP student, former Arlington Intern, and a “charter member” of the NDPA! If my memory serves me correctly, she is also a star alum of the CALS Asylum Clinic @ Georgetown Law. No wonder Adina made the Forbes “30 Under 30” list of young Americans leaders! She and others like her in the NDPA are ready to go in and start cleaning  up and improving EOIR right now! Judge Garland take note!

Adina Appelbaum
Adina Appelbaum
Director, Immigration Impact Lab
CAIR Coalition
PHOTO: “30 Under 30” from Forbes

Despite CAIR’s outstanding efforts, Ms. Arita-Deras still is nowhere near getting the relief to which she should be entitled under a proper application of the law by expert judges committed to due process. Instead, after eight years, she plunges back into EOIR’s 1.3 million case “never never land” where she might once again end up with Immigration Judges at both the trial and appellate level who are not qualified to be hearing asylum cases because they don’t know the law and they are “programmed to deny” to meet their “deportation quotas” in support of ICE Enforcement.

Focus on it folks! This is America; yet individuals on trial for their lives face a prosecutor and a “judge” who are on the same side! And, they are often forced to do it without a lawyer and without even understanding the complex proceedings going on around them! How is this justice? It isn’t! So why is it allowed to continue?

Also, let’s not forget that under the recently departed regime, EOIR falsely claimed that having an attorney didn’t make a difference in success rates for respondents. That’s poppycock! Actually, as the Vera Institute recently documented the success rate for represented respondents is an astounding 10X that of unrepresented individuals. In any functional system, that differential would be more than sufficient to establish a “prima facie” denial of due process any time an asylum seeker (particularly one in detention) is forced to proceed without representation. 

🇺🇸⚖️🗽🧑🏽‍⚖️VERA INSTITUTE RECOMMENDS FEDERAL DEFENDER PROGRAM FOR IMMIGRANTS — Widespread Public Support For Representation In Immigration Court!

Yet, this miscarriage of justice occurs every day in Immigration Courts throughout America! Worse yet, EOIR and DHS have purposely “rigged” the system in various ways to impede and discourage effective representation.

To date, while flagging EOIR for numerous life-threatening errors, the Article IIIs have failed to come to grips with the obvious: The current EOIR system provides neither due process nor fundamental fairness to the individuals coming before these “courts” (that aren’t “courts” at all)! 

Acting AG Wilkinson has piled up an impressive string of legal defeats in immigration matters in just a short time on the job. It’s going to be up to Judge Garland to finally make it right. It’s urgent for both our nation and the individuals whose rights are being stomped upon by a broken system on a daily basis!

🇺🇸⚖️🗽Due Process Forever! Failed Courts Never!

PWS

03–05-21

🏴‍☠️🤮👎🏻RACISM IN AMERICA: With Racially Tone-Deaf Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson & His Righty Buddy Judge Paul Niemeyer Leading the Way, Split 4th Circuit Panel, Says “Yes” To Trump/Miller White Nationalist Attack On Public Benefits For Immigrants of Color! 

Kevin R. Johnson
Kevin R. Johnson
Dean
U.C. Davis Law

Dean Kevin Johnson @ ImmigrationProf Blog reports:

https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2020/08/fourth-circuit-vacates-injunction-against-public-charge-immigration-rule.html

Thursday, August 6, 2020

Fourth Circuit Vacates Injunction Against Public Charge Immigration Rule

By Immigration Prof

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Courthouse News Service reports that the Fourth Circuit yesterday ruled 2-1 (opinion by Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, with Judge Robert B. King dissenting)  in favor of a Trump administration policy that makes it more difficult for noncitizens to become lawful permanent residents if they have received public benefits.

The ruling does not, however, change an injunction issued last week by a federal judge in New York barring enforcement of the so-called public charge rule.

The Second Circuit affirmed the injunction but limited its scope to New York, Connecticut and Vermont. The appeals court found the government’s justification for the rule is “unmoored from the nuanced views of Congress.”

KJ

 

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Judge Wilkinson’s racially insensitive judging recently was publicly “called out” by Fourth Circuit Chief Judge Roger Gregory in a remarkably honest and incisive opinion. https://immigrationcourtside.com/2020/07/16/%e2%9a%96%ef%b8%8fcalling-out-white-nationalist-judging-in-a-remarkable-opinion-4th-cir-chief-judge-roger-gregory-blasts-colleagues-retrograde-views-on-race-judging-policing-communiti/

Perhaps, dissenting Judge Robert B. King best sums up his colleagues’ willingness to distort the law and pervert rationality in support of the regime’s racist-driven, White Nationalist Immigration agenda:

In the face of the extensive history accompanying the term “public charge,” to conclude that the DHS Rule’s definition of “public charge” is reasonable makes a mockery of the term “public charge,” “does violence to the English language and the statutory context,” and disrespects the choice — made consistently by Congress over the last century and a quarter — to retain the term in our immigration laws. See Cook Cty., 962 F.3d at 229. For those reasons, the Rule’s “public charge” definition ventures far beyond any ambiguity inherent in the meaning of the term “public charge,” as used in the Public Charge Statute, and thus fails at Chevron’s second step. In light of the foregoing, the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Rule is unlawful, and the majority is wrong to conclude otherwise.

Equal justice for all, due process, reasonableness, and non-racist judging aren’t “rocket science.” That’s why Wilkinson had to cloak his anti-immigrant bias with 71 pages of irrational nonsense and legal gobbledygook. 

Just another example of the U.S. District Judge “getting it right” only to be undermined by bad judging from higher Federal Courts. Unwillingness of the Federal Judiciary to take a unified strand for equal justice and against institutionalized racism and the White Nationalist agenda of the Trump regime is literally ripping our nation apart as well as showing the fatal weakness of the Federal Judiciary as a protector of our democracy and our individual rights.

Folks like Wilkinson and Niemeyer are what they are. But, we have the power to elect a President and a Senate who will appoint judges who actually believe in Constitutional due process and equal justice for all, regardless of color or status. Judges who will “tell it like it is,” “just say no” to “Dred Scottification” of “the other,” and courageously stand up for an unbiased interpretation the law and for simple human decency, rather than pretzeling themselves to defend an indefensible Executive agenda of unbridled White Nationalism and racism.

This November vote like your life and the future of our nation depend on it. Because they do.

PWS

08-06-20

⚖️CALLING OUT WHITE NATIONALIST JUDGING: In a Remarkable Opinion, 4th Cir. Chief Judge Roger Gregory Blasts Colleague’s Retrograde Views on Race, Judging, Policing, & Communities of Color!

Chief Judge Roger Gregory
Chief Judge Roger Gregory
U.S. Court of Appeals
Fourth Circuit

U.S. v. Curry

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/184233A.P.pdf

GREGORY, Chief Judge, concurring:

Our decision today affirms that a central tenet of law nearly as old as this country—

namely, “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures”—applies equally to all. U.S. Const. amend. IV. I join the majority Opinion in its entirety. However, I must say a few words in response to Judge Wilkinson’s dissent.

When I read the first line of Judge Wilkinson’s dissent I was heartened by the thought: well, at least he acknowledges that there are “two Americas.” But this glint of enlightenment was to serve as a “soap box” for his charge against the majority’s decision. It is understandable that such a pseudo-sociological platform was necessary as his assertions are bereft of any jurisprudential reasoning. More to the point, his recognition of a divided America is merely a preamble to the fallacy-laden exegesis of “predictive policing” that follows. Through his opinion, my colleague contributes to the volumes of work gifted by others who felt obliged to bear their burden to save minority or disadvantaged communities from themselves.

Of course, the story of two Americas of which Judge Wilkinson speaks is an ancient tale to some. See, e.g., Frederick Douglas, “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?” 1852. There’s a long history of black and brown communities feeling unsafe in police presence. See, e.g., James Baldwin, A Report from Occupied Territory, The Nation, July 11, 1966 (“[T]he police are simply the hired enemies of this population. . . . This is why those pious calls to ‘respect the law,’ always to be heard from prominent citizens each time the ghetto explodes, are so obscene.”). And at least “[s]ince Reconstruction, subordinated

communities have endeavored to harness the criminal justice system toward recognition 33

that their lives have worth.” Deborah Tuerkheimer, Criminal Justice and the Mattering of Lives, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 1145, 1146 (2018). Thus, just a few decades ago, laws designed to decrease violence in these communities were considered “a civil rights triumph.” James Forman, Locking Up our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America 73 (2017). The thought being that our government had finally “promised to provide police protection to a community so long denied it.” Id. This increased protection, however, led to what has been described as “a central paradox of the African American experience: the simultaneous over- and under-policing of crime.” Id. at 35.

Judge Wilkinson chooses to focus largely on one dimension of this paradox, ignoring the details of the familiar perils of over-policing. See, e.g., Marie Gottschalk, Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American Politics (2015); Michael Tonry, Punishing Race: A Continuing American Dilemma (2011); Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow (2010); Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America (2010); Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag (2007). Describing the hazard of “hot spot policing” as “the danger of overreaction,” Wilkinson Dis. Op. at 68, Judge Wilkinson mitigates the concerns of some that any encounter with an officer could turn fatal. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing “the talk” that black and brown parents frequently give to their children “all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to them”); see also United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 541 (4th Cir. 2013) (“In certain communities that have been subject to overbearing or harassing police conduct, cautious parents may

counsel their children to be respective, compliant, and accommodating to police officers, 34

to do everything officers instruct them to do.”). In so doing, my dissenting colleague in turn presents a sordid view of under-policing, suggesting that our decision today will lead to “an America where gated communities will be safe enough and dispossessed communities will be left to fend increasingly for themselves.” Wilkinson Dis. Op. at 69.

But we know that many of our fellow citizens already feel insecure regardless of their location. In a society where some are considered dangerous even when they are in their living rooms eating ice cream, asleep in their beds, playing in the park, standing in the pulpit of their church, birdwatching, exercising in public, or walking home from a trip to the store to purchase a bag of Skittles, it is still within their own communities—even those deemed “dispossessed” or “disadvantaged”—that they feel the most secure. Permitting unconstitutional governmental intrusions into these communities in the name of protecting them presents a false dichotomy. My colleague insists on a Hobson’s choice for these communities: decide between their constitutional rights against unwarranted searches and seizures or forgo governmental protection that is readily afforded to other communities. But those inclined to shrug their shoulders at citizens who wave their Constitutions in the air during uncertainty must not forget “[h]istory teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Indeed, it is in moments of insecurity that our constitutional bells ring the loudest.

Why even suppose that checking police power in these circumstances would lead to

some communities falling into a Hobbesian state of nature? It’s unclear. Judge Wilkinson 35

supports this slippery slope argument in a couple of mutually incompatible and individually questionable ways. He mentions Professor Rod K. Brunson’s work on policing to bolster the view that our decision here will further entrench the perception that police fail to serve those in disadvantaged communities. But Professor Brunson has long argued that this perception is largely created by aggressive policing strategies and discourteous treatment of members in their community. See, e.g., Rod K. Brunson, “Police Don’t Like Black People”: African-American Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences, 6(1) Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 71 (2007). Indeed, Professor Brunson has noted that “arrests and successful prosecutions are unlikely without cooperating witnesses.” Rod K. Brunson, Protests focus on Over-policing. But under-policing is also Deadly, Wash. Post, June 12, 2020. And those from disadvantaged communities “want a different kind of policing than the aggressive approaches they typically see—one that values their humanity.” Id.; see also Estate of Jones v. City of Martinsburg, W. Va., –– F.3d ––, 2020 WL 3053386, at *7 (4th Cir. 2020) (recognizing a “desperate need” for more and different police training).

From this perspective, the video of the present incident mimics the aggressive, discourteous, and ineffective policing that concern many. As the officers approached the scene seconds after gunshots rang out, the members of this community, including Curry, pointed them in the direction in which the perpetrator was likely to be found. Because, as Judge Diaz notes in his concurrence, it would have been difficult for the officers “to determine whether any firearm (which, of course, are generally lawful to possess) seized in the effort to identify the suspect was the source of the gunfire,” Judge Diaz Op. at 57,

one would think that the officers’ best hope for finding the shooter was to accept the 36

guidance offered by community members. See Black, 707 F.3d at 540 (“Being a felon in possession of a firearm is not the default status.”). That, of course, was not the case here. Cf. Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice 4 (2007) (describing the notion of “testimonial injustice,” where a speaker suffers from deflated credibility owing to an identity prejudice on the hearer’s part). The officers ignored the assistance and the shooter got away. Like most citizens, it is likely that residents of the Creighton Court community do not want police officers to be tough on crime, or weak on crime—they want them to be smart on crime.

No doubt it is beyond the scope of our roles to explain to any institution what it means to be smart on crime. I will leave that to our clever colleagues in the chambers of City Council. But it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Thus, “[i]n some circumstances . . . we must remind law enforcement that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and that those protections extend to all people in all communities. Black, 707 F.3d at 534. This is one of those circumstances.

Contrary to Judge Wilkinson’s suggestion, our decision today does not deliver “a gut-punch to predictive policing.” Wilkinson Dis. Op. at 71. As Judge Wilkinson notes, predictive policing programs “differ in their details,” but generally seek to use “smart policies” to “affirmatively prevent crime from happening, rather than just solve it.” Id. at 65; see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 Emory L.J. 259, 265 (2012) (“In simple terms, predictive policing involves computer

models that predict areas of future crime locations from past crime statistics and other 37

data.”). But see id. at 321 (“Predictive policing may well become an effective tool for law enforcement. Yet, the technology will also create tension for police in defending Fourth Amendment challenges by defendants.”); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1113, 1149 (2017) (“More bluntly, the initial predictive policing projects have raised the question of whether this data-driven focus serves merely to enable, or even justify, a high-tech version of racial profiling.”). But, as with all policies, the devil is going to lie in those details. Nothing in the majority Opinion prevents the police from using, in good faith with constitutional principles, smart policies to identify where crimes may occur and accordingly dispatching officers to those neighborhoods. But it is how they, upon arrival, engage with the people in those neighborhoods that is important here. A suspicionless, investigatory stop was not warranted under the circumstances. Affirming our long-standing rules is nothing novel. If merely preventing crime was enough to pass constitutional muster, the authority of the Fourth Amendment would become moot.

Don’t get me wrong—I understand the frustrations and uncertainties that attend most discussions of how to abate crime. As a country, we are in a moment of reckoning. And the unpredictability of the future encourages us to want to hang on to those entities that make us feel secure. Still, “[t]he facts of this case give us cause to pause and ponder the slow systematic erosion of Fourth Amendment protections for a certain demographic.” Black, 707 F.3d at 542. The “lifelines a fragile community retains against physical harm and mental despair,” Wilkinson Dis. Op. at 70, must be the assurance that there truly is equal protection under law. Thus, “[i]n the words of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., we are

[once again] reminded that ‘we are tied together in a single garment of destiny, caught in 38

an inescapable network of mutuality,’ [and] that our individual freedom is inextricably bound to the freedom of others.” Black, 707 F.3d at 542. It is with these truths that I join my colleagues in the majority in ensuring that “the Fourth Amendment rights of all individuals are protected.” Id. (emphasis in original).

*******************************

You can read the majority, Judge Wilkinson’s tone-deaf dissent, and all of the other opinions at the above link.

To be honest, Judge Wilkinson’s opinion sounded like Jeff Sessions’s racist blather about how African American communities didn’t really want the DOJ to interfere with police brutality because it protected them from crime. And, according to “Sessions’ theory,” more crime originated in communities of color so they of course disproportionally benefitted from “aggressive” (mostly White) police tactics. That’s how we got to George Floyd and the backlash against police violence directed at communities of color.

Well, at least the 4th Circuit allows spirited dissent. That’s unlike today’s BIA that papers over the festering issues of racism and injustice in today’s bias-driven immigration enforcement and legal perversion of human rights with fake unanimity and mindless “go along to get alongism.”

Institutional racism and “Dred Scottification” of the “other” unfortunately are deeply ingrained in our Federal Court System. It’s very clear in the Supremes’ majority’s enabling of the Trump/Miller race-driven White Nationalist Agenda under various transparent “pretexts,” mainly relating to clearly bogus national emergencies or fabricated national security concerns. It ran throughout the majority’s “greenlighting” of the “Travel (“Muslim”) Ban,” “Remain in Mexico” (“Let “em Die In Mexico”),  “Expedited Removal (“Systematic Dismantling of Due Process For Asylum Applicants”), “The Wall,” “Public Charge” (“Let’s Terrorize Ethnic Communities”), and “Punishing Sanctuary Cities” (“Attacking Those Who Dare Stand Against ICE Abuses”), sometimes without even deigning to provide a rationale. 

Obviously, due process for “persons” in the United States under the Fifth Amendment means little or nothing to Justices who view migrants as sub-human with lives not worth protecting or even caring about. For these unfortunates, “due process” means something that would be totally unacceptable if applied to the Justices themselves, their families, or to those (largely White) folks to whom they are willing to extend constitutional protections. Sound familiar? It should, for anyone who has ever visited the  Holocaust Museum. 

As the vile racism and overt White Nationalism of the Trump regime unfold in full ugliness and irrationality during the final stages of the 2020 campaign, the abject failure of Roberts and his colleagues to recognize and enforce the constitutional rights and humanity of every person in the U.S.(including those actually here or at our borders but “fictionalized” by disingenuous judges into “non-presence”) comes into full focus.

America needs and deserves better Federal Judges at all levels from the Supremes to the Immigration Courts. Judges who will cut through the many layers of historical BS and racism-covering gobbledygook and make equal justice for all a reality in America. 

“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” What if we finally had courts comprised of courageous, principled Justices and Judges who believed Dr. King’s words and acted accordingly, rather than merely mouthing them in ceremonies every January?

Due Process Forever! Complicit courts that cover for the Trump/Miller White Nationalist agenda, never!

PWS

07-16-20

BLOWING THE BASICS: 4th Cir. Says BIA Got Nexus & Political Opinion Wrong in Guatemalan Asylum Case — Lopez-Ordonez v. Barr — The Facts Were Compelling, But The BIA Worked Hard to Wrongfully Deny Protection!

Dan Kowalski
Dan Kowalski
Online Editor of the LexisNexis Immigration Law Community (ILC)

Dan Kowalski reports from LexisNexis Immigration Community:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca4-on-;-nexus-political-opinion-guatemala-lopez-ordonez-v-barr

CA4 on Asylum, Nexus, Political Opinion, Guatemala: Lopez Ordonez v. Barr

Lopez Ordonez v. Barr

“Hector Daniel Lopez Ordonez was conscripted into the Guatemalan military when he was 15 years old. As part of the G-2 intelligence unit, Lopez Ordonez was ordered— and repeatedly refused—to torture and kill people. After a particularly horrific incident in which Lopez Ordonez refused to murder a five-month-old baby and threatened to report the G-2’s abuses to human rights organizations, the G-2 confined him to a hole in the ground for ten months. Upon his release, he fled to the United States. Lopez Ordonez now petitions this Court to review an order from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his asylum application and ordering his removal to Guatemala. The BIA determined that Lopez Ordonez did not meet the nexus requirement to establish his eligibility for asylum—that is, he did not show past persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground. The record in this case, however, compels us to conclude that Lopez Ordonez has demonstrated that one central reason for his persecution by the Guatemalan military was his political opinion, a protected ground under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Accordingly, we vacate the BIA’s nexus determination and remand for further proceedings.”

[Hats off to Samuel B. Hartzell!]

pastedGraphic.png

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Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Wynn joined.”

Beneath the smokescreens of the uncontrolled backlog and gross mismanagement at EOIR lies an uglier truth. The BIA is a politically motivated tool of the Trump regime that puts reaching preconceived denials of protection ahead of Due Process and the fair application of asylum law. 

This case should have been an easy grant, probably a precedent. By requiring the DHS, the Asylum Office, and Immigration Judges to follow a properly fair and generous interpretation of asylum law that would achieve its overriding purpose of protection, an intellectually honest BIA with actual legal expertise in applying asylum laws would force an end to the racially-driven intentional perversion of asylum laws and Due Process by the Trump regime. 

More cases granted at a lower level would discourage the largely frivolous attempts to deny asylum engaged in by the DHS here. It would reduce the backlog by returning asylum and other protection grants to the more appropriate 60%+ levels they were at before first the Obama Administration and now the Trump regime twisted the laws and employed various coercive methods to encourage improper denials to “deter” legitimate refugees from Central America and elsewhere from seeking protection. 

With fair access to legal counsel, many more asylum cases could be well-documented and granted either by the USCIS Asylum Office (without going to Immigration Court) or in “short hearings” using party stipulations.  The ability to project with consistency favorable outcomes allows and encourages ICE Assistant Chief Counsel to be more selective in the cases that they choose to fully litigate. That encourages the use of stipulations, pre-trial agreements, and prosecutorial discretion that allows almost all other courts in America, save for Immigration Courts, to control dockets without stomping on individual rights.

It would also force all Administrations to establish robust, realistic refugee programs for screening individuals nearer to the Northern Triangle to obviate the need for the journey to the Southern border. Additionally, compliance with the law would pressure our Government to work with the international community to solve the issues causing the refugee flow at their roots, in the refugee-sending countries, rather than misusing the U.S. legal system and abusing civil detention as “deterrents.”

Due Process Forever! Captive “Courts” Never!

PWS

04-18-20 

4th CIR. NABS BIA VIOLATING DUE PROCESS, AGAIN: Yes, Guys, Believe It Or Not You Should Allow the Respondent To Actually TESTIFY Before Sustaining An “Adverse Credibility” Finding! — Atemnkeng v. Barr – Plus, Bonus Mini-Essay: “When Will Life-Tenured Judges Stop Enabling The Arrogant Trashing Of Due Process By Our Authoritarian Regime?”

4th CIR. NABS BIA VIOLATING DUE PROCESS, AGAIN: Yes, Guys, Believe It Or Not You Should Allow the Respondent To Actually TESTIFY Before Sustaining An “Adverse Credibility” Finding! — Atemnkeng v. Barr – Plus, Bonus Mini-Essay: “When Will Life-Tenured Judges Stop Enabling The Arrogant Trashing Of Due Process By Our Authoritarian Regime?”

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/181886.P.pdf

Atemnkeng v. Barr, 4th Cir. Jan. 24, 2020, published

PANEL:  GREGORY, Chief Judge, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY:  Chief Judge Gregory

KEY QUOTE:

Ngawung Atemnkeng, a citizen of Cameroon, fled her country after participating in

anti-government meetings and protests, getting arrested and was detained without trial several times, being tortured and beaten by government officers, and receiving numerous death threats. An immigration judge (“IJ”) initially noted some inconsistencies in Atemnkeng’s application, but nevertheless found her credible and her explanations plausible, and granted her asylum application. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) reversed the IJ’s determination and instructed the IJ, in reviewing the asylum application a second time, to afford Atemnkeng an opportunity to explain any inconsistencies.

On remand, Atemnkeng has now relocated to Baltimore and the new IJ (“Baltimore IJ”) permitted her to submit additional documents in support of her asylum application and scheduled a master calendar hearing. Approximately one month prior to the hearing, however, the Baltimore IJ issued a written ruling denying Atemnkeng’s applications for asylum and other reliefs. The Baltimore IJ concluded, without Atemnkeng’s new testimony, that she was not credible in light of inconsistencies in her story. On a second appeal to the BIA, the Baltimore IJ’s ruling was affirmed without an opinion. Atemnkeng now petitions for review of the BIA’s summary affirmance of the Baltimore IJ’s rulings.

In her petition for review, she raises several claims, most notably, that her due process rights were violated when the Baltimore IJ deprived her of an opportunity to testify on remand. Concluding that Atemnkeng’s claim related to her ability to testify is

meritorious, we grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s affirmance, and remand for 2

further proceedings. In light of our conclusion that the Baltimore IJ failed to give Atemnkeng an opportunity to testify and weigh the relevance of that testimony in conjunction with the entire record, we decline to address whether the adverse credibility determination and denials of Atemnkeng’s applications for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) were erroneous.

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When Will Life-Tenured Judges Stop Enabling The Arrogant Trashing Of Due Process By Our Authoritarian Regime?”

By Paul Wickham Schmidt

“Courtside” Exclusive

Jan. 1, 2020

Giving someone a chance to testify in person and explain apparent discrepancies, particularly when the case was for remanded for just that reason, seems like “Law 101.” It’s so elementary, I wouldn’t even include it on a final exam!

 

After all, simple logic, unclouded by a philosophy of treating migrants as a subclass whose legal rights judges often parrot but seldom enforce, would say that “Due Process is at its zenith” when human lives are at stake, as was the case here. It’s also required not only by the Constitution, but by BIA precedents like Matter of A-S-. So, how does this “go south” at EOIR?

 

Following precedents where it might help a respondent, be it a BIA or a Circuit precedent, seems to have become largely “optional” in the Immigration Courts these days, as I have previously observed. Instead, with constant encouragement from a White Nationalist, xenophobic regime, and lots of complicit judges at all levels, Due Process has largely been wiped out in Immigration Court.

 

Thank goodness this respondent, represented by long-time practitioner Ronald Richey (an Arlington Immigration Court regular” during my tenure), had the wherewithal to get to the Fourth Circuit and to draw a panel of judges interested in setting things right.

 

Think about what might have happened if she had landed in a complicit, largely “Decency Free Zone” like the Fifth or Eleventh Circuits, known for “going along to get along” with almost any abuse of migrants’ rights by the Government.

 

When are all Article III Judges going to start “connecting the dots” and asking why a supposedly “expert tribunal” whose one and only job should be to painstakingly insure that nobody is denied relief and removed from the United States, particularly to potential torture or death, without full Due Process and fundamental fairness is making fundamental mistakes in churning out removal orders.

 

Once upon a time, EOIR, the “home” of the Immigration Courts set out to use “teamwork and innovation to become the world’s best administrative tribunals, guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.”Not only has that “noble vision” been totally trashed, but the exact opposite has become institutionalized at EOIR: “Worst practices,” badly skewed pro-prosecutor hiring, inadequate professional training, lack of expertise, speed and expediency elevated over quality and care, intentional institutionalization of anti-immigrant, anti-asylum, pro-DHS bias, demeaning treatment of respondents and their lawyers, and the extermination of judicial independence and public accountability.

 

Today’s EOIR is truly a grim place, particularly for those whose lives are being destroyed by its substandard performance and also for the attorneys trying desperately to save them. Obviously, most Article IIIs have insulated themselves from the practical humanitarian disasters unfolding in Immigration Courts every day under their auspices.

 

What do they think happens to folks who can’t afford to be represented by Ronald Richey or one of his colleagues and whose access to pro bono counsel is intentionally hampered or impeded by EOIR? Think they have any chance whatsoever of a “fundamentally fair hearing” that complies with Due Process? Hearings for unrepresented individuals in detention are so grotesquely ridiculous that EOIR and DHS have gone to extreme lengths to impede public access so their abuses will take place in secret. Just ask my friendLaura Lynch over at AILA or my colleague Judge Ilyce Shugall of our Round Table what it’s like simply trying to get EOIR and DHS to comply with their own rules.

 

Listen folks, I helped formulate and implement the Refugee Act of 1980 as a Senior Executive in the “Legacy INS” during the Carter and Reagan Administrations. I even represented a few asylum applicants in private practice, something most Article III Judges and even many Immigraton Judges have never done. In 21 years on the “Immigration Bench” at both the trial and appellate levels, I personally listened to, read, or reviewed on appeal more asylum cases than any sitting Article III Judge of whom I’m aware.

 

The various parodies and travesties of justice in today’s Immigration Courts are eerily similar to, or in some cases the same, as I used to hear and read about in some of the third-world dictatorships, banana republics, and authoritarian tyrannies I dealt with on a regular basis. It’s simply infuriating, and beyond my understanding, that privileged, life-tenured, Article III Judges in our country, sworn to uphold our laws and Constitution, can continue to permit and so “glibly gloss over” these violations of law and gross perversions of human decency.

 

And, that goes right up to the Supremes’ intentional, disingenuous “tone deaf” approach to ignoring the real unconstitutional, invidious motives and fabrications behind the Administration’s original “Travel Ban.” All of the fatal legal defects were carefully documented and explained by various lower court judges trying conscientiously to uphold their oaths of office and “do the right thing.” Instead they were “dissed” by the Supremes and their hard work was ignored and denigrated. Fake, exaggerated, or “trumped up” “national security” pretexts for abusive treatment of “others” and political or religious opponents is a staple of persecuting regimes everywhere, as it now has become a judicially-enable staple of our current regime.

 

It’s long past time for the Article IIIs to wake up and put an end to the systemic nonsense that is literally killing people in our dysfunctional Immigration Court system. Is this the type of system to which you would entrust YOUR life, judges? If not, and I severely doubt that it is, why does it pass for “Due Process” for some of the most vulnerable among us? Think about it?

 

Due Process Forever; Complicit Courts Never!

 

PWS

01-31-20

 

DERELICTION OF DUTY: 4th Cir. Exposes BIA’s Incompetence & Anti-Asylum Bias, Yet Fails To Confront Own Complicity — SINDY MARILU ALVAREZ LAGOS; K.D.A.A., v. WILLIAM P. BARR

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/172291.P.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0V6wyNPGePFSgscsU5Qw-PQxasjIHuwnGXYQr4RraWbpMse6GOc4bAJqY

DIAZ, 4th Cir., 06-14-19, published

PANEL: GREGORY, Chief Judge, and DIAZ and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge

KEY QUOTE:

Sindy Marilu Alvarez Lagos testified credibly that she and her then-seven-year-old daughter, natives and citizens of Honduras, were threatened with gang rape, genital mutilation, and death if they did not comply with the extortionate demands of a Barrio 18 gang member. Unable to meet those demands and fearing for their lives, Alvarez Lagos and her daughter fled to the United States, where they sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.

Now, almost five years later, an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals have issued a total of three separate decisions denying Alvarez Lagos’s claims. The government defends none of those decisions, including the most recent, which came after we agreed, at the government’s request, to remand the case for reconsideration. Instead, the government admits that errors remain, but argues that we should leave them unaddressed and simply remand once again so that the agency may have a fourth opportunity to analyze Alvarez Lagos’s claims correctly.

We decline that request. A remand is required here on certain questions that have yet to be answered, or answered fully, by the agency. But we take this opportunity to review the agency’s disposition of other elements of Alvarez Lagos’s claims. For the reasons given below, we reverse the agency’s determination with respect to the “nexus” requirement for asylum and withholding of removal. And so that they will not recur on remand, we identify additional errors in the agency’s analysis of the “protected ground” requirement for the same forms of relief, and in the agency’s treatment of Alvarez Lagos’s claim under the Convention Against Torture.

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It’s partially on the Article IIIs. Great decision in many ways. But, this type of injustice occurs daily in our unconstitutional U.S. Immigration Courts. How many Central American asylum applicants get this type of representation—Steve Shulman of Akin Gump for a pro bono lawyer, Tom Boerman as an expert? Not very many.

How many can be this persistent, particularly if detained or sent to Mexico to wait? Almost none! I think that if these respondents were in “Return to Mexico” they would have long ago been forced to give up and accept “Death Upon Return.”

This case should have been a “no brainer grant” five years ago. Could have been done at an Asylum Office (under a more rational system) or by DHS stipulation. THIS abuse of the legal system and gross waste of public resources by DHS and DOJ is the reason why we have unmanageable Immigration Court backlogs, not because asylum applicants and their representatives assert their legal rights.

The Office of Immigration Litigation (“OIL”) didn’t even bother to defend any of the EOIR actions here!  So, after five years why is it “Due Process” for the Fourth Circuit to give the BIA yet another opportunity to come up with bogus reasons to deny asylum.

An Article III Court fulfilling its oath to uphold the laws and Constitution could have ordered this case to be granted and either exercised contempt authority against those at DOJ responsible for this mess or ordered an independent investigation into the judicial incompetence and bias evident here. At the least, the court should have removed any judge having had a role in this abomination from any future proceedings involving these respondents.

Cases such good as this also illustrate the continuing dereliction of duty by Article III Courts who continue to “go along top get along” with the absurdly unconstitutional position that unrepresented asylum applicants can receive “Due Process” in today’s overtly unfair and biased Immigration Courts. The Due Process clause applies to all persons in the U.S., and the right to a fair asylum hearing exceeds the rights at stake in 98% of the civil litigation and most of the criminal litigation in the Federal Courts. If the Article III Courts actually viewed asylum applicants as “persons,” that is “fellow human beings,” rather than dehumanized “aliens,” this farce would have ended decades ago! Folks represented by Steve Schulman and Akin Gump can’t get a “fair shake” from EOIR; what chance does any unrepresented applicant have?

You reap what you sow, and what goes around comes around! If Article III Courts want to be taken seriously and respected, they must step up to the plate and stop the systematic bias against asylum applicants (particularly women and children from Central America) and the abuses like this occurring every day in our unconstitutional U.S. Immigration Courts!

History is watching and making a record, even if those wronged by the Article IIIs all too often don’t survive or aren’t in a position to confront them with their dereliction of legal duties and the obligations human beings owe to each other.

PWS

06-17-19

 

DEATH THREATS ARE A WELL-ESTABLISHED FORM OF PERSECUTION, EXCEPT @ THE BIA — 4th Cir. Tells BIA To Follow Precedent — Tairou v. Whitaker

TAIROU-4TH-DEATH THREATS

Tairou v. Whitaker, 4th Cir., 11-30-18

PANEL: GREGORY, Chief Judge, MOTZ, Circuit Judge, and William L. OSTEEN, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY: CHIEF JUDGE GREGORY

KEY QUOTE:

Mocktar Tairou (“Tairou”) petitions this Court to review a final removal order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his asylum and withholding of removal application and ordering his removal to Benin. Tairou contends that the BIA erred in finding that he was not subjected to past persecution and that he lacked a well- founded fear of persecution were he to return to Benin. Our binding precedent explicitly holds that a threat of death constitutes persecution. Because Tairou experienced multiple death threats in Benin, we hold Tairou established that he was subjected to past persecution. We therefore grant the petition for review and remand to allow the BIA to consider whether, in light of Tairou’s demonstrated past persecution, he has a well- founded fear of future persecution.

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As I’ve pointed out before, beneath the hoopla and commotion caused by the direct assault on Due Process in Immigration Court conducted by the Trump Administration and Jeff Sessions, there is a deeper much more fundamental lingering problem. The BIA, a supposedly “expert tribunal,” consistently errors in the application of some of the most basic precepts of immigration law, particularly when it comes to recognizing and protecting the rights of asylum seekers. 

Also, even without a finding of past persecution, the threats shown in this case clearly should have been more than enough to show a “reasonable likelihood” (10% chance) of future persecution that fulfills the (supposedly) generous “well founded fear” standard for asylum enunciated by the Supremes in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca and endorsed by the BIA in Matter of Mogharrabi.

In other words, the BIA’s analysis in this case contravenes what we used to teach in basic training of Immigration Judges and Judicial Law Clerks and would have earned a student “minimal credit” on my “Refugee Law and Policy” final exam at Georgetown Law. This clearly is a system where quality and fairness are not only “Not Job 1” but aren’t even on the charts! Astoundingly, we have Appellate Judges serving on the “highest immigration tribunal” who are less competent and knowledgeable than most second year law students!

Even before Sessions, many asylum seekers were wrongfully denied by intentionally skewed interpretations and careless work by a tribunal that had long ago lost sight of its supposed vision of “being the world’s best administrative tribunal, guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.” Folks with good lawyers, the wherewithal to appeal, and the luck of the “right panel in the right circuit” might eventually obtain justice. Others had their lives ruined or even ended by a system operating in contravention of normal judicial precepts and Constitutional Due Process. Sessions “doubled down” on bias and “worst practices.”

How many must suffer and die before this system is brought into even  minimal compliance with our laws, international conventions, and Constitution (let alone fulfilling its now mocked promise of becoming the “world’s best administrative tribunal guaranteeing fairness and Due Process for all”)?

Shame on those in Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Article III Judiciary who have either promoted or enabled this travesty of justice. And, shame on America for not holding all of these public officials accountable.

Join the New Due Process Army and fight to force all public officials to live up to their oaths of office!

PWS

12=07-18

 

 

HERE’S THE FUTURE AS SESSIONS DUMBS DOWN, SPEEDS UP, SKEWS THE LAW, AND DE-PROFESSIONALIZES IMMIGRATION COURTS – 4th Circuit Slams BIA’s Sloppy Analytical Work, Refuses Deference, Reverses, & Remands — Ramirez v. Sessions

RAMIREZVSESSIONS,4THSLOPPY

Ramirez v. Sessions, 4th Cir., 04-17-18, Published

PANEL: GREGORY, Chief Judge, MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: CHIEF JUDGE GREGORY

SUMMARY (From Chief Judge Gregory’s opinion):

Jose Ramirez seeks review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) finding him ineligible for special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). Specifically, the question is whether Ramirez’s convictions for obstruction of justice pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 18.2- 460(A) qualify as crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). We hold that obstruction of justice under § 18.2-460(A) is not a CIMT because it may be committed without fraud, deception, or any other aggravating element that shocks the public conscience. We therefore grant Ramirez’s petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order of removal, and remand with directions for the Government to facilitate Ramirez’s return to the United States to participate in further proceedings.

KEY QUOTE:

In relation to those cases, the BIA’s one-member decision in this case attempts to significantly expand the definition of a CIMT by removing deceit, a critical indicator of moral turpitude, from the equation. Since this non-precedential decision departs from, rather than relies on, precedential BIA decisions, it is not eligible for Chevron review.

In the absence of Chevron deference, the weight given to a BIA decision “hinges on ‘the thoroughness evident in [the BIA’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.’” Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241, 246 n.2 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Martinez, 740 F.3d at 909–10); see Mead, 533 U.S. at 221. Here, the BIA provides only three sentences of analysis that are conclusory in nature and disregards the agency’s prior emphasis on fraud or deceit as a critical determinant without identifying an alternative aggravator. Consequently, the BIA decision is also undeserving of so-calledSkidmore respect because it lacks the power to persuade. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 221.

In sum, under Chevron, BIA decisions defining morally turpitudinous conduct are controlling if they are precedential and reasonable. However, the BIA’s interpretations of laws that it does not administer, such as the Virginia obstruction of justice statute, and its non-precedential decisions are only given weight to the extent that this Court finds the reasoning persuasive. Here, because we do not find persuasive the BIA’s abbreviated and non-precedential opinion, we do not accord it any deference.

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As we saw during the Bush Administration, “haste makes waste” procedures imposed by the DOJ at the Immigration Courts and the BIA are likely to cause a rebellion in the Article III Courts as they are presented with sloppy work including inadequate factual analyses, incorrect fact-findings, and abbreviated, deficient legal analyses. Factors such as pressure to render more “contemporaneous oral decisions” at the end of the hearing without reviewing the full record and testimony as well as single-judge BIA decisions or “summary affirmances” without opinion aggravate the problem.

As the quantity increases and quality decreases, the Article III Courts will lose confidence in the ImmigratIon Courts and begin returning large numbers of cases for “quality control redos” — something that adds to delay and increases backlogs as well as demoralizing Immigration Judges and frustrating respondents and counsel on both sides.

At some point, I foresee that attorneys for respondents should succeed in convincing the Article III Courts that the BIA no longer qualifies as an “expert tribunal” and that its decisions therefore should not receive so-called “Chevron deference.” Session’s use of his certification power to interfere in judicial decisions is also highly problematic.

Jeff Sessions is neither a judge nor by any stretch of the imagination an unbiased quasi-judicial decision maker. Indeed any Article III or Administrative Judge who made some of the untrue and pejorative statements about migrants, asylum seekers, private attorneys, and the law that Sessions has publicly made since becoming the Attorney General would certainly be required to disqualify himself or herself from a quasi-judicial role in any immigration adjudication.

There is no possibility of a fair, unbiased, due process oriented Immigration Court system under Jeff Sessions and the DOJ.

We have “seen this show before” under Ashcroft and the Bush Administration.  Congress seriously disregards its responsibilities by standing by and watching disaster unfold again with hundreds of thousands of lives, and perhaps the stability of our entire Federal Judicial System, at stake.

PWS

04-19-18

BIGGIE ON GANG ASYLUM: PUBLISHED 4TH CIR. BLASTS BIA’S BOGUS APPROACH TO NEXUS IN GANG CASES — Court Eviscerates BIA’s Disingenuous Approach To Nexus In Matter of L-E-A- (Without Citing It!) – SALGADO-SOSA V. SESSIONS

4thGangsNexusSalgado-Sosa

Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 4th Cir., 04-13-18, Published

PANEL: GREGORY, Chief Judge, and FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: JUDGE PAMELA HARRIS

SUMMARY OF HOLDING (From Court’s Opinion):

“Reynaldo Salgado-Sosa, a native and citizen of Honduras, seeks asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. If he is returned to Honduras, he fears, he will face persecution at the hands of the gang MS-13, which has repeatedly attacked his family for resisting extortion demands.

The agency proceedings focused on whether Salgado-Sosa could show, for purposes of both his asylum and withholding of removal claims, a nexus between MS-13’s threats and membership in a cognizable “particular social group” – here, Salgado-Sosa’s family. The Board of Immigration Appeals found that Salgado-Sosa could not establish the requisite nexus, and denied withholding of removal on that ground. The Board separately found that Salgado-Sosa’s asylum application was untimely, and that there was insufficient evidence to justify protection under the Convention Against Torture.

We conclude that the Board erred in holding that Salgado-Sosa did not meet the nexus requirement. The record compels the conclusion that at least one central reason for Salgado-Sosa’s persecution is membership in his family, a protected social group under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Accordingly, we vacate the denial of withholding of removal, and remand for further proceedings on that claim. On the asylum claim, we separately remand for consideration of whether our recent decision in Zambrano v. Sessions, 878 F.3d 84 (4th Cir. 2017), affects Salgado-Sosa’s argument that a statutory “changed circumstances” exception allows consideration of his untimely application.”

KEY QUOTE FROM  OPINION:

“For three reasons, we are “compelled to conclude,” see Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 948, that the IJ and the Board erred in finding that Salgado-Sosa has not shown that his kinship ties are “at least one central reason” for the harm he fears. First, the record manifestly establishes that MS-13 threatened Salgado-Sosa “on account of” his connection to his stepfather and to his family. Salgado-Sosa testified, for instance, that MS-13 attacked him because of his stepfather Merez-Merlo’s conflict with the gang, not his own. Merez-Merlo similarly testified that his refusal to give MS-13 “what they wanted, which was the war tax,” led the gang to repeatedly threaten to kill his wife and son. J.A. 236; see J.A. 234, 315–16. Other evidence also corroborates the centrality of family ties. For example, the family’s long-time neighbor submitted an affidavit averring

2 As before the IJ and Board, Salgado-Sosa’s argument in this court emphasizes evidence that he and his family were targeted because of his stepfather’s testimony against MS-13. But both on appeal and before the agency, Salgado-Sosa also has argued more generally that he fears persecution based on his membership in a “particular social[] group, as defined by Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011).” Appellant’s Br. at 5; see also A.R. 101, 478–79. And our holding in Crespin-Valladares was not limited to family members of witnesses, but instead established that family membership itself is a “prototypical example of a [cognizable] particular social group.” 632 F.3d at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted). The IJ and BIA accordingly considered not only whether Salgado-Sosa was persecuted for being a family member of a witness, but also whether he was persecuted because of his kinship ties generally. See A.R. 126 (finding that Salgado-Sosa “has not demonstrated” that any persecution “would be on account of a statutorily protected ground, be that family group membership, as witnesses, or any other potential protected ground”) (emphasis added). Following that lead, we also consider whether the evidence shows that Salgado-Sosa was threatened on account of his familial ties, regardless of the role played by his stepfather’s testimony.

10

that “the reason why the gang members wants [sic] to hurt [Salgado-Sosa]” is that he “defended his stepfather from the gang member[s]” when they assaulted the family. J.A. 537 (emphasis added). And the IJ, as noted above, did not doubt the credibility of any of this evidence.

Second, that Salgado-Sosa’s anticipated harm is on account of membership in his family follows from the IJ’s own factual findings, adopted by the BIA. The IJ herself determined that the central reasons for Salgado-Sosa’s feared persecution are his stepfather’s refusal to pay the gang and revenge on the family for resisting MS-13’s extortion. See J.A. 5–6, 126–27. On a proper reading of the nexus requirement and our cases applying it, that finding compels the conclusion that Salgado-Sosa’s kinship ties are a central reason for the harm he fears.

Our decision in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch is instructive. There, the petitioner applied for asylum after gang members in El Salvador threatened her for refusing to allow her son to join the gang. 784 F.3d at 947. The BIA rejected her assertion that the persecution was “on account of” familial ties, concluding that the petitioner “was not threatened because of her relationship to her son (i.e. family), but rather because she would not consent to her son engaging in a criminal activity.” Id. at 949. We found this distinction “meaningless” and “unreasonable” given that “[petitioner’s] relationship to her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened” by the gang. Id. at 950 (emphasis added). Thus, because the petitioner’s “family connection to her son” was at least one of “multiple central reasons” for the gang’s threats, we found the nexus

requirement satisfied, and rejected the BIA’s contrary determination as resting on “an 11

excessively narrow reading of the requirement that persecution be undertaken ‘on account of membership in a nuclear family.’” Id. at 949–50.

The same logic applies here. There is no meaningful distinction between whether Salgado-Sosa was threatened because of his connection to his stepfather, and whether Salgado-Sosa was threatened because MS-13 sought revenge on him for an act committed by his stepfather. See Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 950. However characterized, Salgado-Sosa’s relationship to his stepfather (and to his family) is indisputably “why [he], and not another person, was threatened” by MS-13. See id. Thus, the IJ and BIA erred by focusing narrowly on the “immediate trigger” for MS-13’s assaults – greed or revenge – at the expense of Salgado-Sosa’s relationship to his stepfather and family, which were the very relationships that prompted the asserted persecution. See Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 60 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that the BIA drew “too fine a distinction” between the “immediate trigger” for persecution – breaking the rules imposed on former gang members – and what ultimately led to persecution – protected status as a former gang member). On the IJ’s own unchallenged account of the facts – that Salgado-Sosa’s fear of persecution arises from the actions of his stepfather and his family – the only reasonable conclusion is that family membership is “at least one central reason for [his] persecution.” See Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 950.

Third and finally, the BIA’s decision improperly focused on whether Salgado- Sosa’s family was persecuted on account of a protected ground, rather than on whether Salgado-Sosa was persecuted because of a protected ground – here, his relationship to his

family. The critical fact, for the BIA, was that the motive for the attacks on Salgado- 12

Sosa’s family was “financial gain or personal vendettas,” neither of which is itself a protected ground under the INA. J.A. 6. But as we have explained before, it does not follow that if Salgado-Sosa’s family members were not targeted based on some protected ground, then Salgado-Sosa could not have been targeted based on his ties to his family. Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting argument that feared persecution is not on account of membership in family if attacks on family are not related to protected ground). Instead, “[t]he correct analysis focuses on [Salgado-Sosa himself] as the applicant, and asks whether [he] was targeted because of [his] membership in the social group consisting of [his] immediate family.” Villatoro v. Sessions, 680 F. App’x 212, 221 (4th Cir. 2017). And once the right question is asked, the record admits of only one answer: whatever MS-13’s motives for targeting Salgado-Sosa’s family, Salgado-Sosa himself was targeted because of his membership in that family.

For all these reasons, it is clear that Salgado-Sosa has shown the required nexus between anticipated persecution and membership in a particular social group consisting of his family. Specifically, Salgado-Sosa has demonstrated that “at least one central reason” for the harm he faces is his connection to his stepfather and family. See 8 U.S.C. §1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Because the IJ and BIA relied exclusively on an erroneous determination as to nexus in denying withholding of removal, we vacate that denial and remand for further proceedings regarding Salgado-Sosa’s application.”

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First, congrats to Alfred Lincoln (“Rob”) Robertson, Jr., ROBERTSON LAW OFFICE, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, who successfully represented Mr. Salgado-Sosa before the Fourth Circuit. Rob was a “regular” in the Arlington Immigration Court, particularly on my always challenging detained docket. One of the things I liked about him is that he was willing to take “tough cases” — ones where the respondent had a decent argument but by no means a “slam dunk winner.” He also practiced before the local Virginia criminal courts, so was familiar with what “really happens” in criminal court as opposed to the “Alice in Wonderland Version” often presented in Immigration Court.

Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011) lives! One of my all-time favorite cases, because I was the Immigration Judge incorrectly reversed by the BIA on an asylum grant. I was right on all sorts of things, and the BIA was wrong! But, hey, who remembers things like that?

This decision is good news for justice and due process for asylum seekers. It spells some bad news for the BIA’s highly contrived decision in Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&n 40 (BIA 2017). There, the BIA looked beyond primary causation (the “but for” rule) of a family-based PSG to find a secondary cause, “criminal extortion” that did not relate to the protected ground. In other words, the BIA encouraged IJs to look for any way possible to twist facts to deny family-based PSG asylum claims. Indeed, the only lame example that the BIA could cite that might qualify under their bizarre analysis was the long-dead Romanov Family of Russia.

Both Judge Jeffrey Chase and I ripped the BIA’s anti-asylum, anti-Due Process machinations in previous blogs:

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/05/25/new-precedent-family-is-a-psg-but-beware-of-nexus-matter-of-l-e-a-27-in-dec-40-bia-2017-read-my-alternative-analysis/

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/06/03/introducing-new-commentator-hon-jeffrey-chase-matter-of-l-e-a-the-bias-missed-chance-original-for-immigrationcourtside/

What if EOIR concentrated on quality, Due Process, and fairness for asylum seekers, rather than merely looking for ways to deport more migrants (whether legally correct or not) in accordance with Sessions’s anti-migrant agenda? We need an independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court with an Appellate Division that acts like a U.S. Court of Appeals, not an extension of the Administration political agendas and DHS enforcement!

PWS

02-21-18

 

SLAMMED AGAIN! — 4TH CIR. FINDS CLEAR ANTI-MUSLIM BIAS IN AGAIN REJECTING TRUMP’S BOGUS TRAVEL BAN! — SUPREMES WILL HAVE LAST WORD!

https://www.buzzfeed.com/zoetillman/a-federal-appeals-court-ruled-that-trumps-third-travel-ban

Zoe Tillman reports for BuzzFeed News:

“A federal appeals court on Thursday ruled that President Donald Trump’s third attempt at a travel ban is likely unconstitutional, writing that it “continues to exhibit a primarily religious anti-Muslim objective.”

The US Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit upheld a lower court injunction that blocked the Trump administration from enforcing key parts of the travel ban, but put its order on hold while the US Supreme Court takes up the issue of the ban.

The president’s third travel ban is already before the Supreme Court, after the 9th Circuit ruled in December that it violated federal law. The 9th Circuit did not rule on the issue addressed by the 4th Circuit — whether the ban amounts to religious discrimination in violation of the US Constitution’s Establishment Clause — but the justices asked for briefing on the constitutional question as well.

The 4th Circuit sided in favor of the groups challenging the ban in a 9–4 decision. Chief Judge Roger Gregory wrote in the majority opinion that the government’s “proffered rationale for the Proclamation lies at odds with the statements of the President himself.”

“Plaintiffs here do not just plausibly allege with particularity that the Proclamation’s purpose is driven by anti-Muslim bias, they offer undisputed evidence of such bias: the words of the President,” Gregory wrote.

Gregory cited Trump’s “disparaging comments and tweets regarding Muslims,” the president’s repeated references to a Muslim ban, the fact that Trump’s previous travel bans were focused on majority-Muslim countries, and statements by Trump and his advisers that the latest order has the same goals as the previous ones.

A Justice Department spokesman did not immediately return a request for comment.

Cecillia Wang, deputy legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, who argued the case for the travel ban challengers in the 4th Circuit, said in a statement, that, “President Trump’s third illegal attempt to denigrate and discriminate against Muslims through an immigration ban has failed in court yet again. It’s no surprise. The Constitution prohibits government actions hostile to a religion.”

After federal courts struck down the president’s first two attempts at a travel ban, Trump on Sept. 24 signed the latest set of travel restrictions. It in large part suspended travel to the US by nationals of five majority-Muslim countries covered under the previous travel bans — Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen — as well as two new countries, Chad and North Korea. The presidential proclamation also placed travel restrictions on certain government officials in Venezuela and their family members.

In October, federal judges in Hawaii and Maryland issued injunctions blocking enforcement of the ban, which the Trump administration appealed. The Supreme Court issued an order on Dec. 4 allowing the ban to go fully into effect while the appeals in the 9th Circuit and the 4th Circuit went forward. The justices wrote at the time that it expected that the appeals courts would rule “with appropriate dispatch.”

The 9th Circuit, which heard arguments on Dec. 6, issued its opinion on Dec. 20. But the 4th Circuit, which heard arguments two days later, did not rule until Thursday.

Gregory wrote in the main opinion that even if the proclamation was “facially legitimate” — that the text on its face didn’t run afoul of the constitution — it failed the test of whether the government had a “bona fide” reason for adopting it. The administration argued that the proclamation was rooted in national security concerns, but Gregory wrote that Trump’s statements undermined that.

Gregory said that even setting aside Trump’s statements during the campaign calling for a Muslim ban, the president had continued to make statements that “convey the primary purpose of the Proclamation—to exclude Muslims from the United States.” He quoted Trump’s tweets supporting his original travel ban executive order, which multiple courts determined was likely unconstitutional, as well as a tweet expressing support for an unverified story about a general who killed Muslims using bullets dipped in pig’s blood and his retweets of anti-Muslim videos.

“Plaintiffs offer undisputed evidence that the President of the United States has openly and often expressed his desire to ban those of Islamic faith from entering the United States. The Proclamation is thus not only a likely Establishment Clause violation, but also strikes at the basic notion that the government may not act based on ‘religious animosity,'” Gregory wrote.

The court upheld US District Judge Theodore Chuang’s preliminary injunction, which blocked enforcement of the proclamation’s travel restrictions with respect to nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen who have a “credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.”

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The Administration continues to trip over the out of court statements by Trump and his sleazy subordinates which reveal the real agenda of bias and  hate beneath his actions.

No matter how the Supremes come out (and Trump could win the cherished right to discriminate and carry out his bogus hate agenda) the stain on America being caused by Trump, Sessions, Miller, the other White Nationalists, and their supporters and enablers will take a long time to wash away!

PWS

02-15-15

“INEXCUSABLE OMISSIONS” — 4th Cir. Slams BIA For Unjustified Denial Of Family-Based Gang Threat Asylum Claim From El Salvador — BIA’s Shoddy Factual & Legal Analysis Of “One Central Reason” Exposed — ZAVALETA-POLICIANO v. SESSIONS!

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ZAVALETA-POLICIANO v. SESSIONS, 4th Cir., as amended 09-18-17 (Published)

PANEL:  GREGORY, Chief Judge, WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge

OPINION BY:  Chief Judge Gregory

KEY QUOTE:

“We hold that the BIA abused its discretion in affirming the IJ’s clearly erroneous factual finding. To start, the IJ unjustifiably relied on the fact that the threatening notes themselves did not explain why Zavaleta Policiano was targeted. As this Court recently explained, the single-minded focus on the “articulated purpose” for the threats while “failing to consider the intertwined reasons for those threats” represents “a misapplication of the statutory nexus standard.” Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122, 129 (4th Cir. 2017). It is unrealistic to expect that a gang would neatly explain in a note all the legally significant reasons it is targeting someone. The IJ’s heavy reliance on the fact that El Salvadoran gangs target various groups of people in the country was similarly misguided. That “the criminal activities of MS-13 affect the population as a whole,” we have explained, is simply “beside the point” in evaluating an individual’s particular claim. Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 127.

More fundamentally, the IJ and BIA failed to appreciate, or even address, critical evidence in the record. It is this Court’s responsibility to “ensure that unrebutted, legally significant evidence is not arbitrarily ignored by the factfinder.” Baharon v. Holder, 588 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 2009). The IJ did discuss the threatening notes (although while drawing unwarranted conclusions, as discussed above). But the IJ failed to address, or to assign any weight to, the significant body of unrebutted, indeed, undisputed, probative evidence giving meaning and context to the threatening notes: (1) Zavaleta Policiano and her father’s stores, as well as their familial relationship, were well-known in the community; (2) MS-13 threatened Zavaleta Policiano several times by phone; (3) Zavaleta Policiano’s statement that MS-13 “threatened me because my father had left;” and (4) the threats against Zavaleta Policiano began immediately after her father fled to Mexico. These are inexcusable omissions in the agency’s analysis.

The Government asks us to reject much of the overlooked evidence, characterizing it as Zavaleta Policiano’s “subjective beliefs [] as to the gangs’ motives.” Appellees’ Br. 22–23. This argument does not explain away the IJ’s and BIA’s wholesale failure to discuss the evidence, however. See Ai Hua Chen v. Holder, 742 F.3d 171, 179 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the IJ and BIA must “offer a specific, cogent reason for rejecting evidence” (quoting Tassi, 660 F.3d at 720)). What is more, Zavaleta Policiano’s affidavit includes much more than her “subjective beliefs”—it contains key evidence of the context, nature, frequency, and timing of the gang’s threats against her and her family. By stipulating to the credibility and veracity of the affidavit, the Government forwent the opportunity to probe and weaken the evidentiary basis of Zavaleta Policiano’s claims.

When considering the unchallenged record evidence, we are compelled to conclude that Zavaleta Policiano’s familial relationship to her father was “at least one central reason” MS-13 targeted and threatened her. The evidence shows that MS-13 explicitly threatened to kill Zavaleta Policiano’s father and his family if he did not pay the extortion demands, and that “[i]mmediately after” he fled El Salvador, the gang began threatening Zavaleta Policiano. A.R. 210. The timing of the threats against Zavaleta Policiano is key, as it indicates that MS-13 was following up on its prior threat to target Barrientos’s family if he did not accede to the gang’s demands. This explanation appears especially probable given the absence of record evidence that Zavaleta Policiano was ever threatened before her father’s departure. Beyond the timing, Zavaleta Policiano’s affidavit outlines the well-known relationship between the two businesses and the Policiano family, and contextualizes her statement that she was threatened because her father left. And just as MS-13 threatened Zavaleta Barrientos and his children, the gang threatened Zavaleta Policiano and her children, suggesting a pattern of targeting nuclear family members. The totality of this undisputed evidence demonstrates that Zavaleta Policiano was persecuted on account of her family membership.

We add that the BIA’s attempt to distinguish our precedent is unpersuasive. The BIA found, in a single sentence without any analysis, that Zavaleta Policiano’s claim is distinct from the one at issue in Hernandez-Avalos. A.R. 4 (mentioning Hernandez- Avalos, 784 F.3d at 949–50). But that decision actually bolsters Zavaleta Policiano’s position. There, the BIA denied asylum to a mother who was threatened by an El Salvadoran gang after she refused to allow her son to join the gang. The BIA held that the mother was not threatened on the basis of familial ties, but rather “because she would not consent to her son engaging in a criminal activity.” Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 949 (citation omitted). In other words, the BIA determined that the gang’s threats against the mother were motivated by its desire to recruit the son. This Court rejected that “excessively narrow reading of the requirement that persecution be undertaken ‘on account of membership in a nuclear family.’” Id. We instead found that the nexus requirement was satisfied, explaining that the mother’s relationship “to her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened with death if she did not allow him to join [the gang].” Id. at 950. The same logic applies here. MS-13 warned Zavaleta Barrientos that it would target his family if he did not pay the extortion demands, and the gang in fact threatened Zavaleta Policiano immediately after her father left. Zavaleta Policiano’s relationship to her father is why she, rather than some other person, was targeted for extortion.

For all the reasons outlined above, we conclude that the BIA erred by affirming the IJ’s clearly erroneous finding. Zavaleta Policiano was not required to prove that the gang’s threats were “exclusively” motivated by her family ties—such “a requirement defies common sense.” See Cruz, 853 F.3d at 130. She only needed to show that the relationship with her father was “at least one central reason” MS-13 threatened her. Because Zavaleta Policiano made this showing, we find the BIA decision to be manifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discretion. See Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 953 n.10. By establishing that she was persecuted on account of her family membership, Zavaleta Policiano has satisfied the first two requirements of her asylum claim.”

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Read the complete decision at the above link.

“Inexcusable” describes how the Immigration Courts under the BIA’s defective leadership are skewing facts and law to deny protection to Central American refugees. Not everyone can get a great lawyer like Tamara Jezic, and not every Circuit Court is as conscientious as this Fourth Circuit panel. That means that many of those Central Americans being railroaded through the system by DHS and EOIR are being improperly denied protection.

How can Federal Courts including the Supremes justify continuing to give “deference” to an appellate body that possesses neither expertise in the law nor care in reviewing records? It’s clear that BIA appellate review has become highly politicized and biased against asylum seekers. How much more of this nonsense are the Federal Courts going to put up with?

It also appears that the term “excessively narrow reading” is a perfect description of the BIA’s recent precedent in  Matter of L-E-A, 27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017), in which the BIA tortured the law to come up with a way of denying most family-based claims. Will the Fourth Circuit “call out” the BIA on this attempt to evade the law by denying family-based asylum claims?

We need an independent Article I Immigration Court!

Thanks and congratulations to respondent’s attorney Tamara Jezic for alerting me to this important decision.

PWS

09-18-17