4th Cir. Finds No Nexus In Gang-Based Asylum Case – Cortez-Mendez v. Whitaker

162389.P

Cortez-Mendez v. Whitaker, 4th Cir., 01-07-19, Published

PANEL: WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and James P. JONES, United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY:  Judge Agee

KEY QUOTE:

Cortez-Mendez disputes the IJ and BIA’s conclusion that he was threatened because of “general criminal gang activity” in his hometown. A.R. 3; see A.R. 65–66. He asserts the gangs persecuted him because his father’s disabilities caused Cortez-Mendez to be poor, “vulnerable,” and “an easy mark [without] the backing and advice of a father.” A.R. 148. Cortez-Mendez argues his persecution was pointedly discriminatory because he “knew many of his persecutors[ ] and had heard them ridicule his father and the rest of his family.” Opening Br. 11; see A.R. 56. We find his arguments unpersuasive.

Cortez-Mendez presented no direct or circumstantial evidence that the gangs harassed him “on account of” his father’s disabilities as opposed to his own rejection of gang membership. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). He provided no direct evidence that the gangs intimidated him because he was his father’s son. His only evidence of linkage to his father is that non-gang neighborhood harassers had “made fun of” him because of Marcial Cortez’s disabilities, A.R. 146–47, and the gang members who called his mother in 2005 “remembered [him] as a son of a mute and dumb person,” A.R. 176. Even if either of these groups of taunters knew about Marcial Cortez’s disabilities, it does not follow that they intimidated Cortez-Mendez because of his relation to his disabled father.See Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 950 n.7 (“[N]ot . . . every threat that references a family member is made on account of family ties.”).

7

Indeed, the circumstantial evidence in the record reflects a different reason for Cortez-Mendez’s harassment: he rejected the gangs’ recruitment efforts. Cortez-Mendez testified that he feared the gangs would harm him “if [he] did not become a gangster” or “if [he] did not [agree] to become part of the gangs.” A.R. 175. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s and BIA’s conclusions that the “neighborhood gangs observed the family’s poverty and concluded they could easily recruit” Cortez-Mendez, A.R. 56, and that it was after Cortez-Mendez refused to join the gangs that they threatened him, A.R. 3–4, 66. Cortez-Mendez even admitted that he left El Salvador because had rejected gang membership: “they kept asking me to join them and be a member of the gang, and that is why I fled.” A.R. 140. At most, Cortez-Mendez demonstrated that the gangs may have targeted him because of his poverty but only threatened him because he would not join their ranks. Flight from gang recruitment is not a protected ground under the INA. See Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 166–67 (4th Cir. 2012); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 589 (B.I.A. 2008). Consequently, Cortez-Mendez’s own testimony of his circumstantial fears defeats his argument that a protected ground like his relation to his disabled father was “at least one central reason for” his treatment in El Salvador.Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 127.

Furthermore, while it is not dispositive, Cortez-Mendez testified that his father and other family members still live in El Salvador and have suffered no harm. Our decision relies on whether Cortez-Mendez—and not some other person—was persecuted because of his relation to his father, see Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 950; Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 127 n.6, but a fact we may consider with the rest is whether other family

8

members have been persecuted because of their identical family ties, see Mirisawo, 599 F.3d at 398 (“The fact that family members whose political opinions Mirisawo fears will be imputed to her have not themselves faced harm fatally undermines her claim that she will suffer persecution because of her association with them.”). The evidence in the record that Cortez-Mendez’s family—including his disabled father—remains unharmed suggests that Cortez-Mendez’s relation to his father is not the reason for the persecution he fears.

*****************************************

Primarily a failure of proof. Had there been evidence that: (1) the gang’s threats were because of the respondent’s father’s disabled status; (2) his father or other members of the family had been harmed or threatened; or (3) gangs in El Salvador had a particular antipathy toward disabled individuals and their families, the result could have been different.

Still, the fact-based nature of this outcome, and the Fourth Circuit’s carefully articulated analysis, give lie to Session’s attempt to create a “de facto presumption” against the granting of asylum cases based on domestic violence and/or harm from gangs. Each case must be separately analyzed on its facts. That will take considerable time and careful analyses by U.S. immigration Judges and the BIA — the polar opposite of Sessions’s prejudicial “judicial quotas” and his urging that Immigration Judges cut corners by prejudging gang-related cases against respondents as he suggested in Matter of A-B-.

With the backlog growing exponentially by the day as a result of Trump’s mindless shutdown, the Immigration Courts can’t possibly carry out their mission consistently with Due Process as long as they are controlled by politicos like Sessions, Whitaker, and Trump.

HISTORICAL NOTE: Both Miriswano and Crespin-Valladares, cited by the Fourth Circuit cases were my cases when I was at the Arlington Immigration Court.

PWS

01-10-19