⚖️🗽👍🏼TOUGH, SMART NDPA LITIGATORS DEFEAT GARLAND’S BIA AGAIN — Latest 7th Circuit Beat-Down Of BIA On “Modified Categorical Approach” Also Illustrates Clear Unconstitutionality Of Immigration Courts — NO Unrepresented Individual Would Have Had A Chance Of Producing This Result!

 

Subject: Illinois burglary

More good news from the Seventh Circuit – generic Illinois burglary is not an aggravated felony nor a turpitude offense!  

 

Parzych v. Garland, __ F.3d __ (7th Cir. June 28, 2021)

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2021/D06-28/C:20-2317:J:Brennan:aut:T:fnOp:N:2726021:S:0

If you congratulate anyone, you might include Hena Mansori, now at Cook County PD office, who represented Chester for years before leaving NIJC (and Diana Rashid handled it after Hena left).  It’s not fair that us appellate folks get all the glory.

Regards, 

Chuck 

 

Charles Roth

Director of Appellate Litigation

National Immigrant Justice Center

*****************

Thanks, Chuck. And, congrats to Hena Mansori, Diana Rashid, and you on another great victory!

Unrepresented individuals appearing before non-expert judges “supervised” by a BIA tilted in favor of DHS enforcement is not due process! Yet, that’s what happens every day in Immigration Courts.

Too many of these “courts” are “embedded” in the DHS “New American Gulag,” an inherently coercive environment that makes mincemeat out of fundamental fairness and mocks due process.

Tell AG Garland you’ve had enough of this scofflaw farce! Demand progressive changes starting with a new BIA with progressive expert judges, merit-based judicial selections, universal representation, and an end to Gulag courts and overused televideo “adjudication centers” that dehumanize and mechanize “justice” in a totally improper manner!

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-29-21

BAD NEWS FOR  BIGOTLAND: Even As Billy The Bigot Blatantly Bashes The “Categorical Approach,” 10th Cir. Blasts Billy’s Biased BIA’s Bogus Blowing Of Same To Illegally Deport Under CO Controlled Substances Law! 

EYORE
“Eyore In Distress”
Once A Symbol of Fairness, Due Process, & Best Practices, Now Gone “Belly Up”
Dan Kowalski
Dan Kowalski
Online Editor of the LexisNexis Immigration Law Community (ILC)

10th-Johnson-drugs19-9550

From: Dan Kowalski 

Sent: Friday, July 31, 2020 4:16 PM
To: ICLINIC@LIST.MSU.EDU; Immigration Law Professors List
Subject: [immprof] FW: victory in Johnson v. Barr – Colorado possession statute overbroad and indivisble!!!

 

 

team,

a huge victory today for one of our clients, and hopefully many other folks in our community.

 

in Johnson v. Barr, the 10th circuit ruled that the Colorado statute of possession of a controlled substance is overboard as to the federal schedule and indivisible as to the particular controlled substance within a schedule.

 

the court honed in on the categorical approach, looking first to the plain language of the statute, the penalties assigned under the statute, its unpublished decision in Arellano, and persuasive state case law in deciding in our favor.

 

-this means that no conviction for possession of a schedule I or II CS can support the CS grounds of inadmissibility or deportability. this will hopefully help countless people who were found inadmissible, deportable, subject to mandatory detention, and ineligible for relief to seek redress of those legal errors.

 

-by extension, this decision is likely to apply to simply possession of a schedule III-V because it is also overbroad and structured nearly identically to the possession statute at issue in Johnson. moreover, due to legislative change last year classifying all PCS of schedule I-V CS as a DM1 offense starting in 2020, all future PCS offenses are likely also overbroad and indivisible.

 

this is definitely a day to celebrate. we will see whether the govt seeks rehearing or cert.

 

keep loving, keep fighting.

h

Hans Meyer

The Meyer Law Office, P.C.

 

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to immprof+unsubscribe@lists.ucla.edu.

Hans Meyer ESQ
Hans Meyer ESQ
Meyer Law
Denver, CO

****************

Congratulations, Hans!

As noted by Hans, this decision could have “big-time” impact and result in numerous motions to reopen and “redos.” It’s just another example of how the gimmicks and misinterpretations used and encouraged by the Trump regime as part of their “haste makes waste” deport everyone policies actually create backlogs and waste resources while doing grave injustices.

America needs an independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court with real expert judges, with a commitment to human rights and due process,  dedicated to seeing that individual results are fair and just, rather than carrying out a perverted, race and hate driven nativist political agenda to maximize deportations in disregard of the law.

Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-02-20

BIA SHOOTS UNREPRESENTED RESPONDENT ON “DIVISIBILITY” ANALYSIS — MATTER OF P-B-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 43 (BIA 2020) — Like Shooting Fish 🐟 In A Barrel 🛢!

MATTER OF P-B-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 43 (BIA 2020)

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1296956/download

BIA HEADNOTE:

Section 13-3407 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, which criminalizes possession of a dangerous drug, is divisible with regard to the specific “dangerous drug” involved in a violation of that statute.

PANEL: Board Panel: GREER and O’CONNOR, Appellate Immigration Judges; SWANWICK, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.

OPINION: O’CONNOR, Appellate Immigration Judge

*******************************

You think this isn’t “Theater of The Absurd?” Let’s check out Fns 5 & 6 from the opinion:

5 We recognize that the Ninth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises, utilized a modified categorical inquiry in Alvarado, 759 F.3d at 1130–33, to discern whether an alien’s conviction under section 13-3407 involved a federally controlled substance and was therefore a predicate for removal under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. However, the Ninth Circuit did not expressly analyze the divisibility of section 13-3407 in that decision, nor did the court have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s articulation of divisibility in Mathis. Moreover, the circuit recently certified a similar issue to the Arizona Supreme Court. See Romero-Millan v. Barr, 958 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2020) (asking the court to resolve whether Arizona statutes proscribing possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of a narcotic drug under sections 13-3415 and 13-3408 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, respectively, are divisible with respect to the identity of the drug involved in each offense). For these reasons, we do not consider Alvarado to be persuasive authority regarding the divisibility of section 13-3407, which, in light of Romero-Millan, we view as an unsettled issue in the Ninth Circuit.

6 We acknowledge that State v. Prescott, No. 1 CA-CR 15-0188, 2016 WL 611656, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2016), and State v. Castorina, No. 1 CA-CR 08-0816, 2010 WL 2450117, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 17, 2010), suggest that the identity of the “dangerous drug” involved in a violation of section 13-3407 is not an element of the statute. However, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona recently reviewed both cases, found that their reasoning was flawed, and concluded that Arizona case law fails to provide a “clear answer[] as to the divisibility” of section 13-3407. United States v. Sanchez-Murillo, No. CR-19-00795-PHX-SPL, 2019 WL 3858606, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 16, 2019) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Prescott or Castorina “definitively answer[s] whether the dangerous drug requirement of [section] 13-3407[] is divisible.” Gonzalez-Dominguez v. Sessions, 743 F. App’x 808, 811 (9th Cir. 2018).

So, how do you think that the unrepresented, almost certainly detained, respondent did on these issues, assuming that he even can read the BIA’s decision or have someone accurately read It to him?

The whole Immigration Court System has become a judicially and Congressionally-enabled “Due Process Farce” befitting a third word failed state that our country now resembles under the Trump kakistocracy. 

NO, those who say our democratic institutions are “holding up” under Trump are living in a parallel universe! 

PWS

07-24-20

NEW BIA PRECEDENT EXPLAINS WHY IN SOME CASES THE ATTEMPT MIGHT BE WORSE THAN THE CRIME – MATTER OF CERVANTES NUNEZ, 20 I&N DEC. 238 (BIA 2018)

3920

Matter of CERVANTES NUNEZ, 20 I&N Dec. 238 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

The crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter in violation of sections 192(a) and 664 of the California Penal Code, which requires that a defendant act with the specific intent to cause the death of another person, is categorically an aggravated felony crime of violence under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2012), notwithstanding that the completed offense of voluntary manslaughter itself is not such an aggravated felony.

PANEL:  BIA Appellate Immigration Judges Pauley, Guendelsberger, Wendtland

OPINION BY: Judge Roger A. Pauley

KEY QUOTE:

“Although perhaps counterintuitive, we therefore hold that the respondent’s offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter under sections 192(a) and 664 of the California Penal Code is categorically a crime of violence under § 16(a). Unlike the completed crime of voluntary manslaughter under California law, which encompasses reckless conduct and is therefore not categorically a crime of violence under Ninth Circuit law, attempted voluntary manslaughter requires the specific intent to kill. Although “physical force” is not an express element of attempted voluntary manslaughter, we deem it evident under Ninth Circuit law that the offense, which requires a “volitional,” or intentional, mental state and contemplates a direct act on the part of the accused that is capable of causing the death of another person, inherently presupposes the use of “physical force.” Since the respondent’s offense necessarily involves the intentional use of physical force, it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).”

***********************************************

In this particular case, the respondent was convicted of both the completed crime of voluntary manslaughter and the attempt under California law. But, there could be cases where in negotiating a plea bargain, counsel would be better off from an immigration standpoint pleading her client to the completed crime, not the attempt.

PWS

03-18-18

 

11th Cir. — BIA GETS IT WRONG AGAIN ON MODIFIED CATEGORICAL APPROACH & AGFEL — GORDON V. ATTORNEY GENERAL

http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201513846.pdf

Key quote:

“Further, the Board’s conclusion that the crime was an aggravated felony because the sale or delivery was “for monetary consideration” is meritless. That the sale or delivery was “for monetary consideration” does nothing to assist us in determining “which of a statute’s alternative elements”—sale or delivery— “formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284. The Supreme Court has made clear time and time again that “[a]n alien’s actual conduct is irrelevant to the inquiry.” Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1986. As the Board did not appropriately determine that Gordon was convicted of an aggravated felony, we grant Gordon’s petition and reject the Board’s finding of removability.”

PANEL: Circuit,Judges Tjoflat, Wilson; District Judge Robreno

INION BY: Judge Tjoflat

***********************************

So, why does an “expert tribunal” like the BIA keep getting this fairly basic stuff wrong? And, why has the DOJ eliminated EOIR training?

PWS

07-13-17

2D CIR Raps BIA, USIJ For Applying Wrong Tests For Agfel —- NY 5th Degree Sale Of A Controlled Substance Not A “Drug Trafficking Crime” — Respondent Eligible For Cancellation — KENNARD GARVIN HARBIN v. JEFFERSON SESSIONS III

http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1865217.html

“We hold that NYPL § 220.31 defines a single crime and is therefore an “indivisible” statute. Accordingly, the agency should have applied the so-called “categorical approach,” which looks to the statutory definition of the offense of conviction, rather than the particulars of an individual’s behavior, to determine whether a prior conviction constitutes an aggravated felony. See Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986 (2015). Now applying the categorical approach, we conclude that Harbin’s conviction under the NYPL § 220.31 did not constitute a commission of an aggravated felony. Harbin’s § 220.31 conviction therefore did not bar him from seeking cancellation of removal and asylum.”

PANEL: Circuit Judges CABRANES, POOLER, and PARKER.

OPINION BY:  Judge Pooler.

*************************************************

When will they ever learn, when will they ever learn? Attempts by U.S. Immigration Judges and the BIA to “blow by” proper application of “divisibility analysis” and the “categorical approach” in an effort to maximize removals under the “aggravated felony” provisions of the INA continue to draw criticism from higher court judges. However, they probably are “less career threatening” with respect to the BIA’s relationship to their political bosses at the DOJ. Whoever heard of a due process court system being owned and operated by the chief prosecutor? And, nobody can doubt that Attorney General Jeff Sessions sees himself as the Chief Prosecutor of migrants in the United States. But, to be fair, the last Attorney General to actually attempt to let the BIA function as an an independent quasi-judicial body was the late Janet Reno. And, that was 17 years ago.

PWS

06-23-17

BIA PRECEDENT: SD Receipt Of Stolen Motor Vehicle NOT An Agfel — Lacks Mens Rea — Matter Of DEANG, 27 I&N Dec. 57 (BIA 2017) — Split Panel!

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/974211/download

BIA HEADNOTES:

(“1) An essential element of an aggravated felony receipt of stolen property offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2012), is that an offender must receive property with the “knowledge or belief” that it has been stolen, and this element excludes a mens rea equivalent to a “reason to believe.”

(2) A conviction for receipt of a stolen motor vehicle under section 32-4-5 of the South Dakota Codified Laws categorically does not define an aggravated felony receipt of stolen property offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act because it is indivisible with respect to the necessary mens rea and only requires, at a minimum, that an offender have a “reason to believe” that the vehicle received was stolen.”

BIA PANEL: Appellate Immigration Judges Pauley, Creppy, & Malphrus

OPINION BY: Judge Pauley

DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Malphrus

Here’s an excerpt from Judge Malphrus’s dissent:

“I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the respondent’s receipt of stolen property offense does not qualify as an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2012). I agree that our task is to determine the generic, contemporary meaning of the phrase “receipt of stolen property” in section 101(a)(43)(G) by surveying the Federal and State statutes as they existed in 1994, when Congress added the phrase “receipt of stolen property” to section 101(a)(43) of the Act, as well as the Model Penal Code. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592, 598 (1990); see also Matter of Alvarado, 26 I&N Dec. 895, 897 (BIA 2016). However, there was simply no consensus regarding the mens rea standard for receipt of stolen property offenses in 1994. I cannot conclude that Congress intended to adopt a mens rea that, according to the majority, would preclude offenses in 21 jurisdictions, as well as a Federal offense, from qualifying as aggravated felonies.”

**************************************************

Read the complete majority and dissenting opinions at the link. This is a very rare (these days) “split panel” on a BIA precedent.

PWS

06-18-17

 

NEW FROM 4TH CIRCUIT: Court Reviews Expedited Removal, Finds VA Statutory Burglary “Not Divisible” — CASTENDET-LEWIS v. SESSIONS!

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/152484.P.pdf

PANEL:

GREGORY, Chief Judge, KING, Circuit Judge, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.

OPINION BY:  JUDGE KING

“In these circumstances, we must assess whether a Virginia statutory burglary constitutes an aggravated felony using the categorical approach. See Omargharib, 775 F.3d at 196. As the Attorney General concedes in this proceeding, the Virginia burglary statute is broader than the federal crime of generic burglary. In Taylor, the Supreme Court included in its definition of a generic burglary “an unlawful or unprivileged entry” into “a building or other structure,” and explained that state burglary statutes that “eliminat[e] the requirement that the entry be unlawful, or . . . includ[e] places, such as automobiles and vending machines, other than buildings,” fall outside the definition of generic burglary. See 495 U.S. at 598-99. As we noted above, the Virginia burglary statute is satisfied by various alternative means of entry, including one’s entry without breaking or one’s concealment after lawful entry. By proscribing such conduct, the statute falls outside the scope of generic burglary. The Virginia burglary statute also reaches several places that are not buildings or structures, such as ships, vessels, river craft, railroad cars, automobiles, trucks, and trailers. As the BIA recently recognized, the breadth of the statute means that it falls outside the definition of an aggravated felony. See In re H-M-F, __ I. & N. Dec. __ (BIA Mar. 29, 2017). Utilizing the categorical approach, we are also satisfied that the Virginia offense of statutory burglary criminalizes more conduct than the generic federal offense of burglary. The DHS therefore erred in classifying Castendet’s conviction as an aggravated felony.”

******************************************

Could the wheels be starting to come off the DHS’s “Expedited Removal Machine” before it even gets up to full throttle?

PWS

04-27-17

PRECEDENT: BIA Opines On “Divisibility” In Agfel Cases — Matter of CHAIREZ-CASTREJON, 27 I&N Dec. 21 (BIA 2017)

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/959656/download

Here’s the BIA headnote:

“In determining whether a statute is divisible under Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), Immigration Judges may consider or “peek” at an alien’s conviction record only to discern whether statutory alternatives define “elements” or “means,” provided State law does not otherwise resolve the question.”

PANEL: Appellate Immigration Judges Pauley, Greer, Malphrus

OPINION BY: Judge Pauley

CONCURRING OPINION BY: Judge Malphrus

***********************************

This case is unusual because BIA Judges seldom file “separate opinions” in published decisions these days.

In his concurring opinion, Judge Garry D. Malphrus appears to be both questioning whether the  Supreme Court’s approach to statutory “divisibility” analysis comports with congressional intent in immigration matters and inviting Congress to perhaps change the INA so that the BIA and the Immigration Judges could examine the facts of the case, as set forth in the record of conviction, to determine whether the individual should be removed. Judge Malphrus says in his conclusion:

“Here, we must presume that the respondent committed the least of the acts criminalized within the range of conduct punishable under his statute of conviction. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684–85 (2013). This is true even though the respondent’s plea agreement indicates that he did more—specifically, that he knowingly discharged a firearm at another, and thus he committed an aggravated felony crime of violence. See id.

The approach to divisibility required by Descamps and Mathis will result in immigration proceedings being terminated for many aliens who have committed serious crimes in the United States. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1127, 1134–38 (9th Cir. 2016) (reversing the order of removal upon concluding that the California statute proscribing felony child abuse was not divisible, and thus it was improper to consider the conviction records in determining whether the alien’s conviction constituted an aggravated felony crime of violence). [footnote omitted].  It is for Congress to determine whether this approach is consistent with its intent regarding the immigration consequences of such criminal conduct.”

*****************************************

Another observation: How could an unrepresented respondent charged under this section possibly defend himself consistent with due process when the law is so complex and convoluted. This particular respondent was fortunate enough to have a lawyer, and as we can see, he was able to achieve a favorable result. But, recent studies have shown that the overwhelming number of respondents in detention (as individuals charged as “agfels” must be) must proceed without counsel. http://wp.me/p8eeJm-Gv

PWS

04-24-17