⚖️👏😎 BREAKING: SUPREME RELIEF: Court Reaffirms Executive’s Authority To Set Sane Immigration Enforcement Policies! — “Standing” Key! — Baseless Attacks By GOP In Texas & Louisiana Thwarted (For Now)  — 8-1 Win For Administration, Opinion by Justice Kavanaugh, 3 Concurring, Alito Lone Dissenter! — U.S. v. Texas

Here’s a copy of the full decision:

 https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf

Here’s the syllabus (NOT part of the decision):

UNITED STATES ET AL. v. TEXAS ET AL. CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–58. Argued November 29, 2022—Decided June 23, 2023

In 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security promulgated new immigra- tion-enforcement guidelines (Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law) that prioritize the arrest and removal from the United States of noncitizens who are suspected terrorists or dangerous criminals or who have unlawfully entered the country only recently, for example. The States of Texas and Louisiana claim that the Guide- lines contravene two federal statutes that they read to require the ar- rest of certain noncitizens upon their release from prison (8 U. S. C. §1226(c)) or entry of a final order of removal (§1231(a)(2)). The District Court found that the States would incur costs due to the Executive’s failure to comply with those alleged statutory mandates, and that the States had standing to sue based on those costs. On the merits, the District Court found the Guidelines unlawful and vacated them. The Fifth Circuit declined to stay the District Court’s judgment, and this Court granted certiorari before judgment.

Held: Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge the Guidelines. Pp. 3–14.

(a) Under Article III, a plaintiff must have standing to sue. This bedrock constitutional requirement has its roots in the separation of powers. So the threshold question here is whether the States have standing to maintain this suit. Based on this Court’s precedents and longstanding historical practice, the answer is no.

To establish standing, a plaintiff must show an injury in fact caused by the defendant and redressable by a court order. The District Court found that the States would incur additional costs due to the chal- lenged arrest policy. And monetary costs are an injury. But this Court has stressed that the alleged injury must also “be legally and judicially cognizable.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 819. That requires that

2

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS Syllabus

the dispute is “traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Ibid. Here, the States cite no precedent, history, or tradition of federal courts entertaining lawsuits of this kind. On the contrary, this Court has previously ruled that a plaintiff lacks standing to bring such a suit “when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.” See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 619. The Linda R. S. Article III standing principle remains the law today, and the States have pointed to no case or historical prac- tice holding otherwise. Pp. 3–6.

(b) There are good reasons why federal courts have not traditionally entertained lawsuits of this kind. For one, when the Executive Branch elects not to arrest or prosecute, it does not exercise coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property, and thus does not infringe upon interests that courts often are called upon to protect. Moreover, such lawsuits run up against the Executive’s Article II authority to decide “how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. ___, ___. The principle of Executive Branch enforcement dis- cretion over arrests and prosecutions extends to the immigration con- text. Courts also generally lack meaningful standards for assessing the propriety of enforcement choices in this area, which are invariably affected by resource constraints and regularly changing public-safety and public-welfare needs. That is why this Court has recognized that federal courts are generally not the proper forum for resolving claims that the Executive Branch should make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. Pp. 6–9.

(c) This holding does not suggest that federal courts may never en- tertain cases involving the Executive Branch’s alleged failure to make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. First, the Court has adjudi- cated selective-prosecution claims under the Equal Protection Clause in which a plaintiff typically seeks to prevent his or her own prosecu- tion. Second, the standing analysis might differ when Congress ele- vates de facto injuries to the status of legally cognizable injuries re- dressable by a federal court. Third, the standing calculus might change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory respon- sibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions. Fourth, a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both arrest or prosecution priorities and the provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis. Fifth, policies governing the contin- ued detention of noncitizens who have already been arrested arguably might raise a different standing question than arrest or prosecution policies. But this case presents none of those scenarios. Pp. 9–12.

(d) The discrete standing question raised by this case rarely arises because federal statutes that purport to require the Executive Branch

Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 3 Syllabus

to make arrests or bring prosecutions are rare. This case is different from those in which the Federal Judiciary decides justiciable cases in- volving statutory requirements or prohibitions on the Executive, be- cause it implicates the Executive Branch’s enforcement discretion and raises the distinct question of whether the Federal Judiciary may in effect order the Executive Branch to take enforcement actions. The Court’s decision does not indicate any view on whether the Executive is complying with its statutory obligations. Nor does the Court’s nar- row holding signal any change in the balance of powers between Con- gress and the Executive. Pp. 12–14.

606 F. Supp. 3d 437, reversed.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS and BAR- RETT, JJ., joined. BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judg- ment, in which GORSUCH, J., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Key quotes from Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion:

In short, this Court’s precedents and longstanding

historical practice establish that the States’ suit here is not the kind redressable by a federal court.

B

Several good reasons explain why, as Linda R. S. held, federal courts have not traditionally entertained lawsuits of this kind.

To begin with, when the Executive Branch elects not to arrest or prosecute, it does not exercise coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property, and thus does not infringe upon interests that courts often are called upon to protect. See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562. And for standing purposes, the absence of coercive power over the plaintiff makes a difference: When “a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed” to establish standing. Id., at 562 (emphasis deleted).2

Moreover, lawsuits alleging that the Executive Branch has made an insufficient number of arrests or brought an insufficient number of prosecutions run up against the Executive’s Article II authority to enforce federal law. Article II of the Constitution assigns the “executive Power” to the President and provides that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U. S. Const., Art. II, §1, cl. 1; §3. Under Article II, the Executive Branch possesses authority to decide “how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.” TransUnion LLC, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13); see Lujan, 504 U. S., at 576–578; Allen, 468

——————

2 By contrast, when “the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or

forgone action) at issue,” “there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562.

Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 7

Opinion of the Court

U.S., at 760–761. The Executive Branch—not the Judiciary—makes arrests and prosecutes offenses on behalf of the United States. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 693 (1974) (“the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case”); Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 922–923 (1997) (Brady Act provisions held unconstitutional because, among other things, they transferred power to execute federal law to state officials); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456, 464 (1996) (decisions about enforcement of “the Nation’s criminal laws” lie within the “special province of the Executive” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 138 (1976) (“A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’” (quoting U.S. Const., Art. II, §3)); see also United States v. Cox, 342 F. 2d 167, 171 (CA5 1965).

That principle of enforcement discretion over arrests and prosecutions extends to the immigration context, where the Court has stressed that the Executive’s enforcement discretion implicates not only “normal domestic law enforcement priorities” but also “foreign-policy objectives.” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 490–491 (1999). In line with those principles, this Court has declared that the Executive Branch also retains discretion over whether to remove a noncitizen from the United States. Arizona v. United States, 567 U. S. 387, 396 (2012) (“Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all”).

In addition to the Article II problems raised by judicial review of the Executive Branch’s arrest and prosecution policies, courts generally lack meaningful standards for assessing the propriety of enforcement choices in this area. After all, the Executive Branch must prioritize its

8 UNITED STATES v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court

enforcement efforts. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S. 598, 607–608 (1985). That is because the Executive Branch (i) invariably lacks the resources to arrest and prosecute every violator of every law and (ii) must constantly react and adjust to the ever-shifting public-safety and public- welfare needs of the American people.

This case illustrates the point. As the District Court found, the Executive Branch does not possess the resources necessary to arrest or remove all of the noncitizens covered by §1226(c) and §1231(a)(2). That reality is not an anomaly—it is a constant. For the last 27 years since §1226(c) and §1231(a)(2) were enacted in their current form, all five Presidential administrations have determined that resource constraints necessitated prioritization in making immigration arrests.

In light of inevitable resource constraints and regularly changing public-safety and public-welfare needs, the Executive Branch must balance many factors when devising arrest and prosecution policies. That complicated balancing process in turn leaves courts without meaningful standards for assessing those policies. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 830–832 (1985); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U. S. 182, 190–192 (1993). Therefore, in both Article III cases and Administrative Procedure Act cases, this Court has consistently recognized that federal courts are generally not the proper forum for resolving claims that the Executive Branch should make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. See Linda R. S., 410 U. S., at 619; cf. Heckler, 470 U. S., at 831 (recognizing the “general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement”); ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 283 (1987) (“it is entirely clear that the refusal to prosecute cannot be the subject of judicial review”).3

——————

3 Also, the plaintiffs here are States, and federal courts must remain

mindful of bedrock Article III constraints in cases brought by States

Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 9

Opinion of the Court

All of those considerations help explain why federal courts have not traditionally entertained lawsuits of this kind. By concluding that Texas and Louisiana lack standing here, we abide by and reinforce the proper role of the Federal Judiciary under Article III. The States’ novel standing argument, if accepted, would entail expansive judicial direction of the Department’s arrest policies. If the Court green-lighted this suit, we could anticipate complaints in future years about alleged Executive Branch under-enforcement of any similarly worded laws—whether they be drug laws, gun laws, obstruction of justice laws, or the like. We decline to start the Federal Judiciary down that uncharted path. Our constitutional system of separation of powers “contemplates a more restricted role for Article III courts.” Raines, 521 U. S., at 828.

C

In holding that Texas and Louisiana lack standing, we do not suggest that federal courts may never entertain cases involving the Executive Branch’s alleged failure to make more arrests or bring more prosecutions.

First, the Court has adjudicated selective-prosecution claims under the Equal Protection Clause. In those cases, however, a party typically seeks to prevent his or her own prosecution, not to mandate additional prosecutions

——————

against an executive agency or officer. To be sure, States sometimes have standing to sue the United States or an executive agency or officer. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144 (1992). But in our system of dual federal and state sovereignty, federal policies frequently generate indirect effects on state revenues or state spending. And when a State asserts, for example, that a federal law has produced only those kinds of indirect effects, the State’s claim for standing can become more attenuated. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U. S. 886 (1970); Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 16–18 (1927); cf. Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562. In short, none of the various theories of standing asserted by the States in this case overcomes the fundamental Article III problem with this lawsuit.

10 UNITED STATES v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court

against other possible defendants. See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U. S., at 604; Armstrong, 517 U. S., at 459, 463.

Second, as the Solicitor General points out, the standing analysis might differ when Congress elevates defacto injuries to the status of legally cognizable injuries redressable by a federal court. See Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 3; cf. TransUnion LLC, 594 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 10–11); Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 20 (1998); Raines, 521 U. S., at 820, n. 3; Lujan, 504 U. S., at 578; Linda R. S., 410 U. S., at 617, n. 3. For example, Congress might (i) specifically authorize suits against the Executive Branch by a defined set of plaintiffs who have suffered concrete harms from executive under-enforcement and (ii) specifically authorize the Judiciary to enter appropriate orders requiring additional arrests or prosecutions by the Executive Branch.

Here, however, the relevant statutes do not supply such specific authorization. The statutes, even under the States’ own reading, simply say that the Department “shall” arrest certain noncitizens. Given the “deep-rooted nature of law- enforcement discretion,” a purported statutory arrest mandate, without more, does not entitle any particular plaintiff to enforce that mandate in federal court. Castle Rock, 545 U. S., at 761, 764–765, 767, n. 13; cf. Heckler, 470 U. S., at 835. For an arrest mandate to be enforceable in federal court, we would need at least a “stronger indication” from Congress that judicial review of enforcement discretion is appropriate—for example, specific authorization for particular plaintiffs to sue and for federal courts to order more arrests or prosecutions by the Executive. Castle Rock, 545 U. S., at 761. We do not take a position on whether such a statute would suffice for Article III purposes; our only point is that no such statute is present in this case.4

——————

4 As the Solicitor General noted, those kinds of statutes, by infringing

Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 11 Opinion of the Court

Third, the standing calculus might change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory responsibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a plaintiff arguably could obtain review of agency non-enforcement if an agency “has consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” Heckler, 470 U. S., at 833, n. 4 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id., at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring); cf. 5 U. S. C. §706(1). So too, an extreme case of non-enforcement arguably could exceed the bounds of enforcement discretion and support Article III standing. But the States have not advanced a Heckler-style “abdication” argument in this case or argued that the Executive has entirely ceased enforcing the relevant statutes. Therefore, we do not analyze the standing ramifications of such a hypothetical scenario.

Fourth, a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution priorities and the Executive Branch’s provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis. That is because the challenged policy might implicate more than simply the Executive’s traditional enforcement discretion. Cf. Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 11–12) (benefits such as work authorization and Medicare eligibility accompanied by non- enforcement meant that the policy was “more than simply a non-enforcement policy”); Texas v. United States, 809 F. 3d 134, 154 (CA5 2015) (Linda R. S. “concerned only nonprosecution,” which is distinct from “both nonprosecution and the conferral of benefits”), aff ’d by an equally divided Court, 579 U. S. 547 (2016). Again, we need

——————

on the Executive’s enforcement discretion, could also raise Article II issues. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 24–25.

12 UNITED STATES v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court

not resolve the Article III consequences of such a policy. Fifth, policies governing the continued detention of noncitizens who have already been arrested arguably might raise a different standing question than arrest or prosecution policies. Cf. Biden v. Texas, 597 U. S. ___ (2022). But this case does not concern a detention policy, so

we do not address the issue here.5

***************************************

Given the narrow resolution on standing grounds, and the reservations set forth in Section C of Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion, in addition to the somewhat different approach of the three concurring Justices, Gorsuch, Thomas, and Barrett, it’s unpredictable what this decision might mean if the DACA challenge now pending before U.S. District Judge Hanen eventually reaches the Supremes. In “point four” of “Section C,” Justice Kavanaugh goes to some length to distinguish a situation “that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution priorities and the Executive Branch’s provision of legal benefits or legal status,” citing the Court’s earlier decision in DHS v. Regents, involving a DACA challenge that was decided on APA technical grounds.

Still, this is a strong statement rejecting the attempt of GOP States and GOP lower Federal Court Judges to take over Federal immigration enforcement! And, with Immigration Courts overwhelmed with a largely artificially-inflated 2 million case backlog, many consisting of cases in which relief should be granted elsewhere (like at USCIS) or where removal would actually be detrimental to the interests of the U.S., a reaffirmation of the Executive’s historical authority to set reasonable, practical immigration enforcement priorities could not come soon enough. 

In that light, it’s curious why in a case where the ultimate result was lopsided, the Court DENIED the Administration’s motion for a stay pending review of the Fifth Circuit’s and USDC’s wrong orders! This unnecessarily created months of “enforcement chaos” which has been damaging both to individuals and to our national interests.

I also find it interesting that Justice Kavanaugh cited and in part relied upon the Executive’s Article II authority to enforce the law. This was also part of the rationale I used in a 1976 legal opinion written for then General Counsel Sam Bernsen reaffirming the “Legacy” INS’s authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion in designating some cases as “non priority.” 

That memo stated:

The ultimate source for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the Federal Government is the power of the President. Under Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, the executive power is vested in the President. Article II, Section 3, states that the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

. . . .

The reasons for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion are both practical and humanitarian. There simply are not enough resources to enforce all of the laws and regulations presently on the books. As a practical matter, therefore, law enforcement officials have to make policy choices as to the most effective and desirable way in which to deploy their limited resources. Thus, for example, police and prosecutors may choose to concentrate on apprehension and prosecution of perpetrators of violent crimes, while choosing not to proceed against those committing so-called “victimless crimes,” such as certain consensual sex acts and possession of small amounts of marihuana. In addition, there are times when defects in the quality, quantity, or method of gathering evidence will make it difficult to prove the matter before a court.

Aside from purely practical considerations, it is also obvious that in enacting a statute the legislature cannot possibly contemplate all of the possible circumstances in which the statute may be applied. In some situations, application of the literal letter of the law would simply be unconscionable and would serve no useful purpose. For instance, a prosecutor may well decide not to proceed against a terminally ill individual, even in the presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt.

You can find a copy of that legal opinion here: https://wp.me/p8eeJm-260. Still relevant, after nearly half a century!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-23-23

“TORTURE” UNDER U.N. DEFINITION! ☠️— “GOVERNMENT-SANCTIONED CHILD ABUSE!” — WHAT HAVE WE BECOME AS A PEOPLE & A NATION? — AMERICA HAS PUT NOTORIOUS CHILD ABUSERS AND SHAMELESS “PERPS” OF “CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY” IN CHARGE — We Now Have A Chance To Throw Them Out & Start The Return To Human Decency As An Overriding National Value! 🗽

 

Here’s an array of reports on how America under the Trump regime has joined the ranks of dictatorships, torturers, child abusers, persecutors, and human rights criminals!

Eugene Robinson
Eugene Robinson
Opinion Columnist
Washington Post
Source: WashPost Website

Eugene Robinson @ WashPost:

What kind of people are we? As a society, are we so decadent and insecure that we show “toughness” by deliberately being cruel to innocent children? Is this what our nation has come to? Or are we better than that?

This election demands we answer those questions. The choice between President Trump and Joe Biden is not just political. It is also moral. And perhaps nothing more starkly illustrates the moral dimension of that decision than the Trump administration’s policy of kidnapping children at the southern U.S. border, ripping them away from their families — and doing so for no reason other than to demonstrate Trump’s warped vision of American strength.

We learned this week that some of those separations will probably be permanent. As NBC News first reported, 545 boys and girls taken as many as three years ago — the children of would-be immigrants and asylum seekers, mostly from Central America — have not been reunited with their parents and may never see their families again.

These are not among the nearly 3,000 families separated at the border in 2018, when children were kept in cages like animals or shipped away to facilities across the country, hundreds or thousands of miles from the border. We now know, thanks to the American Civil Liberties Union and other pro bono lawyers, that an additional 1,500 children were torn away from their families beginning in 2017, when the Trump administration conducted a trial run of the separation policy.

Please think about that. The shocking scenes we saw two years ago did not result from a sudden spasm of presidential anger. They didn’t stem from a Fox News segment Trump might have seen one evening. Rather, the administration rehearsed this form of cruelty.

What the administration did not plan for was how to reunite the children taken in 2017 with their families. Many of the parents were deported, and their children were placed in shelters around the country, then ostensibly released to parents or guardians, placements that the ACLU is still trying to confirm.

[Our Democracy in Peril: A series on the damage Trump has caused — and the danger he would pose in a second term]

The ACLU and other organizations have sent investigators to towns and villages in Central America in an attempt to find the kidnapped children’s families — an effort complicated not just by time and distance, but also by the covid-19 pandemic. Parents of 545 children have not been found, the ACLU reported this week.

Disturbingly, the Department of Homeland Security suggested that some of the parents declined to get their children back so they could remain in the United States. Keep in mind that most of these families were seeking asylum from deadly violence in their home countries. The Trump administration changed immigration guidelines to make it unlikely that the families would ultimately be allowed to stay in the United States, but federal law gives them the right to apply for asylum and to have their cases heard. They did nothing wrong. They should never have been asked to choose between parenting their children and getting them to safety — not by their home countries, and not by the United States.

Trump’s racism and xenophobia have been hallmarks of his presidency from the beginning, so perhaps it should be no surprise that he would preside over such an outrage. But he didn’t do this by himself. He had plenty of help.

Former attorney general Jeff Sessions seized an opportunity to make his rabid antipathy toward Hispanic immigration into policy. White House senior adviser Stephen Miller, a former Sessions aide in the Senate, was the architect of Trump’s “zero tolerance” immigration policy. Then-White House Chief of Staff John F. Kelly said in 2018 that the children taken would be “taken care of — put into foster care or whatever.” Former homeland security secretary Kirstjen Nielsen said last year that she regretted that “information flow and coordination to quickly reunite the families was clearly not in place” — but not the separations themselves.

. . . .

Read the rest of Eugene’s article here:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/do-we-tolerate-the-kidnapping-of-children-this-election-is-our-chance-to-answer/2020/10/22/0f60d17c-1496-11eb-ad6f-36c93e6e94fb

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Elise Foley
Elise Foley
Deputy Enterprise Editor
HuffPost
Photo Source: HuffPost.com

Elise Foley @ HuffPost:

President Donald Trump’s administration started and carried out a policy that took more than 4,000 children from their parents, at least 545 of whom are still split apart years later. But at Thursday’s debate, the president insisted that he did nothing wrong at all ― blaming his Democratic predecessors and even insisting the kids are doing fine.

“They are so well taken care of,” Trump said of the children taken from their parents by his administration. “They’re in facilities that were so clean.”

Trump’s first term was marked by a full-out assault on immigration, both legal and unauthorized. The most dramatic was his “zero tolerance” policy on unauthorized border-crossing, used in a 2017 pilot program and expanded more broadly in 2018, that led to criminal prosecution of parents and locking up their kids separately. Splitting up families was intentional and calculated, according to multiple reports.

Thanks to mass public outrage and a court order, Trump was forced to stop his family separation policy. Most families were reunited, but the American Civil Liberties Union, which was part of the lawsuit against the government that stopped the policy, said this week that at least 545 kids are still away from their parents.

“Their kids were ripped from their arms and separated,” Democratic nominee Joe Biden said during the debate. “And now they cannot find over 500 sets of those parents and those kids are alone. Nowhere to go. Nowhere to go. It’s criminal.”

. . . .

Read the rest of Elise’s article here:

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-debate-family-separation_n_5f924368c5b62333b2439d2b

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Ruth Marcus
Washington Post Columnist Ruth Marcus, moderates a panel discussion about chronic poverty with Education Secretary John B. King and Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack, during the National Association of Counties at the Washington Marriott Wardman Park, in Washington, DC, on Tuesday, Feb. 23, 2016. U.S. Department of Agriculture photo by Lance Cheung.

Ruth Marcus @ WashPost:

545.

That is the number of children still separated from their families by the Trump administration — separated deliberately, cruelly and recklessly. They might never be reunited with their parents again. Even if they are, the damage is unimaginable and irreparable.

545.

Even one would be too many. Each one represents a unique tragedy. Imagine being ripped from your parents, or having your child taken from you. Imagine the desperation that the parents feel, the trauma inflicted on their children.

545.

That number represents an indelible stain on President Trump and every individual in his administration who implemented this policy, flawed at the conception and typically, gruesomely incompetent in the execution. It is, perhaps in the technical sense but surely in the broader one, a crime against humanity. It is torture.

545.

That number — I will stop repeating it, yet it cannot be repeated enough — represents a moral challenge and responsibility for the next administration. If Joe Biden is elected president, he must devote the maximum resources of the federal government to fixing this disaster. The United States broke these families; it must do whatever it takes to help them heal.

Nothing like that would happen in a second Trump term, because Trump himself doesn’t care. He doesn’t grasp the horror that he oversaw. He doesn’t comprehend the policy, and he is incapable of feeling the pain it inflicted.

Those truths could not have been clearer cut than during Thursday night’s debate.

Moderator Kristen Welker of NBC News asked the president a simple question: “How will these families ever be reunited?”

First, Trump misstated the situation: “Their children are brought here by coyotes and lots of bad people, cartels, and they’re brought here, and they used to use them to get into our country.”

No. These are children separated from their families, not separated from smugglers. They are children brought by their parents in desperate search of a better life, desperate enough that they would take the risk of the dangerous journey.

Then Trump pivoted to the irrelevant: “We now have as strong a border as we’ve ever had. We’re over 400 miles of brand new wall. You see the numbers. And we let people in, but they have to come in legally.”

Welker persisted: “But how will you reunite these kids with their families, Mr. President?”

Trump responded by pointing his finger at his predecessor: “Let me just tell you, they built cages. You know, they used to say I built the cages, and then they had a picture in a certain newspaper and it was a picture of these horrible cages and they said look at these cages, President Trump built them, and then it was determined they were built in 2014. That was him.”

This is typical Trumpian deflection, bluster undergirded by ignorance. The “cages” are ugly but irrelevant to the topic at hand: the deliberately cruel plan to deter border-crossing by separating children from parents. That was a Trump administration special, implemented with callous sloppiness and so extreme that even the Trump administration abandoned it.

Welker, for the third time: “Do you have a plan to reunite the kids with their families?”

At which point Trump made clear that he did not: “We’re trying very hard, but a lot of these kids come out without the parents, they come over through cartels and through coyotes and through gangs.” The children, he added later, “are so well taken care of, they’re in facilities that were so clean.”

. . . .

Read the rest of Ruth’s op-ed here:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/545-children-are-still-separated-from-their-families-what-if-one-of-them-were-yours/2020/10/23/63d3be04-154f-11eb-ba42-ec6a580836ed_story.html

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Bess Levin
Bess Levin
Politics & Finance Writer
Vanity Fair


Bess Levin
@ Vanity Fair:

The third and final presidential debate gave Donald Trump and Joe Biden the opportunity to make their final pitch to the American people before the 2020 election. For the Democratic nominee, that meant driving home the point that he believes in science, that he’ll take the COVID-19 pandemic seriously, that climate change is real, and that systemic racism must be dealt with. For Trump, it meant making it clear that in addition to being a science-denying, QAnon-promoting dimwit, he’s also an actual monster who thinks separating small children from their parents, in some cases permanently, is absolutely fine.

Asked by moderated Kristen Welker about the news that parents of 545 children separated at the border—60 of whom are under the age of five—cannot be located, Trump defended the policy and gave no explanation for how the government plans to find these people and reunite their families. “Children are brought here by coyotes and lots of bad people, cartels, and they’re brought here and they used to use them to get into our country,” Trump said, which is objectively false, as they are brought here by their parents, which is why it’s called the family separation policy. “We now have as strong a border as we’ve ever had. We’re over 400 miles of brand new wall. You see the numbers and we let people in but they have to come in legally.”

pastedGraphic.png

Noting that Trump hadn’t answered the question, Welker pressed: “But how will you unite these kids with their families?”

“They built cages, they used to say I built cages…that was him,” Trump said, pointing to Biden and referring to the fact that the Obama administration did build temporary enclosures but failing, naturally, to mention that his predecessor did not separate families.

“Do you have a plan to reunite the kids with their parents?” Welker asked a third time. Again, Trump responded by claiming that the children “come without the parents, they come over through cartels and through coyotes and through gangs.”

At this point, Joe Biden was given a chance to weigh in and used his time to describe the policy implemented by Trump as the horror show all non-sociopaths know it to be. “Parents, their kids were ripped from their arms and they were separated and now they cannot find over 500 sets of those parents and those kids are alone, nowhere to go. It’s criminal.”

Then Trump interjected with what he apparently believed was an important point that would cast his administration in a much more favorable light and perhaps might even win it some awards or sainthood by the Catholic church. “Kristen, I will say this,” he told the moderator, of the children stolen from their parents. “They’re so well taken care of. They’re in facilities that are so clean.

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With regard to that claim, NBC News reporter Jacob Soboroff weighed in on that after the debate, telling Rachel Maddow: “I was one of the reporters I guess the president mentioned, they invited me to go to the epicenter of this policy…what I saw was little children sitting on concrete floors, covered by mylar blankets, supervised by security contractors in a watchtower, it makes me sick every time I recall it. And Physicians for Human Rights…called this torture…the American Academy of Pediatrics called this state-sanctioned child abuse, and the president of the United States I guess interprets that as children being well taken care of.”

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Read the rest of The Levin Report here:

https://mailchi.mp/c4319dce073e/levin-report-trumps-heart-bursting-with-sympathy-for-his-buddy-bob-kraft-2882762?e=adce5e3390

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Jacob Soboroff
Jacob Soboroff
NBC Correspondent
Jacob Soboroff at the ABC News Democratic Debate
National Constitution Center. Philadelphia, PA.
Creative Commons License

Here’s a video from NBC New’s  Jacob Soboroff, who has actually been inside “Trump’s Kiddie Gulag.” Surprise spoiler: It’s not “nice.” More like “torture” and “child abuse.”

https://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/watch/soboroff-the-conditions-of-migrant-children-trump-described-as-well-taken-care-of-made-me-sick-94450757764

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Julia Edwards Ainsley

And, here’s another video from NBC News’s always incisive and articulate Julia Edwards Ainsley:

https://www.cnbc.com/video/2020/10/21/lawyers-cant-find-parents-of-545-migrant-children-separated-by-the-trump-administration.html

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There is neither moral nor legal justification for what the Trump regime has done to asylum seekers and other migrants over the past four years as part of their racist, White Nationalist, nativist agenda. But, we can show that we’re a better country than his horrible vision by voting him and all of his enablers out of office! Vote ‘Em out, vote ‘Em out!

PWS

10-25-20

NO DEFERENCE DUE! – 6th CIR. SLAMS TWO BIA PRECEDENTS – MATTER OF KEELEY, 27 I&N DEC. 27 I&N DEC. 146 (BIA 2017) & MATTER OF JASSO ARANGURE, 27 I&N DEC. 178 (BIA 2017) BITE THE DUST! — Time To Put An End To Inappropriate “Chevron Deference” For “Captive” BIA!

6th-Keeley18a0270p-06

Keeley v. Whitaker, 6th Cir., 12-17-18, Published

PANEL: GRIFFIN and DONALD, Circuit Judges; BERTELSMAN, District Judge*

*The Honorable William O. Bertelsman, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY: JUDGE BERNICE BOUIE DONALD

 KEYQUOTE: 

This case requires us to use the tools of statutory interpretation to determine whether a conviction for rape in Ohio is an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The Fifth Circuit and the Board  of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) previously considered this question and answered it in the negative. In the case before us, though, the BIA reversed course in a published decision and found that such a conviction is an aggravated felony under the INA. On review of all the relevant materials, we disagree with the BIA. A conviction for rape in Ohio can be committed by digital penetration, whereas the aggravated felony of rape under the INA cannot. Therefore, the Ohio conviction does not categorically fit within the federal definition, and the petitioner’sconviction is not an aggravated felony. Accordingly, we REVERSE.

. . . .

In its opinion, the BIA ignored the most important guiding factor to statutory interpretation—the language of the statute—which shows that Congress did not consider rape and sexual abuse to be coextensive. When a court discerns the intent of Congress, “[o]ur analysis begins with the language of the statute.” Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1569 (emphasis added) (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 (2004)). When defining what crimes constituted aggravated felonies in the INA, Congress included “rape” and “sexual abuse of a minor” separately. § 101(a)(43)(A). The only conclusion we can draw from this drafting is that Congress intended for the terms to describe different aggravated felonies.

The BIA’s approach is impermissible because it would strip meaning from the statute’s words. “Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, we must interpret statutes as a whole,giving effect to each word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.” Menuskin v. Williams, 145 F.3d 755, 768 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lake Cumberland Trust, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 954 F.2d 1218, 1222 (6th Cir. 1992)). To accept the BIA’s position that Congress intended for rape and sexual abuse to be synonymous would render meaningless Congress’ decision to utilize the two different terms—rape and sexual abuse—to describe two different aggravated felonies.6 Congress clearly intended to penalize a more expansive set of sex crimes

No. 17-4210 Keeley v. Whitaker Page 7

committed against minors than against adults; and to effectuate that intent, Congress used the term “rape” as to adults and “sexual abuse” as to minors. The BIA ignored the language of the statute.7 Its holding cannot stand.

The primary error the BIA committed was to place the states’ treatment of the crime above the language of the statute. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding that we must discern the intent of Congress when interpreting a federal statute).8 Even accepting as true that many of the states treated rape and sexual abuse as “interchangeable” in 1996, we cannot impute such an understanding to Congress. The language of the INA prohibits us from doing so.

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Gee, the Fifth Circuit actually told the BIA the correct answer! And, initially, the BIA got it right!

But then, perhaps in an effort to ingratiate themselves with “Gonzo Apocalypto” Sessions, their “new boss,” the BIA screwed it up by trying to expand the reach of the removal provision so that more folks could be removed in violation of law. Sounds like just the kind of scofflaw thing Ol’ Gonzo encouraged and dreamed about. Looks to me like “job security” is overruling “justice” at “Justice!”

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172209.P Jasso-6th Cir18a0272p-06

Jasso Arangure v. Whitaker, 6th Cir., 12-18-18, Published

PANEL: THAPAR, BUSH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: JUDGE THAPAR

KEY QUOTE:

Courts have always had an “emphatic[]” duty “to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). But all too often, courts abdicate this duty by rushing to find statutes ambiguous, rather than performing a full interpretive analysis. When dealing with agencies, this abdication by ambiguity is even more tempting—and even more problematic. Because, under Chevron, ambiguity means courts get to outsource their “emphatic” duty by deferring to an agency’s interpretation. But even Chevron itself reminds courts that they must do their job before applying deference: they must first exhaust the “traditional tools” of statutory interpretation and “reject administrative constructions” that are contrary to the clear meaning of the statute. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). First and foremost, this means courts must analyze the statutory text. But when the text standing alone does not supply an answer, courts must consider canons of interpretation. Here, a canon makes the statute’s meaning clear. Thus, we reject the agency’s contrary interpretation.

. . . .

In this case, the Chevron analysis begins and ends with step one. The common-law presumption of res judicata makes the INA unambiguous. Res judicata doctrine applies in removal proceedings.

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“Preaching to the choir” here on “Chevron deference.”  As my former students in RLP and ILP at Georgetown might remember, I referred to Chevron as “judicial task avoidance,” which is exactly what it is.  It’s a gross violation of Marbury. Effectively, “TJ” dancing on the grave of John Marshall!

Chevron deference is particularly inappropriate in the case of the BIA, which these days functions as an enforcement appendage of the Attorney General (who, without authorization, has actually “re-assumed” many of the civil immigration enforcement functions of DHS). And, both Sessions and Whitaker have shown that if the BIA dares to render any semblance of a reasonable interpretation that might actually help a respondent in Removal Proceedings in any way it will be swiftly and mindlessly reversed.

Neither Sessions nor Whitaker had any chance of being confirmed as an Article III Judge. Indeed, Sessions was emphatically rejected for such a position by his own party because of his record of racially biased views (which he inflicted on the most vulnerable migrants during his toxic tenure as AG).

They have no business serving in a “quasi-judicial” capacity in any immigration proceeding. And, the Article III Courts have no business giving the BIA “deference” reserved for an impartial panel of subject matter experts. By no stretch of the imagination does that describe today’s “captive” BIA (which, incidentally, hasn’t had an “outside Government” appointment this century –even before Sessions, its jurisprudence had become very lopsidedly in favor of the DHS).

PWS

12-22-18