BIA SHOOTS UNREPRESENTED RESPONDENT ON “DIVISIBILITY” ANALYSIS — MATTER OF P-B-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 43 (BIA 2020) — Like Shooting Fish 🐟 In A Barrel 🛢!

MATTER OF P-B-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 43 (BIA 2020)

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1296956/download

BIA HEADNOTE:

Section 13-3407 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, which criminalizes possession of a dangerous drug, is divisible with regard to the specific “dangerous drug” involved in a violation of that statute.

PANEL: Board Panel: GREER and O’CONNOR, Appellate Immigration Judges; SWANWICK, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.

OPINION: O’CONNOR, Appellate Immigration Judge

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You think this isn’t “Theater of The Absurd?” Let’s check out Fns 5 & 6 from the opinion:

5 We recognize that the Ninth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises, utilized a modified categorical inquiry in Alvarado, 759 F.3d at 1130–33, to discern whether an alien’s conviction under section 13-3407 involved a federally controlled substance and was therefore a predicate for removal under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. However, the Ninth Circuit did not expressly analyze the divisibility of section 13-3407 in that decision, nor did the court have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s articulation of divisibility in Mathis. Moreover, the circuit recently certified a similar issue to the Arizona Supreme Court. See Romero-Millan v. Barr, 958 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2020) (asking the court to resolve whether Arizona statutes proscribing possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of a narcotic drug under sections 13-3415 and 13-3408 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, respectively, are divisible with respect to the identity of the drug involved in each offense). For these reasons, we do not consider Alvarado to be persuasive authority regarding the divisibility of section 13-3407, which, in light of Romero-Millan, we view as an unsettled issue in the Ninth Circuit.

6 We acknowledge that State v. Prescott, No. 1 CA-CR 15-0188, 2016 WL 611656, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2016), and State v. Castorina, No. 1 CA-CR 08-0816, 2010 WL 2450117, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 17, 2010), suggest that the identity of the “dangerous drug” involved in a violation of section 13-3407 is not an element of the statute. However, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona recently reviewed both cases, found that their reasoning was flawed, and concluded that Arizona case law fails to provide a “clear answer[] as to the divisibility” of section 13-3407. United States v. Sanchez-Murillo, No. CR-19-00795-PHX-SPL, 2019 WL 3858606, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 16, 2019) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Prescott or Castorina “definitively answer[s] whether the dangerous drug requirement of [section] 13-3407[] is divisible.” Gonzalez-Dominguez v. Sessions, 743 F. App’x 808, 811 (9th Cir. 2018).

So, how do you think that the unrepresented, almost certainly detained, respondent did on these issues, assuming that he even can read the BIA’s decision or have someone accurately read It to him?

The whole Immigration Court System has become a judicially and Congressionally-enabled “Due Process Farce” befitting a third word failed state that our country now resembles under the Trump kakistocracy. 

NO, those who say our democratic institutions are “holding up” under Trump are living in a parallel universe! 

PWS

07-24-20

NEW BIA PRECEDENT ON CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES – MATTER OF ROSA, 27 I&N DEC. 228 (BIA 2018) — We’re All Becoming Bit Players In A Continuous Performance Of “The Theater Of The Absurd!”

ROSA- 3919

Matter of ROSA, 27 I&N Dec. 228 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

(1) In deciding whether a State offense is punishable as a felony under the Federal Controlled Substances Act and is therefore an aggravated felony drug trafficking crime under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012), adjudicators need not look solely to the provision of the Controlled Substances Act that is most similar to the State statute of conviction.

(2) The respondent’s conviction under section 2C:35-7 of the New Jersey Statutes for possession with intent to distribute cocaine within 1,000 feet of school property is for an aggravated felony drug trafficking crime because his State offense satisfies all of the elements of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012) and would be punishable as a felony under that provision.

PANEL: BIA Appellate Immigration Judges PAULEY, WENDTLAND, O’CONNOR

OPINION BY: Judge Linda S. Wendtland

CONCURRING OPINION: Judge Blair T. O’Connor

 KEY QUOTE FROM JUDGE O’CONNOR’S CONCURRING OPINION:

“So while I do not disagree with the point made by the majority and the DHS about avoiding absurd results, I unfortunately do not find it to be persuasive. This statement alone is a sad commentary on the state of affairs when it comes to making criminal law determinations in immigration proceedings and is an earnest call for a congressional fix to the mess we currently find ourselves in. See United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2014) (collecting cases that call on Congress to “rescue the federal courts from the mire into which . . . [the] ‘categorical approach’ [has] pushed [them]” (quoting Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 131–32 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring))); Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the “continued congressional inaction in the face of a system that each year proves more unworkable”).

Finally, it bears noting that the Third Circuit has already found § 860 to be the proper Federal analogue to section 2C:35-7, albeit in an unpublished decision. See Chang-Cruz, 659 F. App’x 114. In that decision, the Government conceded that this was the case, and having lost the divisibility battle there, the DHS now seeks to use § 841 to argue that section 2C:35-7 is categorically an aggravated felony drug trafficking crime. Although I do not disagree with the majority that such an approach is permissible, I do so with reservations over how much more complicated categorical determinations may become for adjudicators who must now decide what is an “appropriate Federal analogue” and consider that analogue, or any permissible combination of such analogues, in discerning whether a State offense is a felony under the Controlled Substances Act. These determinations are difficult enough for an immigration system that is already overburdened. In the words of Justice Alito, “I wish them good luck.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2268 (Alito, J., dissenting).”

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Bottom line:

  • The respondent loses (of course);
  • The law is too complicated; and
  • Judge O’Connor thinks it should be unnecessary to go through all this rigmarole because this is a “bad guy” whom Congress clearly intended to kick out without recourse.

If anyone can explain the legal gibberish in this case further to me in plain English in 25 words or fewer, please do!

I get the point that the law has become too complex. But, this discussion seems to bypass the real problem in cases like this that has been “lost in space.”

How would an unrepresented, detained individual who doesn’t speak English properly defend him or herself in a case like this. The clear answer: they couldn’t, since even the “expert judges” in the Ivory (or Glass) Towers with their teams of cracker-jack law clerks are struggling with this stuff. Therefore, in the absence of counsel, appointed if necessary, these hearings before the Immigration Judges are nothing but judicial farces, theaters of the absurd, that mock due process and fairness and trample our Constitution. Samuel BeckettLuigi Pirandello, Friedrich Dürrenmatt, and friends would be proud of what’s been accomplished in our 21st Century immigration system!

That’s the problem to which both Congress and the Article III Appellate Courts need to wake up before it’s too late. In the meantime, please explain to me just how Sessions’s “pedal faster, schedule more, cut corners” approach to the Immigration Courts is helping to solve this problem?

PWS

03-14-18

 

SPLIT BIA SPEAKS ON “WAVE THROUGH” – “PLAIN MEANING” APPLIES EXCEPT WHEN IT FAVORS THE RESPONDENT – JUDGE ROGER PAULEY, DISSENTING, APPEARS TO GET IT RIGHT! — MATTER OF CASTILLO ANGULO, 27 I&N DEC. 194 (BIA 2018)

3913

Matter of Castillo Angulo, 27 I&N Dec. 194 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

“(1) In removal proceedings arising within the jurisdiction of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, an alien who was “waved through” a port of entry has established an admission “in any status” within the meaning of section 240A(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) (2012). Tula-Rubio v. Lynch, 787 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2015), and Saldivar v. Sessions, 877 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2017), followed in jurisdiction only.

(2) In removal proceedings arising outside the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, to establish continuous residence in the United States for 7 years after having been “admitted in any status” under section 240A(a)(2), an alien must prove that he or she possessed some form of lawful immigration status at the time of admission.”

BIA PANEL:  Appellate Immigration Judges Greer, O’Connor, & Pauley

OPINION BY: Judge Blair O’Connor

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Roger A. Pauley

KEY QUOTE FROM DISSENT:

“I concur in the result, which the majority only reaches because it acknowledges that the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Saldivar v. Sessions, 877 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2017), which holds that a wave through constitutes an “admission in any status” for purposes of section 240A(a)(2) of the Act, is binding on the Board since this case arises in that circuit. However, unlike the majority, I conclude that both the Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, whose similar holding in Tula-Rubio v. Lynch, 787 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit followed, arrived at the correct result, even though, like the majority, I disagree with some aspects of those courts’ reasoning.

. . . .

I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion otherwise and would find that, in any circuit, an alien is eligible to seek cancellation of removal if he or she establishes an admission via a wave through, even if the alien cannot demonstrate the particular lawful status under which admission was authorized, and even if it is later found that he or she had no lawful status at that time.”

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Gee, to me, “any status” means “any” status. But, hey, I’m just an old retired trial judge who in ancient time was Chair of the BIA. What would I know about “modern” concepts of statutory interpretation at the BIA?

For a quasi-judicial body that 1) often gets carried away with obtuse linguistic analysis, and 2) claims to see its role as maintaining nationwide consistency, it seems odd that the BIA has gone out of its way to a) rewrite the statute to its own liking, and 2) create a Circuit conflict where none previously existed.

The best way of understanding it is probably “doing what’s necessary to get to ‘no” for respondents not fortunate enough to be in the 9th or 5th Circuits.

My compliments to Judge Pauley for 1) having the backbone, and 2) caring enough to file a separate opinion that better follows the statutory language, produces a much better practical result, and, not surprisingly,  is much closer to what the only Article III Courts to address this particular issue already have decided.

PWS

01-30-18

 

GONZO’S WORLD: ATTACK ON U.S. CENSUS LATEST FRONT IN GONZO’S WAR ON AMERICAN DEMOCRACY!

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-justice-department-pushes-for-citizenship-question-on-census-alarming-experts_us_5a46fc79e4b0b0e5a7a68d3d

Justin Elliott reports for HuffPost:

“The Justice Department is pushing for a question on citizenship to be added to the 2020 census, a move that observers say could depress participation by immigrants who fear that the government could use the information against them. That, in turn, could have potentially large ripple effects for everything the once-a-decade census determines — from how congressional seats are distributed around the country to where hundreds of billions of federal dollars are spent.
The DOJ made the request in a previously unreported letter, dated Dec. 12 and obtained by ProPublica, from DOJ official Arthur Gary to the top official at the Census Bureau, which is part of the Commerce Department. The letter argues that the DOJ needs better citizenship data to better enforce the Voting Rights Act “and its important protections against racial discrimination in voting.”
A Census Bureau spokesperson confirmed the agency received the letter and said the “request will go through the well-established process that any potential question would go through.” The DOJ declined to comment and the White House did not respond to a request for comment.
Observers said they feared adding a citizenship question would not only lower response rates, but also make the census more expensive and throw a wrench into the system with just two years to go before the 2020 count. Questions are usually carefully field-tested, a process that can take years.
“This is a recipe for sabotaging the census,” said Arturo Vargas, a member of the National Advisory Committee of the Census and the executive director of NALEO Educational Fund, a Latino advocacy group. “When you start adding last-minute questions that are not tested — how will the public understand the question? How much will it suppress response rates?”
The 2010 census included a handful of questions covering age, sex, race, Hispanic origin, household relationship and owner/renter status — but not citizenship.
“People are not going to come out to be counted because they’re going to be fearful the information would be used for negative purposes,” said Steve Jost, a former top bureau official during the 2010 census. “This line about enforcing voting rights is a new and scary twist.” He noted that since the first census in 1790, the goal has been to count everyone in the country, not just citizens.”

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Read the complete article at the link.

Under the law and Supreme Court precedents, census data is used to draw Congeessional districts. Indeed, quite contrary to the way the GOP operates, Reprsentatives are supposed to represent the interests of all of the residents of their district, not just “voters” or “GOP voters.”

The DOJ’s bogus request to add a citizenship question is a rather transparent attempt to reduce Hispanic political power, in line with the overall White Nationalist anti-democracy direction the party is moving under Trump.

PWS

12-30-17m

 

NEW BIA PRECEDENT: CANCELLED CERTIFICATE OF CITIZENSHIP — Worthless! — Matter Of Falodun, 25 I&N Dec. 52 (BIA 2017)

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/971036/download

Here’s the BIA headnote:

“(1) Unlike a Certificate of Naturalization, a certificate of citizenship does not confer United States citizenship but merely provides evidence that the applicant previously obtained citizenship status.

(2) The institution of judicial proceedings to revoke naturalization are not required to cancel a certificate of citizenship, which the Department of Homeland Security can cancel administratively upon a determination that an applicant is not entitled to the claimed citizenship status.”

PANEL: Appellate Immigration Judges Grant, Mann, O’Connor

OPINION BY: Judge O’Connor

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PWS

06-03-17