🤯JUDGE ANNE GREER’S “PLAIN LANGUAGE” DISSENT GETS LAW RIGHT, BUT DROWNED OUT BY PRO-DHS TRUMP HOLDOVERS! 🤬 — Matter of M-M-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 494 (BIA 2022) — At DHS “Partner’s” Request, BIA Wrongly Restricts IJ’s Independent Discretion To Do Justice!👎🏽

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“Oh, Great and Exalted Masters at DHS Enforcement, how high would you like your humble servants here at the BIA to jump?” 
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https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1482556/download

Matter of M-M-A-, Respondent

Decided March 11, 2022

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

When the Department of Homeland Security raises the mandatory bar for filing a frivolous asylum application under section 208(d)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2018), an Immigration Judge must make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law on whether the requirements for a frivolousness determination under Matter of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 2007), have been met.

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Elias Z. Shamieh, Esquire, San Francisco, California

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Jennifer L. Castro, Assistant Chief Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: WILSON and GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judges. Dissenting Opinion: GREER, Appellate Immigration Judge.

WILSON, Appellate Immigration Judge: [Opinion]

For those interested in what the law actually says (clearly an “endangered minority” @ Garland’s BIA), here’s key language from Judge Greer’s dissent:

In my view, when an Immigration Judge elects to undertake the analysis set forth in our precedent under Matter of Y-L-, either independently or at the request of the DHS, and determines that the application is frivolous, then the plain statutory language requires the entry of a frivolousness finding as part of the Immigration Judge’s decision. But whether the Immigration Judge must conduct that analysis in the first place because the DHS requests it is a different question. This key distinction was recognized by the Second Circuit in stating that Immigration Judges “regularly exercise discretion when deciding whether to initiate a frivolousness inquiry.” Mei Juan Zheng, 672 F.3d at 186.

Requiring the adjudicator, either independently or at the request of the DHS, to engage in this analysis because the respondent made a material misrepresentation upends current practice by creating a rigid structure not mandated by statute. It equates adverse credibility with frivolousness, which I view as conflicting with the case law. It also removes discretion from the Immigration Judge and transfers it to the DHS. Accordingly, the majority’s interpretation constitutes an unwarranted expansion of the frivolousness provisions.

Although the majority casts this question in terms of whether an Immigration Judge may “ignore” a mandatory bar to asylum, the question is whether the Immigration Judge has the authority to make a judgment about pursuing a frivolousness inquiry. This Immigration Judge did not ignore a request from DHS to consider frivolousness. Rather, she entertained it and made an independent judgment not to proceed based on particular facts and circumstances in this case after deliberation. As discussed, the DHS did not question the judgment she made, which is a critical distinction; rather the DHS questions the ability of the Immigration Judge to make this judgment at all.2

I interpret the language and structure of the statute and development of relevant case law, combined with the sequencing of the frivolousness inquiry and its consequences, to demonstrate the discretionary nature of the frivolousness inquiry. And, absent any challenge to how the Immigration Judge exercised her discretion in this case, which I consider to have been waived, I would dismiss the appeal.

2 The relevant factors for the Immigration Judge to assess in making a threshold determination whether to invoke the frivolousness inquiry are a separate issue not implicated by the posture of this case.

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BIA to IJs: “When our overlords @ DHS tell you to jump, your duty is to say ‘how high, my masters!’”

Under Garland, the “Miller Lite Holdover BIA” continues to pile up some really wrong, one-sided, and poorly-reasoned decisions that intentionally skew the law against migrants and adversely affect human lives. Decisions that punctuate Judge Joan Churchill’s call for an independent Article I Immigration Judiciary. In an article I posted yesterday, Joan argued persuasively that that EOIR never had true quasi-judicial independence.  Decisions like this illustrate her point. https://immigrationcourtside.com/2022/03/12/%e2%9a%96%ef%b8%8f%f0%9f%91%a9%f0%9f%8f%bb%e2%9a%96%ef%b8%8f%f0%9f%91%a9%f0%9f%8f%be%e2%9a%96%ef%b8%8f%f0%9f%97%bdfeature-the-latest-issue-of-the-abas-judges/

Here, a correct (basically, uncontested on the merits, as Judge Greer points out) grant of a waiver was reversed just because DHS wanted “control” over the judges. “How dare a ‘mere employee’ of the AG exercise discretion in the face of the ICE ACC’s demand? Do these guys think they are ‘real’ judges? Let’s tell our buddy Merrick to get his toadies back in line like they were under Sessions and Barr!” How does the “holdover” BIA’s steady stream of incorrect decisions, institutionalized bias, and “worst practices” advance justice? 

The “Biden-Era BIA” is building a legacy of bad law, poor judging, and unnecessarily broken lives. Not exactly what the Biden Administration promised during the election! And, it goes without saying that requiring a fact-heavy “full Y-L- analysis” at the unilateral demand of the DHS will increase the backlog as Garland “shoots for 2 million” in his dysfunctional and chronically misdirected “courts.”

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

03-13-22

 

👩🏻‍⚖️ “TEMPORARY” APPELLATE JUDGE BETH LIEBMANN GETS IT RIGHT,😎 BUT GARLAND’S HOLDOVER BIA MAJORITY “STEAMROLLS” STATUTE TO BAR ASYLEE ADJUSTMENT AT DHS’S REQUEST! ☹️ — Matter of T-C-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 472 (BIA 2022)

 

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1476746/download

Matter of T-C-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 472 (BIA 2022)

BIA HEADNOTE:

An applicant for adjustment of status under section 209(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2018), must possess asylee status at the time of adjustment, and thus an applicant whose asylee status has been terminated cannot adjust to lawful permanent resident status under this provision.

PANEL:

WILSON and GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judges. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: LIEBMANN, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.

OPINION BY: Judge Goodwin

CONCURRING & DISSENTING:  Judge Liebmann

KEY QUOTE FROM JUDGE LIEBMANN’S SEPARATE OPINION:

Based on the unambiguous and controlling language “any alien granted asylum” in section 209(b) of the Act, I would hold that an asylee who has not previously adjusted to lawful permanent resident status pursuant to section 209(b) may apply for adjustment of status under that section even after termination of asylee status, provided that the noncitizen continues to be a refugee or the spouse or child of a refugee. A review of the overall context of section 209(b) of the Act, the governing regulations, and relevant case law supports this reading of the statute. I would therefore remand to permit the respondent to apply for adjustment of status pursuant to section 209(b). [Citation Omitted]

***********************

Nice to see some common sense “scholarly pushback” to the Garland “Holdover” BIA’s ridiculously pro-DHS-tilted precedents. While Garland apparently isn’t paying any attention to what’s being done in his name, hopefully the Appellate Courts will pick up on Judge Liebmann’s cogent analysis.

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

02-26-22

⚖️OF NOTE: Individual Wins Appeal, Gets Positive Guidance From Garland’s BIA! –  Matter of S-L-H- & L-B-L-, 28 I&N Dec. 318 (BIA 2021)!

The Board of Immigration Appeals has issued a decision in Matter of S-L-H- & L-B-L-, 28 I&N Dec. 318 (BIA 2021).

(1) Immigration Judges may exercise their discretion to rescind an in absentia removal order and grant reopening where an alien has established through corroborating evidence that his or her late arrival at a removal hearing was due to “exceptional circumstances” under section 240(e)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1) (2018), and, in doing so, should consider factors such as the extent of the alien’s tardiness, whether the reasons for the alien’s tardiness are appropriately exceptional, and any other relevant factors in the totality of the circumstances.

(2) Corroborating evidence may include, but is not limited to, affidavits, traffic and weather reports, medical records, verification of the alien’s arrival time at the courtroom, and other documentation verifying the cause of the late arrival; however, general statements—without corroborative evidence documenting the cause of the tardiness—are insufficient to establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant reopening removal proceedings. Matter of S-A-, 21 I&N Dec. 1050 (BIA 1997), reaffirmed and clarified.

PANEL:  GREER, O’CONNOR, and GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judges.

OPINION:  Judge Deborah K.  Goodwin

*****************************

Interesting points:

1) This case “clarifies and reaffirms” Matter of S-A-, 21 I&N Dec. 1050 (BIA 1997) a “Schmidt Board” en banc precedent written by Judge Gerry Hurwitz. My Round Table colleague Judge Lory Rosenberg and I dissented. Here is my dissent:

DISSENTING OPINION: Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman

I respectfully dissent.

On appeal from the denial of his motion to reopen in absentia exclusion proceedings, the applicant has submitted an affidavit stating that the

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Interim Decision #3331

Interim Decision #3331

information furnished in support of his earlier motion to reopen on notice grounds was not authorized by him. I would not reject this contention and find the applicant, in effect, incredible by reason of inconsistent statements without giving him an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing on the truth of his contention that he did not authorize the inconsistent representations contained in his earlier motion. Cf. Arrieta v. INS, 117 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding remand appropriate to give the respondent an opportunity to provide evidentiary support for statements made in an affidavit accompanying a motion to reopen).

In his first motion to reopen and on appeal, the applicant, who lives a distance of several hours from the Immigration Court, claims that he was 20-30 minutes late for his hearing because of traffic congestion. If this were in fact the case, the interests of justice and the statutory purpose of providing fair hearings to aliens before removing them from the United States would have been better served by the Immigration Judge exercising his available discretion to hear the case at another time during the day. See Romano-Morales v. INS, 25 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 1994)(stating that rules regarding in absentia hearings should be carefully applied to avoid conflict with statutory or constitu- tional rights); Matter of W-F-, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996) (stating that notwithstanding rules governing in absentia hearings, an Immigration Judge retains authority to excuse presence, grant a continuance, or change venue). I am not necessarily convinced that every incidence of tardiness must be treated as an “absence” from the hearing.

I therefore dissent from the decision to dismiss the applicant’s appeal.

Perhaps, in disavowing a “per se” rule on traffic delays, referring to the “totality of the circumstances,” and setting forth some useful criteria to guide practitioners, the panel at least “inched” toward the position Lory and I articulated in our respective 1997 dissents.

2) The “prevailing attorney” in this case, Farhad B. Sethna, Esquire, Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, was a “regular” before the Arlington Immigration Judges during the years we were responsible for the Cleveland, Ohio docket.

 

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

 

PWS

06-30-21