⚖️ EMILY GARCIA @ BLOOMBERG: TORTURED LAW: Official Negativity, Captive Courts, Unduly Restrictive Criteria, Subjective Standards Combine To Deny Mandatory Protection In A World Where Torture Is Widespread ☠️— “It’s sort of in the mind of the beholder,” Say I!

EMILY GARCIA
Emily Garcia
Litigation Reporter
Bloomberg Law
PHOTO: talkingbiznews.com
Torture
This phase of the Inquisition is over. But, torture is still widely practiced worldwide. US Officialdom has shown little enthusiasm for carrying out its mandatory protection responsibilities under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
PHOTO: Public Realm

 

The Supreme Court recently removed one procedural hurdle for noncitizens seeking humanitarian relief but the high courts ruling clears up no substantial issues about a law theyll make their claims under, immigration attorneys say—allowing some relief seekers to be sent back to torturous conditions.

Estrella Santos-Zacaria, a Guatemalan transgender woman, asked for federal review of the Board of Immigration Appealss decision denying her protection under the Convention Against Torture. In a unanimous decision, the justices said federal judges can weigh in on BIAs decisions before discretionary administrative remedies are exhausted. In Santos-Zacarias case, her petition may be sent back to BIA for further review but that doesnt guarantee relief.

While lawyers are hopeful that earlier review by a federal court will facilitate a smoother process for their clients, they express concerns that immigration judges and the BIA too readily dismiss the risk of torture, and say it shouldnt be so difficult to get humanitarian relief.

CAT protections, including deferral and withholding of removal, allow noncitizens who arent eligible for asylum to remain in the US. To receive protection, a noncitizen must show an immigration judge that if they are deported, its more likely than not that they will be tortured with government acquiescence or participation. Unlike asylum, protections under the Convention are mandatory and serious criminal convictions cant disqualify a noncitizen. But protections are especially difficult to win, said Eleni Bakst, a lawyer at the Capital Area ImmigrantsRights Coalition.

. . . .

Paul Schmidt, a former immigration judge and chairman of the BIA between and 2001, said the process for evaluating claims under the Convention isnt scientific. Theres no formula to plug in that will tell the odds of someone being tortured. Its sort of in the mind of the beholder,” Schmidt said.

. . . .

As an immigration judge, Schmidt said he and other immigration judges relied heavily on country conditions reports published by the US Department of State. Asked if he believed the reports were an adequate representation of a country, Schmidt said certainly not.”

Bakst said statistics provided by other countries can also be inaccurate. In El Salvador, the government doesnt allow monitoring bodies into its prisons so data on inmate torture is incomplete.

Pushing back against questionable reports and statistics, immigration advocates are aware that immigration judges and the BIA may dismiss their clients risk of torture, and their client may be tortured anyway.

Such was the case for Patrick Julney, a client of CAIR Coalition who was denied deferral under the Convention for failure to show that the likelihood of torture was more than 50% and deported to Haiti. Bakst said that immediately upon his arrival in Haiti, he was imprisoned and tortured.” Julney was denied access to food, water, and medicine.

Estelle McKee, a clinical immigration law professor at Cornell Law School, represented a schizophrenic man from El Salvador who was denied CAT relief. After his deportation, McKee hired a Salvadorean attorney to track down her client.

She said the attorney couldnt even enter her clients village because it was gang-controlled.

I dont have much hope that he survived,” McKee said.

McKee and other immigration attorneys agree that the Supreme Courts decision will speed up the humanitarian claims process, though results may vary. Julneys case was reviewed by the Third Circuit, but his outcome was unchanged.

. . . .

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Reads Emily’s full, well-written article at the above link.

A Government colleague once remarked to me that “the U.S. should never have signed the CAT.” Obviously, that private view has permeated and driven USG policy on implementing the CAT, particularly at the DOJ where it was immediately treated as “PNG” because of its lack of exclusionary clauses. Even “bad guys” aren’t supposed to be returned to torture (in terms of legal theory, if not reality).

There is no objective evidence that torture is on the decline worldwide. See, e.g., https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/torture/. Yet the mandatory protection required by the CAT remains elusive and quite arbitrary within the U.S. legal system.

One of the best examples of how Government officials who should be insuring that the legal protections under CAT are fairly and reasonably applied to achieve the Convention’s purposes are instead promoting an “any reason to deny” culture is former AG John Ashcroft’s precedent decision in Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I&N Dec. 912 (A.G. 2006). There, Ashcroft reversed a CAT grant by the IJ and the BIA to an unrepresented respondent. In the process, Ashcroft established the “enhanced test” that to gain CAT protection, the respondent must “establish that each step in the hypothetical chain of events is more likely than not to happen.”

In other words, this is an official invitation, some might say directive, to IJs to “lengthen the chain of causation until it breaks” (which it inevitably will, in most cases) and protection can be denied.

Moreover, many CAT claims, like this one, involve unrepresented respondents. The chances of an unrepresented respondent understanding the “chain of causation” or what it means to prove “each step is more likely than not to occur” are very slim.

Additionally, even if they did understand, since many of the unrepresented respondents are in detention, they would have little or no realistic chance of obtaining the type of detailed, timely expert testimony and comprehensive documentation, far beyond the DOS Country Reports (which, by the way are only available in English), necessary to overcome Ashcroft’s “de facto presumption of denial” and prove that every step of the “hypothetical chain” is “more likely than not” to happen.

Effectively, every problem mentioned by Emily and expert practitioners in this article is essentially (intentionally) magnified by J-F-F- and other anti-CAT administrative precedents.

CAT relief is mandatory, thus suggesting a high obligation on the part of IJs and other Government officials to insure non-return to torture. Yet, Ashcroft chastises the IJ involved in J-F-F- for essentially insuring that the respondent exercised his legal right to apply for CAT and helping him develop the record. Ashcroft even took the extraordinary step of disqualifying this IJ from any “hypothetical” future proceedings involving this respondent.

At the beginning of the BIA’s quest to interpret CAT (ironically at the same time Bush Administration lawyers at DOJ were secretly searching for legal pretexts to justify torture), I dissented from an unduly restrictive BIA precedent Matter of J-E-, 23 I&N Dec. 291, 304 (BIA  2002), Paul Wickham Schmidt, Board Member, dissenting, joined by Board Members John W. Guendelsberger, Noel Ann Brennan, Cecelia M. Espenoza, and Juan P. Osuna.

There, I stated:

The majority concludes that the extreme mistreatment likely to befall this respondent in Haiti is not “torture,” but merely “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” The majority further concludes that conduct defined as “torture” occurs in the Haitian detention system, but is not “likely” for this respondent. In short, the majority goes to great lengths to avoid applying the Convention Against Torture to this respondent.

We are in the early stages of the very difficult and thankless task of construing the Convention. Only time will tell whether the majority’s narrow reading of the torture definition and its highly technical approach to the standard of proof will be the long-term benchmarks for our country’s implementation of this international treaty.

Although I am certainly bound to follow and apply the majority’s constructions in all future cases, I do not believe that the majority adequately carries out the language or the purposes of the Convention and the implementing regulations. Therefore, I fear that we are failing to comply with our international obligations.

I conclude that the respondent is more likely than not to face officially sanctioned torture if returned to Haiti. Therefore, I would grant his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture and the implementing regulations. Consequently, I respectfully dissent.

More than two decades after J-E-, my fears and predictions of officially-sanctioned non-compliance with CAT unfortunately continue to be proved correct.

I also note with pride that our Round Table of Former Immigration Judges ⚔️🛡 filed an amicus brief before the Supremes in Santos-Zacaria supporting the interpretation that eventually prevailed.

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-01-23

 

☠️⚰️AMERICAN DEMOCRACY MIGHT NEVER RECOVER FROM THE 9-11 “DIRECT HIT!” — Our Response Revived One Of Vilest Aspects Of Our History, With A Corrupt DOJ Leading The Way: Misuse & Weaponization Of The Law To Abuse Human Rights & Shield The “Perps in Power” From Accountability: If You Want To Torture Illegally, Just Have Stooge Lawyers “Redefine” The Term! — Carlos Lozada @ WashPost

Torture? What torture? It’s merely “enhanced fact-finding!”

Star Chamber Justice
Public realm
Woman Tortured
“They all want to voluntarily waive further hearings and take final orders!”
Amazing StoriesArtist Unknown, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

 

Carols Lozada
Carlos Lozada
Journalist

Carlos writes: 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/interactive/2021/911-books-american-values/

. . . .

Lawyering to death.

The phrase appears in multiple 9/11 volumes, usually uttered by top officials adamant that they were going to get things done, laws and rules be damned. Anti-terrorism efforts were always “lawyered to death” during the Clinton administration, Tenet complains in “Bush at War,” Bob Woodward’s 2002 book on the debates among the president and his national security team. In an interview with Woodward, Bush drops the phrase amid the machospeak — “dead or alive,” “bring ’em on” and the like — that became typical of his anti-terrorism rhetoric. “I had to show the American people the resolve of a commander in chief that was going to do whatever it took to win,” Bush explains. “No yielding. No equivocation. No, you know, lawyering this thing to death.” In “Against All Enemies,” Clarke recalls the evening of Sept. 11, 2001, when Bush snapped at an official who suggested that international law looked askance at military force as a tool of revenge. “I don’t care what the international lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass,” the president retorted.

The message was unmistakable: The law is an obstacle to effective counterterrorism. Worrying about procedural niceties is passe in a 9/11 world, an annoying impediment to the essential work of ass-kicking.

Except, they did lawyer this thing to death. Instead of disregarding the law, the Bush administration enlisted it. “Beginning almost immediately after September 11, 2001, [Vice President Dick] Cheney saw to it that some of the sharpest and best-trained lawyers in the country, working in secret in the White House and the United States Department of Justice, came up with legal justifications for a vast expansion of the government’s power in waging war on terror,” Jane Mayer writes in “The Dark Side,” her relentless 2008 compilation of the arguments and machinations of government lawyers after the attacks. Through public declarations and secret memos, the administration sought to remove limits on the president’s conduct of warfare and to deny terrorism suspects the protections of the Geneva Conventions by redefining them as unlawful enemy combatants. Nothing, Mayer argues of the latter effort, “more directly cleared the way for torture than this.”

To comprehend what our government can justify in the name of national security, consider the torture memos themselves, authored by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel between 2002 and 2005 to green-light CIA interrogation methods for terrorism suspects. Tactics such as cramped confinement, sleep deprivation and waterboarding were rebranded as “enhanced interrogation techniques,” legally and linguistically contorted to avoid the label of torture. Though the techniques could be cruel and inhuman, the OLC acknowledged in an August 2002 memo, they would constitute torture only if they produced pain equivalent to organ failure or death, and if the individual inflicting such pain really really meant to do so: “Even if the defendant knows that severe pain will result from his actions, if causing such harm is not his objective, he lacks the requisite specific intent.” It’s quite the sleight of hand, with torture moving from the body of the interrogated to the mind of the interrogator.

After devoting dozens of pages to the metaphysics of specific intent, the true meaning of “prolonged” mental harm or “imminent” death, and the elasticity of the Convention Against Torture, the memo concludes that none of it actually matters. Even if a particular interrogation method would cross some legal line, the relevant statute would be considered unconstitutional because it “impermissibly encroached” on the commander in chief’s authority to conduct warfare. Almost nowhere in these memos does the Justice Department curtail the power of the CIA to do as it pleases.

In fact, the OLC lawyers rely on assurances from the CIA itself to endorse such powers. In a second memo from August 2002, the lawyers ruminate on the use of cramped confinement boxes. “We have no information from the medical experts you have consulted that the limited duration for which the individual is kept in the boxes causes any substantial physical pain,” the memo states. Waterboarding likewise gets a pass. “You have informed us that this procedure does not inflict actual physical harm,” the memo states. “Based on your research . . . you do not anticipate that any prolonged mental harm would result from the use of the waterboard.”

You have informed us. Experts you have consulted. Based on your research. You do not anticipate. Such hand-washing words appear throughout the memos. The Justice Department relies on information provided by the CIA to reach its conclusions; the CIA then has the cover of the Justice Department to proceed with its interrogations. It’s a perfect circle of trust.

Yet the logic is itself tortured. In a May 2005 memo, the lawyers conclude that because no single technique inflicts “severe” pain amounting to torture, their combined use “would not be expected” to reach that level, either. As though embarrassed at such illogic, the memo attaches a triple-negative footnote: “We are not suggesting that combinations or repetitions of acts that do not individually cause severe physical pain could not result in severe physical pain.” Well, then, what exactly are you suggesting? Even when the OLC in 2004 officially withdrew its August 2002 memo following a public outcry and declared torture “abhorrent,” the lawyers added a footnote to the new memo assuring that they had reviewed the prior opinions on the treatment of detainees and “do not believe that any of their conclusions would be different under the standards set forth in this memorandum.”

In these documents, lawyers enable lawlessness. Another May 2005 memo concludes that, because the Convention Against Torture applies only to actions occurring under U.S. jurisdiction, the CIA’s creation of detention sites in other countries renders the convention “inapplicable.” Similarly, because the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is meant to protect people convicted of crimes, it should not apply to terrorism detainees — because they have not been officially convicted of anything. The lack of due process conveniently eliminates constitutional protections. In his introduction to “The Torture Memos: Rationalizing the Unthinkable,” David Cole describes the documents as “bad-faith lawyering,” which might be generous. It is another kind of lawyering to death, one in which the rule of law that the 9/11 Commission urged us to abide by becomes the victim.

Years later, the Senate Intelligence Committee would investigate the CIA’s post-9/11 interrogation program. Its massive report — the executive summary of which appeared as a 549-page book in 2014 — found that torture did not produce useful intelligence, that the interrogations were more brutal than the CIA let on, that the Justice Department did not independently verify the CIA’s information, and that the spy agency impeded oversight by Congress and the CIA inspector general. It explains that the CIA purported to oversee itself and, no surprise, that it deemed its interrogations effective and necessary, no matter the results. (If a detainee provided information, it meant the program worked; if he did not, it meant stricter applications of the techniques were needed; if still no information was forthcoming, the program had succeeded in proving he had none to give.)

“The CIA’s effectiveness representations were almost entirely inaccurate,” the Senate report concluded. It is one of the few lies of the war on terror unmasked by an official government investigation and public report, but just one of the many documented in the 9/11 literature.

. . . ,.

****************************

Sound painfully familiar? It should, to those of us “DOJ vets” who lived through this period. The use of the “third person,” “double and triple negatives,” “weasel words” like “you have given us to understand that,” “decision by committee” where a memo is routed through so many layers of bureaucracy that the original author or authors don’t even appear on its face — are all “devices” to diffuse and obscure responsibility and avoid clear accountability for controversial (and too often wrong) decisions!

During our time at the BIA, my fellow U.W. Badger, Judge Mike Heilman and I were often at odds on the law, particularly when it came to asylum. Anybody who doubts this should read Mike’s remarkable and famous (or infamous) “rabbi dissent” in Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337, 349 (BIA 1996) (Heilman, Board Member, dissenting). Nevertheless, one thing we agreed upon was requiring any decisions written for us to use the first person to reflect whose decision it actually was!

“Lawyers enable lawlessness.” How true! In 2002, DOJ lawyers (hand-chosen by the politicos) “tanked” and enabled, even encouraged, gross law violations by the CIA. 

Fast forward to 2018. Then, White Nationalist AG Jeff Sessions exhorted his wholly-owned “judges” at EOIR not to treat DHS enforcement as a party before the court, but rather as a worthy “partner” in combatting the largely-fabricated “scourge” of illegal immigration (that actually, as we can now see, was propping up Trump’s economy). Is it surprising that precedent decisions by Sessions, Whitaker, and Barr favored DHS nearly 100% of the time and the BIA thereafter issued almost no precedents where the individual prevailed (not that there were many of those following “the Ashcroft purge,” even before Sessions)?

Asylum grant rates in Immigration Court tumbled precipitously, while both the trial, and particularly appellate, levels at EOIR were “packed” with judges whose main qualification appeared to be an expectation that they would churn out large numbers of removal orders without much analysis or consideration of the factors favoring the individual. Misogyny and anti-asylum, anti-private-lawyer attitudes (those “dirty lawyers”) were encouraged by Sessions as part the “culture” at EOIR, sometimes visibly rewarded by “elevation” to the BIA.

Interestingly, at the same time in 2002 that the group of DOJ attorneys was furiously working in secret to justify torture, in clear violation of the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), another group in the DOJ, the BIA, was struggling to make the CAT work in “real world” litigated cases. A number of us dissented from the majority of our BIA colleagues’ wrong-headed and rather transparent attempt to “neuter” CAT protection from the outset. Unlike the “secret lawyers” at the DOJ, our work was public and had consequences not only for the humans involved, but for those of us who had the audacity to stand up for their rights under domestic and international law!

Here’s an excerpt from my long-forgotten dissenting opinion in Matter of J-E-, 22 I&N Dec. 291, 314-15 (BIA 2002) (Schmidt, Board Member, dissenting):

The majority concludes that the extreme mistreatment likely to befall this respondent in Haiti is not “torture,” but merely “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” The majority further concludes that conduct defined as “torture” occurs in the Haitian detention system, but is not “likely” for this respondent. In short, the majority goes to great lengths to avoid applying the Convention Against Torture to this respondent.

We are in the early stages of the very difficult and thankless task of construing the Convention. Only time will tell whether the majority’s narrow reading of the torture definition and its highly technical approach to the standard of proof will be the long-term benchmarks for our country’s implementation of this international treaty.

Although I am certainly bound to follow and apply the majority’s constructions in all future cases, I do not believe that the majority adequately carries out the language or the purposes of the Convention and the implementing regulations. Therefore, I fear that we are failing to comply with our international obligations.

I conclude that the respondent is more likely than not to face officially sanctioned torture if returned to Haiti. Therefore, I would grant his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture and the implementing regulations. Consequently, I respectfully dissent.

Within a year of that decision, my dissenting colleagues and I were among those “purged” from the BIA by Ashcroft because of our views. I’d argue that EOIR has continued to go straight downhill since then, and is now in total free fall! Surely, any “facade” of quasi-judicial independence at the BIA has long-since crumbled. Yet, AG Garland pretends there is no problem. Garland’s apparent belief that this is still Judge Bell’s or Ben Civiletti’s or even Ed Levi’s DOJ is simply, demonstrably, wrong. 

Today’s DOJ has been part and parcel of a highly inappropriate “weaponization” of the law and “Dred Scottification” directed against individual civil rights, migrants, voters, women, people of color, and a host of “others” who were on the far right “hit list” of the Trump kakistocracy. Nowhere has that been more evident than at the dysfunctional and institutionally biased EOIR. The problems plaguing American justice today have increased since 9-11. They will continue to fester and grow unless and until Garland faces reality and makes progressive leadership and judicial changes at EOIR to addresses the toxic culture of complicity and abusive use of the law to degrade individual and human rights. And, some real accountability at the rest of the badly-damaged DOJ should not be far behind.

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

09-05-21

HON. JEFFREY S. CHASE:  The Message From Barr’s Improper Intervention in Matter of R-A-F-: Forget The Law, You Are My Stooges! — Only An Independent Article I Immigration Court Will End This Mockery of Due Process & Fundamental Fairness!

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/3/1/the-real-message-of-matter-of-r-a-f-

The Real Message of Matter of R-A-F-

On February 26, the Attorney General (or more likely, someone authorized to speak on his behalf) issued a precedent decision in Matter of R-A-F-.  My take on the import of this decision seems to be different than most.  Let me first provide some background.

Most people seeking asylum in this country also apply for a lesser form of protection called withholding of removal under Article III of the U.N. Convention Against Torture (“CAT” for short).  Whereas asylum provides a path to U.S. permanent residence, CAT only prevents someone with a deportation order from being sent to a country in which they are likely to suffer torture.  CAT generally only comes into play where the applicant isn’t found eligible for asylum, something which is happening more frequently as the present administration churns out new bars and obstacles to eligibility.

To provide an example, someone who establishes they will likely be murdered or raped if returned to their country may be barred from even applying for asylum if they didn’t file their application within one year of their arrival in this country, or if they did not apply for asylum in a third country they passed through en route to the southern border.  Even if allowed to apply, they may still be denied asylum if the immigration judge does not determine that their persecution would be for the proper motive.  But while our asylum laws as written allow some leeway as to whom the government will afford permanent status in the U.S., the same government is bound by international treaty not to send an individual to a place where they would suffer persecution.  It is often CAT that fills the gap between those who are not permitted to remain permanently but should nevertheless not be repatriated.

The U.S. was one of 154 countries to sign the U.N. Convention Against Torture.  However, it was the only country to add a “specific intent” requirement to its internal regulations implementing the convention, requiring a finding that the torture “be specifically intended to inflict severe…pain and suffering,” and specifically excluding acts that result “in unanticipated or unintended severity of pain or suffering.”1  The specific intent requirement seriously undermines the purpose of the law, as many are forced to rely on CAT specifically because they couldn’t prove the proper intent of their persecutor that is required for asylum.  It is thus necessary for the specific intent provision to be interpreted in the least restrictive manner for CAT to function in its intended way.

In 2002, the BIA had its first chance to interpret how the specific intent requirement should be applied in a case called Matter of J-E-.  At the time, the BIA was comprised of judges holding diverse views of the law.  As a result, the Board was sharply split on the issue.  The more restrictive reading won out, but 6 judges dissented.2  Five of them were no longer on the BIA a year later following then Attorney General John Ashcroft’s infamous purge of Board judges whom he viewed as too liberal.

An important point that was glossed over in the majority opinion in Matter of J-E- and its progeny is that where governments do intentionally maintain horrific conditions in its prisons or mental institutions that are intended to punish those institution’s populations, they tend to be smart enough not to admit to it.  To illustrate this point, I refer to a November 12, 2019 report of the Washington Post finding that although the Trump Administration characterized its outrageous treatment of unaccompanied immigrant children as an unintended consequence of the volume of immigrants seeking asylum at the border, such outcome “also was a result of policy decisions that officials knew would ensnare unaccompanied minors in bureaucratic tangles and leave them in squalid conditions.”

Cognisant of this fact, in his dissenting opinion in Matter of J-E-, Hon. Paul W. Schmidt found the specific intent requirement to be satisfied by a “clearly documented acceptance of extreme mistreatment amounting to torture as a routine aspect of detention in Haiti.”  Concluding that the Haitian government “cannot claim it does not know what happens to detainees in its prisons,” Judge Schmidt found the specific intent requirement to have been met.  Hon. Lory D. Rosenberg began her companion dissenting opinion in the case by quoting from the Second Circuit that “Among the rights universally proclaimed by all nations . . . is the right to be free of physical torture.”3

In late 2018, the BIA again rejected such arguments and reiterated the majority view of J-E- in another precedent decision, Matter of J-G-R-P-.  This time, the BIA did so in a three-judge panel decision in which there were no dissents.  As this decision was published less than 16 months prior to the A.G.’s decision in R-A-F-, there was really no need at the time the A.G. issued R-A-F- for another decision on the topic.

I thus believe the real motive behind issuing the decision was not to give guidance, but rather to serve warning.  While published precedential decisions have always received broad attention, individual BIA appellate judges have felt safe affording relief in sympathetic cases  in unpublished decisions where the outcome is generally known only to the parties involved.

A colleague recently made me aware of a job posting within EOIR for an attorney to work not for the Immigration Courts or the BIA, but rather within the office of EOIR’s director, James McHenry, who has imposed the administration’s political will on the agency’s judges with a heavy hand.  The job description included “review(ing) court cases including appeals cases for adherence to procedural requirements, proper interpretation and application of statutes, regulations and precedents,” and “recommend(ing) action on precedent-setting issues to senior officials.”  In other words, McHenry was looking to hire what is commonly referred to as a “snitch” to sort through decisions that might not pass muster with the likes of Stephen Miller, and flag them for corrective action.  One such shameless staffer apparently flagged R-A-F- in this manner, and through the resulting A.G. certification, the case will serve as a cautionary tale for a group of BIA judges that certainly hasn’t forgotten the fate of the Matter of J-E- dissenters.

The decision in question was issued in September by Appellate Immigration Judge Linda Wendtland, whose retirement party was held this past week.  Judge Wendtland is by no means a liberal, and worked the majority of her career for the Department of Justice; prior to her appointment to the BIA, she had been an assistant director with the DOJ’s Office of Immigration Litigation.  But Judge Wendtland is highly knowledgeable of the law, and is reasonable and fair (all endangered qualities on the present BIA).

Looking to Judge Wendtland’s decision below, it would be difficult to find a more sympathetic applicant than R-A-F-.  The respondent seeking CAT protection is in his 70s, and suffers from Parkinson’s disease, dementia, Major Depressive Disorder, traumatic brain injury, PTSD, and chronic kidney disease.  The evidence of record established that if returned to his native Mexico, R-A-F- faced a significant risk of being institutionalized in a facility in which he could be subject to physical and sexual abuse, physical and chemical restraints, and containment in cages and isolation rooms, all without access to justice.  Judge Wendtland agreed with the Immigration Judge that such treatment rose to the definition of torture.

Based on her reputation and body of work, Judge Wendtland is undoubtedly someone who had earned the right to have her decision in R-A-F- accorded deference.  However, these are different times.  And instead of deference, the A.G. (who, of course, knows next to nothing about immigration law or the specific matter in question) chose to unceremoniously refer to himself and then slam the BIA’s decision.  The legacy of such action will be fully felt the next time a single judge at the BIA has the opportunity to affirm a similarly sympathetic grant of relief, but will instead choose not to do so out of fear and self-preservation.  This is not how justice should be afforded to our country’s most vulnerable population.

Notes:

  1. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(5).
  2. I am proud to note that the authors of the two dissenting opinions, Paul W. Schmidt and Lory D. Rosenberg, and former BIA judge Cecelia Espenoza, who joined in both dissents, are presently members of the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges.
  3. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).

Copyright 2020 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

Reprinted with permission.

********************************

Thanks, Jeffrey my friend,  for the “shout out” for the dissents of Lory, Cecelia, and me in Matter of J-E-!

I recently reached the same conclusion as Jeffrey about R-A-F-although in less scholarly, measured, and elegant terms: https://immigrationcourtside.com/2020/02/28/barr-to-his-wholly-owned-immigration-judges-just-deny-cat-protection-any-ol-ground-will-do-matter-of-r-a-f-27-in-dec-778-a-g-2020/.

I have said before that I always respected Judge Wendtland. She was a scholarly, industrious, fair-minded, “center right” jurist. While I had been exiled from the BIA before she was appointed, she seemed like a judge with whom I would have enjoyed having a continuing dialogue, much like my more conservative, yet thoughtful and scholarly, friend the late Judge Lauri Steven Filppu. And, we probably would have ended up on the same side of a number of issues coming before the BIA. 

It’s both disheartening and enraging to see that even “conscientious conservative” jurists like Judge Wendtland get no real respect and deference from the likes of Billy Barr and his toady colleagues. And, the function of having Director McHenry “ride heard” on the BIA is both unethical and stupid, since he is not an Immigraton Judge himself. Indeed, the gross incompetence with which todays’ EOIR is managed suggests that the Director’s sole role should be to attend to the failing administrative and support structure of the Immigration Courts in a nonpartisan, apolitical manner under the direction of, not overseeing, the BIA Chair and the Chief Immigration Judge. 

This system is broken! Every time an Article III Circuit Court signs off on an order of removal resulting from this unconstitutional, unethical, and grossly mismanaged morass, those Article III Judges enable the regime’s continuing fraud, waste, and abuse, and shirk their sworn constitutional duties.

PWS

03-02-20