https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/20a0156p-06.pdf
Juan Antonio v. Barr, 6th Cir., 05-19-20, published
PANEL: COLE, Chief Judge; BOGGS and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges
OPINION BY: Judge Gibbons
CONCURRING OPINION: Judge Boggs
KEY QUOTES:
Footnote 3:
3Matter of A-R-C-G was overruled by Matter of A-B, which held that the Board in Matter of A-R-C-G- did not conduct a rigorous enough analysis in its determination that the particular social group was cognizable. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 331 (A.G. 2018) (noting that because DHS conceded that particular social group was cognizable, “the Board performed only a cursory analysis of the three factors required to establish a particular social group”). Our sister circuits have determined that this change counsels remand. See Padilla- Maldonado v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 751 F. App’x 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2018) (“While the overruling of A-R-C-G- weakens [the applicant’s] case, it does not automatically defeat her claim that she is a member of a cognizable particular social group. As we remand to the BIA to remand to the IJ, the IJ should determine whether [the applicant’s] membership in the group . . . is cognizable . . ..”); Moncada v. Sessions, 751 F. App’x 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2018) (“This Court, like the BIA, applies the law as it exists at the time of decision. And, where, as here, intervening immigration decisions from the executive branch alter the applicable legal standards, we have previously exercised our discretion to remand the matter to the BIA to apply the new standards in the first instance. Recognizing the wisdom of this practice, we take the same tack here and remand this case ‘for the BIA to interpret and apply the standards set forth in [Matter of A-B-] in the first instance.’” (quoting Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted)).
However, Matter of A-B- has since been abrogated. See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018). Grace found that the policies articulated in Matter of A-B- were arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. See id. at 126–27 (holding that there is no general rule against claims involving domestic violence as a basis for membership in a particular social group and that each claim must be evaluated on an individual basis under the statutory factors). The district court’s decision in Grace is currently on appeal to the D.C. Circuit. We acknowledge that we are not bound by Grace but find its reasoning persuasive. Because Matter of A-B- has been abrogated, Matter of A-R-C-G- likely retains precedential value. But, on remand, the agency should also evaluate what effect, if any, Matter of A-R-C-G- and Grace have had on the particular social group analysis. See Bi Xia Qu, 618 F.3d at 609 (“When the BIA does not fully consider an issue, . . . the Supreme Court has instructed that a reviewing court ‘is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed.’ Rather, ‘the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the [BIA] for additional investigation or explanation.’” (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006))).
. . . .
When an asylum claim focuses on non-governmental conduct, the applicant must show that the alleged persecutor is either aligned with the government or that the government is unwilling or unable to control him. See Khalili, 557 F.3d at 436. An applicant meets this burden when she shows that she cannot “reasonably expect the assistance of the government” in controlling her perpetrator’s actions. Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 998. For example, in In re S-A, the Board found that an applicant was eligible for asylum when she suffered domestic abuse at the hands of her father. In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000). Relying on evidence showing that “in Morocco, domestic violence is commonplace and legal remedies are generally unavailable to women,” and that “‘few women report abuse to authorities’ because the judicial procedure is skewed against them,” the Board held that “even if the respondent had turned to the government for help, Moroccan authorities would have been unable or unwilling to control her father’s conduct.” Id. at 1333, 1335 (quoting Committees on International Relations and Foreign Relations, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997 1538 (Joint Comm. Print 1998)).
Here, both the immigration judge and Board agreed that the beatings, rape, and threats Maria suffered were severe enough to constitute persecution, but that she failed to show that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control Juan. In support of its conclusion,
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the Board noted that the government issued a restraining order against Juan, the mayor fined Juan for beating their daughter, and that Maria and their children were able to remain in their home for the year before she left Guatemala. AR 5, BIA Decision. Maria argues on appeal that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. We agree with her.
Taken as a whole, the record compels the conclusion that Maria cannot “reasonably expect the assistance of the government” in controlling Juan. Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 998. First, the Board’s conclusion that the restraining order effectively controlled Juan is clearly contradicted by the evidence. Maria testified that Juan “did not obey [the restraining order] because there [was] no police” and “[h]e wasn’t afraid” of any consequences, AR 180, Immigration Ct. Tr., and that at some time that year, Juan came to Maria’s home and beat their oldest child with his belt. She further testified that she went to the police station to file a complaint, but the police never investigated the crime. Second, the Board’s conclusion that “the respondent and her children were able to live legally in the family house” for a year does not paint an accurate picture of that year. AR 5, BIA Decision. The year was not a “period of calm,” as the Board characterized it, but rather, a year which affirmed that the Guatemalan government had not effectively gained control over Juan. Id at 5 n.2. Throughout the course of the year, Maria received threats that Juan “was going to kill [her], and if not[,] that he would pay someone to do something.” AR 188, Immigration Ct. Tr. Juan’s girlfriend also “began threatening [Maria] about once a week, yelling at [her] . . . that she and Juan would kill [her] if [she] didn’t move out of the house.” AR 332, I-589 Appl. In May 2014, Juan’s sister told Maria that “Juan had bought a gun and that he planned to kill [Maria].” Id. at 333. The events of that year indicate that the government had not effectively gained control over Juan.
Moreover, that Juan received a fine of approximately $200 for beating up their oldest child (from a judge who no longer works in town, at a courthouse that has since been destroyed) may indicate some willingness of the Guatemalan government to control Juan but it does not indicate its ability to do so. The concurrence points to the restraining order and fine as evidence
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Guatemala is willing to enforce its laws but may not always be successful.4 While the concurrence would emphasize what Guatemala did, it is more important to look at the numerous instances when the government failed to act or even respond as well as the harm the government failed to prevent. The death threats Maria received continued even after Juan was fined. And Juan’s purchasing of a gun—which ultimately led Maria to flee—came after Juan was fined. Moreover, the police failed to respond to Maria’s calls for help on two occasions when Juan came to Maria’s house and threatened her and/or their children. In reviewing this evidence, the immigration court opined that it “would be left to wonder if Juan intended to kill the respondent, the mother of his four children, why would he not have done so.” AR 70, Immigration Ct. Order. But it cannot be that an applicant must wait until she is dead to show her government’s inability to control her perpetrator.
The supplemental evidence regarding Guatemala’s country conditions corroborates that Maria could not “reasonably expect the assistance of the government” in controlling Juan’s actions. Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 998; see In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000). The evidence Maria submitted shows that “[t]he systemic marginalization of indigenous communities . . . continues with no meaningful efforts by the government to overcome it.” AR 285, State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2015—Guatemala. It also indicates that “[i]mpunity for perpetrators remain[s] very high,” AR 255, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016, and that for Mayan indigenous women, there is “increased vulnerability and gender-based violence . . . exacerbated by a weak state apparatus that struggles to implement laws and programming to protect these groups.” AR 274, Guatemala Struggles to Protect Women Against Endemic Violence. Indigenous Mayan women are particularly unable to seek help from the government because they speak a different language from most of the country’s authorities. To be sure, the supplemental material does not indicate no willingness on behalf of the Guatemalan government—indeed, the country has taken some steps to codify laws prohibiting violence against women—but rather, the material reinforces the country’s lack of
4The concurrence’s reference to the enforcement of domestic abuse law violations in this country is both inapt and irrelevant.
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Further, the Board’s conclusion that Maria did not meet her burden of showing that the Guatemalan government was “helpless” relies on a standard that has since been deemed arbitrary and capricious. AR 5, BIA Decision. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that the “complete helplessness” standard is arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, and “not a permissible construction of the persecution requirement.” Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 130 (D.D.C. 2018).
Thus, the Board’s conclusion that Maria did not demonstrate that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control Juan is not supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Zhao, 569 F.3d at 247 (quoting Koulibaly, 541 F.3d at 619). Maria’s testimony about her experiences, corroborated by supplemental evidence of the conditions for indigenous Mayan women in Guatemala, compels a contrary conclusion to that of the Board. See Mandebvu, 755 F.3d at 424. Based on the evidence in the record, Maria could not “reasonably expect the assistance of the government” in controlling Juan’s actions. Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 998. We therefore vacate the Board’s finding that Maria did not show that the government was unable or unwilling to protect her and remand so the agency can reconsider her application consistent with this opinion.
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Thanks to my Round Table colleague Judge Jeffrey Chase for spotting this decision and sending it my way.
And congratulations to Margaret Wong, Esquire, of Cleveland, OH, who represented the respondent so ably before the 6th Circuit. Margaret and the attorneys from her firm appeared before me numerous times during the many years that I was assigned to the Cleveland docket part-time from Arlington, with most of the hearings taking place by televideo.
Senior PartnerMargaret W. Wong & Associates LLC
The BIA’s bogus “helpless standard” came directly from Matter of A-B- — Sessions’s unethical, legally incorrect, and misogynistic attempt to write female domestic violence victims from Central America out of refugee protections as part of his White Nationalist agenda. Judge Gibbons’s opinion found persuasive U.S. District Judge Sullivan’s (D. D.C.) conclusion in Grace v. Whitaker that Sessions’s A-B- atrocity was “arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.”
This further confirms the problems of a politicized and weaponized Immigration Court system controlled by anti-asylum politicos. How many more “Marias” are out there who are arbitrarily denied protection by the Immigration Courts and the BIA, but lack the ability to obtain competent counsel to assist them and/or are not fortunate enough to have a Court of Appeals panel that takes their case seriously, rather than just “deferring” to the BIA? For example, the Fifth Circuit has “tanked” on the A-B- issue. And, today, the Trump regime is being allowed to turn away asylum seekers at the border in violation of law and without any meaningful opportunity whatsoever to present a claim.
Disgraceful as the BIA’s performance was in this case, worse happens every day in the broken Immigration Court system and the abusive, scofflaw enforcement system administered by the Trump regime. And those charged with putting an end to such blatant violations of law and human rights – the Article III Judiciary – have largely shirked their duty to put an end to this unconstitutional, illegal, unethical, and inhumane “bad joke” of a “court system” and to stop the regime’s illegal abrogation of U.S. asylum laws.
Due Process Forever!
PWS
05-19-20