https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-67_n6io.pdf
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. SINENENG-SMITH CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 19–67. Argued February 25, 2020—Decided May 7, 2020
Respondent Evelyn Sineneng-Smith operated an immigration consulting firm in San Jose, California. She assisted clients working without au- thorization in the United States to file applications for a labor certifi- cation program that once provided a path for aliens to adjust to lawful permanent resident status. Sineneng-Smith knew that her clients could not meet the long-passed statutory application-filing deadline, but she nonetheless charged each client over $6,000, netting more than $3.3 million.
Sineneng-Smith was indicted for multiple violations of 8 U. S. C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i). Those provisions make it a federal felony to “encourag[e] or induc[e] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law,” §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), and impose an enhanced penalty if the crime is “done for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain,” §1324(a)(1)(B)(i). In the District Court, she urged that the pro- visions did not cover her conduct, and if they did, they violated the Petition and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment as applied. The District Court rejected her arguments and she was convicted, as relevant here, on two counts under §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i).
Sineneng-Smith essentially repeated the same arguments on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Again she asserted a right under the First Amendment to file administrative applications on her clients’ behalf, and she argued that the statute could not constitutionally be applied to her conduct. Instead of adjudicating the case presented by the par- ties, however, the court named three amici and invited them to brief and argue issues framed by the panel, including a question never raised by Sineneng-Smith: Whether the statute is overbroad under the
2 UNITED STATES v. SINENENG-SMITH Syllabus
First Amendment. In accord with the amici’s arguments, the Ninth Circuit held that §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is unconstitutionally overbroad.
Held: The Ninth Circuit panel’s drastic departure from the principle of party presentation constituted an abuse of discretion.
The Nation’s adversarial adjudication system follows the principle of party presentation. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U. S. 237, 243. “In both civil and criminal cases, . . . we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” Id., at 243.
That principle forecloses the controlling role the Ninth Circuit took on in this case. No extraordinary circumstances justified the panel’s takeover of the appeal. Sineneng-Smith, represented by competent counsel, had raised a vagueness argument and First Amendment arguments homing in on her own conduct, not that of others. Electing not to address the party-presented controversy, the panel projected that §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) might cover a wide swath of protected speech, including abstract advocacy and legal advice. It did so even though Sineneng-Smith’s counsel had presented a contrary theory of the case in her briefs and before the District Court. A court is not hidebound by counsel’s precise arguments, but the Ninth Circuit’s radical trans- formation of this case goes well beyond the pale. On remand, the case is to be reconsidered shorn of the overbreadth inquiry interjected by the appellate panel and bearing a fair resemblance to the case shaped by the parties. Pp. 3–9.
910 F. 3d 461, vacated and remanded.
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion.
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👎Justice Thomas used his concurring opinion as an opportunity to attack the “overbreadth doctrine,” and to solicit future challenges to it, presumably from right-wing advocates and activist conservative judges who agree with him.
It’s interesting how moderate and liberal judges who believe in the Constitution, the rule of law, and standing up for individual rights in the face of government overreach are often forced to deny that they are “activists.” By contrast, right wing judges often make little or no attempt to disguise their activist, often anti-human-rights, “turn back the clock to the bad old days,” agenda and to use their opinions as a forum to critique and solicit challenges to rules of law they don’t like. Often such rules under attack from the judicial right tend to vindicate the rights and humanity of individuals, particularly minorities and other vulnerable individuals, over corporate, government, financial, and other elitist interests.
Additionally, as with Thomas, the the right-wing judicial activists customarily harken back wistfully to a past “golden” age of American Jurisprudence when the exclusively white, male, nearly 100% Christian Supremes were perfectly happy to look the other way and bend the rules to favor ruling elites over African Americans, women, children, the poor, non-Christians, and others who weren’t part of the “ruling elites.” Thomas laments the abandonment of the views and methods of the “18th & 19 century” American judiciary. Most ironically, under those rules and the “world outlook and values” they often embodied, it’s highly unlikely that Thomas himself would have been able to attend Yale, become a Justice, or otherwise be allowed and encouraged to reach his full potential.
Quite contrary to Thomas’s argument, we can’t and shouldn’t take “value judgement” out of judging. Indeed, Thomas’s plea to let the Legislature and the Executive run roughshod over constitutional rights if they choose to do so is, in and of itself, a clear “value judgment” as to what best serves society. Making “value judgments” is at the heart of all judging. That isn’t the problem. No, the real problem is the lack of consistent human (and humane) values, practical experience, and human empathy in too many of today’s Federal Judges, particularly those appointed by Trump and Moscow Mitch.
At least we clearly know what’s coming in the future from the “Trump Judiciary” and their cheerleaders like Thomas. Consequently, it’s critically important that “Democrats and liberals” act accordingly the next time they get control over Federal Judicial appointments.
Due Process Forever!
PWS
05-07-20