"The Voice of the New Due Process Army" ————– Musings on Events in U.S. Immigration Court, Immigration Law, Sports, and Other Random Topics by Retired United States Immigration Judge (Arlington, Virginia) and former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals Paul Wickham Schmidt. To see my complete professional bio, just click on the link below.
Nearly 300 pages into Bob Woodward’s new book, Fear: Trump in the White House, a West Wing aide named Zach Fuentes cautions fellow staffers. With depressingly familiar words, Fuentes informs his colleagues, “He’s not a detail guy. Never put more than one page in front of him. Even if he’ll glance at it, he’s not going to read the whole thing. Make sure you underline or put in bold the main points … you’ll have 30 seconds to talk to him. If you haven’t grabbed his attention, he won’t focus.” Some subjects, such as the military, do engage him, but the overwhelming picture is worrying and dire. Still, one could finish this passage and feel at least slightly relieved that people like Fuentes are aware of the reigning deficiencies in the White House, and doing their best to mitigate them.
Fuentes is merely an assistant to John Kelly, the White House chief of staff, but Kelly and James Mattis, the secretary of defense, are presented throughout Woodward’s book as being cognizant of the president’s extreme limitations and authoritarian instincts, and rather boldly willing to push back against their boss. This is why it’s probably worth mentioning that Fuentes wasn’t talking about Donald Trump; no, he was talking about John Kelly. And Woodward’s book—which arrived at around the same time as the already infamous, still-currently anonymous New York Times op-edabout the men and women in the executive branch supposedly working to protect America from Donald Trump—is as much a portrait of the craven, ineffective, and counterproductive group of “adults” surrounding Trump as it is a more predictable look into the president’s shortcomings. It’s not entirely clear how aware Woodward is of what he has revealed about the people he’s quoting at length. (Sources tend to come off well in his books.) But intentionally or not, Fear will make plain to the last optimist that, just as Republicans in Congress are unlikely to save us, neither are the relative grown-ups in the Trump administration.
Is Woodward the last optimist? He quite obviously believes that Trump is unfit to be president, but a reader can’t quite shake the sense that he somehow thinks maybe, just maybe, things could be different with the right coaching or incentives. Fear is a book full of stories about Trump being contained; his instincts being thwarted; his worst qualities being slightly minimized by people who claim to be afraid of what would happen if they weren’t there. “It’s not what we did for the country,” former Trump economic adviser Gary Cohn says early on. “It’s what we saved him from doing.” Quotes like this aim to settle the ethical debate—which has been going on from the start of the Trump presidency—over whether anyone should be working for a bigoted and corrupt president with no respect for democracy, even if they are planning to, in that most tiresome phrase, contain his worst impulses. But that conversation has obscured the more pressing question of what those supposedly well-intentioned individuals can actually accomplish from the inside. Even allowing for the self-serving nature of the accounts that Woodward offers here, the answer appears to be: not much.
Indeed, the near-misses Woodward writes about feel particularly insubstantial, in part because very few of these aides and appointees seem to really grasp the nature of the man they are serving (no matter how much they talk about his stupidity and recklessness), and in part because Trump himself is so clueless and aimless that he rarely seems to follow through on his worst ideas anyway. (The terrible things he has followed through on, such as various immigration policies, are not really discussed at length, and on these matters a good chunk of his staff appear to agree with him.) Moreover, many of these aides are tasked with—or see their roles as—not preventing policy decisions, but instead as putting the nicest, non-Trumpy face on Trumpism; the ethics of this deserves its own debate.
Fear will make plain to the last optimist that, just as Republicans in Congress are unlikely to save us, neither are the relative grown-ups in the Trump administration.
Perhaps the biggest non-hinge moment in the book occurs in July 2017, six months after Trump has taken office and two years since he emerged as a presidential candidate by offering his thoughts on Mexican rapists. “Mattis and Gary Cohn had several quiet conversations about The Big Problem: The president did not understand the importance of allies overseas, the value of diplomacy or the relationship between the military, the economy, and intelligence partnerships with foreign governments.” The two men decide to meet to “develop an action plan,” which consists of getting the president in the Tank, “the Pentagon’s secure meeting room for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” because it might “focus him.” But when they do, and succeed in telling him about the value of allies and diplomacy, Trump ignores them and proceeds to rant and rave on a variety of subjects. The meeting wraps up after accomplishing precisely nothing. (This is the event that caused Rex Tillerson to call Trump a “fucking moron.”)
What remains astonishing about the meeting is not that Trump is an idiot. It’s that Mattis and Cohn seemed to have hopes for their plan, believing they could use the sit-down to really turn a corner. The book is so full of scenes like this because the people around Trump seem to have less feel for the president than a politically astute person who spends 20 minutes a day reading the newspaper. It’s not that hard to grasp that Trump’s authoritarian leanings condition him to distrust democratic allies; nor is it a secret that he has utter contempt for America’s intelligence agencies. An earlier passage in the book has Mattis telling a NATO-skeptical Trump that, “If you didn’t have NATO, you’d have to invent it” and “there’s no way Russia could win a war if they took on NATO,” which left me wondering if Mattis could have chosen an argument that would be less likely to appeal to the president, and why anyone who has paid even glancing attention to Trump’s behavior toward Russia would think it would be effective.
Woodward conveys all this in his typically matter-of-fact style, with dialogue heavy-scenes, and with his sources sounding reasonable and frustrated. He rarely tips his hand or offers critiques of those who talked to him, but his narrative does allow for them to come across as ill-equipped. Take former national security adviser H.R. McMaster, who Woodward presents as a thoughtful enough guy simply unwilling or unable to contain his pedantic lecturing style, even though it is clearly irking the president. This leads McMaster to get involved in stupid, inevitably doomed spats stemming from Trump’s childishness, including one over precisely where the president and the Indian prime minister will dine that is too dreary to recount. Of course, McMaster doesn’t last long, in large part because of this type of nonsense; meanwhile, he can’t get along with Mattis or Tillerson, two other guys who apparently pride(d) themselves on being the last line of defense. And yet, they do everything they possibly can to undermine McMaster, and make his job more difficult. “McMaster considered Mattis and Tillerson ‘the team of two’ and found himself outside their orbit, which was exactly the way they wanted it,” Woodward writes. Now the national security adviser is John Bolton. Good job, everyone.
The story in the book about Mattis that has gotten the most attention concerns his decision to quietly counter Trump on Syria after the president reportedly screamed “let’s fucking kill him” over the phone about Bashar al-Assad. According to Woodward, Mattis hung up and stated to an aide, “We’re not going to do any of that. We’re going to be much more measured.” A victory for common sense, you might say. A couple pages later, we read that “Trump had stepped back from his initial desire to kill Assad.” But did he step back or just forget? Immediately afterward, Trump asks McMaster for some Syria hypotheticals, which McMaster can’t answer because he is being ignored by Mattis and Tillerson. Thankfully, Woodward concludes, “Trump soon forgot his questions.” It’s certainly possible that Mattis or Tillerson or McMaster stopped Trump from doing something truly terrible or illegal over the past nearly 20 months, but if so we are not told what it was. Despite all the self-aggrandizing quotes from the so-called moderating influences in the White House, the upshot of Woodward’s own reporting is that if we end up riding out this term free of a foreign policy catastrophe, it is more likely to be the result of Trump’s incuriosity and short attention span than a bold act of bravery by one of the grown-ups.
The possible exception is Cohn’s already famous decision to steal a paper from Trump’s desk that would have removed the United States from a trade deal with South Korea, and thus possibly impacted national security by undermining the Washington-Seoul alliance. This at least counts as a staff member taking strong action, although, as Woodward acknowledges, it’s “an administrative coup d’etat,” and neither Woodward nor Cohn (quoted as saying, “got to protect the country”) convincingly show that the stakes were high enough to warrant such a step. Tellingly, and predictably, Trump keeps bringing the pact up but can’t seem to remember that he was just about to pull out of the deal, which makes you wonder if he was really on the verge of doing so.
Photo illustration by Slate. Photo by Michael Kovac/Getty Images for Vanity Fair.
Nevertheless, there is a strong argument to be made that someone like Mattis should stay in his job, and the person who wants to see him resign in protest is braver than I am. But the case to keep working in the Trump administration is much weaker if your job isn’t a matter of life and death, and some of the examples in the book meant to highlight the good deeds of the people around Trump are extremely thin. After Trump’s disgraceful response to Charlottesville, staff secretary Rob Porter apparently cajoled the president into giving a less grotesque speech about what occurred. Porter, who appears to be Woodward’s biggest source and therefore comes across relatively well—his resignation after allegations of domestic abuse is afforded less than a page—“felt it was a moment of victory, of actually doing some good for the country. He had served the president well. This made the endless hours of nonstop work worth it.” Naturally, within a day, Trump had backtracked and surprised precisely no one by making clear that he doesn’t actually have a problem with Nazis, leaving Porter feeling that “Charlottesville was the breaking point” and wondering “if trying to repair [racial divisions] after Charlottesville was almost a lost cause.”
Unless Woodward is winking at readers with that “lost cause” reference, he doesn’t betray any acknowledgement of how absurd Porter’s musings seem, coming as they did years or months after birtherism, blatant bigotry, and a ban on certain Muslims from being allowed to enter the country. Nor does it ever seem to occur to Porter—or Gary Cohn, whose supposedly tortured post-Charlottesville dilemma is afforded considerable space—that Trump is a racist; that he will continue putting into effect racist policies; and that focusing, as the people around Trump do, on ensuring that the words of his speeches are inoffensive is really just a way of helping Trump politically so he can carry out his policies with less opposition.
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Read the rest of Chotiner’s article at the above link.
It’s painfully clear that the white (almost all) men surrounding Trump don’t have much real problem with his overt bigotry, racism, immorality, misogyny, and lawlessness except when revealing it gets in the way of their policies.
After all, it’s important to the country that we have more tax breaks for the rich, less health care for the general populace, dirtier air, polluted rivers and lakes, fewer National monuments, more black lung, reduced worker protections, fewer voters of color, almost no refugees, only white immigrants, more abused children, a generation of young people who are barred from reaching their full potential, dumber schools, religious bigotry and hate speech, homophobia, a subservient, non-professional Civil Service and Foreign Service composed of political hacks, more racial and religious resentment, less free press, etc.
These dudes don’t really want to change the toxic agenda that is destroying our democracy. No, they just want to make sure that Trump’s stunning incompetence and unsuitability for office is mitigated enough that they can carry out their nasty anti-democratic policies without his interference. That’s what passes for “courage” and “true patriotism” in today’s GOP.
The only way to save our republic is to throw every Republican out of office and force the party to either ditch its White Nationalist base or split into two parties — a legitimate conservative opposition party and a far right White Nationalist party.
Trump is the end product of a GOP that just doesn’t believe in 21st Century America as a diverse, multi-racial, multi-cultural nation of immigrants and the strength and power that gives all of us. We need regime change. This November is the time to start that process at the ballot box! Don’t wait until it’s too late!
“A week after President Trump declared his preference for immigrants from places like Norway over various “shithole” countries (that just happen to be majority nonwhite), Congress and the White House are negotiating over keeping the government funded, with immigration as a key issue. Most Democrats only want to do avoid a shutdown if the Dreamers are given legal protections that Trump has sought to remove. In return for offering them protections, Trump wants funding for things like a border wall. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has continued its heightened pace of immigration raids and deportations, and recently declared that it would remove protections from Salvadoran immigrants who had settled in the country.
To discuss the state of play on Capitol Hill, and Trump’s approach to immigration more broadly, I spoke by phone with Jonathan Blitzer, a staff writer at the New Yorker who covers immigration issues. (Earlier this month, he wrote about the presence of the MS-13 gang on Long Island.) During the course of our conversation, which has been edited and condensed for clarity, we discussed how much racism has influenced Trump’s immigration policies, whether tough-on-immigration stances can be counterproductive to halting crime, and if Democrats should compromise on a border wall if it means protecting the Dreamers.
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Essentially in the past, in the last two years of the Obama presidency, DHS created a set of priorities, basically saying to ICE: Look, there’s a huge undocumented immigrant population in the United States. 12 million people. You can’t go after everyone. If you guys are going to be a serious police force and if people aren’t going to live in fear of completely random acts of arrest and deportations, you have to prioritize people with criminal records. You have to prioritize people who could be viewed as constituting a public safety threat. The new administration immediately canceled those priorities, which pretty much means there are actually no guidelines for how ICE now goes about its business.
In one sense, that suits the MO of the administration, which is almost total randomness. There really isn’t a kind of thoroughgoing vision of what immigration enforcement looks like. In fact, if you think thematically, the administration is doing things that in some ways undermine the president’s very public statements about how concerned he is with the growing undocumented population in the U.S.
How so?
Just talking about the Salvadoran population, you’re talking about 200,000 people. Those people aren’t just going to leave after two decades here because the administration has now removed this legal protection for them. You are going to see the undocumented community grow in the United States under the Trump administration.
What’s more, arrests are up, right? So the statistics I’ve seen are that ICE arrests have gone up by something like 40 percent, and a significant number of those are people who did not have criminal records. There’s an enormous backlog in immigration courts, a backlog of over 600,000 cases, which means that you actually can’t process all the people who are being arrested. In fact, if you were thinking about this all rationally, [the arrests] would be counterproductive.
One thing your colleague Sarah Stillman mentions in her piece in last week’s issue of the New Yorker is that immigrants are not reporting crime. The drops in major cities are staggering. In Arlington, Virginia, for example, according to Stillman, “domestic-assault reports in one Hispanic neighborhood dropped more than eighty-five per cent in the first eight months after Trump’s Inauguration, compared with the same period the previous year. Reports of rape and sexual assault fell seventy-five per cent.” You would think that as an administration that talks about being tough on crime that this would be a huge problem, but it isn’t to them.
One hundred percent agreed. It’s counterproductive in almost every sense. You don’t even need to go to the bleeding-heart liberals for confirmation of this. You talk to police, you talk to sheriffs, and a lot of them are actually quite concerned about what this means for public safety and how they do their police work. Victims aren’t coming forward.
In some of the work that I’ve done on Long Island, MS-13 has been basically an obsession with this administration, and in every instance, the way the administration has gone about trying to combat the gang problem has backfired and has resulted in communities being a lot less safe than they otherwise would have been.
What specifically?
What’s happening on Long Island—and I think it’s fair to say this is happening elsewhere where MS-13’s been active—what ICE and local law enforcement have started to do is they’ve been so indiscriminate in who they’re arresting for suspected gang associations that they’re actually arresting a lot of people who are the victims of gang crime. I mean, you look at some of these communities, the victims and the perpetrators live side-by-side in these tiny hamlets. They go to the same schools. They work the same jobs. The idea of arresting anyone who has this kind of peripheral association with the gang is nonsensical.
There’s some racial profiling going on on Long Island, and this is exactly the stuff that you’re describing, the fears that people have. I mean you have victims of crimes who are scared to come forward because when they talk to the police, they know police are talking to ICE and the next thing they know, they’ll either end up in detention or family members will end up in detention.
“It’s counterproductive in almost every sense. You don’t even need to go to the bleeding-heart liberals for confirmation ofthis.”— Jonathan Blitzer
What would be a more proper approach to MS-13? It seems like a tough issue for Democrats.
The proper approach from a law enforcement and community-building standpoint is to invest more money in after school programs. It sounds like sort of milquetoast policy, but you talk to experts on this, you talk to former gang members and community organizers and all of them, all of them are aligned in stressing the importance of just basically providing some sense of community for kids who live in these immigrant communities who often have come fleeing gang violence in Central America who have essentially nowhere else to turn. They go to schools. They don’t speak the language. There aren’t after school programs. They don’t have counseling. Some of them have undergone intense trauma. They’re easy marks for a gang that recruits people who feel isolated and socially marginalized. Oftentimes what happens is they join up on the U.S. side and not on the Central American side, precisely because they feel exposed here.
But that’s not an easy sell. I think Democrats are in a tough spot on that and I think that’s one of the reasons why the Republicans have really tried to link MS-13 to this kind of nationwide attack on sanctuary cities. It’s all playing on these fears and rhetorically, I think for the most part has been pretty successful for Republicans.
If you put aside for a minute America’s role in helping immiserate El Salvador, going back many years to our support for very bad people during their civil war, what would you tell American citizens about taking in immigrants who might be likely to end up in gangs like this?
I don’t think they are so likely to end up in gangs. I think that’s one of the first things that the administration trades on: playing up the idea that all of these kids who arrive here are somehow threats. A tiny, tiny minority of unaccompanied kids who show up in the U.S. end up joining these gangs. The vast majority, the overwhelming majority of them have no gang affiliation, want nothing to do with the gangs, and if given the opportunity here, thrive.
The argument for why we should be more open to them is the same argument that I would make about U.S. refugee policies generally. It is a mark of American moral and political leadership. It actually affects our policies and our foreign policy weight in these regions. The United States has supported all kinds of horrifying political regimes in Central America, but even leaving that political history aside, the gang problem in Central America is the direct outgrowth of U.S. deportation policy. It’s a literal shift. It’s not even a manner of speaking.
Mass deportation creates instability. It’s just going to continue to create a refugee crisis. I mean this crisis is just the continuation of a decades-long trend. We sometimes look the other way, which sometimes is contributing directly to the violence in these regions and then people basically having no other move than to try to move north.
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Read the complete interview at the link.
As I have been saying, Trump, Sessions, Miller, Homan, & Co. have little or no interest in effective law enforcement. Anything but!
Indeed, as this article points out, and as I have said in the past, truly effective, legitimate law enforcement would involve securing the trust of the Hispanic communities and separating real law enforcement targets — serious criminals and terrorists — from the vast, vast bulk of the undocumented population who are residing peacefully and productively in the U.S. In addition to exercising “PD” for the latter, effective law enforcement would involve putting forth a “no strings attached” proposal to give these folks legal status and work authorization in the U.S., preferably with, but even without, a “path to citizenship.”
No, with the Trumpsters, it’s all about White Nationalism, racism, and the quest to create a false link between Hispanics, crime, and loss of American jobs (conveniently forgetting that we’re now basically at “full employment” in the U.S. and that without undocumented workers our economy would likely be contracting rather than continuing to expand). As a result, ICE is becoming a “bad joke” in the legitimate law enforcement community and an anathema to people almost everywhere. In a democracy (which Trump, Sessions, et al don’t really want) law enforcement can’t operate effectively without a certain amount of mutual trust and respect from the community.
