⚖️ DISSENTING OPINION: Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge Denise G. Brown Says “No” To Colleagues “Go Along To Get Along” With DHS Enforcement Approach To Chevron In Latest “Crime of Violence” Precedent:  Matter of POUGATCHEV, 28 I&N Dec. 719 (BIA 2023)

Scales of Justice
The BIA’s approach to statutory interpretation under Chevron tends to be one-sided in favor of DHS Enforcement.
IMAGE: Wikimedia Commons

BIA HEADNOTE:

(1) A conviction for burglary of a building under section 140.25(1)(d) of the New York Penal Law is not categorically an aggravated felony burglary offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2018), because the statute is overbroad and indivisible with respect to the definition of “building” under New York law.

(2) A conviction for displaying what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, or other firearm while committing burglary under section 140.25(1)(d) of the New York Penal Law necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another and therefore constitutes an aggravated felony crime of violence under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Yuriy Pereyaslavskiy, Esquire, Albany, New York

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Donald W. Cassidy, Associate Legal Advisor

BEFORE: Board Panel: GOODWIN and WILSON, Appellate Immigration Judges. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: BROWN, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.

GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge [majority opinion]

Judge Brown’s Dissent:

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: Denise G. Brown, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge

I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that holds that second degree burglary under section 140.25(1)(d) of the New York Penal Law is categorically an aggravated felony crime of violence under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2018). As an initial matter, I have reservations that this case is an appropriate means through which to establish binding precedent on this issue as the Immigration Judge did not reach it. While the parties have had an opportunity to address the issue through supplemental briefing, we lack the benefit of the Immigration Judge’s reasoning. It is our role to “review” questions of law de novo, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2023), but there is no underlying decision regarding whether the respondent was convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence for us to review here.

Further, I disagree with the majority’s analysis by which it concludes that a violation of section 140.25(1)(d) of the New York Penal Law is categorically a crime of violence. Section 140.25(1)(d) provides that a person is guilty of burglary in the second degree:

when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein, and when

. . . [i]n effecting entry or while in the building or in immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime

. . . [d]isplays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm . . . .

N.Y. Penal Law § 140.25(1)(d) (McKinney 2017). A crime of violence under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), is “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2018).

I disagree with the majority that second degree burglary under section 140.25(1)(d) includes as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person. In my view, second degree burglary under section 140.25(1)(d) does not include any element that requires the presence of a person other than the defendant. In the absence of an element that requires the presence of a person, the majority’s conclusion that this offense is a crime of violence is unavailing. See Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1825 (2021) (“The phrase ‘against another,’ when modifying the ‘use of force,’ demands that the perpetrator direct his action at, or target, another individual.”).

The majority’s analysis heavily relies on case law involving robbery to support its conclusion that second degree burglary under this subsection is a crime of violence. But under New York law, robbery always involves forcible stealing from a person and burglary does not. In United States v. Ojeda, 951 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2020), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that it was possible to commit New York first degree robbery with the aggravating factor of the display of an

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apparent weapon without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The court held that the defendant’s argument ignored the foundational element being aggravated, i.e., forcible stealing, which is defined in New York to include the use or threatened immediate use of physical force upon another person. Id. at 72. Forcible stealing is an element for every degree of robbery in New York and “that element categorically requires the use of physical force.” Id. Thus, New York robbery always includes as an element the use or threatened use of physical force against another person, regardless of whether an apparent weapon is displayed. Accordingly, the New York robbery statutes are distinguishable from the burglary statute at issue here, and thus the case law relied upon by the majority relating to robbery is not persuasive in this context. For the same reason, the case law cited by the majority relating to assault is likewise unpersuasive.

The majority also relies on the definition of “display” in the New York model jury instructions to conclude that a display of an apparent weapon must be in front of a person. The majority concludes that “display” in the context of section 140.25(1)(d) necessarily means a conscious display of an apparent weapon to a victim. “Display” as described by the model jury instructions does not constitute the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person because, as the Supreme Court explained in Borden, “against the person of another” means “in opposition to” and expresses “a kind of directedness or targeting” rather than being akin to “waves crashing against the shore.” Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1825–26. However, the language of the model jury instructions—i.e., describing display to be “manifest[ing] the presence of an object that can reasonably be perceived” as a weapon—does not require the type of directedness or targeting described in Borden. N.Y. Crim. Jury Instr. & Model Colloquies, Penal Law § 140.25(1)(d) (May 2018). The language instead appears to contemplate that a person be “the mere recipient” of the display. Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1826.

Even if the majority’s conclusion were correct that display of an apparent weapon necessarily contemplates the presence of a person to perceive it and that it necessarily involved conduct directed at another person as contemplated by Borden—a conclusion not supported by the actual language of section 140.25(1)(d)—there is nothing in the statute that requires the person perceiving the display to be the victim of the crime, rather than a bystander or another defendant.

The majority’s conclusion that an offense under section 140.25(1)(d) is categorically a crime of violence also assumes that the crime a defendant intends to commit is necessarily a “confrontational crime.” But there is nothing in the statute that connects the display of an apparent weapon with

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the crime the defendant has “intent to commit [in the building],” and thus nothing in the statute that requires the crime a defendant has “intent to commit [in the building]” to be a confrontational crime, as the majority concludes. N.Y. Penal Law § 140.25.

For these reasons, I am not persuaded by the majority’s conclusion that an offense under section 140.25(1)(d) of the New York Penal Law is categorically a crime of violence. I would instead conclude that it is not and that therefore the respondent is not removable as charged.

******************************

Thanks for speaking out, Judge Brown, against the BIA’s one-sided approach to statutory interpretation that almost always favors DHS over better and more reasonable interpretations offered by individuals. Then, the Article III Courts compound the problem by giving Chevron deference” to the BIA’s one-sided jurisprudence! 

Dissent matters!

Here’s Judge Brown’s official EOIR bio:

Denise G. Brown

Attorney General Merrick B. Garland appointed Denise G. Brown as a temporary Appellate Immigration Judge in July 2021. Judge Brown earned a Bachelor of Arts in 1992 from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and a Juris Doctor in 1995 from the Catholic University of America. From July 2007 to July 2021, she has served as an attorney advisor, Board of Immigration Appeals, Executive Office for Immigration Review. During this time, from March to September 2019, she served on detail as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Virginia, and from January to July 2017, she served on detail as a temporary Immigration Judge at the Headquarters Immigration Court, EOIR. From December 1999 to July 2007, she served as an Associate General Counsel at the Office of General Counsel, Department of the Air Force. Judge Brown is a member of the District of Columbia Bar.

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-27-23

🤯JUDGE ANNE GREER’S “PLAIN LANGUAGE” DISSENT GETS LAW RIGHT, BUT DROWNED OUT BY PRO-DHS TRUMP HOLDOVERS! 🤬 — Matter of M-M-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 494 (BIA 2022) — At DHS “Partner’s” Request, BIA Wrongly Restricts IJ’s Independent Discretion To Do Justice!👎🏽

Kangaroos
“Oh, Great and Exalted Masters at DHS Enforcement, how high would you like your humble servants here at the BIA to jump?” 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/rasputin243/
Creative Commons License

 

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1482556/download

Matter of M-M-A-, Respondent

Decided March 11, 2022

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

When the Department of Homeland Security raises the mandatory bar for filing a frivolous asylum application under section 208(d)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2018), an Immigration Judge must make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law on whether the requirements for a frivolousness determination under Matter of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 2007), have been met.

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Elias Z. Shamieh, Esquire, San Francisco, California

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Jennifer L. Castro, Assistant Chief Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: WILSON and GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judges. Dissenting Opinion: GREER, Appellate Immigration Judge.

WILSON, Appellate Immigration Judge: [Opinion]

For those interested in what the law actually says (clearly an “endangered minority” @ Garland’s BIA), here’s key language from Judge Greer’s dissent:

In my view, when an Immigration Judge elects to undertake the analysis set forth in our precedent under Matter of Y-L-, either independently or at the request of the DHS, and determines that the application is frivolous, then the plain statutory language requires the entry of a frivolousness finding as part of the Immigration Judge’s decision. But whether the Immigration Judge must conduct that analysis in the first place because the DHS requests it is a different question. This key distinction was recognized by the Second Circuit in stating that Immigration Judges “regularly exercise discretion when deciding whether to initiate a frivolousness inquiry.” Mei Juan Zheng, 672 F.3d at 186.

Requiring the adjudicator, either independently or at the request of the DHS, to engage in this analysis because the respondent made a material misrepresentation upends current practice by creating a rigid structure not mandated by statute. It equates adverse credibility with frivolousness, which I view as conflicting with the case law. It also removes discretion from the Immigration Judge and transfers it to the DHS. Accordingly, the majority’s interpretation constitutes an unwarranted expansion of the frivolousness provisions.

Although the majority casts this question in terms of whether an Immigration Judge may “ignore” a mandatory bar to asylum, the question is whether the Immigration Judge has the authority to make a judgment about pursuing a frivolousness inquiry. This Immigration Judge did not ignore a request from DHS to consider frivolousness. Rather, she entertained it and made an independent judgment not to proceed based on particular facts and circumstances in this case after deliberation. As discussed, the DHS did not question the judgment she made, which is a critical distinction; rather the DHS questions the ability of the Immigration Judge to make this judgment at all.2

I interpret the language and structure of the statute and development of relevant case law, combined with the sequencing of the frivolousness inquiry and its consequences, to demonstrate the discretionary nature of the frivolousness inquiry. And, absent any challenge to how the Immigration Judge exercised her discretion in this case, which I consider to have been waived, I would dismiss the appeal.

2 The relevant factors for the Immigration Judge to assess in making a threshold determination whether to invoke the frivolousness inquiry are a separate issue not implicated by the posture of this case.

*********************

BIA to IJs: “When our overlords @ DHS tell you to jump, your duty is to say ‘how high, my masters!’”

Under Garland, the “Miller Lite Holdover BIA” continues to pile up some really wrong, one-sided, and poorly-reasoned decisions that intentionally skew the law against migrants and adversely affect human lives. Decisions that punctuate Judge Joan Churchill’s call for an independent Article I Immigration Judiciary. In an article I posted yesterday, Joan argued persuasively that that EOIR never had true quasi-judicial independence.  Decisions like this illustrate her point. https://immigrationcourtside.com/2022/03/12/%e2%9a%96%ef%b8%8f%f0%9f%91%a9%f0%9f%8f%bb%e2%9a%96%ef%b8%8f%f0%9f%91%a9%f0%9f%8f%be%e2%9a%96%ef%b8%8f%f0%9f%97%bdfeature-the-latest-issue-of-the-abas-judges/

Here, a correct (basically, uncontested on the merits, as Judge Greer points out) grant of a waiver was reversed just because DHS wanted “control” over the judges. “How dare a ‘mere employee’ of the AG exercise discretion in the face of the ICE ACC’s demand? Do these guys think they are ‘real’ judges? Let’s tell our buddy Merrick to get his toadies back in line like they were under Sessions and Barr!” How does the “holdover” BIA’s steady stream of incorrect decisions, institutionalized bias, and “worst practices” advance justice? 

The “Biden-Era BIA” is building a legacy of bad law, poor judging, and unnecessarily broken lives. Not exactly what the Biden Administration promised during the election! And, it goes without saying that requiring a fact-heavy “full Y-L- analysis” at the unilateral demand of the DHS will increase the backlog as Garland “shoots for 2 million” in his dysfunctional and chronically misdirected “courts.”

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

03-13-22

 

⚖️9TH PANEL LETS IT ALL HANG OUT ON IMMIGRATION CASE — Goulart v. Garland

 

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/11/18/19-72007.pdf

From the dissent by U.S. District Judge Edward R.  Korman, EDNY, sitting by designation:

Goulart is not a sympathetic character. I can understand the desire to remove convicted burglars from this country. Indeed, Judge VanDyke questions why I have bothered to “champion” the cause of a convicted burglar. The answer should be obvious. The judicial oath, which was adopted in the Judiciary Act of 1789, requires us to “administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich.” See 1 Stat. 73, 76 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 453). We take such an oath, which derives from biblical teachings, see Deuteronomy 1:17, so as not to be blinded by our like or dislike of the parties. We are not called to decide whether Goulart is a good person, but rather whether a person who has been banished from the United States without legal justification should be permitted to seek to return. The Supreme Court has held that the precise statute under which Goulart was deported violates the Constitution. Principles of law and equity require that he be permitted to move for reconsideration in this case. I respectfully dissent.

***********************

Wow! Three opinions on a three-judge panel! Been there, done that! Reminds me of my long gone days on the “Schmidt BIA” when we all took our jobs seriously, even if it often didn’t result in “fake unanimity” (the watchword of today’s dysfunctional BIA).

For those who like to apply “ideological analysis” to Article III decisions, this one doesn’t “fit the mold:”

Judge Richard A. Paez (“majority” opinion) is a Clinton appointee.

Judge Lawrence VanDyke (concurring opinion) is a Trump appointee.

Judge Edward R. Korman (dissenting opinion) is a Reagan appointee.

That being said, the majority’s rationale that a deported respondent should have been a “legal clairvoyant,” predicting the eventual Supreme Court decision finding the statute under which he was convicted unconstitutional, is a piece of absurdist legal sophistry. Wonder what the result might have been if the panel majority didn’t look at him as an “alien bank robber,” not deserving of fair treatment or legal rights? Reminds me of what my former “boss” the late “Iron Mike” Inman used to yell at me during heated arguments at the “Legacy INS OGC:” “What did they teach you at that law school!”

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

11-20-21

 

⚖️🗽🇺🇸👨🏻‍⚖️👩‍⚖️NEVER TOO LATE: 22 YEARS AGO, FIVE OF US DISSENTED FROM THE BIA’S “ROLLOVER” TO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE “JOSEPH II” BOND CASE — Four Of Us Were “Exiled” For Our Views — Now, The 3rd Circuit Says We Were Right! — Gayle v. Warden!

Kangaroos
There was a time in the distant past when all BIA judges were not required to be members of the pro-immigration enforcement “mob!” 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/rasputin243/
Creative Commons License.

 

Dan Kowalski reports for LexisNexis Immigration Community:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca3-on-mandatory-detention-gayle-v-warden

CA3 on Mandatory Detention: Gayle v. Warden

Gayle v. Warden

“Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the Government must detain noncitizens who are removable because they committed certain specified offenses or have connections with terrorism, and it must hold them without bond pending their removal proceedings. This appeal asks us to decide what process is due when such detainees contend that they are not properly included within § 1226(c) and whether noncitizens who have substantial defenses to removal on the merits may be detained under § 1226(c). Because the District Court granted relief in the form of a class-wide injunction, we must also decide whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) permits class-wide injunctive relief. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the District Court that § 1226(c) is constitutional even as applied to noncitizens who have substantial defenses to removal. But for those detainees who contend that they are not properly included within § 1226(c) and are therefore entitled to a hearing pursuant to In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999), we hold that the Government has the burden to establish the applicability of § 1226(c) by a preponderance of the evidence and that the Government must make available a contemporaneous record of the hearing, consisting of an audio recording, a transcript, or their functional equivalent. Because we also conclude that § 1252(f)(1) does not authorize class-wide injunctions, we will reverse the District Court’s order in part, affirm in part, and remand for the entry of appropriate relief.”

******************

As as interesting footnote, like most of my colleagues at the Arlington Immigration Court, I always recorded bond hearings, long before this court ordered it as required by due process. One of the first things one of my colleagues told me when I arrived at Arlington was “record everything that happens in open court.” Recording protects everyone in the courtroom, including the judge!

It also helped our Judicial Law Clerks and interns “reconstruct” the bond record and understand our reasoning in the infrequent event that a “bond appeal” were filed. Otherwise, the “bond memorandum” would have to be based on the IJ’s notes and his or her recollection of what had transpired.

Talk about a defective system that should have been changed ages ago! But, that’s EOIR! And, it’s not going to improve without some major personnel changes and dynamic leadership that actually understands what happens in Immigration Court and is willing to think creatively, progressively, and change long-outdated practices and procedures, many of them in effect since EOIR was created in the early 1980s!

Here’s my favorite quote from Judge Krause’s opinion:

Having considered the standards urged by the Government and by Plaintiffs, we settle on one in between: To comport with due process, the Government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the detainee is properly included within § 1226(c) as both a factual and a legal matter. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 423–24. It must show, in other words, that it is more likely than not both that the detainee in fact committed a relevant offense under § 1226(c) and that the offense falls within that provision as a matter of law. Cf. Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 809 (Schmidt, Chairman, dissenting) (contending that the Government must “demonstrate[] a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge” at the Joseph hearing).

Here’s a link to the full opinion, including my separate opinion, in Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999) (Joseph II):

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/07/25/3398.pdf

Here’s the full text of my concurring/dissenting opinion (very “compact,” if I do say so myself):

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman; in which Fred W. Vacca, Gustavo D. Villageliu, Lory D. Rosenberg, and John Guendelsberger, Board Members, joined

I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

I join entirely in the majority’s rejection of the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s appellate arguments and in the unanimous conclusion that, on this record, the Service is substantially unlikely to prevail on the merits of the aggravated felony charge. Therefore, I agree that the respondent is not properly included in the category of aliens subject to mandatory detention for bond or custody purposes.

However, I do not share the majority’s view that the proper standard in a mandatory detention case involving a lawful permanent resident alien is that the Service is “substantially unlikely to prevail” on its charge. Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 3398, at 10 (BIA 1999). Rather, the standard in a case such as the one before us should be whether the Service has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge that the respondent is removable because of an aggravated felony.

Mandatory detention of a lawful permanent resident alien is a drastic step that implicates constitutionally-protected liberty interests. Where the lawful permanent resident respondent has made a colorable showing in cus- tody proceedings that he or she is not subject to mandatory detention, the Service should be required to show a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge to continue mandatory detention. To enable the Immigration Judge to make the necessary independent determination in such a case, the Service should provide evidence of the applicable state or federal law under which the respondent was convicted and whatever proof of conviction that is available at the time of the Immigration Judge’s inquiry.

The majority’s enunciated standard of “substantially unlikely to prevail” is inappropriately deferential to the Service, the prosecutor in this matter. Requiring the Service to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge would not unduly burden the Service and would give more appropriate weight to the liberty interests of the lawful permanent res- ident alien. Such a standard also would provide more “genuine life to the regulation that allows for an Immigration Judge’s reexamination of this issue,” as referenced by the majority. Matter of Joseph, supra, at 10.

The Service’s failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits would not result in the release of a lawful permanent resident who poses a threat to society. Continued custody of such an alien would still be war- ranted under the discretionary criteria for detention.

In conclusion, mandatory detention should not be authorized where the Service has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its charge. Consequently, while I am in complete agreement with the decision to release this lawful permanent resident alien, and I agree fully that the Service is substantially unlikely to prevail on the merits of this aggravated felony charge, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s enunciation of “substantially unlikely to prevail” as the standard to be applied in all future cases involving mandatory detention of lawful permanent resident aliens.

“Pushback” from appellate judges actually committed to the then-EOIR vision of “guaranteeing fairness and due process for all,” was essential! Once the “Ashcroft purge” “dumbed down” the BIA and discouraged dissent and intellectual accountability, the system precipitously tanked! It got so bad that it actually provoked harsh criticism and objections from Circuit Judges across the political/ideological spectrum.

Eventually the Bush II DOJ was forced to back off a few steps from their all-out assault on immigrants’ rights. But, the damage was done, and there were no meaningful attempts to restore balance and quasi-judicial independence at EOIR thereafter. Indeed, Ashcroft’s Bush-era successors blamed the Immigration Judges for the meltdown engineered by Ashcroft,  while sweeping their own role in creating “disorder in the courts” under the carpet in the best bureaucratic tradition!

EOIR continued to languish under Obama before going into a complete “death spiral” under the Trump DOJ kakistocracy.

Despite unanimous recommendations from experts that he make progressive reform and major leadership and personnel changes at EOIR one of his highest priorities, AG Garland has allowed the mess and the fatal absence of progressive, due-process-focused, expert judges and best practices at EOIR fester.

Long-deposed progressive judges willing to speak up for due process and fundamental fairness, even in the face of a “go along to get along” culture at DOJ, are still making their voices heard, even decades after they were sent packing! It’s tragic that Garland is letting the opportunity to create a long-overdue and necessary independent progressive judiciary at EOIR slip through his fingers. Progressive Dems might “dream” of transforming the Article III Judiciary; but, it’s not going to happen while Dems are running a “regressive judiciary” at the “retail level” in the one potentially powerful judiciary they do completely control.

Sadly, vulnerable individuals, many of them women, children, and people of color, will continue to suffer the brunt of Garland’s indifferent approach to judicial justice at EOIR. Beyond that, however, his failure to transform EOIR into an independent progressive court system willing to stand up for constitutional due process, equal justice, racial equity, best judicial practices, and the rule of law undermines democracy and diminishes the rights of everyone in America!

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

09-08-21

⚖️OF NOTE: Individual Wins Appeal, Gets Positive Guidance From Garland’s BIA! –  Matter of S-L-H- & L-B-L-, 28 I&N Dec. 318 (BIA 2021)!

The Board of Immigration Appeals has issued a decision in Matter of S-L-H- & L-B-L-, 28 I&N Dec. 318 (BIA 2021).

(1) Immigration Judges may exercise their discretion to rescind an in absentia removal order and grant reopening where an alien has established through corroborating evidence that his or her late arrival at a removal hearing was due to “exceptional circumstances” under section 240(e)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1) (2018), and, in doing so, should consider factors such as the extent of the alien’s tardiness, whether the reasons for the alien’s tardiness are appropriately exceptional, and any other relevant factors in the totality of the circumstances.

(2) Corroborating evidence may include, but is not limited to, affidavits, traffic and weather reports, medical records, verification of the alien’s arrival time at the courtroom, and other documentation verifying the cause of the late arrival; however, general statements—without corroborative evidence documenting the cause of the tardiness—are insufficient to establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant reopening removal proceedings. Matter of S-A-, 21 I&N Dec. 1050 (BIA 1997), reaffirmed and clarified.

PANEL:  GREER, O’CONNOR, and GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judges.

OPINION:  Judge Deborah K.  Goodwin

*****************************

Interesting points:

1) This case “clarifies and reaffirms” Matter of S-A-, 21 I&N Dec. 1050 (BIA 1997) a “Schmidt Board” en banc precedent written by Judge Gerry Hurwitz. My Round Table colleague Judge Lory Rosenberg and I dissented. Here is my dissent:

DISSENTING OPINION: Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman

I respectfully dissent.

On appeal from the denial of his motion to reopen in absentia exclusion proceedings, the applicant has submitted an affidavit stating that the

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Interim Decision #3331

Interim Decision #3331

information furnished in support of his earlier motion to reopen on notice grounds was not authorized by him. I would not reject this contention and find the applicant, in effect, incredible by reason of inconsistent statements without giving him an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing on the truth of his contention that he did not authorize the inconsistent representations contained in his earlier motion. Cf. Arrieta v. INS, 117 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding remand appropriate to give the respondent an opportunity to provide evidentiary support for statements made in an affidavit accompanying a motion to reopen).

In his first motion to reopen and on appeal, the applicant, who lives a distance of several hours from the Immigration Court, claims that he was 20-30 minutes late for his hearing because of traffic congestion. If this were in fact the case, the interests of justice and the statutory purpose of providing fair hearings to aliens before removing them from the United States would have been better served by the Immigration Judge exercising his available discretion to hear the case at another time during the day. See Romano-Morales v. INS, 25 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 1994)(stating that rules regarding in absentia hearings should be carefully applied to avoid conflict with statutory or constitu- tional rights); Matter of W-F-, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996) (stating that notwithstanding rules governing in absentia hearings, an Immigration Judge retains authority to excuse presence, grant a continuance, or change venue). I am not necessarily convinced that every incidence of tardiness must be treated as an “absence” from the hearing.

I therefore dissent from the decision to dismiss the applicant’s appeal.

Perhaps, in disavowing a “per se” rule on traffic delays, referring to the “totality of the circumstances,” and setting forth some useful criteria to guide practitioners, the panel at least “inched” toward the position Lory and I articulated in our respective 1997 dissents.

2) The “prevailing attorney” in this case, Farhad B. Sethna, Esquire, Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, was a “regular” before the Arlington Immigration Judges during the years we were responsible for the Cleveland, Ohio docket.

 

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

 

PWS

06-30-21

 

 

 

 

 

SPLIT BIA SPEAKS ON “WAVE THROUGH” – “PLAIN MEANING” APPLIES EXCEPT WHEN IT FAVORS THE RESPONDENT – JUDGE ROGER PAULEY, DISSENTING, APPEARS TO GET IT RIGHT! — MATTER OF CASTILLO ANGULO, 27 I&N DEC. 194 (BIA 2018)

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Matter of Castillo Angulo, 27 I&N Dec. 194 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

“(1) In removal proceedings arising within the jurisdiction of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, an alien who was “waved through” a port of entry has established an admission “in any status” within the meaning of section 240A(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) (2012). Tula-Rubio v. Lynch, 787 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2015), and Saldivar v. Sessions, 877 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2017), followed in jurisdiction only.

(2) In removal proceedings arising outside the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, to establish continuous residence in the United States for 7 years after having been “admitted in any status” under section 240A(a)(2), an alien must prove that he or she possessed some form of lawful immigration status at the time of admission.”

BIA PANEL:  Appellate Immigration Judges Greer, O’Connor, & Pauley

OPINION BY: Judge Blair O’Connor

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Roger A. Pauley

KEY QUOTE FROM DISSENT:

“I concur in the result, which the majority only reaches because it acknowledges that the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Saldivar v. Sessions, 877 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2017), which holds that a wave through constitutes an “admission in any status” for purposes of section 240A(a)(2) of the Act, is binding on the Board since this case arises in that circuit. However, unlike the majority, I conclude that both the Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, whose similar holding in Tula-Rubio v. Lynch, 787 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit followed, arrived at the correct result, even though, like the majority, I disagree with some aspects of those courts’ reasoning.

. . . .

I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion otherwise and would find that, in any circuit, an alien is eligible to seek cancellation of removal if he or she establishes an admission via a wave through, even if the alien cannot demonstrate the particular lawful status under which admission was authorized, and even if it is later found that he or she had no lawful status at that time.”

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Gee, to me, “any status” means “any” status. But, hey, I’m just an old retired trial judge who in ancient time was Chair of the BIA. What would I know about “modern” concepts of statutory interpretation at the BIA?

For a quasi-judicial body that 1) often gets carried away with obtuse linguistic analysis, and 2) claims to see its role as maintaining nationwide consistency, it seems odd that the BIA has gone out of its way to a) rewrite the statute to its own liking, and 2) create a Circuit conflict where none previously existed.

The best way of understanding it is probably “doing what’s necessary to get to ‘no” for respondents not fortunate enough to be in the 9th or 5th Circuits.

My compliments to Judge Pauley for 1) having the backbone, and 2) caring enough to file a separate opinion that better follows the statutory language, produces a much better practical result, and, not surprisingly,  is much closer to what the only Article III Courts to address this particular issue already have decided.

PWS

01-30-18

 

Five Circuit Judges Dissent From 9th Circuit’s Decision Not To Vacate The Panel Decision In State of Washington v. Trump On Travel Ban 1.0!

Judge Bybee writing for the dissenters:

“Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (Motions Panel–February 9, 2017)
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

MAR 15 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

BYBEE, Circuit Judge, with whom KOZINSKI, CALLAHAN, BEA, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting from the denial of reconsideration en banc.

I regret that we did not decide to reconsider this case en banc for the purpose of vacating the panel’s opinion. We have an obligation to correct our own errors, particularly when those errors so confound Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent that neither we nor our district courts will know what law to apply in the future.

The Executive Order of January 27, 2017, suspending the entry of certain aliens, was authorized by statute, and presidents have frequently exercised that authority through executive orders and presidential proclamations. Whatever we, as individuals, may feel about the President or the Executive Order,1 the President’s decision was well within the powers of the presidency, and “[t]he wisdom of the policy choices made by [the President] is not a matter for our consideration.” Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 165 (1993).

1 Our personal views are of no consequence. I note this only to emphasize that I have written this dissent to defend an important constitutional principle—that the political branches, informed by foreign affairs and national security considerations, control immigration subject to limited judicial review—and not to defend the administration’s policy.

This is not to say that presidential immigration policy concerning the entry of aliens at the border is immune from judicial review, only that our review is limited by Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)—and the panel held that limitation inapplicable. I dissent from our failure to correct the panel’s manifest error.”

Read Judge Bybee’s full dissent here:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2017/03/15/17-35105 en banc.pdf

 

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I had speculated at the time a Judge of the 9th Circuit requested a vote on rehearing en banc that it was part of a strategy not intended to actually force such review, but rather to give those Judges who disagreed with the 3-Judge panel a chance to publicly express dissenting views.  This dissent will be published.

Nevertheless, with only five of the 29 or so active Judges on the 9th Circuit joining Judge Bybee’s dissent, the prospect for the Administration obtaining any relief there from the TRO in State of Hawaii v. Trump enjoining Travel Ban 2.0 appears dim.

Notwithstanding President Trump’s claim that he will litigate Travel Ban 2.0 to the Supreme Court, that might not be so easy, particularly for the foreseeable future. The Supreme Court is not obligated to take any case just because the President wishes it.  The Court has discretion.

In exercising that discretion (known as a “petition for certiorari”) the Court generally does not like to intervene at the TRO or Preliminary Injunction stage, before a full record is developed. Also, the current eight member configuration, presenting the possibility of a tie vote, makes it less likely that the Court would take the case now.

And, one of the reasons for the Court taking such a case — a split in Circuits — doesn’t exist here. The Administration has consistently lost on the issue except for a single District Court ruling from Massachusetts.

Consequently, the Administration might have to wait for a full trial on the merits of the plaintiffs’ case, a process that would take weeks at a minimum and quite possibly months or even years. Even then, there is no guarantee that the Supreme Court would take the case, or that even with Justice Gorsuch on the bench the Administration’s position would prevail.

Finally, I note that much of Judge Bybee’s dissent echoes the views expressed by Nolan Rappaport in several articles from The Hill posted on this blog.  The most recent of those, relating to State of Hawaii v. Trump, can be found here:

http://wp.me/p8eeJm-tV

PWS

03/16/17