😢SUPREMES SLAM DUNK ON ADJUSTMENT APPLICANTS WITH “NO JURISDICTION” RULING, OVER SPIRITED DISSENT FROM JUSTICE GORSUCH! — Patel v. Garland (5-4)

Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch
Associate Justice Neil M. Gorsuch; photograph by Franz Jantzen, 2017.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-979_h3ci.pdf

Held: Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of dis- cretionary-relief proceedings under §1255 and the other provisions enumerated in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Pp. 6–17.

From Justice Gorsuch’s dissent (joined by Justices Breyer, Kagan, & Sotomayor):

The majority concludes that courts are powerless to cor- rect an agency decision holding an individual ineligible for relief from removal based on a factual error, no matter how egregious the error might be. The majority’s interpretation has the further consequence of denying any chance to cor- rect agency errors in processing green-card applications outside the removal context. Even the government cannot bring itself to endorse the majority’s arresting conclusions. For good reason. Those conclusions are at war with all the evidence before us. They read language out of the statute and collapse the law’s clear two-step framework. They dis- regard the lessons of neighboring provisions and even ig- nore the statute’s very title. They make no sense of the statute’s history. Altogether, the majority’s novel expan- sion of a narrow statutory exception winds up swallowing the law’s general rule guaranteeing individuals the chance to seek judicial review to correct obvious bureaucratic mis- steps. It is a conclusion that turns an agency once account- able to the rule of law into an authority unto itself. Perhaps some would welcome a world like that. But it is hardly the world Congress ordained.

***********************
Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion.

Interestingly, neither the Respondent nor the Solicitor General defended the 11th Circuit’s decision. So, the Court appointed Taylor A.R. Meehan as amicus to defend that decision. Her “no jurisdiction” statutory argument prevailed.

Looking at rulings like this, the makeup of the Supremes, and the bleak prospects for Article I in an ideologically divided Congress, the composition of the Immigration Courts and the BIA becomes even more significant.

As Justice Gorsuch points out, in many important cases, even the most obvious and egregious mistakes from EOIR Judges will go uncorrected by the Article IIIs. So, getting the results right in the first place and having higher quality appellate review at the BIA becomes even more “life determining.”

As judicial vacancies arise, it’s critical that NDPA members who are eligible to apply do so in large numbers! That also goes for the U.S. Magistrate Judges and the Article IIIs!

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

05-16-22

🎊🎉🍾THE GIBSON REPORT IS BACK!😎😎😎 — 03-07-22 — Congrats To NDPA Stalwart 🗽 Liz Gibson On Her New Job As Managing Attorney @ National Immigrant Justice Center!  

 

Elizabeth Gibson
Elizabeth Gibson
Managing Attorney
National Immigrant Justice Center
Publisher of “The Gibson Report”

Weekly Briefing

 

Note: The briefing is back after a short hiatus while I transitioned to a new position at NIJC. It will be coming from my gmail for a few weeks while I set up a more long-term distribution system. In the meantime, please add egibson@heartlandalliance.org to your trusted contact list so that any future messages do not go to spam.

 

CONTENTS (click to jump to section)

  • PRACTICE ALERTS
  • NEWS
  • LITIGATION & AGENCY UPDATES
  • RESOURCES
  • EVENTS

 

PRACTICE ALERTS

 

eROPs: EOIR has begun digitizing some paper records of proceedings (ROPs). Once an ROP is an eROP, only ECAS electronic filing will be permitted on that case. However, this will be a lengthy process and it sounds like EOIR is prioritizing conversion of smaller records first.

 

TOP NEWS

 

Secretary Mayorkas Designates Ukraine for Temporary Protected Status for 18 Months

DHS: Individuals eligible for TPS under this designation must have continuously resided in the United States since March 1, 2022. Individuals who attempt to travel to the United States after March 1, 2022 will not be eligible for TPS.

 

USCIS to Offer Deferred Action for Special Immigrant Juveniles

USCIS: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services today announced that it is updating the USCIS Policy Manual to consider deferred action and related employment authorization for noncitizens who have an approved Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant, for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) classification but who cannot apply to adjust status to become a lawful permanent resident (LPR) because a visa number is not available.

 

Courts give dueling orders on asylum limits at border

AP: A federal appeals court on Friday upheld sweeping asylum restrictions to prevent spread of COVID-19 but restored protections to keep migrant families from being expelled to their home countries without a chance to plead their cases. Almost simultaneously, a federal judge in another case ruled that the Biden administration wrongly exempted unaccompanied children from the restrictions and ordered that they be subject to them in a week, allowing time for an emergency appeal.

 

Poor tech, opaque rules, exhausted staff: inside the private company surveilling US immigrants

Guardian: BI claims it provides immigrant tracking and ‘high quality’ case management. A Guardian investigation paints a very different picture. See also Over 180,000 Immigrants Now Monitored by ICE’s Alternatives to Detention Program.

 

Delays Are Taking a Costly Toll on Frustrated Workers

Bloomberg: The estimated wait time for a work permit has risen to eight to 12 months, up from about three months in 2020, according to data from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

 

Texas Border Op Expected To Grow Unless Feds Intervene

Law360: Texas’ Operation Lone Star border security initiative has expanded over the past year despite courtroom setbacks revealing cracks in its legal foundation, and it appears poised to grow further unless the federal government steps in to confront it.

 

LITIGATION & AGENCY UPDATES

 

SCOTUS: Wooden v. United States, relevant to “single scheme of criminal misconduct”

SCOTUS: “Wooden committed his burglaries on a single night, in a single uninterrupted course of conduct. The crimes all took place at one location, a one-building storage facility with one address. Each offense was essentially identical, and all were intertwined with the others. The burglaries were part and parcel of the same scheme, actuated by the same motive, and accomplished by the same means.”

 

Justices weigh the effect of foreign borders and national security in Bivens actions

SCOTUSblog: The Supreme Court on Wednesday [in oral arguments] returned to the scope of the right to sue federal officers for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, in a case arising from events surrounding an (unfairly) disparaged inn and suspicious characters near the U.S.-Canada border.

 

CA4 on Changed Country Conditions: Hernandez V. Garland

Lexis: As we noted above, while (b)(4) requires “changed country conditions,” (b)(3) does not. Thus, the BIA’s reference to a “material change in country conditions” and the analysis that followed shows that the BIA applied § 1003.23(b)(4). In applying the standard of § 1003.23(b)(4) to a timely filed motion, the BIA acted contrary to law.

 

Unpub. CA6 Claim Preclusion Victory: Jasso Arangure v. Garland

Lexis: . After he pled guilty to first-degree home invasion, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal. But the removal didn’t go as planned: DHS failed to show that Jasso was in fact removable, and the immigration judge terminated the proceeding. So DHS tried again. It started a second removal proceeding based on a new legal theory but the same underlying facts. The problem? The doctrine of claim preclusion prevents parties from litigating matters they failed to raise in an earlier case. Because claim preclusion barred the second removal proceeding, we grant the petition for review, vacate, and remand.

 

Massachusetts judge can be prosecuted for blocking immigration arrest, court rules

Reuters: A federal appeals court on Monday declined to dismiss an “unprecedented” criminal case filed during the Trump administration against a Massachusetts judge accused of impeding a federal immigration arrest of a defendant in her courtroom.

 

16 AGs Back Illinois Over Detention Contract Ban At 7th Circ.

Law360: Sixteen attorneys general of Democratic-led states, including the District of Columbia, are defending a new Illinois law phasing out immigrant detention contracts and urging the Seventh Circuit to dismiss a challenge by two Illinois counties, saying the policy does not interfere with federal enforcement of immigration law.

 

A.C.L.U. Lawsuit Accuses ICE Jailers of Denying Detainees Vaccines

NYT: People with health conditions that place them at high risk from Covid-19 have been denied access to coronavirus vaccine booster shots while in federal immigration detention, the American Civil Liberties Union said in a lawsuit filed on Tuesday.

 

U.S. to process some visas in Cuba after 4-year hiatus

Reuters: The U.S. Embassy in Havana announced on Thursday it would increase staffing and resume some visa processing in Cuba several years after the Trump administration slashed personnel at the facility following a spate of unexplained health incidents.

 

EOIR to Open Hyattsville and Laredo Immigration Courts

AILA: EOIR will open immigration courts in Hyattsville, Maryland, and Laredo, Texas, today, February 28, 2022. The Hyattsville and Laredo immigration courts will have 16 and 8 immigration judges, respectively. Both courts will hear transferred cases; EOIR is notifying parties whose locations have changed.

 

DHS Designates Sudan and Extends and Redesignates South Sudan for TPS

AILA: Due to conflict in both regions, DHS will extend and redesignate South Sudan for TPS for 18 months, and designate Sudan for TPS for 18 months. The extension and redesignation of South Sudan is in effect from 5/3/2022, through 11/3/2023. The memo details eligibility guidelines.

 

Lockbox Filing Location Updates

AILA: USCIS announced that its website will now feature a Lockbox Filing Location Updates page, where customers can track when lockbox form filing locations are updated. Updates will also be emailed and announced on social media.

 

M-274 Guidance Updates: Native American Tribal Documents and Victims of Human Trafficking and Criminal Activity

USCIS: USCIS has clarified Form I-9 guidance related to Native American tribal documents.  We also published new guidance regarding T nonimmigrants (victims of human trafficking) and U nonimmigrants (victims of certain other crimes) in the M-274, Handbook for Employers.  USCIS has provided these updates to respond to customer needs.

 

RESOURCES

 

 

EVENTS

 

 

Elizabeth Gibson (Pronouns: she/her/ella)

Managing Attorney for Capacity Building and Mentorship

National Immigrant Justice Center

A HEARTLAND ALLIANCE Program

224 S. Michigan Ave., Suite 600, Chicago, IL 60604
T: (312) 660-1688| F: (312) 660-1688| E: egibson@heartlandalliance.org

www.immigrantjustice.org | Facebook | Twitter

****************

Thanks for all you do for due process and fundamental fairness in America, Liz! And congrats again to both you and NIJC/Heartland Alliance on your new position!

My good friend Heidi Altman, Director of Policy at NIJC, should be delighted, as Liz is a “distinguished alum” of both the CALS Asylum Clinic at Georgetown Law (where Heidi was a Fellow) and my Refugee Law & Policy class. Liz also served as an Arlington Intern and a Judicial Law Clerk at the NY Immigration Court. Liz has been a “powerful force for due process, clear, analytical writing, and best practices” wherever she has been! So, I’m sure that will continue at NIJC! Clearly, Liz is someone who eventually belongs on the Federal Bench at some level.

Heidi Altman
Heidi Altman
Director of Policy
National Immigrant Justice Center
PHOTO: fcnl.org

Liz’s mention under “Litigation” of the Supremes’ decision in Wooden v U.S., where Justice Kagan for a unanimous Court interpreted the term “single occasion” broadly in favor of a criminal defendant, raises an interesting immigration issue.

Two decades ago, in Matter of Adetiba, 20 I&N Dec. 506 (BIA 1992), the BIA basically “nullified” the INA’s statutory exemption from deportation for multiple crimes “arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” Rejecting the 9th Circuit’s contrary ruling, the BIA essentially read the exception out of the statute by effectively limiting it to lesser included offenses.

How narrow was this interpretation? Well, in 21 years on the immigration appellate and trial benches, I can’t recall a single case where the “scheme” did not result in deportation under Adetiba. Taking advantage of the outrageous “doctrine of judicial task avoidance” established by the Supremes in the notorious “Brand X,” the BIA eventually took the “super arrogant” step of nullifying all Circuit interpretations that conflicted with Adetiba! Matter of Islam, 25 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 2011).

Surprisingly, in my view, in his concurring opinion in Wooden, Justice Gorsuch actually applied the “rule of lenity” — something else the “21st Century BIA” has basically “read out of the law” in their haste to deport! Here’s what Justice Gorsuch said:

Today, the Court does not consult lenity’s rule, but neither does it forbid lower courts from doing so in doubtful cases. That course is the sound course. Under our rule of law, punishments should never be products of judicial conjecture about this factor or that one. They should come only with the assent of the people’s elected representatives and in laws clear enough to supply “fair warning . . . to the world.” McBoyle, 283 U. S., at 27.7

This language is directly relevant to Hon. “Sir Jeffrey” Chase’s recent article on why the term “crime involving moral turpitude” under the INA is unconstitutionally vague! See https://immigrationcourtside.com/2022/03/04/cimt-practical-scholar-sir-jeffrey-chase-⚔%EF%B8%8F🛡-explains-how-a-supreme-constitutional-tank-from-71-years-ago-continues-to-screw/

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges

As the ongoing (“backlog enhancing”) “Pereira fiasco” shows, the BIA has had little problem “blowing off” or distinguishing the Supremes to deport or deny when asked by DHS Enforcement to do so. Today’s BIA “rule” for interpreting supposedly “ambiguous” statutes is actually straightforward, if one-sided: Adopt whatever interpretation DHS Enforcement offers even if that means “taking a pass” on a better interpretation offered by the respondent. So, I’m sure that Garland’s current “Miller Lite” BIA will simply distinguish Wooden as dealing with statutory language different from the INA and ignore its broader implications if asked to do so by “their partners” at DHS Enforcement.

But, whether all Circuits will see it that way, and/or allow themselves to continue to be humiliated by “Brand X,” or whether the issue will reach the Supremes, are different questions. In any event, immigration advocates should pay attention to Wooden, even if the BIA is likely to blow it off.

The current Supremes don’t seem to have much difficulty jettisoning their own precedents when motivated to do so! Why they would continue to feel bound by the bogus “Chevron doctrine” or its “steroid laden progeny Brand X” to follow the interpretations of Executive Branch administrative judges on questions of law is beyond me! Somewhere Chief Justice John Marshall must be turning over in his grave!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

03-08-22

 

 

 

 

 

⚖️SUPREMES UNANIMOUSLY SAY THAT “PRESUMPTION OF CREDIBILITY” DOESN’T APPLY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW IN OPINION BY JUSTICE GORSUCH — Garland v. Ming Dai

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-1155_1a7d.pdf

Syllabus by Court staff:

GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL v. MING DAI CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–1155. Argued February 23, 2021—Decided June 1, 2021*

In each of these cases, a foreign national appeared before an immigration judge (IJ) and requested that he not be returned to his country of origin. For Cesar Alcaraz-Enriquez, the IJ first had to determine whether Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez had committed a disqualifying “partic- ularly serious crime” based on his prior California conviction for “in- flicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant.” See 8 U. S. C. §1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). The IJ considered both the probation report issued at the time of the conviction (which detailed a serious domestic vio- lence incident) and Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez’s own testimony at the re- moval proceeding (which included an admission that he hit his girl- friend but allegedly did so in defense of his daughter). Relying in part on the version of events in the probation report, the IJ held Mr. Al- caraz-Enriquez ineligible for relief. On appeal, the Bureau of Immi- gration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. In Ming Dai’s case, he testified that he and his family had suffered past persecution by Chinese officials and expected future persecution upon return. But Mr. Dai initially failed to disclose that his wife and daughter had both returned volun- tarily to China since accompanying him to the United States. When confronted, Mr. Dai told the “real story” of why he remained in the United States. The IJ found that Mr. Dai’s testimony undermined his claims and denied relief. On appeal, the BIA affirmed. Mr. Alcaraz- Enriquez and Mr. Dai each sought judicial review, and in each case, the Ninth Circuit noted that neither the IJ nor the BIA made an ex- plicit “adverse credibility determination” under the Immigration Na- tionality Act (INA). §§1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(C), 1229a(c)(4)(C).

——————

* Together with No. 19–1156, Garland v. Alcaraz-Enriquez, also on cer- tiorari to the same court.

2 GARLAND v. MING DAI Syllabus

Applying its own judge-made rule that a reviewing court must treat the noncitizen’s testimony as credible and true absent an explicit ad- verse credibility determination, the Ninth Circuit granted relief.

Held: The Ninth Circuit’s deemed-true-or-credible rule cannot be recon- ciled with the INA’s terms. Pp. 6–15.

(a) The Ninth Circuit’s rule has no proper place in a reviewing court’s analysis. The INA provides that a reviewing court must accept “administrative findings” as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudi- cator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” §1252(b)(4)(B). And a reviewing court is “generally not free to impose” additional judge-made procedural requirements on agencies. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 524.

Judicial proceedings in cases like these do not constitute “appeals” in which the “rebuttable presumption of credibility on appeal” applies absent an explicit credibility determination. §§1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(C), 1229a(c)(4)(C). Here, there is only one appeal—from the IJ to the BIA. See §§1158(d)(5)(iii)–(iv). Subsequent judicial review takes place not by appeal, but by means of a “petition for review,” which the INA describes as “the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal.” §1252(a)(5). A presumption of credi- bility may arise in some appeals before the BIA, but no such presump- tion applies in antecedent proceedings before an IJ or in subsequent collateral review before a federal court. This makes sense because re- viewing courts do not make credibility determinations, but instead ask only whether any reasonable adjudicator could have found as the agency did. The Ninth Circuit’s rule gets the standard backwards by giving conclusive weight to any testimony that cuts against the agency’s finding. Pp. 6–9.

(b) Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez and Mr. Dai offer an alternative theory for affirming the Ninth Circuit. Because, they say, they were entitled to a presumption of credibility in their BIA appeals, they are entitled to relief in court because no reasonable adjudicator obliged to presume their credibility could have found against them. Even assuming that there was no explicit adverse credibility determination here, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is flawed for at least two reasons. Pp. 10–15.

(1) The presumption of credibility on appeal under the INA is “re- buttable.” And the INA contains no parallel requirement of explicit- ness when it comes to rebutting the presumption on appeal. Reviewing courts, bound by traditional administrative law principles, must “up- hold” even “a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U. S. 281, 286. In neither case did the Ninth

Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021) 3 Syllabus

Circuit consider the possibility that the BIA implicitly found the pre- sumption of credibility rebutted. The BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s decision in Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez’s case, which, in turn, noted that Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez’s story changed from the time of the probation report to the time of the hearing—a factor the statute specifically identifies as relevant to credibility, see §§1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(C), 1229a(c)(4)(C). And in Mr. Dai’s case, the BIA also adopted the IJ’s decision, which discussed specific problems with Mr. Dai’s demeanor, candor, and internal inconsistency—an analysis that certainly goes to the presumption of credibility even if the agency didn’t use particular words. See ibid. In each case, the Ninth Circuit should consider whether the BIA in fact found the presumption of credibility overcome. If so, it seems unlikely that the conclusion in either case is one no rea- sonable adjudicator could have reached. Pp. 10–13.

(2) The presumption of credibility applies with respect to credibil- ity but the INA expressly requires the noncitizen to satisfy the trier of fact on credibility, persuasiveness, and the burden of proof. §§1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(C), 1229a(a)(4)(B). Even if the BIA treats a noncitizen’s testimony as credible, the agency need not find such evidence persuasive or sufficient to meet the burden of proof. Here, the Ninth Circuit erred by treating credibility as dispositive of both persuasiveness and legal sufficiency. Pp 13–15.

884 F. 3d 858 and 727 Fed. Appx. 260, vacated and remanded. GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

*********************************

Can’t win ‘em all: The Round Table filed an amicus brief on behalf of the respondent in this case. Sadly, on this occasion, we didn’t convince anyone.☹️

Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-01-21

FINALLY: SPLIT 9TH CIR PANEL ENTERS NATIONWIDE INJUNCTION AGAINST “LET ‘EM DIE IN MEXICO” A/K/A “MIGRANT ‘PROTECTION’ PROTOCOLS” — Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf

9thMPPInjunction

Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 9th Cir., 02-28-20, published

PANEL:  Ferdinand F. Fernandez, William A. Fletcher, and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY:  Judge William A. Fletcher

DISSENTING OPINION:  Judge Ferdinand F. Fernandez

KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY:

In addition to likelihood of success on the merits, a court must consider the likelihood that the requesting party will

 

INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 49

suffer irreparable harm, the balance of the equities, and the public interest in determining whether a preliminary injunction is justified. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “When the government is a party, these last two factors merge.” Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).

There is a significant likelihood that the individual plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if the MPP is not enjoined. Uncontested evidence in the record establishes that non-Mexicans returned to Mexico under the MPP risk substantial harm, even death, while they await adjudication of their applications for asylum.

The balance of equities favors plaintiffs. On one side is the interest of the Government in continuing to follow the directives of the MPP. However, the strength of that interest is diminished by the likelihood, established above, that the MPP is inconsistent with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and 1231(b). On the other side is the interest of the plaintiffs. The individual plaintiffs risk substantial harm, even death, so long as the directives of the MPP are followed, and the organizational plaintiffs are hindered in their ability to carry out their missions.

The public interest similarly favors the plaintiffs. We agree with East Bay Sanctuary Covenant:

On the one hand, the public has a “weighty” interest “in efficient administration of the immigration laws at the border.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). But the public also has an interest in ensuring that “statutes enacted by [their] representatives”

 

50 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

are not imperiled by executive fiat. Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers).

932 F.3d at 779 (alteration in original).

VII. Scope of the Injunction

The district court issued a preliminary injunction setting aside the MPP—that is, enjoining the Government “from continuing to implement or expand the ‘Migrant Protection Protocols’ as announced in the January 25, 2018 DHS policy memorandum and as explicated in further agency memoranda.” Innovation Law Lab, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 1130. Accepting for purposes of argument that some injunction should issue, the Government objects to its scope.

We recognize that nationwide injunctions have become increasingly controversial, but we begin by noting that it is something of a misnomer to call the district court’s order in this case a “nationwide injunction.” The MPP operates only at our southern border and directs the actions of government officials only in the four States along that border. Two of those states (California and Arizona) are in the Ninth Circuit. One of those states (New Mexico) is in the Tenth Circuit. One of those states (Texas) is in the Fifth Circuit. In practical effect, the district court’s injunction, while setting aside the MPP in its entirety, does not operate nationwide.

For two mutually reinforcing reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the MPP.

 

INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 51

First, plaintiffs have challenged the MPP under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Section 706(2)(A) of the APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . not in accordance with law.” We held, above, that the MPP is “not in accordance with” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Section 706(2)(A) directs that in a case where, as here, a reviewing court has found the agency action “unlawful,” the court “shall . . . set aside [the] agency action.” That is, in a case where § 706(2)(A) applies, there is a statutory directive—above and beyond the underlying statutory obligation asserted in the litigation—telling a reviewing court that its obligation is to “set aside” any unlawful agency action.

There is a presumption (often unstated) in APA cases that the offending agency action should be set aside in its entirety rather than only in limited geographical areas. “[W]hen a reviewing court determines that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result is that rules are vacated—not that their application to the individual petitioners is proscribed.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F3d 476, 511 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When a court determines that an agency’s action failed to follow Congress’s clear mandate the appropriate remedy is to vacate that action.” Cal. Wilderness Coalition v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1095 (9th Cir. 2011); see also United Steel v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 925 F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“The ordinary practice is to vacate unlawful agency action.”); Gen. Chem. Corp. v. United States, 817 F.2d 844, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The APA requires us to vacate the agency’s decision if it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”).

 

52 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

Second, cases implicating immigration policy have a particularly strong claim for uniform relief. Federal law contemplates a “comprehensive and unified” immigration policy. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012). “In immigration matters, we have consistently recognized the authority of district courts to enjoin unlawful policies on a universal basis.” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d at 779. We wrote in Regents of the University of California, 908 F.3d at 511, “A final principle is also relevant: the need for uniformity in immigration policy. . . . Allowing uneven application of nationwide immigration policy flies in the face of these requirements.” We wrote to the same effect in Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 701 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018): “Because this case implicates immigration policy, a nationwide injunction was necessary to give Plaintiffs a full expression of their rights.” The Fifth Circuit, one of only two other federal circuits with states along our southern border, has held that nationwide injunctions are appropriate in immigration cases. In sustaining a nationwide injunction in an immigration case, the Fifth Circuit wrote, “[T]he Constitution requires ‘an uniform Rule of Naturalization’; Congress has instructed that ‘the immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly’; and the Supreme Court has described immigration policy as ‘a comprehensive and unified system.’” Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original; citations omitted). In Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017), we relied on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Texas to sustain the nationwide scope of a temporary restraining order in an immigration case. We wrote, “[W]e decline to limit the geographic scope of the TRO. The Fifth Circuit has held that such a fragmented immigration policy would run afoul of the

 

INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 53 constitutional and statutory requirement for uniform

immigration law and policy.” Id. at 1166–67. Conclusion

We conclude that the MPP is inconsistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and that it is inconsistent in part with 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b). Because the MPP is invalid in its entirety due to its inconsistency with § 1225(b), it should be enjoined in its entirety. Because plaintiffs have successfully challenged the MPP under § 706(2)(A) of the APA, and because the MPP directly affects immigration into this country along our southern border, the issuance of a temporary injunction setting aside the MPP was not an abuse of discretion.

We lift the emergency stay imposed by the motions panel, and we firm the decision of the district court.

****************************

At last, a breath of justice in halting, at least temporarily, an outrageously illegal program that is also a grotesque violation of our national values and humanity. Unfortunately, it has already resulted in thousands of injustices and damaged many lives beyond repair. That’s something that a clueless shill for authoritarianism, wanton cruelty, and abrogation of the rule of law like dissenting Judge Fernandez might want to think about. 

But, hold the “victory dance.” The regime will likely seek “rehearing en banc,” appealing to other enablers of human rights atrocities like Fernandez. And, if the regime fails there, they always can “short circuit” the legal system applicable to everyone else by having Solicitor General Francisco ask his GOP buddies on the Supremes, “The JR Five,” to give the regime a free pass. As Justice Sotomayor pointed out, that type of “tilt” has already become more or less “business as usual” as the regime carries out its nativist, White Nationalist immigration agenda. Indeed, Justices Gorsuch and Thomas have already announced their eagerness to carry the regime’s water for them by doing away with nationwide injunctions, even though they are the sole way for doing justice in immigration cases like this. 

But, at least for today, we can all celebrate a battle won by the New Due Process Army in the ongoing war to restore our Constitution, the rule of law, and human dignity.

Due Process Forever!

PWS 

02-29-20

SUPREMES’ RIGHT WING DELIVERS STARK MESSAGE: BROWN LIVES DON’T MATTER, AS IT SHRUGS OFF CBP AGENT’S UNJUSTIFIED KILLING OF MEXICAN TEEN – Other Four Justices Dissent From Grant of Impunity For Deadly Immigration Enforcement – Hernandez v. Mesa

Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 17-1678, 02-26-20

Hernandez v. Mesa17-1678_m6io

Syllabus [By Court Staff]

HERNANDEZ ET AL. v. MESA
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–1678. Argued November 12, 2019—Decided February 25, 2020

Respondent, United States Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr., shot and killed Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a 15-year-old Mexican national, in a tragic and disputed cross-border incident. Mesa was standing on U. S. soil when he fired the bullets that struck and killed Hernández, who was on Mexican soil, after having just run back across the border following entry onto U. S. territory. Agent Mesa contends that Hernández was part of an illegal border crossing attempt, while petitioners, Hernández’s parents, claim he was playing a game with his friends that involved running back and forth across the culvert sep- arating El Paso, Texas, from Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. The shooting drew international attention, and the Department of Justice investi- gated, concluded that Agent Mesa had not violated Customs and Bor- der Patrol policy or training, and declined to bring charges against him. The United States also denied Mexico’s request for Agent Mesa to be extradited to face criminal charges in Mexico.

Petitioners sued for damages in U. S. District Court under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, alleging that Mesa violated Hernández’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The Dis- trict Court dismissed their claims, and the United States Court of Ap- peals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. After this Court vacated that de- cision and remanded for further consideration in light of Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. ___, the Fifth Circuit again affirmed, refusing to rec- ognize a Bivens claim for a cross-border shooting.

Held: Bivens’ holding does not extend to claims based on a cross-border shooting. Pp. 4–20.

(a) In Bivens, the Court implied a Fourth Amendment claim for damages even though no federal statute authorized such a claim. The Court later extended Bivens’ reach to cover claims under the Fifth and

2

HERNANDEZ v. MESA Syllabus

Eighth Amendments. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228; Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14. But Bivens’ expansion has since become “a ‘disfa- vored’ judicial activity,” Abbasi, supra, at ___, and the Court has gen- erally expressed doubt about its authority to recognize causes of action not expressly created by Congress, see, e.g., Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. ___, ___. When considering whether to extend Bivens, the Court uses a two-step inquiry that first asks whether the request in- volves a claim that arises in a “new context” or involves a “new cate- gory of defendants.” Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 68. If so, the Court then asks whether there are any “special factors [that] counse[l] hesitation” about granting the extension. Abbasi, supra, at ___. Pp. 4–8.

(b) Petitioners’ Bivens claims arise in a new context. Their claims are based on the same constitutional provisions as claims in cases in which damages remedies were previously recognized, but the con- text—a cross-border shooting—is significantly “different . . . from pre- vious Bivens cases.” Abbasi, supra, ___. It involves a “risk of disrup- tive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches.” Abbasi, supra, ___. Pp. 8–9.

(c) Multiple, related factors counsel hesitation before extending Bivens remedies into this new context. Pp. 9–19.

(1) The expansion of a Bivens remedy that impinges on foreign re- lations—an arena “so exclusively entrusted to the political branches . . . as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry,” Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 292—risks interfering with the Executive Branch’s “lead role in foreign policy,” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 524. A cross- border shooting affects the interests of two countries and, as happened here, may lead to disagreement. It is not for this Court to arbitrate between the United States and Mexico, which both have legitimate and important interests at stake and have sought to reconcile those inter- ests through diplomacy. Pp. 9–12.

(2) Another factor is the risk of undermining border security. The U. S. Customs and Border Protection Agency is responsible for pre- venting the illegal entry of dangerous persons and goods into the United States, and the conduct of their agents positioned at the border has a clear and strong connection to national security. This Court has not extended Bivens where doing so would interfere with the system of military discipline created by statute and regulation, see, e.g., Chap- pell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, and a similar consideration is applicable to the framework established by the political branches for addressing cases in which it is alleged that lethal force at the border was unlaw- fully employed by a border agent. Pp. 12–14.

(3) Moreover, Congress has repeatedly declined to authorize the award of damages against federal officials for injury inflicted outside

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 Syllabus

  1. S. borders. For example, recovery under 42 U. S. C. §1983 is avail- able only to “citizen[s] of the United States or other person[s] within the jurisdiction thereof.” The Federal Tort Claims Act bars “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country.” 28 U. S. C. §2680(k). And the Tor- ture Victim Protection Act of 1991, note following 28 U. S. C. §1350, cannot be used by an alien to sue a United States officer. When Con- gress has provided compensation for injuries suffered by aliens outside the United States, it has done so by empowering Executive Branch of- ficials to make payments under circumstances found to be appropriate. See, e.g., Foreign Claims Act, 10 U. S. C. §2734. Congress’s decision not to allow suit in these contexts further indicates that the Judiciary should not create a cause of action that extends across U. S. borders either. Pp. 14–18.

(4) These factors can all be condensed to the concern for respecting the separation of powers. The most important question is whether Congress or the courts should create a damages remedy. Here the an- swer is Congress. Congress’s failure to act does not compel the Court to step into its shoes. Pp. 19–20.

885 F. 3d 811, affirmed.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., andTHOMAS,GORSUCH,andKAVANAUGH,JJ.,joined. THOMAS,J.,fileda concurring opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.

Key Quote From Justice Ginsburg’s dissent:

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), this Court held that injured plaintiffs could pursue claims for damages against U. S. officers for conduct disregarding constitutional constraints. The in- stant suit, invoking Bivens, arose in tragic circumstances. In 2010, the complaint alleges, a Mexican teenager was playing with friends in a culvert along the United States- Mexico border. A U. S. Border Patrol agent, in violation of instructions controlling his office and situated on the U. S. side of the border, shot and killed the youth on the Mexican side. The boy’s parents sued the officer for damages in fed- eral court, alleging that a rogue federal law enforcement of- ficer’s unreasonable use of excessive force violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. At the time of the incident, it is uncontested, the officer did not know whether the boy he shot was a U. S. national or a citizen of another land. See Hernández v. Mesa, 582 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (per curiam) (slip op., at 5–6).

When the case first reached this Court, the Court re- manded it, instructing the Court of Appeals to resolve a threshold question: Is a Bivens remedy available to noncit- izens (here, the victim’s parents) when the U. S. officer acted stateside, but the impact of his alleged wrongdoing

2 HERNANDEZ v. MESA GINSBURG, J., dissenting

was suffered abroad? To that question, the sole issue now before this Court, I would answer “yes.” Rogue U. S. officer conduct falls within a familiar, not a “new,” Bivens setting. Even if the setting could be characterized as “new,” plain- tiffs lack recourse to alternative remedies, and no “special factors” counsel against a Bivens remedy. Neither U. S. for- eign policy nor national security is in fact endangered by the litigation. Moreover, concerns attending the applica- tion of our law to conduct occurring abroad are not involved, for plaintiffs seek the application of U. S. law to conduct occurring inside our borders. I would therefore hold that the plaintiffs’ complaint crosses the Bivens threshold.

* * **

Regrettably, the death of Hernández is not an isolated in- cident. Cf. Rodriguez, 899 F. 3d, at 727 (complaint alleged that border agent fired 14 to 30 bullets across the border, killing a 16-year-old boy); Brief for Immigrant and Civil Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae 26–28 (describing various incidents of allegedly unconstitutional conduct by border and immigration officers); Brief for Border Network for Human Rights et al. as Amici Curiae 8–15 (listing indi- viduals killed by border agents). One report reviewed over 800 complaints of alleged physical, verbal, or sexual abuse lodged against Border Patrol agents between 2009 and 2012; in 97% of the complaints resulting in formal deci- sions, no action was taken. D. Martínez, G. Cantor, & W. Ewing, No Action Taken: Lack of CBP Accountability in Re- sponding to Complaints of Abuse, American Immigration Council 1–8 (2014), americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/

14 HERNANDEZ v. MESA GINSBURG, J., dissenting

default/files/research/No%20Action%20Taken_Final.pdf. Ac- cording to amici former Customs and Border Protection of- ficials, “the United States has not extradited a Border Pa- trol agent to stand trial in Mexico, and to [amici’s] knowledge has itself prosecuted only one agent in a cross- border shooting.” Brief for Former Officials of U. S. Cus- toms and Border Protection Agency as Amici Curiae 4. These amici warn that, “[w]ithout the possibility of civil li- ability, the unlikely prospect of discipline or criminal pros- ecution will not provide a meaningful deterrent to abuse at the border.” Ibid. In short, it is all too apparent that to redress injuries like the one suffered here, it is Bivens or nothing.

***

I resist the conclusion that “nothing” is the answer re- quired in this case. I would reverse the Fifth Circuit’s judg- ment and hold that plaintiffs can sue Mesa in federal court for violating their son’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.

 

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This case is straightforward. Mesa a CBP Agent standing in the United States shot Hernandez, an unarmed 15-year-old Mexican standing in Mexico without justification. This violated Hernandez’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Had the lower Federal Courts and the Supremes applied the law on “Constitutional torts” correctly, Mesa would have been found liable. The Government probably would have settled with the Hernandez family.

Instead, nearly of decade of unnecessary litigation ensued during which all three levels of the U.S. Court System failed the Hernandez family and distorted our system of justice. Dissenting Fifth Circuit Judge (now Ambassador) Ed Prado summed up this legal farce in a single powerful phrase: “[the majority has been] led astray from the familiar circumstances of this case by empty labels of national security, foreign affairs, and extra- territoriality.” For the record, Ambassador Prado is a lifelong Republican. I worked with him on immigration litigation during the Reagan Administration.

Hey, just “business as usual” for a GOP Supremes’ majority that has checked the Constitution and their humanity at the door in their haste to “deconstruct America” and reconstitute it as the White Nationalist authoritarian state that the Trump regime embodies. Heck, corporations and guns have more rights that dead Mexican kids and their families under the majority‘s view. “Not their kids” as I’ve noted before. I do suspect that if members of their own families were being shot and killed by CBP, we would have a different result in cases like this. But, out of sight, out of mind. Wow, think of the potential foreign relations nightmare of CBP Agents stopped killing unarmed Mexican kids from our side of the border!

 

Not to be outdone by the majority’s legal gibberish cloaking moral abdication, Justices Gorsuch and Thomas wrote separately to signal Trump that they would like to do away with Bivens entirely while in the process of rewriting the laws in Trump’s image. Apparently recognizing that the GOP has effectively stymied Congress and that Trump intends to inflict many more legal and Constitutional abuses on the unfortunate non-white population, they would like to eliminate all restraints on the regime’s constant violations of law and abuses of individual rights. Obviously, from their exalted and privileged positions above the Constitutional, legal, and societal chaos affecting less fortunate individuals under the Trump regime, they haven‘t fully thought through want happens when Trump or the next White Nationalist demagogue comes for them and there is neither a rule or law nor anyone left to enforce it in a fair an impartial manner.

I’m not the only one who understands the ugly truth about the future of all of our individual rights and the lives of nonwhite individuals (citizens or not)  that the Trump majority on the Supremes are attempting to hide with their opaque, yet lethal, legal gobbledygook.  Ian Millhiser over at Vox News also sees though the smokescreen at what’s really happening here: “The Supreme Court just held that a border guard who shot a child will face no consequences” https://apple.news/AWWSBpk_aR6uAlmxmQIvZkw

 

As we’re finding out anew every day, the law and fair, impartial, and courageous judging is for suckers!

 

Due Process Forever; The “Roberts Five” Never!

 

PWS

 

02-26-20

COMPLICITY WATCH: Justice Sonia Sotomayor Calls Out “Men In Black” For Perverting Rules To Advance Trump/Miller White Nationalist Nativist Immigration Agenda!

Mark Joseph Stern
Mark Joseph Stern
Reporter, Slate

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/02/sotomayor-trump-wealth-test-bias-dissent.html

Mark Joseph Stern reports for Slate:

. . . .

Put simply: When some of the most despised and powerless among us ask the Supreme Court to spare their lives, the conservative justices turn a cold shoulder. When the Trump administration demands permission to implement some cruel, nativist, and potentially unlawful immigration restrictions, the conservatives bend over backward to give it everything it wants. There is nothing “fair and balanced” about the court’s double standard that favors the government over everyone else. And, as Sotomayor implies, this flagrant bias creates the disturbing impression that the Trump administration has a majority of the court in its pocket. 

Read the full article at the above link.

Here’s a link to Justice Sotomayor’s full dissent in Wolf v. Cook County:

SotomayorPublicChargeDissetn19a905_7m48

Justice Sonia Sotomayor
Justice Sonia Sotomayor

Here’s a “key quote” from Justice Sotomayor’s dissent:

These facts—all of which undermine the Government’s assertion of irreparable harm—show two things, one about the Government’s conduct and one about this Court’s own. First, the Government has come to treat “th[e] exceptional mechanism” of stay relief “as a new normal.” Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting from grant of stay) (slip op., at 5). Claiming one emergency after another, the Government has recently sought stays in an unprecedented number of cases, demanding immediate attention and consuming lim- ited Court resources in each. And with each successive ap- plication, of course, its cries of urgency ring increasingly hollow. Indeed, its behavior relating to the public-charge

6 WOLF v. COOK COUNTY SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

rule in particular shows how much its own definition of ir- reparable harm has shifted. Having first sought a stay in the New York cases based, in large part, on the purported harm created by a nationwide injunction, it now disclaims that rationale and insists that the harm is its temporary inability to enforce its goals in one State.

Second, this Court is partly to blame for the breakdown in the appellate process. That is because the Court—in this case, the New York cases, and many others—has been all too quick to grant the Government’s “reflexiv[e]” requests. Ibid. But make no mistake: Such a shift in the Court’s own behavior comes at a cost.

Stay applications force the Court to consider important statutory and constitutional questions that have not been ventilated fully in the lower courts, on abbreviated timeta- bles and without oral argument. They upend the normal appellate process, putting a thumb on the scale in favor of the party that won a stay. (Here, the Government touts that in granting a stay in the New York cases, this Court “necessarily concluded that if the court of appeals were to uphold the preliminary injunctio[n], the Court likely would grant a petition for a writ of certiorari” and that “there was a fair prospect the Court would rule in favor of the govern- ment.” Application 3.) They demand extensive time and resources when the Court’s intervention may well be unnec- essary—particularly when, as here, a court of appeals is poised to decide the issue for itself.

Perhaps most troublingly, the Court’s recent behavior on stay applications has benefited one litigant over all others. This Court often permits executions—where the risk of ir- reparable harm is the loss of life—to proceed, justifying many of those decisions on purported failures “to raise any potentially meritorious claims in a timely manner.” Mur- phy v. Collier, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (second statement of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 4); see also id., at ___ (ALITO, J., joined by THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., dissenting from grant of stay) (slip op., at 6) (“When courts do not have ad- equate time to consider a claim, the decisionmaking process may be compromised”); cf. Dunn v. Ray, 586 U. S. ___ (2019) (overturning the grant of a stay of execution). Yet the Court’s concerns over quick decisions wither when prodded by the Government in far less compelling circumstances— where the Government itself chose to wait to seek relief, and where its claimed harm is continuation of a 20-year status quo in one State. I fear that this disparity in treatment erodes the fair and balanced decision making process that this Court must strive to protect.

I respectfully dissent.

***************************

Of course, the regime’s use of manufactured and clearly bogus “national emergencies” or fake appeals to “national security” is a perversion of both fact and law, as well as a mocking of Constitutional separation of powers. This obscenely transparent legal ruse essentially was invited by the Roberts and his GOP brethren. Roberts somewhat disingenuously claims to  be a “student of history.” But, whether he takes responsibility for it or not, he has basically invited Trump & Miller to start a new “Reichstag Fire” almost every week with migrants, asylum seekers, Latinos, and the less affluent as the “designated usual suspects.”

Powerful as her dissent is, Justice Sotomayor actually understates the case against her GOP colleagues. Every racist, White Nationalist, nativist, and/or authoritarian movement in American history has been enabled, advanced, and protected by morally corrupt and intellectually dishonest jurists who have intentionally provided “legal cover” for those official misdeeds. How about “states rights,” “separate but equal,” “plenary power,” and a host of other now discredited legal doctrines used to justify everything from slavery to denying voting, and other Constitutional rights including life itself to African Americans? They were all used to “cover” for actions that might more properly have been considered “crimes against humanity.”

Who knows what legal blather Roberts and his four fellow rightist toadies will come up with to further promote the destruction of humanity and the disintegration of American democracy at the hands of Trump, Miller, Barr, Putin, and the rest of the gang?

But, courageous “outings” like those by Justice Sotomayor will help insure that history will be able to trace the bloody path of needless deaths, ruined lives, wasted human potential, official hate mongering, and unspeakable human misery they are unleashing directly to their doors and hold them accountable in a way that our current system has disgracefully failed to do.

 

Trump was right about at least one thing: There are indeed “GOP Justices” on the Supremes wholly owned by him and his party. They consistently put GOP rightist ideology and and authoritarianism above the Constitution, human rights, the rule of law, intellectual honesty, and simple human decency. Other than that, they’re a “great bunch of guys!”

Due Process Forever; Complicit Courts Never!

PWS

02-22-20

GONZO’S WORLD: BOGUS “COURT SYSTEM” REVEALED IN ALL OF ITS DISINGENUOUS INGLORIOUSNESS — SESSIONS MOVES TO TRASH THE “LIMITED DURESS” DEFENSE FOR ASYLEES BEFORE TRUMP TURNS HIM BACK INTO A PUMPKIN (AFTER HALLOWEEN) – Why Have A BIA If It Is Only Permitted To Decide Major Issues In Favor Of The DHS Position? — Matter of Daniel Girmai NEGUSIE, 27 I&N Dec. 481 (A.G. 2018)

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1101746/download

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 481 (A.G. 2018) Interim Decision #3943

Matter of Daniel Girmai NEGUSIE, Respondent

Decided by Attorney General October 18, 2018

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General

BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2018), I direct the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) to refer this case to me for review of its decision. The Board’s decision in this matter is automatically stayed pending my review. See Matter of Haddam, A.G. Order No. 2380-2001 (Jan. 19, 2001). To assist me in my review, I invite the parties to these proceedings and interested amici to submit briefs on: Whether coercion and duress are relevant to the application of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s persecutor bar. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (2012).

The parties’ briefs shall not exceed 15,000 words and shall be filed on or before November 8, 2018. Interested amici may submit briefs not exceeding 9,000 words on or before November 15, 2018. The parties may submit reply briefs not exceeding 6,000 words on or before November 15, 2018. All filings shall be accompanied by proof of service and shall be submitted electronically to AGCertification@usdoj.gov, and in triplicate to:

United States Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General, Room 5114 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530

All briefs must be both submitted electronically and postmarked on or before the pertinent deadlines. Requests for extensions are disfavored.

**************************************

Here’s the BIA headnote a link to Matter of NEGUSIE, 27 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2018):

(1) An applicant who is subject to being barred from establishing eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal based on the persecution of others may claim a duress defense, which is limited in nature.

(2) To meet the minimum threshold requirements of the duress defense to the persecutor bar, an applicant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he acted under an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others; (2) he reasonably believed that the threatened harm would be carried out unless he acted or refrained from acting; (3) he had no reasonable opportunity to escape or otherwise frustrate the threat; (4) he did not place himself in a situation in which he knew or reasonably should have known that he would likely be forced to act or refrain from acting; and (5) he knew or reasonably should have known that the harm he inflicted was not greater than the threatened harm to himself or others.

http://immigrationcourtside.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/3930.pdf

********************************************************

Remains to be seen whether Session’s November 16, 2018 “deadline for brief submission” will exceed his job tenure! But, don’t kid yourself: this decision has already been written, maybe with input or assistance from a “restrictionist” organization. And, even if Sessions departs shortly after the midterms, as most expect, I’m sure Trump will be able to find another “restrictionist patsy” to do his “immigration dirty work” for him.

Want to know how ludicrous Sessions’s action is:  This case has been pending before the Immigration Court, the BIA, the Supreme Court, and now the Attorney General for nearly 15 years, with no end in sight. After Sessions rules against Negusie, the case will go back to the Court of Appeals, and then, perhaps, back to the Supremes, assuming Mr. Negusie lives long enough to see it through to its conclusion. When it comes to removing folks without Due Process, “time is of the essence” for guys like Sessions; but, when it comes to screwing asylum seekers, “time has no essence” — whatever it takes, no matter how long it takes.

Additionally, this is a great illustration of the absurd dereliction of duty in the Supreme’s so-called “Chevron doctrine.” It’s a purely judge-created device that enables the Supremes to avoid deciding important and potentially controversial legal issues by, in effect, “shuffling them off to Buffalo” (a/k/a the Executive Branch). Once in “Buffalo,” sometimes dysfunctional and often biased Executive Branch agencies can exercise their (often purely imaginary) “expertise” in construing ambiguous statutes (which is, after all, a question of law that constitutes the only function of the Article III Courts). And, does anybody (other than Jeff Sessions) really think that a politico like Jeff Sessions has any real “expertise” in immigration adjudication?

Interestingly, Justice Gorsuch, like his conservative predecessor the late Justice Scalia, has been openly skeptical of the Chevron doctrine. Perhaps ironically, he, along with the outlandish actions of the Administration that appointed him, could ultimately spell the well-deserved end or limitation of “Chevron deference.”

As we say in the business, stay tuned.  But, please, please, don’t “hold your breath” on this one!

PWS

10-18-18

🎃🎃🎃

 

 

 

JUSTICE GORSUCH EXPRESSES SOME SKEPTICISM ABOUT GOV’S UNLIMITED POWER IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION CASE!

6https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/chrisgeidner/supreme-court-dhs-immigrant-detention

Chris Geidner reports for BuzzFeed News:

In a case that the ACLU says could affect thousands of immigrants, the Supreme Court on Wednesday considered when the government has the right to detain a class of immigrants without a bail hearing.

Under a 1996 law, the federal government is allowed to detain immigrants whose criminal conviction or involvement in terrorism-related activities would make them inadmissible or deportable. The law says the government “shall” take any of those immigrants into custody “when the alien is released” from criminal custody. The question before the justices is: What happens if the Department of Homeland Security doesn’t do so immediately?

The arguments on Wednesday focused on the technicalities of the 1996 law, rules of grammar, and timelines — not the sort of fiery rhetoric usually favored by President Donald Trump or Attorney General Jeff Sessions when talking about immigrants.

And while the case was granted to resolve the question of whether the statute still applied if DHS does not act immediately — whether there is any time restriction — the arguments shifted to a question of what limitation would be reasonable.

After a back-and-forth with Justice Sonia Sotomayor and a question from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Neil Gorsuch spoke up early in the Wednesday arguments, asking, “[D]oes the government have any view about if ever the obligation [to take an immigrant into custody] lapses? Could it be 30 years? … Thirty years, and the government was aware of him the entire time and chose not to act. … Is there any limit on the government’s power?”

The government lawyer, Zachary Tripp from the Solicitor General’s Office, said the law created “a continuing obligation” that “does not lapse.”

Later, when Justice Stephen Breyer raised a similar question and Tripp began answering about when certain underlying crimes would be covered under the detention provision, Gorsuch interjected, said that back-and-forth was “quibbling,” and redirected Tripp to the larger question: “Justice Breyer’s question is my question, and I really wish you’d answer it.”

Breyer then stated his question more directly: “Is the government’s position that this paragraph, which says shall be arrested upon release, applies to a person who has been released 50 years before?”

Tripp, not giving in at all, said the government’s position is “absolutely that this applies regardless of the time” that’s passed.

. . . .

********************************

Read the complete article at the link.

I had predicted the possibility that Justice Gorsuch’s past jurisprudence questioning the extent of and deference to Executive Power could make him an “honest broker” in some immigration cases.

I’d like to believe Justice Kavanaugh’s testimony that he will approach cases in a fair and impartial manner. But, neither his partisan outburst during his conformation nor his fawning performance during the unnecessary “formal swearing in” that became a Trump campaign rally were very encouraging from a fairness and impartiality standpoint.

Both his reputation and the country would be better served if he filled the “open minded conservative” role played by his predecessor and mentor Justice Kennedy rather than the “bought and paid for partisan vote” that all the Senators and Trump expect him to be.

Indeed, the one unifying theme of the Senate confirmation process was that all believed that he would perform as a totally predictable right-wing partisan vote. If he doesn’t live up to this expectation, the Dems will be (pleasantly) shocked and the GOP outraged at his “betrayal.” That’s why he would do well to at least occasionally listen carefully to the analysis of some of his more “liberal leaning” colleagues.

Here’s the full transcript of the oral argument courtesy of Dan Kowalski over at LexisNexis Immigration Community: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2018/16-1363_h315.pdf

PWS

10-11-18

SUPREMES TAKE ON “STOP TIME” ISSUE FOR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL – TO RESOLVE “CIRCUIT SPLIT” — COULD AFFECT MANY THOUSANDS OF REMOVAL CASES – PEREIRA V. SESSIONS!

Here’s what SCOTUS Blog has to say about the issue:

“Issue: Whether, to trigger the stop-time rule by serving a “notice to appear,” the government must “specify” the items listed in the definition of a “notice to appear,” including “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be held.”

Here’s a link to the SCOTUS Blog material on Cir:

http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/pereira-v-sessions/

Here’s a link to the First Circuit’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, written by Judge Lipez which upheld the BIA’s ruling under so-called “Chevron deference:”

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/16-1033P-01A.pdf

And, here’s a “key quote” from Judge Lipez’s decision in Pereira that explains the issue a little more detail:

“The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) gives the Attorney General discretion to cancel the removal of a non-permanent resident alien if the alien meets certain criteria, including ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Under the “stop-time” rule, the alien’s period of continuous physical presence ends “when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a)” of the INA. Id. § 1229b(d)(1). In this case, we must decide whether a notice to appear that does not contain the date and time of the alien’s initial hearing is nonetheless effective to end the alien’s period of continuous physical presence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) answered this question affirmatively in Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (B.I.A. 2011). The BIA applied that rule in this case.

Joining the majority of circuit courts to address this issue, we conclude that the BIA’s decision in Camarillo is entitled to Chevron deference. We deny the petition for review.”

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So, with the 1st Circuit joining the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 7th, and 9th Circuits in upholding Matter of Camarillo, 25 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 2011); only the 3rd Circuit rejecting the BIA’s interpretation (Orozco- Velasquez v. Att’y Gen. United States, 817 F.3d 78, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2016)); and what is generally perceived as a “conservative leaning” Supreme Court, looks like a “slam dunk” for the Government, right? Not so fast!

On a question of statutory interpretation like this, I could definitely see some of the more conservative “strict constructionist” Justices teaming up with the “liberals” to reject the BIA’s interpretation by invoking the “plain meaning” rule of statutory construction to overcome “Chevron deference.” Indeed, quite interestingly, as I have noted in prior blogs, Justice Neil Gorsuch was an outspoken critic of Chevron while on the Tenth Circuit. Read his opinion in Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016) if you have any doubts! Here’s a link to that opinion: https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-9585.pdf

So, I wouldn’t assume at this point that Justice Gorsuch will be a “shill” or “pushover” for the Administration on all immigration issues, even if Trump thinks that’s the type of “loyalty” all his judicial appointments owe him. Actually, the oath of office that Federal Judges take requires them to uphold the Constitution of the United States, not the views and positions of President Trump, Attorney General Jeff Sessions, DHS Secretary Kristjen Nielsen, or anybody else of any importance whatsoever. That’s what real “judicial independence” (as opposed to the “captive” Immigration Judiciary) is all about!

And, you might ask what’s the “big deal” about this case? After all, even if the Supremes agree with the petitioner and the Third Circuit that the notice was defective, the BIA and DHS could easily cure the “problem” simply by specifying a “time, place, and date” for the Immigration Court hearing on the original Notice to Appear. Indeed, when I joined the Arlington Immigration Court in 2003 such a system, called “Interactive Scheduling” was in effect. But, like much else at EOIR it appears to have run into problems and been largely abandoned as the dockets mushroomed out of control. Many (not all) things about the administration of the Immigration Courts actually moved backward during my 13 year tenure in Arlington.

But, if the original Notice to Appear were held to be ineffective, then it would not serve to “Stop Time” for the 10 year period of “continuous physical presence” required to apply for the relief of “Cancellation of Removal.” This, in turn, would make thousands of individuals now in Immigration Court proceedings, perhaps tens of thousands, eligible to apply for Cancellation. And, it likely would require the reopening of thousands of already completed cases where the respondent was denied Cancellation of Removal based solely on the “Stop Time” rule. So, that’s why it’s worth the Supremes’ time to resolve this conflict among the lower Federal Courts.

PWS

01-13-18

“NINA T” DISHES ON THE SUPREMES — GORSUCH OFF TO TOUGH START – BATTLE WITH KAGAN LOOMING!

http://amp.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/10/why_rumors_of_a_gorsuch_kagan_supreme_court_clash_are_such_a_bombshell.html

Mark Joseph Stern reports for Slate:

“Following his nomination to the Supreme Court, Neil Gorsuch was packaged by his wealthy benefactors as the judicial equivalent of a carrot cake: mild and wholesome with the occasional hint of spice. Now that the justice has been safely installed on the court for life, he has revealed himself to be more akin to melted sorbet: sickly sweet and insubstantial with a tangy finish that induces slight nausea. Gorsuch’s abrupt pivot to arrogance has been on full display in his bumptious opinions and questions from the bench. But it also appears to be infecting his interactions with justices behind the scenes. Whispers emerging from the court indicate Gorsuch is more likely to alienate than influence even his conservative colleagues.

The latest sign of trouble comes from NPR’s Nina Totenberg, who dropped in on the indispensable Supreme Court podcast First Mondays to dish some gossip about the newest justice.”

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Read Nina’s “scoop” over on Slate at the above link.

Ah, the “Eddie Haskell act” is over, and the real fun begins.

PWS

10o-20-17

LA TIMES: SUPREMES MUST DELIVER ON PROMISE OF DUE PROCESS FOR IMMIGRANTS! — “[T]oo often immigrants haven’t received fair treatment from the courts.“ — Is Justice Gorsuch About To Make Good On His Oath To Uphold The Constitution By Standing Up For Due Process For Migrants?

http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-scotus-immigrants-20171005-story.html

“This week the Supreme Court heard arguments in two cases that pose the question of whether noncitizens should be afforded at least some of the due process of law that Americans take for granted. The answer in both cases should be a resounding yes.

On Monday, the justices considered whether a Filipino legal immigrant convicted of two home burglaries in California could be deported even if the wording of the federal law used to determine whether he could be removed from the U.S. was so unconstitutionally vague that it could not be enforced in a criminal court. On Tuesday, lawyers for a group of noncitizens detained by immigration authorities asked the court to rule that detainees are entitled to a bond hearing after six months of confinement.

Although the circumstances and legal issues in the two cases differ, the common denominator is the importance of affording due process to noncitizens.

James Garcia Dimaya, who was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident at the age of 13, pleaded no contest in 2007 and 2009 to two charges of residential burglary. Concluding that one of the convictions was an “aggravated felony,” the Board of Immigration Appeals agreed with the Homeland Security Department that Dimaya should be deported.

The United States is often called “a nation of immigrants.” But too often immigrants haven’t received fair treatment from the courts.
But the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals overturned that decision. It said the definition of “aggravated felony” in immigration law incorporated a definition of “crime of violence” that was similar to language in a different law the Supreme Court had concluded in 2015 was too vague to be constitutional.

At Monday’s oral argument, Deputy Solicitor General Edwin S. Kneedler said the law at issue in Dimaya’s case didn’t suffer from the same vagueness problem. But even if it did, Kneedler told the court, “immigration is distinctive” and deportation “is not punishment for [a] past offense.” In other words, even if the law was too vague to be used for the purposes of criminal punishment, it could still be used for the purposes of deportation.

This brought a devastating rejoinder from Justice Neil Gorsuch. “I can easily imagine a misdemeanant who may be convicted of a crime for which the sentence is six months in jail or a $100 fine, and he wouldn’t trade places in the world for someone who is deported,” Gorsuch said. He questioned the soundness of the “line that we’ve drawn in the past” between criminal punishment and civil penalties such as deportation.

We agree. If the court decides that the wording of the law that triggered Dimaya’s removal order was unconstitutionally vague, he should be entitled to relief. A law that is too vague to justify a criminal sentence shouldn’t be a good enough reason to expel someone from the country.

 

In the case argued Tuesday, a class-action lawsuit, noncitizens detained by immigration authorities asked the court to rule that they should receive bond hearings if their detention lasts for six months. The lead plaintiff is Alejandro Rodriguez, who grew up in Los Angeles as a lawful permanent resident. After Rodriguez was sentenced to five years’ probation on a misdemeanor drug possession conviction, he was detained and targeted for deportation to Mexico, the country he had left as a baby two decades earlier. He remained locked up as his legal battle dragged on for years.

The 9th Circuit ruled not only that detainees were entitled to bond hearings but also that they should be released unless the government could demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they were dangerous or a flight risk. But on Tuesday Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm Stewart told the court that detainees “have no such right.” He later said that insofar as foreigners arriving in the U.S. are concerned, the Supreme Court has made it clear that “whatever process Congress chooses to give is due process.”

Yet in recent years the court has recognized not only that noncitizens have constitutional rights but that deportation can be a catastrophic experience. In June, the court overturned the guilty plea of an immigrant from South Korea because his lawyer wrongly told him he wouldn’t be deported as a consequence of a plea bargain.

The United States is often called “a nation of immigrants.” But too often immigrants haven’t received fair treatment from the courts. The cases argued this week offer the Supreme Court an opportunity to rectify that injustice.”

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”Mouthing” due process for migrants is easy; the BIA does it all the time — so does EOIR.  But, actually providing due process for migrants is something totally different. Most courts, and particulately the BIA, routinely sign off on unfair procedures and interpretations that would never be considered “Due Process” in any other context.

I’m “cautiously heartened” by Justice Gorsuch’s apparent realization of the potentially catastrophic real human consequences of removal (often blithely ignored or downplayed by the BIA, Sessions, restrictionists, and Federal Courts) and recognition that the “civil-criminal” distinction is totally bogus — designed to sweep Constitutional violations under the rug — and needs to be eliminated.

As an Immigration Judge, when I was assigned to the “Detained Docket” in Arlington, I had case after case of green card holders who had minor crimes for which they paid fines or got suspended sentences — in other words, hadn’t spent a day in jail — “mandatorily detained” for months, sometimes years, pending resolution of their “civil” immigration cases. In plain language, they were sentenced to indefinite imprisonment but without the protections that a criminal defendant would receive! They, their families, and their employers were incredulous that this could be happening in the United States of America. I simply could not explain it in a way that made sense.

Talk is one thing, action quote another. But, if Justice Gorsuch folllows through on his apparent inclination to make Due Process protections for migrants “a reality” rather than a “false promise,” Constitutional protections will be enhanced for every American! We are no better than how we treat the least among us.

Ultimately, full delivery on the promise of Constitutional Due Process for everyone in America, including migrants, will require the creation of an independent Article I U.S. Immigraton Court. The current “captive system” — unwilling and unable to stand up for true Due Process for migrants — is a facade behind which routine denials of Constitutional Due Process take place. As Americans, we should demand better for the most vulnerable among us.

PWS

10-06-17

3RD CIR REAFFIRMS THAT 18 USC 16(B) “CRIME OF VIOLENCE” AS INCORPORATED INTO THE INA IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE: Mateo v. Attorney General — Supremes Remain MIA

151160p

Before: McKEE, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: JUDGE VANASKIE

KEY QUOTE:

“The petitioner in Baptiste, like Mateo, faced removal on the basis of his purported status as an alien convicted of a crime of violence under § 16(b). As stated previously, § 16(b) defines a crime of violence as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In order to determine whether the crime of conviction is a crime of violence under § 16(b), courts utilize the same categorical approach that was applied to the ACCA’s residual clause. Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 617. The petitioner in Baptiste argued that the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson striking down the residual clause should apply to negate § 16(b). After comparing the features of the § 16(b) analysis to those found to contribute to the unconstitutionality of the residual clause in Johnson, we agreed that the same defects were present in § 16(b), rendering the provision unconstitutional. Regarding the first feature, we recognized that the same “ordinary case inquiry” is used when applying the categorical approach in both contexts. Id. Like the residual clause, § 16(b) “offers no reliable way to choose between . . . competing accounts of what” that “judge- imagined abstraction” of the crime involves. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2558. Thus, we concluded in Baptiste that “the ordinary case inquiry is as indeterminate in the § 16(b) context as it was in the residual clause context.” 841 F.3d at 617. Turning to the second feature—the risk inquiry—we observed that despite slight linguistic differences between the provisions, the same indeterminacy inherent in the residual clause was present in § 16(b). Id. “[B]ecause the two inquiries under the residual clause that the Supreme Court found to be indeterminate—the ordinary case inquiry and the serious potential risk inquiry—are materially the same as the inquiries under § 16(b),” we concluded that “§ 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.” Id. at 621. This conclusion applies equally to Mateo’s petition. Our treatment of § 16(b) is in step with the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, which have all similarly deemed the provision to be void for vagueness in immigration cases. See Shuti, 828 F.3d at 451; Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1120; Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2016). The Seventh Circuit has also taken this position in the criminal context. See United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2015). In fact, the only circuit that has broken stride is the Fifth Circuit.7 See United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 677 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). In the meantime, we await the Supreme Court’s decision in the appeal of Dimaya.”

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The Dimaya case before the Supremes (again) should be a good test of whether newest Justice Gorsuch will adhere to his strict constructionist principles where they will produce a favorable result for a migrant under the immigration laws.

The Johnson case, relied on by the Third Circuit, was written by none other than the late Justice Antonin Scalia, a leading strict constructionist and conservative judicial icon, who nevertheless found that his path sometimes assisted migrants in avoiding removal.  So, on paper, this should be a “no brainer” for Justice Gorsuch, who has also been critical of some of the BIA’s “Chevron overreach” and non-responsiveness to Article III Courts.

PWS

09-07-17

 

Supremes Drop Back, Boot It Deep, J. Gorsuch Calls For Fair Catch, Play To Resume In Fall Quarter! — I.O.W. They “Punted” The 3 Remaining Immigration Cases On The Fall 2016 Docket!

Actually, only two of them”went to Gorsuch,” that is, were set for re-arguement next Fall, presumably because the Justices were tied 4-4. The other case was kicked back to the 9th Circuit to reconsider in light of Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court’s recent decision on “Bivens actions.” Here’s a link to my prior Ziglar blog:

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/06/19/relax-cabinet-members-supremes-say-no-monetary-damages-for-unconstitutional-acts-ziglar-v-abbasi/

You can read all about it over on ImmigrationProf Blog in a short article by Dean Kevin Johnson at this link:

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2017/06/supreme-court-ends-2016-term-with-three-immigration-decisions.html

 

PWS

06-26-17

Justice Gorsuch Thinks It’s Great That The “government can lose in its own courts.” — I Agree! — But, The Guy Who Appointed Him Might Not!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/gorsuch-stresses-rule-of-law-system-where-government-can-lose-in-its-own-courts/2017/06/03/6d85cdc4-487b-11e7-a196-a1bb629f64cb_story.html?utm_term=.16cabc457759

Robert Barnes reports for the Washington Post:

“CAMBRIDGE, Mass. — With legal challenges to the Trump administration’s initiatives multiplying in federal courts, new Supreme Court Justice Neil M. Gorsuch extolled the virtues of judicial independence and praised a legal system in which “government can lose in its own courts” Friday night.

It was the first public appearance off the bench for President Trump’s choice for the high court, who joined Justice Stephen G. Breyer at the Harvard Marshall Forum. Both are former Marshall scholars who did graduate work in the United Kingdom, and spoke at an event commemorating the 70th anniversary of George C. Marshall’s plan to rebuild Europe after World War II.

The event was about as noncontroversial as it could be, even if one of the first questions to Gorsuch concerned a naked sex doll the future justice observed when he had tea with an Oxford dean.

Trump last week made good on his pledge to political opponents to “see you in the Supreme Court,” asking the justices to revive his plan to temporarily ban entry to citizens of six mostly Muslim countries. A string of judges and appeals courts have concluded the president’s executive orders have more to do with his campaign pledge to ban Muslims from entering the country than an immediate threat to the country’s security.

Trump has bitterly denounced those rulings, as well as a decision to stop his proposal to cut federal funds from cities that protect illegal immigrants. During the campaign, he criticized a federal judge who ruled against him in a suit involving his for-profit universities because he said the judge’s Mexican ancestry made him prejudiced.

Jeffrey Rosen, a legal scholar and writer who is also president of the National Constitution Center, did not ask Gorsuch and Breyer about those controversies or any matter before the court.

But Gorsuch and Breyer talked in broad terms about independence and respect for the judicial branch’s decisions.

Gorsuch said he is grateful for the tradition that “judges can safely decide the law according to their conscience, without fear of reprisal.”

It is a remarkable thing, he said, “that government can lose, in its own courts, and accept the judgment of those courts without an army to back up the judgments. Just nine old people in polyester black robes that we have to buy at the uniform supply store…that is a heritage that is very special.”

As he did at his confirmation hearing, Gorsuch downplayed divisive decisions and stressed unanimity and acceptance of court’s decisions. Only about 5 percent of cases are appealed, he said, and “our court” accepts only 80 or so a year, a relative handful.

“Nine justices appointed by six presidents over a 30-year period,” Gorsuch said. “And we’re unanimous about 40 percent of the time.”

Of course, it is the closely divided cases at the appeals courts and the Supreme Court that are its most important. But Gorsuch and Breyer stressed the independence judges have to make controversial decisions.”

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Read the complete story at the link.

Even today, in the wake of tragedy in London, Trump couldn’t resist an inappropriate tweet taking a cheap shot at the U.S. Courts. Nor could he stop himself from trying to promote panic and throwing darts at the Mayor of London. He’s certainly the embodiment of the “Ugly American.”

One of the major differences between the U.S. and the many countries I dealt with on a daily basis over the past 21 years in various courts is the true independence of the Article III judiciary in the U.S.

By contrast, Trump’s demeanor, behavior, temperament, and the folks he surrounds himself with are very reminiscent of third-world dictators.

PWS

06-04-17