GONZO’S WORLD: MORE “AIMLESS DOCKET RESHUFFLING” & BIGGER CONTRIVED IMMIGRATION COURT BACKLOGS ON THE WAY AS SESSIONS SEVERELY LIMITS EOIR’S AUTHORITY TO “ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE” CASES – MATTER OF CASTRO-TUM, 27 I&N DEC. 271 (A.G. 2018)

CASTRO-TUM AG3926

KEY QUOTE:

On January 4, 2018, I directed the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) to refer for my review its decision in this matter, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i), and I invited the parties and any interested amici to submit briefs addressing questions relevant to that certification. Matter of Castro- Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 187 (A.G. 2018).

For the reasons set forth in the accompanying opinion, I affirm the Board’s order and remand for further proceedings. I hold that immigration judges and the Board do not have the general authority to suspend indefinitely immigration proceedings by administrative closure. Accordingly, immigration judges and the Board may only administratively close a case where a previous regulation or a previous judicially approved settlement expressly authorizes such an action. Where a case has been administratively closed without such authority, the immigration judge or the Board, as appropriate, shall recalendar the case on the motion of either party. I overrule Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012), Matter of W- Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017), and any other Board precedent, to the extent those decisions are inconsistent with this opinion.

Matter of Castro-Tum

In recent years, immigration judges and the Board have increasingly ordered administrative closure to remove a large number of cases from their dockets. The Board has described the practice as “a docket management tool that is used to temporarily pause removal proceedings,” Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17, 18 (BIA 2017), and “remove a case from an Immigration Judge’s active calendar or from the Board’s docket.” Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688, 692 (BIA 2012).

Although described as a temporary suspension, administrative closure is effectively permanent in most instances. Unless a party “move[s] to recalendar [an administratively closed case] before the Immigration Court . . . or to reinstate the appeal before the Board,” id., the case remains indefinitely

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suspended without a final resolution. Statistics supplied by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) demonstrate that effect.

Since 1980, immigration judges have recalendared less than a third of administratively closed cases. Because the case comes off the active docket, the immigration judge no longer tracks it, and EOIR does not count the case as active in assessing backlogs in immigration proceedings. See, e.g.,Memorandum for All Immigration Judges, from Brian M. O’Leary, Chief Immigration Judge, EOIR, Re: Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 13-01: Continuances and Administrative Closure at 2–3 (Mar. 7, 2013) (“OPPM 13-01”). Administratively closed cases are also difficult to recalendar. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) may not know when the reason for the suspension (such as the pendency of a collateral proceeding) has been resolved. Even where DHS moves to recalendar, the Board has imposed the burden of persuasion on the movant.W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. at 18 & n.4. And the alien respondent in most cases has few incentives to seek to recalendar because “as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.” INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992).

The practice of administrative closure has grown dramatically as the Board has made administrative closure easier to obtain. Statistics maintained by EOIR reveal that over three decades, from EOIR Fiscal Year 1980 to Fiscal Year 2011, 283,366 cases were administratively closed. But in a mere six years, from October 1, 2011 through September 30, 2017, immigration judges and the Board ordered administrative closure in 215,285 additional cases, nearly doubling the total number of cases subjected to administrative closure.

This sharp increase tracks changes in Board precedent. For decades, the immigration judge would grant administrative closure only if both parties agreed. In its 2012 Avetisyan decision, however, the Board discarded that principle and authorized administrative closure even over a party’s objection. 25 I&N Dec. at 694, 696. After the Avetisyan test proved unwieldy, the Board recently “clarif[ied]” that the deciding factor should be “whether the party opposing administrative closure has provided a persuasive reason for the case to proceed and be resolved on the merits.” W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. at 20 (emphasis added).

This certified case illustrates but one example of how administrative closure encumbers the fair and efficient administration of immigration cases. The respondent entered this country illegally in 2014 and was immediately detained. As an unaccompanied minor, he was served with a Notice to Appear and released to a relative after providing the address where they would reside. Despite several efforts to notify the respondent of his hearing dates, he repeatedly failed to appear. The Immigration Judge nonetheless

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continued this case four times and finally ordered the case administratively closed on the ground that DHS had not shown it had a sufficiently reliable address to provide adequate notice.

On appeal, the Board vacated the Immigration Judge’s administrative closure order and remanded. DHS represents that this certified case is one of nearly 200 decisions between April 2017 and December 2017 in which an immigration judge either ordered administrative closure or refused to recalendar an administratively closed case over DHS’s objection. Brief for DHS at 10–11, Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 187 (A.G. 2018).

For the reasons stated below, I affirm the Board’s November 27, 2017 order and hold that there is no general authority for administrative closure. Immigration judges exercise only the authority provided by statute or delegated by the Attorney General. Congress has never authorized administrative closures in a statute, and Department of Justice regulations only permit administrative closure in specific categories of cases. The Attorney General has never delegated the general authority, and I decline to do so now. Cases that have been administratively closed absent a specific authorizing regulatory provision or judicially approved settlement shall be recalendared upon motion of either party. I overrule all Board precedents inconsistent with this opinion and remand for further proceedings.

*********************************

Contrary to Sessions’s usual bogus narrative and distorted statistics, almost all Administrative Closings were either 1) on the DHS’s motion; or 2) on joint motion of the parties. Only minute numbers of cases were closed by IJs over the objection of the DHS under Matter of Avestan.

Indeed, even after this Administration established a basic “no Administrative closing” policy, DHS could only come up with 200 cases closed by IJs over their objection in a period of seven months! That works out to fewer than 400 per year! In other words, citing Avetisyan as a significant factor in the closing of  215,000 cases over the past six years is as absurd as it is intentionally intellectually dishonest.

And, the idea that the DHS is “unfairly burdened” by having to track the Administratively Closed cases is equally absurd. Most cases were closed either because 1) there was relief pending with USCIS, or 2) they were, quite properly, low enforcement priorities for ICE. The idea that it’s unfair to expect DHS to keep track of the cases closed for reasons relating almost exclusively to their own adjudication system and ever-changing enforcement priorities is nonsensical.

The statistic that fewer than one-third of the Administratively Closed cases were ever re-calendared basically supports the idea that they probably shouldn’t have been on the docket in the first place.  Obviously, if the USCIS applications were denied, the individuals were picked up for violations, or the cases became ICE enforcement priorities, ICE would have moved to re-calendar. I almost never denied motions to re-calendar by either party, nor am I aware that any of my colleagues did so on a widespread basis. And, denial of such a motion was appealable to the BIA. There has been no showing that many appeals about failures to re-calendar have been filed by any party.

Sessions’s decision also “sweeps under the table” the real major cause of delays and backlogs: “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” instituted by the DHS or EOIR for enforcement or administrative purposes without the input and in many cases over the wishes of private parties. Almost all private immigration practitioners have seen their “ready for trial” cases “shuffled off to the end of the docket” — sometimes 3-5 years away — without their consent to accommodate the latest “IJ details” or the ICE/EOIR “priority of the day.” This often means that the entire case must be prepared again — country conditions change, witnesses die or otherwise become unavailable, memories fade, and most paying clients balk at paying additional fees for circumstances over which they had no control.

Contrary to the “myth” promoted by Sessions and the restrictionists, most individuals in immigration proceedings seek not indefinite delay — which keeps their lives on hold — but a fair, informed, reasoned decision one way or the other within a reasonable period of time.

Sessions and most of the other arrogant bureaucrats driving this absurd parody of a court system have never been in the private practice of immigration law. I have been. While most of my work was not in Immigration Court, I dealt with enough clients to know that neither the lawyer (who has to “babysit” case and prepare it numerous times for the same fee or for free) nor the clients (who also want some certainty in their lives and those of their families) had much interest in lengthy delays.

This case is just further proof of the pressing need for an Article I U.S. Immigration Court and a truly independent immigration judiciary.

Meanwhile, the immigration bar has predictably reacted with outrage to the latest Sessions abuse of power and “dissing” of Due Process.

Below (courtesy of Laura Lynch at AILA) are links to a few statements that were issued earlier this evening by a few NGOs:

PWS

05-18-18

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Robert Messerli
Robert Messerli
5 years ago

I appreciated your comments on this decision. The most troubling thing to me is the elimination of even the appearance of fundamental fairness. Immigration Court is structured the way that it is (with the Judge being under DOJ and ICE attorneys being under DHS) so that decisions have to be based on facts on legal reasoning. Now, if ICE objects to admin closure, the IJ is essentially powerless and therefore a mere extension of ICE policy.

I’ve asked an IJ for admin closure for the adjudication of an I-601A provisional waiver, and the ICE trial attorney opposed. When the IJ asked why he opposed, he answered, “policy.” The IJ didn’t seem pleased with that answer, but now there is no need for any factual or legal analysis or a reasoned decision. That is the definition of capricious and arbitrary.