"The Voice of the New Due Process Army" ————– Musings on Events in U.S. Immigration Court, Immigration Law, Sports, and Other Random Topics by Retired United States Immigration Judge (Arlington, Virginia) and former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals Paul Wickham Schmidt. To see my complete professional bio, just click on the link below.
As recent polls haveshown, Americans’ confidence in the Supreme Court is at an all-time low, which presumably has something to do with the decision by the Court’s conservatives to inflict their medieval ideas about bodily autonomy on the country and end the national right to an abortion in June. Might it also have something to do with one of the justice’s spouses reportedly attempting to overturn the 2020 election and another securing his lifetime appointment without actually being properly vetted by the FBI? Yes, sure. But the biggie is no doubt the overturning of Roe v. Wade. (No, really: You don’t have to be a constitutional law expert to figure this out, seeing as a majority of Americans think abortion should be legal in all or most instances.)
Justice Elena Kagan—who happens to be one of the few people on the Court who doesn’t believe half of the population should be treated like second-class citizens—recently pointed this out. At a July judicial conference in Big Sky, Montana, she told an audience: “If, over time, the Court loses all connection with the public and with public sentiment, that is a dangerous thing for democracy.” Earlier this month, while speaking on a panel at Northwestern University’s Pritzker School of Law, she declared that a court is legitimate “when it’s acting like a court,” and that it’s a problem when justices attempt to impose their personal preferences on society. And last week, she made similar remarks at Salve Regina University in Newport, Rhode Island, saying that throughout the Court’s history, “The very worst moments have been times when judges have even essentially reflected one party’s or one ideology’s set of views in their legal decisions. The thing that builds up reservoirs of public confidence is the Court acting like a court and not acting like an extension of the political process.”
Kagan’s comments don’t appear to be sitting very well with certain male justices. As Chief Justice John Roberts told a judicial conference in Colorado Springs, “Simply because people disagree with an opinion is not a basis for questioning the legitimacy of the Court.” But it was Samuel Alito’s response that was the most creepy, given the very clear problem he has has with women.
In a comment to The Wall Street Journal, the archconservative said: “It goes without saying that everyone is free to express disagreement with our decisions and to criticize our reasoning as they see fit. But saying or implying that the Court is becoming an illegitimate institution or questioning our integrity crosses an important line.” In other words, he wants Elena Kagan to shut her liberal mouth, which is not only some anti-free-speech bullshit but a convenient way for him to ignore the fact that he shares a large portion of the blame for the widely held view that the Court has no integrity.
Unfortunately, Alito’s comment to the Journal shouldn’t surprise many people who’ve kept up with his work. Not only did he author the opinion overturning Roe v. Wade in June, but he gleefully noted that his inspiration for doing so was a 17th-century English jurist who supported marital rape and had women executed for witchcraft. Later, after a 10-year-old rape victim was denied an abortion in her home state, Alito was doing comedy routines about taking away a pregnant person’s right to choose.
Of course, let’s not forget the other justice who’s done his part to erode confidence in the Supreme Court
. . . .
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Alito’s brand of “justice” harkens back to glorious days of yore when all-male judges had a range of methods for dealing with uppity women who thought they were entitled to control their own bodies and lives! — Woman Being “Tried By Ordeal” 17th Century Woodcut Public Realm Source: Ancient Origins Website https://www.ancient-origins.net/history/trial-ordeal-life-or-death-method-judgement-004160
Read the rest of The Levin Report and subscribe at the above links.
Yesterday, new Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson was invested. As I’ve observed before, after the niceties and handshakes, her right wing extremist GOP colleagues will return to their chambers and continue to plot ways to bend and distort the law to dehumanize, disenfranchise, and demean Justice Brown Jackson, others like her, and all of the genuine American values she represents.
Lawrence Tribe’s tweeted critique of Alito’s disingenuous nonsense (see, full article) is “spot on:” “It’s politically agenda-driven decisions that cross the line by eroding the Court’s legitimacy.”
No institution welcomes scrutiny. Maintaining internal cohesion and operational focus demands informational boundaries against the rest of the world. This wish deserves respect, but not automatic submission, especially when matters of vast public consequence are at stake.
That’s why news media take it as a duty to ignore organizational secrecy rules — except when disclosure would cause unwarranted harm — and insist that public awareness must outweigh institutional convenience. A document leaked from most any federal agency that upended longstanding policy would unquestionably be legitimate news, even if it was preliminary, even if exposure would gum up a cozy internal process, even if the leak broke agency rules.
But not when it comes to the Supreme Court.
Of all our governmental institutions, it is unique in the awe and deference with which our news media, for all their endless claims to seek truth aggressively, treat it.
To be sure, secrecy has a place in the judicial system. Grand juries, for example, are prosecutorial contrivances where untested evidence is presented and people suspected of wrongdoing have weak adversarial protections. Damaging the innocent by publicizing unrebutted claims is a strong possibility. Secrecy makes sense.
But the issue here is altogether different. The leak was of a 98-page draft opinion with 118 footnotes, not a filched personal email or the secondhand account of an overheard chat. It was deeply researched and carefully composed and was distributed internally nearly three months ago, and it signals a major change in an explosive area of public policy. Publishing it doesn’t endanger national security and puts no innocent lives at risk.
So should the Supreme Court, virtually alone among core public institutions, be entitled to say, “We’ll show it to you when we’re ready for you to see it?”
At best, that exceptionalist claim rests on a carefully nurtured myth of the court as a scholarly sanctuary in which big questions of public purpose are engaged through reflection, historical inquiry and quiet, reasoned debate, a process of ripening that must take place behind the sealed doors of an intellectual greenhouse.
That fiction lost credibility a long time ago, at least for anybody who was paying attention in the year 2000 when the court, with the flimsiest of pretexts, awarded the presidency to the candidate with fewer votes but of the same party as its majority.
Indeed, what standards of accountability govern the court? Its members serve life terms free from disciplinary oversight. To get aboard, nominees routinely lie before Congress — about their personal behavior and their judicial philosophy — rendering the Senate’s authority to approve candidates meaningless. Serving justices are not held to any discernible standard of independence. Their right to rule on matters in which close family have personal stakes, or on which they have clear prior leanings, is completely unregulated.
And then there’s the recent sharp increase in furtive rulings reached off-season without full briefing or oral argument — known as the shadow docket — which has further narrowed the window of public visibility. Last summer the court issued 11 such rulings, up from three in 2016, in a slapdash and opaque workaround beloved of the conservative majority that produces jurisprudence that “every day becomes more unreasoned, inconsistent, and impossible to defend,” as dissenting liberal Justice Elena Kagan said.
Perhaps the Roe leak will inaugurate a new era for the court. Maybe there will be more impertinent reporting that exposes the reasoning, bargaining, trade-offs and personal dynamics that drive constitutional lawmaking at the highest levels. Rather than something to be dreaded, such transparency would leave us all better informed and more fully empowered to play the role the system prescribes for us — to shape our collective future.
Edward Wasserman is professor of journalism and former dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at UC Berkeley.
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Read Wasserman’s full article at the link.
He says, “No institution welcomes scrutiny.” Very true. Any leader or group of leaders who claim the contrary are probably lying.
Scrutiny sometimes brings accountability. And, as our system deteriorates before our eyes, that’s something that has become rare in today’s politics and public life.
Elizabeth Gibson Managing Attorney National Immigrant Justice Center Publisher of “The Gibson Report”
Weekly Briefing
Note: The briefing is back after a short hiatus while I transitioned to a new position at NIJC. It will be coming from my gmail for a few weeks while I set up a more long-term distribution system. In the meantime, please add egibson@heartlandalliance.org to your trusted contact list so that any future messages do not go to spam.
CONTENTS (click to jump to section)
PRACTICE ALERTS
NEWS
LITIGATION & AGENCY UPDATES
RESOURCES
EVENTS
PRACTICE ALERTS
eROPs: EOIR has begun digitizing some paper records of proceedings (ROPs). Once an ROP is an eROP, only ECAS electronic filing will be permitted on that case. However, this will be a lengthy process and it sounds like EOIR is prioritizing conversion of smaller records first.
DHS: Individuals eligible for TPS under this designation must have continuously resided in the United States since March 1, 2022. Individuals who attempt to travel to the United States after March 1, 2022 will not be eligible for TPS.
USCIS: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services today announced that it is updating the USCIS Policy Manual to consider deferred action and related employment authorization for noncitizens who have an approved Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant, for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) classification but who cannot apply to adjust status to become a lawful permanent resident (LPR) because a visa number is not available.
AP: A federal appeals court on Friday upheld sweeping asylum restrictions to prevent spread of COVID-19 but restored protections to keep migrant families from being expelled to their home countries without a chance to plead their cases. Almost simultaneously, a federal judge in another case ruled that the Biden administration wrongly exempted unaccompanied children from the restrictions and ordered that they be subject to them in a week, allowing time for an emergency appeal.
Bloomberg: The estimated wait time for a work permit has risen to eight to 12 months, up from about three months in 2020, according to data from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.
Law360: Texas’ Operation Lone Star border security initiative has expanded over the past year despite courtroom setbacks revealing cracks in its legal foundation, and it appears poised to grow further unless the federal government steps in to confront it.
SCOTUS: “Wooden committed his burglaries on a single night, in a single uninterrupted course of conduct. The crimes all took place at one location, a one-building storage facility with one address. Each offense was essentially identical, and all were intertwined with the others. The burglaries were part and parcel of the same scheme, actuated by the same motive, and accomplished by the same means.”
SCOTUSblog: The Supreme Court on Wednesday [in oral arguments] returned to the scope of the right to sue federal officers for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, in a case arising from events surrounding an (unfairly) disparaged inn and suspicious characters near the U.S.-Canada border.
Lexis: As we noted above, while (b)(4) requires “changed country conditions,” (b)(3) does not. Thus, the BIA’s reference to a “material change in country conditions” and the analysis that followed shows that the BIA applied § 1003.23(b)(4). In applying the standard of § 1003.23(b)(4) to a timely filed motion, the BIA acted contrary to law.
Lexis: . After he pled guilty to first-degree home invasion, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal. But the removal didn’t go as planned: DHS failed to show that Jasso was in fact removable, and the immigration judge terminated the proceeding. So DHS tried again. It started a second removal proceeding based on a new legal theory but the same underlying facts. The problem? The doctrine of claim preclusion prevents parties from litigating matters they failed to raise in an earlier case. Because claim preclusion barred the second removal proceeding, we grant the petition for review, vacate, and remand.
Reuters: A federal appeals court on Monday declined to dismiss an “unprecedented” criminal case filed during the Trump administration against a Massachusetts judge accused of impeding a federal immigration arrest of a defendant in her courtroom.
Law360: Sixteen attorneys general of Democratic-led states, including the District of Columbia, are defending a new Illinois law phasing out immigrant detention contracts and urging the Seventh Circuit to dismiss a challenge by two Illinois counties, saying the policy does not interfere with federal enforcement of immigration law.
NYT: People with health conditions that place them at high risk from Covid-19 have been denied access to coronavirus vaccine booster shots while in federal immigration detention, the American Civil Liberties Union said in a lawsuit filed on Tuesday.
Reuters: The U.S. Embassy in Havana announced on Thursday it would increase staffing and resume some visa processing in Cuba several years after the Trump administration slashed personnel at the facility following a spate of unexplained health incidents.
AILA: EOIR will open immigration courts in Hyattsville, Maryland, and Laredo, Texas, today, February 28, 2022. The Hyattsville and Laredo immigration courts will have 16 and 8 immigration judges, respectively. Both courts will hear transferred cases; EOIR is notifying parties whose locations have changed.
AILA: Due to conflict in both regions, DHS will extend and redesignate South Sudan for TPS for 18 months, and designate Sudan for TPS for 18 months. The extension and redesignation of South Sudan is in effect from 5/3/2022, through 11/3/2023. The memo details eligibility guidelines.
AILA: USCIS announced that its website will now feature a Lockbox Filing Location Updates page, where customers can track when lockbox form filing locations are updated. Updates will also be emailed and announced on social media.
USCIS: USCIS has clarified Form I-9 guidance related to Native American tribal documents. We also published new guidance regarding T nonimmigrants (victims of human trafficking) and U nonimmigrants (victims of certain other crimes) in the M-274, Handbook for Employers. USCIS has provided these updates to respond to customer needs.
Thanks for all you do for due process and fundamental fairness in America, Liz! And congrats again to both you and NIJC/Heartland Alliance on your new position!
My good friend Heidi Altman, Director of Policy at NIJC, should be delighted, as Liz is a “distinguished alum” of both the CALS Asylum Clinic at Georgetown Law (where Heidi was a Fellow) and my Refugee Law & Policy class. Liz also served as an Arlington Intern and a Judicial Law Clerk at the NY Immigration Court. Liz has been a “powerful force for due process, clear, analytical writing, and best practices” wherever she has been! So, I’m sure that will continue at NIJC! Clearly, Liz is someone who eventually belongs on the Federal Bench at some level.
Heidi Altman Director of Policy National Immigrant Justice Center PHOTO: fcnl.org
Liz’s mention under “Litigation” of the Supremes’ decision in Wooden v U.S., where Justice Kagan for a unanimous Court interpreted the term “single occasion” broadly in favor of a criminal defendant, raises an interesting immigration issue.
Two decades ago, in Matter of Adetiba, 20 I&N Dec. 506 (BIA 1992), the BIA basically “nullified” the INA’s statutory exemption from deportation for multiple crimes “arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” Rejecting the 9th Circuit’s contrary ruling, the BIA essentially read the exception out of the statute by effectively limiting it to lesser included offenses.
How narrow was this interpretation? Well, in 21 years on the immigration appellate and trial benches, I can’t recall a single case where the “scheme” did not result in deportation under Adetiba. Taking advantage of the outrageous “doctrine of judicial task avoidance” established by the Supremes in the notorious “Brand X,”the BIA eventually took the “super arrogant” step of nullifying all Circuit interpretations that conflicted with Adetiba! Matter of Islam, 25 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 2011).
Surprisingly, in my view, in his concurring opinion in Wooden, Justice Gorsuch actually applied the “rule of lenity” — something else the “21st Century BIA” has basically “read out of the law” in their haste to deport! Here’s what Justice Gorsuch said:
Today, the Court does not consult lenity’s rule, but neither does it forbid lower courts from doing so in doubtful cases. That course is the sound course. Under our rule of law, punishments should never be products of judicial conjecture about this factor or that one. They should come only with the assent of the people’s elected representatives and in laws clear enough to supply “fair warning . . . to the world.” McBoyle, 283 U. S., at 27.7
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase Jeffrey S. Chase Blog Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
As the ongoing (“backlog enhancing”) “Pereira fiasco” shows, the BIA has had little problem “blowing off” or distinguishing the Supremes to deport or deny when asked by DHS Enforcement to do so. Today’s BIA “rule” for interpreting supposedly “ambiguous” statutes is actually straightforward, if one-sided: Adopt whatever interpretation DHS Enforcement offers even if that means “taking a pass” on a better interpretation offered by the respondent. So, I’m sure that Garland’s current “Miller Lite” BIA will simply distinguish Wooden as dealing with statutory language different from the INA and ignore its broader implications if asked to do so by “their partners” at DHS Enforcement.
But, whether all Circuits will see it that way, and/or allow themselves to continue to be humiliated by “Brand X,” or whether the issue will reach the Supremes, are different questions. In any event, immigration advocates should pay attention to Wooden, even if the BIA is likely to blow it off.
The current Supremes don’t seem to have much difficulty jettisoning their own precedents when motivated to do so! Why they would continue to feel bound by the bogus “Chevron doctrine” or its “steroid laden progeny Brand X” to follow the interpretations of Executive Branch administrative judges on questions of law is beyond me! Somewhere Chief Justice John Marshall must be turning over in his grave!
SANCHEZ ET UX. v. MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 20–315. Argued April 19, 2021—Decided June 7, 2021
Petitioner Jose Santos Sanchez is a citizen of El Salvador who challenges the denial of his application to become a lawful permanent resident (LPR) of the United States. Sanchez entered the United States unlaw- fully in 1997. In 2001, the Government granted him Temporary Pro- tected Status (TPS). The TPS program allows foreign nationals of a country designated by the Government as having unusually bad or dangerous conditions to live and work in the United States while the conditions last. See §1254a. In 2014, Sanchez applied under §1255 of the immigration laws to obtain LPR status. Section 1255 provides a way for a “nonimmigrant”—a foreign national lawfully present in this country on a temporary basis—to obtain an “[a]djustment of status” to LPR. 8 U. S. C. §1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigra- tion Services determined Sanchez ineligible for LPR status because he entered the United States unlawfully. Sanchez successfully chal- lenged that decision before the District Court, which reasoned that Sanchez’s TPS required treating him as if he had been lawfully admit- ted to the country for purposes of his LPR application. The Third Cir- cuit reversed, finding Sanchez’s unlawful entry into the country pre- cluded his eligibility for LPR status under §1255, notwithstanding his TPS.
Held: A TPS recipient who entered the United States unlawfully is not eligible under §1255 for LPR status merely by dint of his TPS. Section 1255 provides that eligibility for LPR status generally requires an “ad- mission” into the country— defined to mean “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” §1101(a)(13)(A). Sanchez did not enter lawfully.
2
SANCHEZ v. MAYORKAS Syllabus
And his TPS does not eliminate the effect of that unlawful entry. Sec- tion 1254a(f)(4) provides that a TPS recipient who applies for perma- nent residency will be treated as having nonimmigrant status—the status traditionally and generally needed to invoke the LPR process under §1255. But that provision does not aid the TPS recipient in meeting §1255’s separate admission requirement. Lawful status and admission are distinct concepts in immigration law, and establishing the former does not establish the latter. Sanchez resists this conclu- sion, arguing that the statute’s directive that a TPS recipient “shall be considered . . . as a nonimmigrant” for purposes of §1255 means he must also be considered as admitted. But the immigration laws no- where state that admission is a prerequisite of nonimmigrant status. So there is no reason to interpret the TPS provision’s conferral of nonimmigrant status as including a conferral of admission. In fact, contrary to Sanchez’s position, there are immigration categories in which individuals have nonimmigrant status without admission. See, e.g., §§1101(a)(10), 1101(a)(15)(U), 1182(d)(14). Thus, when Congress confers nonimmigrant status for purposes of §1255, but says nothing about admission, the Court has no basis for ruling an unlawful entrant eligible to become an LPR. Pp. 4–9.
967 F. 3d 242, affirmed.
KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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So TPSers who are long time residents and meet the requirements for a green card will continue to twist in the wind. I wouldn’t hold my breath for Congress to help them out. Many of us believed there were better interpretations available that wouldhave produced a more sensible and humane result. But, we were wrong!
I guess the opportunity to rule against migrants is uniting an otherwise often divided Court!
From Justice Elena Kagan’s dissent in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom:
I fervently hope that the Court’s intervention will not worsen the Nation’s COVID crisis. But if this decision causes suffering, we will not pay. Our marble halls are now closed to the public, and our life tenure forever insulates us from responsibility for our errors. That would seem good reason to avoid disrupting a State’s pandemic response. But the Court forges ahead regardless, insisting that science-based policy yield to judicial edict.
Justice Elena Kagan Photo: Mike Ball Creative Commons License
Ruth Marcus writes about U.S. District Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson in WashPost:
. . . .
Still, Jackson, named to the district court by Obama in 2013, brings to the bench an intriguing — and for the Democratic Party’s restless progressives, attractive — piece of career diversity as well: experience as a public defender.
No current Supreme Court justice has the perspective of having been a public defender, representing indigent defendants, although several — Justices Samuel A. Alito Jr., Sonia Sotomayor and Brett M. Kavanaugh, in his role as associate independent counsel — have prosecutorial experience.
For Jackson, the daughter of two public school teachers (her father later became a lawyer), the criminal justice system has an unusually personal wrinkle as well: Her uncle was convicted of a low-level drug crime when she was a senior in high school, and was sentenced to life in prison under a draconian three-strikes law. (He had been convicted previously of two minor offenses.) He ended up receiving clemency from Obama after serving three decades.
She also brings the real-world perspective of a working mother. In a remarkably candid speech at the University of Georgia in 2017, Jackson described the challenges she encountered juggling private practice at a major law firm, marriage to a surgeon and motherhood to two young daughters.
“I think it is not possible to overstate the degree of difficulty that many young women, and especially new mothers, face in the law firm context,” she observed. “The hours are long; the workflow is unpredictable; you have little control over your time and schedule; and you start to feel as though the demands of the billable hour are constantly in conflict with the needs of your children and your family responsibilities.” How refreshing to hear from a self-confessed non-Superwoman.
. . . .
But a more obscure ruling, involving William Pierce, a deaf D.C. man who was imprisoned for 51 days after a domestic dispute, may offer more insight into Jackson’s belief in law as a mechanism for achieving justice. Corrections officials did nothing to accommodate Pierce’s disability, as the law requires, ignoring his repeated requests for a sign-language interpreter.
Jackson assailed prison officials’ “willful blindness regarding Pierce’s need for accommodation.” She said it was “astonishing” for D.C. to claim that it had done enough, when “prison employees took no steps whatsoever” to figure out how to help him. And she took the unusual step of ruling for Pierce even before trial.
You can learn a lot about a judge by the way she handles the biggest-profile cases, involving those at the highest levels of government. But perhaps the more revealing test is how she applies the law to help those with the least power and the greatest need for justice.
U.S. District Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson Washington D.C. Official Photo Creative Commons License
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Read the full articles at the above links. “Willful blindness” and intentional abuses intended to “dehumanize” are daily occurrences in our warped and broken “immigration justice system” as almost any immigration/human rights/civil rights lawyer could tell you. It just operates below the radar screen, on the border, or in foreign countries (to which vulnerable humans seeking legal refuge are arbitrarily and capriciously “orbited”) where the very human trauma, torture, sickness, desolation, despair, and death are “out of sight, out of mind” to most Federal Judges and Justices.
Yes, eventually journalists and historians will document for posterity the disastrous human rights abuses in which the Federal Judiciary is complicit. But, by then it will be far too late for those who have suffered and died while those in black robes shirked their legal and moral duties!
Judge Jackson understands exactly what’s missing from today’s all too often elitist, non-diverse, non-representative Federal Judiciary (including much of the Immigration Judiciary) who are tone-deaf to, and insulated from, responsibility for the human trauma and injustice caused by their bad decisions.
Additionally, I can assure Justice Kagan that vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers (including children) have died and unnecessarily suffered lifetime trauma from the Supremes’ willful failure to enforce the Constitution against overt Executive tyranny in cases involving the “Remain in Mexico” (“Let ‘Em Die In Mexico”) Program, return of asylum seekers to torture and death with no due process whatsoever, and the “Muslim Ban.”
Indeed, the Supremes’ majority’s abdication of responsibility in the latter case led directly to Trump’s eventual insurrection against the Capitol. He was assured early on by Roberts and others that he was above the Constitution, uncountable, and exempt from normal conventions governing human decency and treatment of the most vulnerable among us in the 21st Century. I/O/W, “Dred Scottification” of the “other”— a 21st Century “Jim Crow Regime” — was A-OK with the GOP Supremes’ majority “forever insulat[ed] . . . from responsibility for [their] errors.”
Today in particular, our nation still struggles with the sense of impunity and unaccountability improperly conferred by a dilatory Supremes’ majority on their party and its leader. Insurrection, violence, attempted overthrow of democracy — it’s all “no problem” to a tone-deaf Supremes’ majority unconcerned with the fate of our democracy.
After all, the Trump’s magamoron rioters weren’t storming their marble halls — just those of the supposedly co-equal branch across the street. But, what might have happened if they had actually stood up against Trump? He might have identified them as “the enemy” and sent his rioters their way! Worth thinking about, Oh Cloistered Ones far removed from the pain and suffering you help cause and countenance!
A better judiciary 🧑🏽⚖️👨🏻⚖️👩⚖️ for a better America! Bring on the “practical scholars” and those with actual experience representing the mostly vulnerable among us (asylum seekers are a prime example) in court.
J Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase Jeffrey S. Chase Blog Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration JudgesKnightess of the Round Table
Asher Stockler reports for Law360:
. . . .
But the government said that, even if these withholding claims succeed, it still retains the right to deport the group of immigrants to other countries that will accept them. Because deportation is still on the table regardless of the status of those claims, the administration argued, the group of immigrants should be treated identically to those who are about to be deported.
The ACLU rebutted that argument, saying that such third-country deportations are exceedingly rare. Because of this, the ACLU said the availability of a third-country option should not mean the
11/12/2020 Justices Told Of Due Process Issues Without Bond Hearings – Law360
deportation-ready provision of the law kicks in. According to the American Immigration Council, fewer than 2% of immigrants who received persecution-based relief in fiscal year 2017 were ultimately deported to a third country.
The Justice Department also raised the possibility that having to scrutinize the practical odds of removal from immigrant to immigrant would be “patently unworkable.”
“A case-by-case approach … would needlessly add to the burdens that are already ‘overwhelming our immigration system,'” the department said, quoting a prior case.
But a coalition of former immigration trial and appeals judges pushed back on that idea with their own amicus brief Thursday.
“Bond hearings in withholding of removal proceedings are no different than bond hearings in other contexts,” the group, representing 34 judges who have cumulatively overseen thousands of cases, wrote. “Contrary to [the administration’s] assertion, bond hearings in withholding of removal proceedings neither lead to a slowdown of cases that ‘thwart Congress’ objectives’ in enacting the immigration laws, nor impose an administrative burden on immigration courts.” The American Civil Liberties Union is represented by its own Michael Tan, Omar Jadwat, Judy Rabinovitz, Cecillia Wang and David D. Cole.
The coalition of former judges is represented by David Keyko, Robert Sills, Matthew Putorti, Daryl Kleiman, Patricia Rothenberg and Roland Reimers of Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP.
The plaintiffs are represented by Paul Hughes, Michael Kimberly and Andrew Lyons-Berg of McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Simon Sandoval-Moshenberg and Rachel McFarland of the Legal Aid Justice Center, Mark Stevens of Murray Osorio PLLC, and Eugene Fidell of Yale Law School’s Supreme Court Clinic.
The Trump administration is represented by Noel Francisco, Jeffrey Wall, Edwin Kneedler and Vivek Suri of the U.S. Solicitor General’s Office and Lauren Fascett, Brian Ward and Joseph Hunt of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Division.
The case is Tony H. Pham et al. v. Maria Angelica Guzman Chavez et al., case number 19-897, at the U.S. Supreme Court.
–Editing by Michael Watanabe.
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Read the complete article over on Law360. The case comes from the Fourth Circuit. Hopefully, the Biden-Harris Administration will withdraw the SG’s disingenuous petition (if not already denied by the Supremes) and implement the Fourth Circuit’s correct decision nationwide.
That’s the way to promote due process and judicial efficiency instead of constantly promoting inhumanity, abuse of due process, judicial inefficiency (fair adjudication is hindered by unnecessary detention in the Gulag), and chaos!
Many, many, many thanks to our all-star pro bono team:
David Keyko, Robert Sills, Matthew Putorti, Daryl Kleiman, Patricia Rothenberg and Roland Reimers of Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP.
Couldn’t have done it without you guys! You constantly “Make us look smart!”
I also note with great pride the following “charter members” of the “New Due Process Army” who were on the plaintiffs’ legal team:
Rachel McFarland, my former Georgetown Law student;
Simon Sandoval-Moshenberg, who appeared before me at the Arlington Immigration Court, and is an occasional contributor to “Courtside;
Mark Stevens, who appeared before me at the Arlington Immigration Court.
Well done, fearless fighters for due process!
Rachel McFarland Legal Aid Justice Center Charter Member, New Due Process Army
This disgraceful performance by the Solicitor General’s Office (once revered, now reviled) has become “the norm” under Trump. Francisco’s arguments are those of an attorney who didn’t do “due diligence,” but doesn’t expect the Court to know or care what really happens in Immigration Court. And, unfortunately, with the exception of Justice Sotomayor and perhaps Justice Kagan, that may well be a correct assumption. But that doesn’t make it any less of a powerful and disturbing indictment of our entire U.S. Justice system in the age of Trump.
Reality check: I routinely did 10-15, sometimes more, bond hearings at a Detained Master Calendar in less than one hour. I treated everyone fairly, applied the correct legal criteria, and set reasonable bonds (usually around $5,000) for everyone legally eligible. Almost all represented asylum seekers and withholding seekers eligible for bond who had filed complete and well-documented asylum or withholding applications were released on bond. About 99% showed up for their merits hearings.
I encouraged attorneys on both sides to file documents in advance, discuss the case with each other, and present a proposed agreed bond amount or a range of amounts to me whenever possible. Bond hearings were really important (freedom from unnecessary restraint is one of our most fundamental rights), but they weren’t “rocket science.” Bond hearings actually ran like clockwork.
Indeed, if the attorneys were “really on the ball,” and ICE managed to find and present all the detainees timely, I could probably do 10-15 bond cases in 30 minutes, and get them all right. My courtroom and my approach weren’t any different from that of my other then-colleagues at Arlington. In thirteen years on the bench, I set thousands of bonds and probably had no more than six appeals to the BIA from my bond decisions. I also reviewed many bond appeals at the BIA. (Although, most bond appeals to the BIA were “mooted” by the issuance of a final order in the detained case before the bond appeal was adjudicated.) Most took fewer than 15 minutes.
Indeed, my past experience suggests that a system led (not necessarily “run”) by competent judicial professionals and staffed with real judges with expertise in immigration, asylum, and human rights and unswervingly committed to due process and fundamental fairness could establish “best practices” that would drastically increase efficiency, cut (rather than mindlessly and exponentially expand) backlogs, without cutting out anyone’s rights. In other words, EOIR potentially could be a “model American judiciary,” as it actually was once envisioned, rather than the slimy mass of disastrous incompetence and the national embarrassment that it is today!
The idea that doing something as straightforward as a bond hearing would tie the system in knots is pure poppycock and a stunning insult to all Immigration Judges delivered by a Solicitor General who has never done a bond case in his life!
Yes the system is overwhelmingly backlogged and dysfunctional! But that has nothing to do with giving respondents due process bond hearings.
It has everything to do with unconstitutional and just plain stupid “politicization” and “weaponization” of the courts under gross incompetence and mismanagement by political hacks at the DOJ who have installed their equally unqualified toadies at EOIR. It also has to do with a disingenuous Solicitor General who advances a White Nationalist political agenda, rather than constitutional rights, fundamental fairness, rationality, and best practices. It has to do with a Supreme Court majority unwilling to take a stand for the legal rights and human dignity of the most vulnerable, and often most deserving, among us in the face of bullying and abuse by a corrupt, would-be authoritarian, fundamentally anti-American and anti-democracy regime.
It has to do with allowing a corrupt, nativist, invidiously-motivated regime to manipulate and intentionally misapply asylum and protection laws at the co-opted and captive DHS Asylum Office; thousands of “grantable” asylum cases are wrongfully and unnecessarily shuffled off to the Immigration Courts, thus artificially inflating backlogs and leading to more pressure to cut corners and dispense with due process.
It also paints an intentionally false and misleading picture that the problem is asylum applicants rather than the maliciously incompetent White Nationalists who have seized control of our system and acted to destroy years of structural development and accumulated institutional expertise.
Good Government matters! Maliciously incompetent Government threatens to destroy our nation! (Doubt that, just look at the totally inappropriate, entirely dishonest, response of the Trump kakistocracy to their overwhelming election defeat by Biden-Harris and the unwillingness of both the GOP and supporters to comply with democratic norms and operate in the real world of facts, rather than false narratives.)
Due process, fundamental fairness, equal justice, simple human decency, and Good Government won’t happen until we get the White Nationalist hacks out of the DOJ and replace the “clown show” at EOIR with qualified members of the New Due Process Army. Problem solvers, rather than problem creators; over-achievers, rather than screw-ups!
The incoming Biden-Harris Administration is left with a stark, yet simple, choice: oust the malicious incompetents and bring in the “competents” from the NDPA to fix the system; or become part of the problem and have the resulting mess forever sully your Administration.
The Obama Administration (sadly) chose the latter. President Elect Biden appears bold, confident, self-aware, and flexible enough to recognize past mistakes. But, recognition without reconstruction (action) is useless! Don’t ruminate — govern! Like your life depends on it!
And, by no means is EOIR the only part of DOJ the needs “big time” reform and a thorough shake up. We must have a Solicitor General committed to following the rules of legal ethics and common human decency and who will insist on her or his staff doing likewise.
The next Solicitor General must also have demonstrated expertise in asylum, immigration, civil rights, and human rights laws and be committed to expanding due process, equal justice, racial justice, and fundamental fairness throughout the Government bureaucracy and “pushing” the Supremes to adopt and endorse best, rather than worst, practices in these areas.
American Justice and our court systems are in “free fall.” This is no time for more “amateur night at the Bijou.”
And here are some thoughts for the future if we really want to achieve “Good Government” and equal justice for all:
Every future Supreme Court Justice must have served a minimum of two years as a U.S. Immigration Judge with an “asylum grant rate” that is at or exceeds the national average for the U.S. Immigration Courts;
Every future Solicitor General must have done a minimum of ten pro bono asylum cases in U.S. Immigration Court.
Due Process Forever! Clown Show (With Lives & Humanity On The Line) Never!
ImmigrationProf blogger Ingrid Eagly and Steven Shafer in an op/ed in the Los Angeles Times take on President Trump who “[l]ast week, during the final presidential campaign debate, President Trump renewed a claim he has often made: Migrants with pending court dates rarely show up for their hearings. In response to the charge by his Democratic challenger, former Vice President Joe Biden, that the administration’s treatment of would-be immigrants was inhumane, Trump told debate watchers that the number who`come back’ to immigration court is `less than 1%.’
The government’s data, however, tell a far different story.”
Check out the op/ed and the take down of President.
A new fact sheet by Nina Siulc and Noelle Smart of the Vera Institute of Justice summarizes new evidence showing that most immigrants appear for their immigration court hearings. The report includes data from Vera’s Safety and Fairness for Everyone (SAFE) Initiative that provides free representation through a universal access model of representation. Vera researchers found that 98 percent of SAFE clients released from custody have continued to appear for their court hearings. Read the full report for additional information on related research, including Vera’s ongoing evaluation of the New York Immigrant Family Unity Project (NYIFUP).
I[ngrid] E[agly]
***********************
Thanks, Ingrid and Steven! Our “Round Table” has used your scholarship in amicus briefs to educate Federal Courts at all levels about the realities of Immigration Court.
It’s particularly critical in an era where the politicized and “ethically challenged” DOJ often puts forth largely fictionalization versions of their self-manufactured “immigration emergency” that is actually little more than the outcome of studied ignorance, White Nationalism, “gonzo” enforcement, and maliciously incompetent administration of the Federal immigration bureaucracy.
Attribution: Stephen Miller Monster by Peter Kuper, PoliticalCartoons.com
If we kick out the kakistocracy next week, we could put qualified “practical scholars” like Ingrid and others like her in charge and remake both DHS and the Immigration Courts to actually operate as required by Due Process while also fulfilling legitimate law-enforcement objectives. To state the obvious, neither of these objectives is being realized at present. It’s bad for America and for humanity.
For far too long, the wrong individuals, lacking the necessary expertise in immigration and human rights, and also lacking a firm commitment to equal justice under law, have been “in charge” of the Government’s immigration policy and legal apparatus and appointed to the Federal Courts, at all levels. That’s particularly true at the Supremes where only Justices Sotomayor and (some days) Kagan appear “up to the job.”
We will never end institutionalized racism, achieve equal justice for all, and realize the true human and economic potential of America until we bring our broken immigration and refugee systems and our failing Federal Judicial System into line with our Constitutional and national values. That process must start, but certainly will not end, with this election!
WASHINGTON – The Supreme Court on Tuesday temporarily allowed the Trump administration to end its 2020 census count earlier than planned, a move that could result in undercounting racial and ethnic minorities and others in hard-to-reach communities.
The Commerce Department had asked the justices to block a lower court ruling that barred the administration from stopping the head count on Oct. 5. The administration had sought to stop counting in order to determine the number of House seats and electoral votes each state gets for the coming decade by Dec. 31, before Trump might have to leave office.
While the decision was unsigned, Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor registered her dissent. She said “meeting the deadline at the expense of the accuracy of the census is not a cost worth paying.”
. . . .
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So, two months wouldn’t be long enough for the USG to get the results to Trump? Gimme a break! And, since when does the most lawless Administration in history lose sleep about missing a statutory deadline? Incredible! But, hardly unexpected from a Court that “belongs” to a political party and makes little attempt to hide it.
Interestingly, however, Justices Breyer and Kagan also “took the day off” on this one. That left Justice Sotomayor as the sole defender of an honest census count.
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent says it all:
While the decision was unsigned, Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor registered her dissent. She said “meeting the deadline at the expense of the accuracy of the census is not a cost worth paying.”
“The harms caused by rushing this year’s census count are irreparable,” Sotomayor wrote. “And respondents will suffer their lasting impact for at least the next 10 years.”
Of course, the “irreparable harm” will skew things illegally in favor of the GOP for the coming decade. But, that’s the point of a politically weaponized Supremes! And, you can bet that Justice Barrett will do everything possible to advance the GOP program of shafting communities of color and majority-Democrat jurisdictions while seeking to maintain GOP minority control of government!
Vote ‘Em out, vote ‘Em out! At every level of Government, the GOP and their ideological judges are committed to unrelenting corruption, inequality, destroying democracy, and forcing an extreme right-wing agenda on the majority of Americans!
It’s beyond disgusting! Life-tenured judges who should know better becoming “Modern Day Jim Crows!” What truly horrible, negative “role models” for younger attorneys fighting for the rights of the most vulnerable and to uphold our Constitutional system.
Speaking of good role models (in addition, of course, to Laura and Leidy, who are among the “best ever”), Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg should be congratulated for having the courage to speak out forcefully in Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant on the “right side of history” and against their colleagues’ disgraceful dereliction of duty and betrayal of their oaths to uphold the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic.
And, there have been few greater enemies of the U.S. Constitution and the true “rule of law” than Trump and his band of political, bureaucratic, and judicial sycophants!
Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 19A230 _________________
WILLIAM P. BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. v. EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY [September 11, 2019]
The application for stay presented to JUSTICE KAGAN and by her referred to the Court is granted. The district court’s July 24, 2019 order granting a preliminary injunction and September 9, 2019 order restoring the nationwide scope of the injunction are stayed in full pending disposition of the Government’s appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is sought. If a writ of certiorari is sought and the Court denies the petition, this order shall terminate automatically. If the Court grants the petition for a writ of certiorari, this order shall terminate when the Court enters its judgment.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, dissenting from grant of stay.
Once again the Executive Branch has issued a rule that seeks to upend longstanding practices regarding refugees who seek shelter from persecution. Although this Nation has long kept its doors open to refugees—and although the stakes for asylum seekers could not be higher—the Government implemented its rule without first providing the public notice and inviting the public input generally required by law. After several organizations representing immi- grants sued to stop the rule from going into effect, a federal district court found that the organizations were likely to prevail and preliminarily enjoined the rule nationwide. A
2 BARR v. EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
federal appeals court narrowed the injunction to run only circuit-wide, but denied the Government’s motion for a complete stay.
Now the Government asks this Court to intervene and to stay the preliminary decisions below. This is an extraordinary request. Unfortunately, the Court acquiesces. Because I do not believe the Government has met its weighty burden for such relief, I would deny the stay.
The Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security promulgated the rule at issue here on July 16, 2019. See 84 Fed. Reg. 33829. In effect, the rule forbids almost all Central Americans—even unaccompanied children—to apply for asylum in the United States if they enter or seek to enter through the southern border, unless they were first denied asylum in Mexico or another third country. Id., at 33835, 33840; see also 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 929–930 (ND Cal. 2019).
The District Court found that the rule was likely unlawful for at least three reasons. See id., at 938–957. First, the court found it probable that the rule was inconsistent with the asylum statute, 94 Stat. 105, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §1158. See §1158(b)(2)(C) (requiring that any regulation like the rule be“consistent”with the statute). Section 1158 generally provides that any noncitizen “physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States . . . may apply for asylum.” §1158(a)(1). And unlike the rule, the District Court explained, the statute provides narrow, carefully calibrated exceptions to asylum eligibility. As relevant here, Congress restricted asylum based on the possibility that a person could safely resettle in a third country. See §1158(a)(2)(A), (b)(2)(A)(vi). The rule, by contrast, does not consider whether refugees were safe or resettled in Mexico—just whether they traveled through it. That blunt approach, according to the District Court, rewrote the statute. See 385 F. Supp. 3d, at 939– 947, 959.
Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 3
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Second, the District Court found that the challengers would likely prevail because the Government skirted typical rulemaking procedures. Id., at 947–951. The District Court noted “serious questions” about the rule’s validity because the Government effected a sea change in immigration law without first providing advance notice and opportunity for public comment. Id., at 930; see also 5 U. S. C. §553. The District Court found the Government’s purported justifications unpersuasive at the preliminary-injunction stage. 385 F. Supp. 3d, at 948–951 (discussing statutory exceptions to notice-and-comment procedures).
Last, the District Court found the explanation for the rule so poorly reasoned that the Government’s action was likely arbitrary and capricious. See id., at 951–957; 5 U. S. C. §706. On this score, the District Court addressed the Government’s principal justifications for the rule: that failing to seek asylum while fleeing through more than one country “raises questions about the validity and urgency” of the asylum seeker’s claim, 84 Fed. Reg. 33839; and that Mexico, the last port of entry before the United States, offers a fea- sible alternative for persons seeking protection from persecution, id., at 33835, 33839–33840. The District Court examined the evidence in the administrative record and explained why it flatly refuted the Government’s assumptions. 385 F. Supp. 3d, at 951–957. A “mountain of evidence points one way,” the District Court observed, yet the Government “went the other—with no explanation.” Id., at 955.
After the District Court issued the injunction, the Ninth Circuit declined the Government’s request for a complete stay, reasoning that the Government did not make the required “ ‘strong showing’ ” that it would likely succeed on the merits of each issue. ___ F. 3d ___ (2019), 2019 WL 3850928, *1 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U. S. 770, 776 (1987)). Narrowing the injunction to the Circuit’s borders, the Ninth Circuit expedited the appeal and permitted
4 BARR v. EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
the District Court to consider whether additional facts would warrant a broader injunction. 2019 WL 3850928, *2– *3.
The lower courts’ decisions warrant respect. A stay pending appeal is “extraordinary” relief. Williams v. Zbaraz, 442 U. S. 1309, 1311 (1979) (Stevens, J., in chambers); see also Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2012) (ROBERTS, C. J., in chambers) (listing stay factors). Given the District Court’s thorough analysis, and the serious questions that court raised, I do not believe the Government has carried its “especially heavy” burden. Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U. S. 1319, 1320 (1994) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers). The rule here may be, as the District Court concluded, in significant tension with the asylum statute. It may also be arbitrary and capricious for failing to engage with the record evidence contradicting its conclusions. It is especially concerning, moreover, that the rule the Government promulgated topples decades of settled asylum practices and affects some of the most vulnerable people in the Western Hemisphere—without affording the public a chance to weigh in.
Setting aside the merits, the unusual history of this case also counsels against our intervention. This lawsuit has been proceeding on three tracks: In this Court, the parties have litigated the Government’s stay request. In the Ninth Circuit, the parties are briefing the Government’s appeal. And in the District Court, the parties recently participated in an evidentiary hearing to supplement the record. In- deed, just two days ago the District Court reinstated a na- tionwide injunction based on new facts. See East Bay Sanc- tuary Covenant v. Barr, No. 4:19–cv–4073, Doc. 73 (ND Cal., Sept. 9, 2019). Notably, the Government moved to stay the newest order in both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit. (Neither court has resolved that request, though the Ninth Circuit granted an administrative stay to allow further deliberation.) This Court has not considered
Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 5
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
the new evidence, nor does it pause for the lower courts to resolve the Government’s pending motions. By granting a stay, the Court simultaneously lags behind and jumps ahead of the courts below. And in doing so, the Court side-steps the ordinary judicial process to allow the Government to implement a rule that bypassed the ordinary rulemaking process. I fear that the Court’s precipitous action today risks undermining the interbranch governmental processes that encourage deliberation, public participation, and transparency.
***
In sum, granting a stay pending appeal should be an “extraordinary” act. Williams, 442 U. S., at 1311. Unfortunately, it appears the Government has treated this exceptional mechanism as a new normal. Historically, the Government has made this kind of request rarely; now it does so reflexively. See, e.g., Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming Nov. 2019). Not long ago, the Court resisted the shortcut the Government now invites. See Trump v. East Bay Sanc- tuary Covenant, 586 U. S. ___ (2018). I regret that my colleagues have not exercised the same restraint here. I respectfully dissent.
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Justice Sotomayor’s dissent says it all, but, alas, in vain.
09-11-19 will be remembered as the day that justice, human rights, and human decency died in America!
Shame on Justices Breyer and Kagan for “going along to get along” with the dismantling of the Refugee Act of 1980. The “blood of the innocents” will be on their hands and the hands of their five colleagues.
The “Dred Scottification” (or “dehumanization”) of immigrants, Latinos, and other minorities that Justice Breyer once predicted, yet lacked the guts to speak out against in this case, is now in full swing. It will increase unabated, now that the Supremes’ sellout to authoritarian racism is assured. And don’t expect “Moscow Mitch” and his gang of toadies to put up any opposition.
The American justice system has been dismantled. But history will remember the roles of each of those “Black Robed Cowards” who participated in its demise.
With this atrocious decision, the Supremes have basically made themselves irrelevant to the battle for fairness and individual rights under the Constitution. As I have suggested before, self-created irrelevance might come back to haunt them.
Sessions v. Dimaya, No. 15–1498, 04-17-18 (5-4 Decision)
Syllabus By Court Staff:
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) virtually guarantees that any alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” after entering the Unit- ed States will be deported. See 8 U. S. C. §§1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C). An aggravated felony includes “a crime of violence (as defined in [18 U.S.C. §16] . . . ) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” §1101(a)(43)(f). Section 16’s definition of a crime of violence is divided into two clauses—often referred to as the elements clause, §16(a), and the residual clause, §16(b). The residual clause, the provision at issue here, defines a “crime of violence” as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” To decide whether a person’s conviction falls within the scope of that clause, courts apply the categorical approach. This approach has courts ask not whether “the particular facts” underlying a conviction created a substantial risk, Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 7, nor whether the statutory elements of a crime require the creation of such a risk in each and every case, but whether “the ordinary case” of an offense poses the requisite risk, James v. United States, 550 U. S. 192, 208.
Respondent James Dimaya is a lawful permanent resident of the United States with two convictions for first-degree burglary under California law. After his second offense, the Government sought to deport him as an aggravated felon. An Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals held that California first-degree bur- glary is a “crime of violence” under §16(b). While Dimaya’s appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit, this Court held that a similar re-
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sidual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)—defining “violent felony” as any felony that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)—was unconstitutionally “void for vagueness” under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. ___, ___. Relying on Johnson, the Ninth Circuit held that §16(b), as incorporated into the INA, was also unconstitu- tionally vague.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
803 F. 3d 1110, affirmed.
JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I, III, IV–B, and V, concluding that §16’s residual clause is un- constitutionally vague. Pp. 6–11, 16–25.
(a) A straightforward application of Johnson effectively resolves this case. Section 16(b) has the same two features as ACCA’s residu- al clause—an ordinary-case requirement and an ill-defined risk threshold—combined in the same constitutionally problematic way. To begin, ACCA’s residual clause created “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime” because it “tie[d] the judi- cial assessment of risk” to a speculative hypothesis about the crime’s “ordinary case,” but provided no guidance on how to figure out what that ordinary case was. 576 U. S., at ___. Compounding that uncer- tainty, ACCA’s residual clause layered an imprecise “serious poten- tial risk” standard on top of the requisite “ordinary case” inquiry. The combination of “indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime [and] indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony,” id., at ___, resulted in “more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates,” id., at ___. Section 16(b) suffers from those same two flaws. Like ACCA’s residual clause, §16(b) calls for a court to identify a crime’s “ordinary case” in order to measure the crime’s risk but “offers no reliable way” to discern what the ordinary version of any offense looks like. Id., at ___. And its “substantial risk” thresh- old is no more determinate than ACCA’s “serious potential risk” standard. Thus, the same “[t]wo features” that “conspire[d] to make” ACCA’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague also exist in §16(b), with the same result. Id., at ___. Pp. 6–11.
(b) The Government identifies three textual discrepancies between ACCA’s residual clause and §16(b) that it claims make §16(b) easier to apply and thus cure the constitutional infirmity. None, however, relates to the pair of features that Johnson found to produce imper- missible vagueness or otherwise makes the statutory inquiry more determinate. Pp. 16–24.
(1) First, the Government argues that §16(b)’s express require-
Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 3
Syllabus
ment (absent from ACCA) that the risk arise from acts taken “in the course of committing the offense,” serves as a “temporal restriction”— in other words, a court applying §16(b) may not “consider risks aris- ing after” the offense’s commission is over. Brief for Petitioner 31. But this is not a meaningful limitation: In the ordinary case of any of- fense, the riskiness of a crime arises from events occurring during its commission, not events occurring later. So with or without the tem- poral language, a court applying the ordinary case approach, whether in §16’s or ACCA’s residual clause, would do the same thing—ask what usually happens when a crime is committed. The phrase “in the course of” makes no difference as to either outcome or clarity and cannot cure the statutory indeterminacy Johnson described.
Second, the Government says that the §16(b) inquiry, which focus- es on the risk of “physical force,” “trains solely” on the conduct typi- cally involved in a crime. Brief for Petitioner 36. In contrast, ACCA’s residual clause asked about the risk of “physical injury,” requiring a second inquiry into a speculative “chain of causation that could possibly result in a victim’s injury.” Ibid. However, this Court has made clear that “physical force” means “force capable of causing physical pain or injury.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133, 140. So under §16(b) too, a court must not only identify the conduct typically involved in a crime, but also gauge its potential consequenc- es. Thus, the force/injury distinction does not clarify a court’s analy- sis of whether a crime qualifies as violent.
Third, the Government notes that §16(b) avoids the vagueness of ACCA’s residual clause because it is not preceded by a “confusing list of exemplar crimes.” Brief for Petitioner 38. Those enumerated crimes were in fact too varied to assist this Court in giving ACCA’s residual clause meaning. But to say that they failed to resolve the clause’s vagueness is hardly to say they caused the problem. Pp. 16– 21.
(2) The Government also relies on judicial experience with §16(b), arguing that because it has divided lower courts less often and resulted in only one certiorari grant, it must be clearer than its ACCA counterpart. But in fact, a host of issues respecting §16(b)’s application to specific crimes divide the federal appellate courts. And while this Court has only heard oral arguments in two §16(b) cases, this Court vacated the judgments in a number of other §16(b) cases, remanding them for further consideration in light of ACCA decisions. Pp. 21–24.
JUSTICE KAGAN, joined by JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concluded in Parts II and IV–A:
(a) The Government argues that a more permissive form of the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies than the one Johnson employed
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SESSIONS v. DIMAYA Syllabus
because the removal of an alien is a civil matter rather than a crimi- nal case. This Court’s precedent forecloses that argument. In Jor- dan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223, the Court considered what vague- ness standard applied in removal cases and concluded that, “in view of the grave nature of deportation,” the most exacting vagueness standard must apply. Id., at 231. Nothing in the ensuing years calls that reasoning into question. This Court has reiterated that deporta- tion is “a particularly severe penalty,” which may be of greater con- cern to a convicted alien than “any potential jail sentence.” Jae Lee v.United States, 582 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 4–6.
(b) Section 16(b) demands a categorical, ordinary-case approach. For reasons expressed in Johnson, that approach cannot be aban- doned in favor of a conduct-based approach, which asks about the specific way in which a defendant committed a crime. To begin, the Government once again “has not asked [the Court] to abandon the categorical approach in residual-clause cases,” suggesting the fact- based approach is an untenable interpretation of §16(b). 576 U. S., at ___. Moreover, a fact-based approach would generate constitutional questions. In any event, §16(b)’s text demands a categorical ap- proach. This Court’s decisions have consistently understood lan- guage in the residual clauses of both ACCA and §16 to refer to “the statute of conviction, not to the facts of each defendant’s conduct.”Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 601. And the words “by its na- ture” in §16(b) even more clearly compel an inquiry into an offense’s normal and characteristic quality—that is, what the offense ordinari- ly entails. Finally, given the daunting difficulties of accurately “re- construct[ing],” often many years later, “the conduct underlying [a] conviction,” the conduct-based approach’s “utter impracticability”— and associated inequities—is as great in §16(b) as in ACCA. John- son, 576 U. S., at ___. Pp. 12–15.
JUSTICE GORSUCH, agreeing that the Immigration and Nationality Act provision at hand is unconstitutionally vague for the reasons identified in Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. ___, concluded that the void for vagueness doctrine, at least properly conceived, serves as a faithful expression of ancient due process and separation of powers principles the Framers recognized as vital to ordered liberty under the Constitution. The Government’s argument that a less-than-fair- notice standard should apply where (as here) a person faces only civ- il, not criminal, consequences from a statute’s operation is unavail- ing. In the criminal context, the law generally must afford “ordinary people . . . fair notice of the conduct it punishes,” id., at ___, and it is hard to see how the Due Process Clause might often require any less than that in the civil context. Nor is there any good reason to single out civil deportation for assessment under the fair notice standard
Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 5
Syllabus
because of the special gravity of its penalty when so many civil laws impose so many similarly severe sanctions. Alternative approaches that do not concede the propriety of the categorical ordinary case analysis are more properly addressed in another case, involving ei- ther the Immigration and Nationality Act or another statute, where the parties have a chance to be heard. Pp. 1–19.
KAGAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, IV–B, and V, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined, and an opin- ion with respect to Parts II and IV–A, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY and ALITO, JJ., joined as to Parts I–C–2, II–A–1, and II–B.
Key Quote From Justice Kagan’s Majority (Pt. V):
Johnson tells us how to resolve this case. That decision held that “[t]wo features of [ACCA’s] residual clause con- spire[d] to make it unconstitutionally vague.” 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5). Because the clause had both an ordinary-case requirement and an ill-defined risk thresh- old, it necessarily “devolv[ed] into guesswork and intui- tion,” invited arbitrary enforcement, and failed to provide fair notice. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). Section 16(b) possesses the exact same two features. And none of the minor linguistic disparities in the statutes makes any real difference. So just like ACCA’s residual clause, §16(b) “produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 6). We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Key Quote From Justice Gorsuch”s Concurring Opinion:
Vague laws invite arbitrary power. Before the Revolu tion, the crime of treason in English law was so capa ciously construed that the mere expression of disfavored opinions could invite transportation or death. The founders cited the crown’s abuse of “pretended” crimes like this as one of their reasons for revolution. See Declaration of Independence ¶21. Today’s vague laws may not be as invidious, but they can invite the exercise of arbitrary power all the same—by leaving the people in the dark about what the law demands and allowing prosecutors and courts to make it up.
The law before us today is such a law. Before holding a lawful permanent resident alien like James Dimaya sub ject to removal for having committed a crime, the Immi gration and Nationality Act requires a judge to determine that the ordinary case of the alien’s crime of conviction involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used. But what does that mean? Just take the crime at issue in this case, California burglary, which applies to everyone from armed home intruders to door-to-door salesmen peddling shady products. How, on that vast spectrum, is anyone supposed to locate the ordinary case and say whether it includes a substantial risk of physical force? The truth is, no one knows. The law’s silence leaves judges to their intuitions and the people to their fate. In my judgment, the Constitution demands more.
Key Quote From Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissenting Opinion:
The more constrained inquiry required under §16(b)— which asks only whether the offense elements naturally carry with them a risk that the offender will use force in committing the offense—does not itself engender “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime.” And the provision’s use of a commonplace sub- stantial risk standard—one not tied to a list of crimes that lack a unifying feature—does not give rise to intolerable “uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify.” That should be enough to reject Dimaya’s facial vagueness challenge.4
Because I would rely on those distinctions to uphold
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4 The Court also finds it probative that “a host of issues” respecting §16(b) “divide” the lower courts. Ante, at 22. Yet the Court does little to explain how those alleged conflicts vindicate its particular concern about the provision (namely, the ordinary case inquiry). And as the Government illustrates, many of those divergent results likely can be chalked up to material differences in the state offense statutes at issue. Compare Escudero-Arciniega v. Holder, 702 F. 3d 781, 783–785 (CA5 2012) (per curiam) (reasoning that New Mexico car burglary “requires that the criminal lack authorization to enter the vehicle—a require- ment alone which will most often ensure some force [against property] is used”), with Sareang Ye v. INS, 214 F. 3d 1128, 1134 (CA9 2000) (finding it relevant that California car burglary does not require unlaw- ful or unprivileged entry); see Reply Brief 17–20, and nn. 5–6.
14 SESSIONS v. DIMAYA ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
§16(b), the Court reproaches me for not giving sufficient weight to a “core insight” of Johnson. Ante, at 10, n. 4; seeante, at 15 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (arguing that §16(b) runs afoul of Johnson “to the extent [§16(b)] requires an ‘ordinary case’ analysis”). But the fact that the ACCA residual clause required the ordinary case approach was not itself sufficient to doom the law. We instead took pains to clarify that our opinion should not be read to impart such an absolute rule. See Johnson, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). I would adhere to that careful holding and not reflexively extend the decision to a different stat- ute whose reach is, on the whole, far more clear.
The Court does the opposite, and the ramifications of that decision are significant. First, of course, today’s holding invalidates a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act—part of the definition of “aggravated felony”—on which the Government relies to “ensure that dangerous criminal aliens are removed from the United States.” Brief for United States 54. Contrary to the Court’s back-of-the-envelope assessment, see ante, at 23, n.12, the Government explains that the definition is “critical” for “numerous” immigration provisions. Brief for United States 12.
In addition, §16 serves as the universal definition of “crime of violence” for all of Title 18 of the United States Code. Its language is incorporated into many procedural and substantive provisions of criminal law, including provisions concerning racketeering, money laundering, domestic violence, using a child to commit a violent crime, and distributing information about the making or use of explosives. See 18 U. S. C. §§25(a)(1), 842(p)(2), 1952(a), 1956(c)(7)(B)(ii), 1959(a)(4), 2261(a), 3561(b). Of special concern, §16 is replicated in the definition of “crime of violence” applicable to §924(c), which prohibits using or carrying a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence,” or possessing a firearm “in furtherance of any such crime.” §§924(c)(1)(A), (c)(3). Though I express no view on whether §924(c) can be distinguished from the provision we consider here, the Court’s holding calls into question convictions under what the Government warns us is an “oft-prosecuted offense.” Brief for United States 12.
Because Johnson does not compel today’s result, I respectfully dissent.
Key Quote From Justice Thomas’s Dissent:
I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that 18 U. S. C. §16(b), as incorporated by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), is not unconstitutionally vague. Section 16(b) lacks many of the features that caused this Court to invalidate the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) in Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. ___ (2015). ACCA’s residual clause—a provision that this Court had applied four times before Johnson—was not unconstitu tionally vague either. See id., at ___ (THOMAS, J., concur ring in judgment) (slip op., at 1); id., at ___–___ (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 13–17). But if the Court insists on adhering to Johnson, it should at least take Johnson at its word that the residual clause was vague due to the “‘sum’” of its specific features. Id., at ___ (majority opinion) (slip op., at 10). By ignoring this limitation, the Court jettisonsJohnson’s assurance that its holding would not jeopardize “dozens of federal and state criminal laws.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12).
While THE CHIEF JUSTICE persuasively explains why respondent cannot prevail under our precedents, I write separately to make two additional points. First, I continue to doubt that our practice of striking down statutes as unconstitutionally vague is consistent with the original meaning of the Due Process Clause. See id., at ___–___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 7–18). Second, if the Court thinks that §16(b) is unconstitutionally vague be cause of the “categorical approach,” see ante, at 6–11, then the Court should abandon that approach—not insist on reading it into statutes and then strike them down. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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Gee whiz, those Trumpsters and GOP Senators who were overflowing with their praise of Justice Gorsuch’s brilliance during his confirmation hearings must be beside themselves now that he joined the “Gang of Four” in striking down a statute in an immigration enforcement case!
I predicted early on that Gorsuch might surprise those on both sides who expected him to be a “complete Trump toady.” Indeed, the case that drove today’s decision in Dimaya, Johnson v. United States, was written by none other than Justice Scalia, one of Justice Gorsuch’s “juridical role models.” At bottom, Dimaya is all about strict adherence to the Constitution and separation of powers, two things that Gorsuch as extolled in past decisions.
No, I don’t think that Justice Gorsuch is likely to team up with Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor on most future immigration cases. But, I am encouraged that he seems to be going where his legal principles, whether one agrees with them or not, take him, rather than just voting to support the Administration’s hard-line immigration agenda as many had predicted and some had hoped or assumed would happen.
There are other important immigration cases before the Supremes where adherence to the literal language of a statute and skepticism about giving the Executive unbridled power under separation of powers could aid the respondent’s position. So, while this might not be a “normal” majority configuration, it could well be repeated in some future immigration case. Let’s hope so!
Interestingly, I had this issue come up in one of the last cases I wrote before retiring from the Arlington Immigraton Court. I noted that the respondent made a strong argument for unconstitutionality under Johnson v, United States. However, as an Immigration Judge, I had no authority to hold a statute unconstitutional (although, ironically, under today’s convoluted system, the respondent was required to make his constitutional argument before me to “preserve” it for review by the Court of Appeals). So, I merely “noted” the constitutional issue for those higher up the “judicial food chain” and decided the issue on the basis that burglary as defined under the state law in question was not categorically a “crime of violence” under the so-called “categorical approach.”
Two other points worth mentioning:
In this particular case, the Supremes upheld the ruling of the much maligned (particularly by Trump & Sessions) 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, having jurisdiction over California ;
This type of issue is frequently recurring in Immigration Court where many, perhaps the majority, of respondents are unrepresented. How would an unrepresented individual who does not even speak English make the type of sophisticated legal arguments that a) got this case to the Supremes in the first place, and b) persuaded the majority of the Court? Of course, they couldn’t. That’s why much of what is going on in today’s U.S. Immigration Courts is a farce — a clear violation of constitutional Due Process that the Federal Courts have been doing their best to ignore or gloss over for many decades.
As more light is shed on the much misunderstood U.S. Immigration Court system, both Congress and the Article III Courts must come to grips with the procedural, ethical, and fairness inadequacies built into today’s “captive” Immigration Courts and the utter lack of any concern about protecting the legal rights of migrants shown by Jeff Sessions and the rest of the Trump Administration. Shockingly, they have actually pledged to stomp on migrants already unfulfilled rights to fair hearings in the name of a “false efficiency.”
Join the “New Due Process Army” and help stop the continuing abuses of human rights, statutory rights, and constitutional rights of migrants by Sessions and the rest of the “Trump Scofflaws!”
“Following his nomination to the Supreme Court, Neil Gorsuch was packaged by his wealthy benefactors as the judicial equivalent of a carrot cake: mild and wholesome with the occasional hint of spice. Now that the justice has been safely installed on the court for life, he has revealed himself to be more akin to melted sorbet: sickly sweet and insubstantial with a tangy finish that induces slight nausea. Gorsuch’s abrupt pivot to arrogance has been on full display in his bumptious opinions and questions from the bench. But it also appears to be infecting his interactions with justices behind the scenes. Whispers emerging from the court indicate Gorsuch is more likely to alienate than influence even his conservative colleagues.
The latest sign of trouble comes from NPR’s Nina Totenberg, who dropped in on the indispensable Supreme Court podcast First Mondays to dish some gossip about the newest justice.”
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Read Nina’s “scoop” over on Slate at the above link.
Ah, the “Eddie Haskell act” is over, and the real fun begins.
Here’s the Court’s Syllabus (NOT part of the decision);
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 16–309. Argued April 26, 2017—Decided June 22, 2017
Petitioner Divna Maslenjak is an ethnic Serb who resided in Bosnia during the 1990’s, when a civil war divided the new country. In 1998, she and her family sought refugee status in the United States. In- terviewed under oath, Maslenjak explained that the family feared persecution from both sides of the national rift: Muslims would mis- treat them because of their ethnicity, and Serbs would abuse them because Maslenjak’s husband had evaded service in the Bosnian Serb Army by absconding to Serbia. Persuaded of the Maslenjaks’ plight, American officials granted them refugee status. Years later, Maslenjak applied for U. S. citizenship. In the application process, she swore that she had never given false information to a government of- ficial while applying for an immigration benefit or lied to an official to gain entry into the United States. She was naturalized as a U. S. cit- izen. But it soon emerged that her professions of honesty were false: Maslenjak had known all along that her husband spent the war years not secreted in Serbia, but serving as an officer in the Bosnian Serb Army.
The Government charged Maslenjak with knowingly “procur[ing], contrary to law, [her] naturalization,” in violation of 18 U. S. C. §1425(a). According to the Government’s theory, Maslenjak violated §1425(a) because, in the course of procuring her naturalization, she broke another law: 18 U. S. C. §1015(a), which prohibits knowingly making a false statement under oath in a naturalization proceeding. The District Court instructed the jury that, to secure a conviction un- der §1425(a), the Government need not prove that Maslenjak’s false statements were material to, or influenced, the decision to approve her citizenship application. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convic- tion, holding that if Maslenjak made false statements violating
2 MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES Syllabus
§1015(a) and procured naturalization, then she also violated §1425(a).
Held:
1. The text of §1425(a) makes clear that, to secure a conviction, the
Government must establish that the defendant’s illegal act played a role in her acquisition of citizenship. To “procure . . . naturalization” means to obtain it. And the adverbial phrase “contrary to law” speci- fies how a person must procure naturalization so as to run afoul of the statute: illegally. Thus, someone “procure[s], contrary to law, naturalization” when she obtains citizenship illegally. As ordinary usage demonstrates, the most natural understanding of that phrase is that the illegal act must have somehow contributed to the obtain- ing of citizenship. To get citizenship unlawfully is to get it through an unlawful means—and that is just to say that an illegality played some role in its acquisition.
The Government’s contrary view—that §1425(a) requires only a vi- olation in the course of procuring naturalization—falters on the way language naturally works. Suppose that an applicant for citizenship fills out the paperwork in a government office with a knife tucked away in her handbag. She has violated the law against possessing a weapon in a federal building, and she has done so in the course of procuring citizenship, but nobody would say she has “procure[d]” her citizenship “contrary to law.” That is because the violation of law and the acquisition of citizenship in that example are merely coincidental: The one has no causal relation to the other. Although the Govern- ment attempts to define such examples out of the statute, that effort falls short for multiple reasons. Most important, the Government’s attempted carve-out does nothing to alter the linguistic understand- ing that gives force to the examples the Government would exclude. Under ordinary rules of language usage, §1425(a) demands a causal or means-end connection between a legal violation and naturaliza- tion.
The broader statutory context reinforces the point, because the Government’s reading would create a profound mismatch between the requirements for naturalization and those for denaturalization: Some legal violations that do not justify denying citizenship would nonetheless justify revoking it later. For example, lies told out of “embarrassment, fear, or a desire for privacy” (rather than “for the purpose of obtaining [immigration] benefits”) are not generally dis- qualifying under the statutory requirement of “good moral charac- ter.” Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S. 759, 780; 8 U. S. C. §1101(f)(6). But under the Government’s reading of §1425(a), any lie told in the naturalization process would provide a basis for rescinding citizenship. The Government could thus take away on one day what
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it was required to give the day before. And by so unmooring the rev- ocation of citizenship from its award, the Government opens the door to a world of disquieting consequences—which this Court would need far stronger textual support to believe Congress intended. The stat- ute Congress passed, most naturally read, strips a person of citizenship not when she committed any illegal act during the naturaliza- tion process, but only when that act played some role in her naturalization. Pp. 4–9.
2. When the underlying illegality alleged in a §1425(a) prosecution is a false statement to government officials, a jury must decide whether the false statement so altered the naturalization process as to have influenced an award of citizenship. Because the entire naturalization process is set up to provide little room for subjective pref- erences or personal whims, that inquiry is properly framed in objec- tive terms: To decide whether a defendant acquired citizenship by means of a lie, a jury must evaluate how knowledge of the real facts would have affected a reasonable government official properly applying naturalization law.
If the facts the defendant misrepresented are themselves legally disqualifying for citizenship, the jury can make quick work of that inquiry. In such a case, the defendant’s lie must have played a role in her naturalization. But that is not the only time a jury can find that a defendant’s lies had the requisite bearing on a naturalization decision, because lies can also throw investigators off a trail leading to disqualifying facts. When relying on such an investigation-based theory, the Government must make a two-part showing. Initially, the Government must prove that the misrepresented fact was suffi- ciently relevant to a naturalization criterion that it would have prompted reasonable officials, “seeking only evidence concerning citizenship qualifications,” to undertake further investigation. Kungys, 485 U. S., at 774, n. 9. If that much is true, the inquiry turns to the prospect that such an investigation would have borne disqualifying fruit. The Government need not show definitively that its investiga- tion would have unearthed a disqualifying fact. It need only estab- lish that the investigation “would predictably have disclosed” some legal disqualification. Id., at 774. If that is so, the defendant’s mis- representation contributed to the citizenship award in the way §1425(a) requires. This demanding but still practicable causal standard reflects the real-world attributes of cases premised on what an unhindered investigation would have found.
When the Government can make its two-part showing, the defend- ant may overcome it by establishing that she was qualified for citizenship (even though she misrepresented facts that suggested the opposite). Thus, whatever the Government shows with respect to a
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MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES Syllabus
thwarted investigation, qualification for citizenship is a complete defense to a prosecution under §1425(a). Pp. 10–15.
3. Measured against this analysis, the jury instructions in this case were in error. The jury needed to find more than an unlawful false statement. However, it was not asked to—and so did not—make any of the necessary determinations. The Government’s assertion that any instructional error was harmless is left for resolution on remand. Pp. 15–16.
821 F. 3d 675, vacated and remanded.
KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
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Interestingly, Justice Gorsuch, in his first immigration-related decision, wrote a separate concurring opinion agreeing with the majority that a misrepresentation must be “material” but indicating that he would not have gone on to attempt to articulate a test for “materiality.”
The full opinion is at the above link. Here’s the Court’s “Detailed Syllabus,” which, of course, is NOT part of the opinion:
Syllabus
ZIGLAR v. ABBASI ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 15–1358. Argued January 18, 2017—Decided June 19, 2017*
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Federal Government ordered hundreds of illegal aliens to be taken into custody and held pending a determination whether a particular detainee had connections to terrorism. Respondents, six men of Arab or South Asian descent, were detained for periods of three to six months in a federal facility in Brooklyn. After their release, they were removed from the United States. They then filed this putative class action against petitioners, two groups of federal officials. The first group consisted of former Attorney General John Ashcroft, for- mer Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert Mueller, and former Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner James Ziglar (Executive Officials). The second group consisted of the facili- ty’s warden and assistant warden Dennis Hasty and James Sherman (Wardens). Respondents sought damages for constitutional viola- tions under the implied cause of action theory adopted in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, alleging that peti- tioners detained them in harsh pretrial conditions for a punitive pur- pose, in violation of the Fifth Amendment; that petitioners did so be- cause of their actual or apparent race, religion, or national origin, in violation of the Fifth Amendment; that the Wardens subjected them to punitive strip searches, in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; and that the Wardens knowingly allowed the guards to abuse them, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Respondents also brought a claim under 42 U. S. C. §1985(3), which forbids certain
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*Together with No. 15–1359, Ashcroft, Former Attorney General, et al. v. Abbasi et al., and No. 15–1363, Hasty et al. v. Abbasi et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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ZIGLAR v. ABBASI Syllabus
conspiracies to violate equal protection rights. The District Court dismissed the claims against the Executive Officials but allowed the claims against the Wardens to go forward. The Second Circuit af- firmed in most respects as to the Wardens but reversed as to the Ex- ecutive Officials, reinstating respondents’ claims.
Held: The judgment is reversed in part and vacated and remanded in part.
789 F. 3d 218, reversed in part and vacated and remanded in part. JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to
Part IV–B, concluding:
1. The limited reach of the Bivens action informs the decision
whether an implied damages remedy should be recognized here. Pp. 6–14.
(a) In 42 U. S. C. §1983, Congress provided a specific damages remedy for plaintiffs whose constitutional rights were violated by state officials, but Congress provided no corresponding remedy for constitutional violations by agents of the Federal Government. In 1971, and against this background, this Court recognized in Bivens an implied damages action to compensate persons injured by federal officers who violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the following decade, the Court allowed Bivens-type remedies twice more, in a Fifth Amend- ment gender-discrimination case, Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, and in an Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause case, Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14. These are the only cases in which the Court has approved of an implied damages remedy un- der the Constitution itself. Pp. 6–7.
(b) Bivens, Davis, and Carlson were decided at a time when the prevailing law assumed that a proper judicial function was to “pro- vide such remedies as are necessary to make effective” a statute’s purpose. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433. The Court has since adopted a far more cautious course, clarifying that, when decid- ing whether to recognize an implied cause of action, the “determina- tive” question is one of statutory intent. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 286. If a statute does not evince Congress’ intent “to create the private right of action asserted,” Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 568, no such action will be created through judicial mandate. Similar caution must be exercised with respect to damages actions implied to enforce the Constitution itself. Bivens is well- settled law in its own context, but expanding the Bivens remedy is now considered a “disfavored” judicial activity. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 675.
When a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action under the Constitution, separation-of-powers principles should be central to the
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Syllabus
analysis. The question is whether Congress or the courts should de- cide to authorize a damages suit. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367, 380. Most often it will be Congress, for Bivens will not be extended to a new context if there are “ ‘special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.’ ” Carlson, supra, at 18. If there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy as part of the system for enforcing the law and correcting a wrong, courts must refrain from creating that kind of remedy. An alternative remedial structure may also limit the Judiciary’s power to infer a new Bivens cause of action. Pp. 8–14.
2. Considering the relevant special factors here, a Bivens-type rem- edy should not be extended to the claims challenging the confinement conditions imposed on respondents pursuant to the formal policy adopted by the Executive Officials in the wake of the September 11 attacks. These “detention policy claims” include the allegations that petitioners violated respondents’ due process and equal protection rights by holding them in restrictive conditions of confinement, and the allegations that the Wardens violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by subjecting respondents to frequent strip searches. The detention policy claims do not include the guard-abuse claim against Warden Hasty. Pp. 14–23.
(a) The proper test for determining whether a claim arises in a new Bivens context is as follows. If the case is different in a mean- ingful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this Court, then the context is new. Meaningful differences may include, e.g., the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the extent of judicial guidance for the official conduct; the risk of disruptive intru- sion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential special factors not considered in previous Bivens cases. Respondents’ detention policy claims bear little resemblance to the three Bivens claims the Court has approved in previous cases. The Second Circuit thus should have held that this was a new Bivens context and then performed a special factors analysis before allowing this damages suit to proceed. Pp. 15–17.
(b)The special factors here indicate that Congress, not the courts, should decide whether a damages action should be allowed.
With regard to the Executive Officials, a Bivens action is not “a proper vehicle for altering an entity’s policy,” Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 74, and is not designed to hold officers responsible for acts of their subordinates, see Iqbal, supra, at 676. Even an action confined to the Executive Officers’ own discrete con- duct would call into question the formulation and implementation of a high-level executive policy, and the burdens of that litigation could prevent officials from properly discharging their duties, see Cheney v.
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ZIGLAR v. ABBASI Syllabus
United States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 382. The litigation process might also implicate the discussion and deliberations that led to the formation of the particular policy, requiring courts to interfere with sensitive Executive Branch functions. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 701.
Other special factors counsel against extending Bivens to cover the detention policy claims against any of the petitioners. Because those claims challenge major elements of the Government’s response to the September 11 attacks, they necessarily require an inquiry into na- tional-security issues. National-security policy, however, is the pre- rogative of Congress and the President, and courts are “reluctant to intrude upon” that authority absent congressional authorization. Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U. S. 518, 530. Thus, Congress’ failure to provide a damages remedy might be more than mere over- sight, and its silence might be more than “inadvertent.” Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U. S. 412, 423. That silence is also relevant and telling here, where Congress has had nearly 16 years to extend “the kind of remedies [sought by] respondents,” id., at 426, but has not done so. Respondents also may have had available “ ‘other alternative forms of judicial relief,’ ” Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U. S. 118, 124, including in- junctions and habeas petitions.
The proper balance in situations like this, between deterring con- stitutional violations and freeing high officials to make the lawful de- cisions necessary to protect the Nation in times of great peril, is one for the Congress to undertake, not the Judiciary. The Second Circuit thus erred in allowing respondents’ detention policy claims to proceed under Bivens. Pp. 17–23.
3. The Second Circuit also erred in allowing the prisoner abuse claim against Warden Hasty to go forward without conducting the required special factors analysis. Respondents’ prisoner abuse alle- gations against Warden Hasty state a plausible ground to find a con- stitutional violation should a Bivens remedy be implied. But the first question is whether the claim arises in a new Bivens context. This claim has significant parallels to Carlson, which extended Bivens to cover a failure to provide medical care to a prisoner, but this claim nevertheless seeks to extend Carlson to a new context. The constitu- tional right is different here: Carlson was predicated on the Eighth Amendment while this claim was predicated on the Fifth. The judi- cial guidance available to this warden with respect to his supervisory duties was less developed. There might have been alternative reme- dies available. And Congress did not provide a standalone damages remedy against federal jailers when it enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act some 15 years after Carlson. Given this Court’s ex- pressed caution about extending the Bivens remedy, this context
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must be regarded as a new one. Pp. 23–26.
4. Petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to re-
spondents’ claims under 42 U. S. C. §1985(3). Pp. 26–32.
(a) Assuming that respondents’ allegations are true and well pleaded, the question is whether a reasonable officer in petitioners’ position would have known the alleged conduct was an unlawful con- spiracy. The qualified-immunity inquiry turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the official’s acts, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 819, “assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly estab- lished’ at the time [the action] was taken,” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 639. If it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the alleged conduct “was unlawful in the situation he confront- ed,” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202, the defendant officer is not entitled to qualified immunity. But if a reasonable officer might not have known that the conduct was unlawful, then the officer is enti-
tled to qualified immunity. Pp. 27–29.
(b) Here, reasonable officials in petitioners’ positions would not
have known with sufficient certainty that §1985(3) prohibited their joint consultations and the resulting policies. There are two reasons. First, the conspiracy is alleged to have been among officers in the same Department of the Federal Government. And there is no clear- ly established law on the issue whether agents of the same executive department are distinct enough to “conspire” with one another within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. §1985(3). Second, open discussion among federal officers should be encouraged to help those officials reach con- sensus on department policies, so there is a reasonable argument that §1985(3) liability should not extend to cases like this one. As these considerations indicate, the question whether federal officials can be said to “conspire” in these kinds of situations is sufficiently open that the officials in this suit would not have known that §1985(3) applied to their discussions and actions. It follows that rea- sonable officers in petitioners’ positions would not have known with any certainty that the alleged agreements were forbidden by that statute. Pp. 29–32.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, IV–A, and V, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV–B, in which ROB- ERTS, C. J., and ALITO, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concur- ring in part and concurring in the judgment. BREYER, J., filed a dis- senting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
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It was an odd opinion in that only six Justices participated, so the majority was 4-2. The majority opinion was Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito. But, the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Alito also wrote or joined in separate concurring opinions. Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Ginsburg joined.
Justices Sotomayer, Kagan, and Gorsuch sat this one out. Justice Sotomayor previously was a Judge on the Second Circuit at the time this case was before that court. Justice Kagan worked on the case as Solicitor General. And, Justice Gorsuch arrived too late to participate in the argument and deliberations.
However, I doubt that there would be a difference in result with all nine Justices voting. Justice Gorsuch almost certainly would side with the majority opinion’s “strict construction” of liability. Even assuming that Justices Sotomayor and Kagan would side with the dissenters, there would still be a 5-4 majority for the approach set forth in Justice Kennedy’s opinion.
Reading between the lines here, I think that the whole Bivens concept is “on the rocks” before this Court. The current, more conservative, Court clearly wishes Bivens were never decided and wants to limit it essentially to its facts. With a GOP President, any future appointments are likely to turn the tide even more solidly for overruling or strictly limiting Bivens.
I must admit to having mixed feelings. As a Government Senior Executive I was subject to several (totally unfounded) Bivens suits. I was greatly relieved and totally delighted when the doctrines of absolute and implied immunity got me dismissed in my private capacity. I also took out a standard Government approved “Bivens liability insurance policy” just in case.
On the other hand, I’d have to say that the specter of being involved in Bivens litigation was something that I and almost all of the other senior government officials whom I advised and worked with, up to and including Cabinet officers, had Bivens in the back of our “collective minds” in determining actions and policies. So, there was at least some “deterrent value” in the Bivens case. Moreover, it was an effective tool for pointing out the necessity for line enforcement officers, whom I often trained or advised, to keep their actions within clearly established constitutional boundries.
The Court suggests that it would be best for Congress to address this subject. But, Bivens has been around for many years and Congress has never addressed it. So, I wouldn’t hold my breath.
Interestingly, among those high-ranking officials who were relieved of any liability in this case were former Attorney General John Ashcroft and then FBI Director Robert Mueller.
