⚖️4TH CIR. — CHIEF CIRCUIT JUDGE ROGER GREGORY (DISSENTING) CASTIGATES COLLEAGUES ON GRANTNG “CHEVRON DEFERENCE” TO BIA!

Chief Judge Roger Gregory
Chief Judge Roger Gregory
U.S. Court of Appeals
Fourth Circuit

Pugin v. Garland, 4th Cir., 12-01-21, published, 2-1 (Chief Judge Gregory, dissenting)

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/201363.P.pdf

GREGORY, Chief Judge, dissenting:

The majority concludes that because the phrase “in relation to obstruction of justice”

in § 1101(a)(43)(S) is ambiguous, the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) renewed interpretation of this provision is due Chevron deference. The majority also concludes that the BIA’s interpretation of “reasonably foreseeable”—in the context of before an investigation or proceeding—is reasonable. Because, in my view, the phrase is not ambiguous, the BIA is not due Chevron deference. However, even if § 1101(a)(43)(S) is ambiguous, the BIA’s conclusion that a formal nexus to an ongoing investigation is not required—based solely on the express exception in § 1512 and the catchall provision that it wrongly interpreted—is unreasonable. Thus, I disagree that Petitioner’s conviction of “Accessory After the Fact to a Felony,” under § 18.2–19 of the Virginia Code, is a categorical match with the generic offense of § 1101(a)(43)(S). For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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Of interest:

  • The “previous interpretation” discussed here, that the BIA subsequently “ditched” in favor of a more pro-DHS one, is Matter of Espinoza- Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. 889 (B.I.A. 1999), a “Schmidt Era” en banc decision written by Judge Ed Grant in which I joined.
  • 64 pages of arcane discussion and citations from three Circuit Court of Appeals’ Judges who cannot agree on the result shows the continuing disingenuous absurdity of a system that claims that “unrepresented” immigrants receive due process — many of these cases require not only lawyers, but great lawyers with expertise in immigration, criminal law, and statutory interpretation to achieve fair resolution;
  • Both the majority and the dissent “talk around” a major problem in the misapplication of “Chevron deference” to the BIA: In recent years, the BIA invariably adopts “any interpretation” offered by the DHS over better interpretations offered by respondents and their lawyers — this is a “rigged system” if there ever was one. For Article III Courts to “legitimize” the bogus application of Chevron by a non-expert tribunal that views itself as an extension of DHS Enforcement is a disgraceful dereliction of judicial duty!

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

12-02-21

HERE’S THE FUTURE AS SESSIONS DUMBS DOWN, SPEEDS UP, SKEWS THE LAW, AND DE-PROFESSIONALIZES IMMIGRATION COURTS – 4th Circuit Slams BIA’s Sloppy Analytical Work, Refuses Deference, Reverses, & Remands — Ramirez v. Sessions

RAMIREZVSESSIONS,4THSLOPPY

Ramirez v. Sessions, 4th Cir., 04-17-18, Published

PANEL: GREGORY, Chief Judge, MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: CHIEF JUDGE GREGORY

SUMMARY (From Chief Judge Gregory’s opinion):

Jose Ramirez seeks review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) finding him ineligible for special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). Specifically, the question is whether Ramirez’s convictions for obstruction of justice pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 18.2- 460(A) qualify as crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). We hold that obstruction of justice under § 18.2-460(A) is not a CIMT because it may be committed without fraud, deception, or any other aggravating element that shocks the public conscience. We therefore grant Ramirez’s petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order of removal, and remand with directions for the Government to facilitate Ramirez’s return to the United States to participate in further proceedings.

KEY QUOTE:

In relation to those cases, the BIA’s one-member decision in this case attempts to significantly expand the definition of a CIMT by removing deceit, a critical indicator of moral turpitude, from the equation. Since this non-precedential decision departs from, rather than relies on, precedential BIA decisions, it is not eligible for Chevron review.

In the absence of Chevron deference, the weight given to a BIA decision “hinges on ‘the thoroughness evident in [the BIA’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.’” Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241, 246 n.2 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Martinez, 740 F.3d at 909–10); see Mead, 533 U.S. at 221. Here, the BIA provides only three sentences of analysis that are conclusory in nature and disregards the agency’s prior emphasis on fraud or deceit as a critical determinant without identifying an alternative aggravator. Consequently, the BIA decision is also undeserving of so-calledSkidmore respect because it lacks the power to persuade. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 221.

In sum, under Chevron, BIA decisions defining morally turpitudinous conduct are controlling if they are precedential and reasonable. However, the BIA’s interpretations of laws that it does not administer, such as the Virginia obstruction of justice statute, and its non-precedential decisions are only given weight to the extent that this Court finds the reasoning persuasive. Here, because we do not find persuasive the BIA’s abbreviated and non-precedential opinion, we do not accord it any deference.

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As we saw during the Bush Administration, “haste makes waste” procedures imposed by the DOJ at the Immigration Courts and the BIA are likely to cause a rebellion in the Article III Courts as they are presented with sloppy work including inadequate factual analyses, incorrect fact-findings, and abbreviated, deficient legal analyses. Factors such as pressure to render more “contemporaneous oral decisions” at the end of the hearing without reviewing the full record and testimony as well as single-judge BIA decisions or “summary affirmances” without opinion aggravate the problem.

As the quantity increases and quality decreases, the Article III Courts will lose confidence in the ImmigratIon Courts and begin returning large numbers of cases for “quality control redos” — something that adds to delay and increases backlogs as well as demoralizing Immigration Judges and frustrating respondents and counsel on both sides.

At some point, I foresee that attorneys for respondents should succeed in convincing the Article III Courts that the BIA no longer qualifies as an “expert tribunal” and that its decisions therefore should not receive so-called “Chevron deference.” Session’s use of his certification power to interfere in judicial decisions is also highly problematic.

Jeff Sessions is neither a judge nor by any stretch of the imagination an unbiased quasi-judicial decision maker. Indeed any Article III or Administrative Judge who made some of the untrue and pejorative statements about migrants, asylum seekers, private attorneys, and the law that Sessions has publicly made since becoming the Attorney General would certainly be required to disqualify himself or herself from a quasi-judicial role in any immigration adjudication.

There is no possibility of a fair, unbiased, due process oriented Immigration Court system under Jeff Sessions and the DOJ.

We have “seen this show before” under Ashcroft and the Bush Administration.  Congress seriously disregards its responsibilities by standing by and watching disaster unfold again with hundreds of thousands of lives, and perhaps the stability of our entire Federal Judicial System, at stake.

PWS

04-19-18