Category: Deepak Lama v. Wilkinson

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2021/02/24/19-71375.pdf

Here’s a recent unpublished decision from the 9th Circuit in Deepak Lama v. Wilkinson, (Feb. 24, 2021):

Before: HURWITZ and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and FEINERMAN,** District Judge.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The Honorable Gary Feinerman, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

Deepak Lama, a citizen of Nepal, petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge (IJ) order denying his claims for asylum and withholding of removal.1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We grant the petition and remand.

The IJ found that Lama had suffered past persecution on account of his political activity and was entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). But, the IJ also found that the government had rebutted the presumption, and the BIA then dismissed Lama’s appeal on the sole basis that Lama could safely and reasonably relocate within Nepal, to Chitwan, where he previously resided for five years without incident. Our review is limited to the ground on which the BIA relied. Qiu v. Barr, 944 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2019).

When the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution applies, the government bears the “burden of showing that relocation is both safe and reasonable under all the circumstances” by a preponderance of the evidence. Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 934 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017). “Relocation analysis consists of two steps: (1) ‘whether an applicant could relocate safely,’ and (2) ‘whether it would be reasonable to require the applicant to do so.’” Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Afriyie, 613 F.3d at 934). We

1 The BIA found that Lama forfeited his claim under the Convention Against Torture. Lama does not challenge that ruling in this court.

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conclude that the BIA’s limited relocation analysis does not satisfy the applicable legal requirements.

First, the agency “failed to take into account the numerous factors for determining reasonableness outlined in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3).” Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 2004). Relying on Lama’s stay in Chitwan between 2003 and 2008, the agency provided no analysis of whether it would be reasonable for Lama to relocate there at the time of his hearing, in 2017. Lama demonstrated that he experienced persecution in Nepal both in his hometown and later in Kathmandu, and that this persecution took place both before and after he lived in Chitwan. While his time in Chitwan appears to have been without incident, he last lived there many years ago. The government presented no evidence that Lama could safely and reasonably return there now, considering both the current political situation in Chitwan and Lama’s personal circumstances. See Singh, 914 F.3d at 661.

Second, the BIA’s analysis rests on an apparent misapprehension of the record. The BIA stated that “[t]he record contains no evidence that it would no longer be safe or reasonable for [Lama] to once again return to [Chitwan] where he had previously voluntarily relocated and resided for approximately 5 years without incident.” (Emphasis added.) But the record contains a 2016 letter written to Lama from his uncle, with whom he lived in Chitwan, indicating that Lama would not be

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safe there. The BIA did not consider this evidence. And to the extent the BIA “erroneously presumed that relocation was reasonable and improperly assigned the burden of proof to [Lama] to show otherwise,” Afriyie, 613 F.3d at 935, it erred in that respect as well. See also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(ii) (burden of proof).

Gomes v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2005), does not support the government’s position that because Lama once resided in Chitwan without incident, “it is axiomatic that he can do so again.” In Gomes, unlike this case, the petitioners had not shown past persecution and thus bore the burden to show that relocation was unreasonable. Id. at 1266–67 & 1266 n.1. In addition, unlike Lama, it appears that the petitioners in Gomes had safely resided in the area in question immediately prior to entering the United States. See id. at 1267. Gomes also did not involve the BIA failing to address evidence (here the letter from Lama’s uncle) indicating that relocation to the designated area could be unsafe.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition and remand this matter to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Any relocation analysis must comport with the governing regulations and this court’s precedents. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3); Singh, 914 F.3d at 659–61. We also dismiss as moot the portion of Lama’s petition challenging the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand.

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART; REMANDED.

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*******************

Once again, this is nothing profound, difficult, or controversial. Just basic application of EOIR’S own regulations, consideration of all the evidence presented by the respondent, and basic analysis, with some fundamental fairness and common sense thrown in. That’s probably why the panel didn’t deem it worthy of publication. But, it does further illustrate a disturbing pattern at the BIA and the Immigration Courts.

During my time as an Immigration Judge, I was sometimes involved in the nationwide judicial  law clerk (JLC)  training program. One of my key points to the JLCs was that many Immigration Judges, even then, continued to get basic “burden shifting” and further analysis wrong once the respondent established past persecution, thereby invoking the regulatory presumption of future persecution.

The DHS then has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence either 1) fundamentally changed conditions that would eliminate any well-founded fear of individualized persecution; or 2) a reasonably available internal relocation alternative under the applicable regulations. 

Because conditions seldom materially improve in most refugee-sending countries, and reasonable relocation alternatives that would eliminate a well-founded fear of persecution (not hiding in someone’s basement or in a cave in the forest) can seldom be established, in my experience, the DHS almost always failed to rebut the presumption. This was particularly the case because then, as now, the ICE counsel usually presented no testimony or other evidence to rebut the presumption beyond that contained in the State Department Country Report, which seldom was definitive on this type of highly individualized analysis.

Even where the DHS rebuts the regulatory presumption, the respondent still can win protection if she or he shows 1) compelling reasons for not returning arising from the past persecution, or 2) a reasonable possibility of other serious harm if returned.

These regulatory standards are consistent with the generous intent of the refugee definition as described by the Supreme Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca. They should result in rather easy grants of protection in most cases involving past persecution,

However it appears that EOIR judges haven’t improved in this area. If anything, result-oriented decision-making geared to make denial of asylum the “administrative norm” evidently has been substituted for careful, professional, expert analysis. Indeed, correct analysis by expert judges knowledgeable in asylum law would probably result in most cases like this being granted at the Immigration Judge level, or even the Asylum Office, thus discouraging the DHS from taking largely meritless appeals to the BIA and reducing the workload in the Circuit Courts.

Instead the sloppy, biased, “any reason to deny” attitude that infects today’s EOIR means that justice for asylum seekers requires skilled lawyers, a “lucky draw” on judges at some level of the system, and, all too often, endless remands and time spent on “redos” to correct elementary errors. No wonder this system is running an astounding 1.3 million case backlog, even with many more IJs on the bench at both the trial and appellate levels! 

This is a “system designed to fail.” And, failing it is, at every level, spilling over into the Article III Courts and placing the foundation of our entire U.S. justice system — due process for all under law — in jeopardy.

Quality, expertise, understanding, and a fair and humane attitude toward asylum seekers is much more important than quantity in asylum adjudication! This the exact opposite of the message delivered by the last Administration.

Here’s my basic thesis:

• • Granting relief wherever possible and at the lowest possible levels of the system speeds things up and promotes best practices and maximum efficiency without stomping on anyone’s rights. (And, it saves lives).
    • En masse denials and trying to run a “deportation railroad” eventually leads to gross inefficiencies and systemic failure. (And, it kills innocent individuals).

I’m not the only one who believes this. As one of my esteemed Round Table colleagues recently quipped: “The sloppiness of the BIA in case after case is alarming.” Indeed it is; but, sadly, not particularly surprising or unusual. 

🇺🇸⚖️🗽Due Process Forever!

PWS

03-01-21