"The Voice of the New Due Process Army" ————– Musings on Events in U.S. Immigration Court, Immigration Law, Sports, and Other Random Topics by Retired United States Immigration Judge (Arlington, Virginia) and former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals Paul Wickham Schmidt. To see my complete professional bio, just click on the link below.
“Petitioner Srecko Pesikan argues that the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) erred in concluding that his 2018 Pennsylvania conviction for driving under the influence (“DUI”) of marijuana constituted an offense involving a “controlled substance,” as defined in the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), thereby rendering him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (“INA”). We agree and will grant his petition for review. … In sum, because the identity of the specific controlled substance is not an element of the Pennsylvania DUI statute, the state statute of conviction is indivisible and cannot serve as the basis for Pesikan’s removal under the INA. … For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Pesikan’s Petition for Review in case number 21-1262 and will reverse the order for removal.”
These are important cases with high stakes! They deserve expert analysis from expert judges.
Eliminating unnecessary Circuit reversals and remands like this would also help address the backlog-building, due-process-denying phenomenon of “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” at EOIR. Avoidable mistakes at the “retail level” are systemically costly to our justice system in more ways than one!
And, remember, that for every EOIR mistake that gets “caught” by the Article IIIs, dozens of these injustices probably go uncorrected! Circuit review is a luxury that isn’t available to most individuals who lose at the BIA level. Even here, Mr. Pesikan would have had no chance at the Circuit except for court-appointed pro bono counsel Stephen A. Fogdall and his team at Dillworth & Paxon, LLP, another luxury unavailable to litigants at the EOIR level.
Moreover, even when Circuit review does take place, the inappropriately deferential standards established by Congress allow (or even require) some Circuit panels to merely sweep glaring injustices under the rug without grappling with the overall constitutional implications of this shoddy, due–process-denying system. Why on earth would “deference” be given or review restricted over the “gang that can’t shoot straight” at EOIR?”
Would you give “deference” to these guys? Theatrical poster from Wikipedia
“The question presented in this appeal—one which has led to a circuit split—is whether a conviction for falsely representing a social security number, see 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B), is a CIMT. … The BIA explained that § 408(a)(7)(B) requires intent to deceive, and as a result Mr. Zarate’s conviction was for a CIMT. Noting that the circuits were divided on the issue, it quoted our decision in Walker v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 783 F.3d 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 2015), for the proposition that, “[g]enerally, a crime involving dishonesty or false statement is considered to be one involving moral turpitude.” The BIA did not, however, address whether a violation of § 407(a)(7)(B) is inherently base, vile, or depraved. And that, as we will later explain, is a significant omission. … Our holding today does not foreclose the possibility that a conviction for a violation of § 408(a)(7)(B) may be a CIMT. But if the BIA is going to hold that it is, it will need to do what it has so far failed to do in Mr. Zarate’s case—it will have to apply its two-pronged moral turpitude standard in toto and decide whether the statute, under the categorical approach, involves conduct that is “reprehensible,” i.e., conduct that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.” Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 833–34 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 Utah L. Rev. at 1007–08 (criticizing courts for “ignor[ing] community moral sentiments when applying the [moral turpitude] standard”). We remand to the BIA for that purpose.”
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase Jeffrey S. Chase Blog Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Former Immigration Judges
My colleague Hon. “Sir Jeffrey” Chase of the Round Table 🛡⚔️ offers the following cogent “instant analysis:”
Besides from what this says about the BIA being too lazy and hellbent on affirming removal orders for even the 11th Circuit’s liking, this is really interesting in its addressing the issue of applying “community moral sentiments”.What community are we talking about, and at what period of time?
There’s also a concurring opinion that does a very deep dive into the process for determining whether a statute is divisible.Could you even imagine the BIA engaging in the necessary analysis?
“Deep analysis” isn’t exactly in the “BIA playbook” under Garland. No, Garland’s “good enough for government work culture” at the DOJ tolerates the “whatever it takes to get to ‘no’” standard that was instilled by Sessions and Barr and, remarkably, still permeates much of the BIA’s work that is being rejected by the Article IIIs.
I note that the “deep dive” concurring opinion referenced by “Sir Jeffrey” was written by Senior Circuit Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat, a 92-year-old Gerald Ford appointee whose intellectual engagement and analytical work product puts the Garland BIA to shame!
“In these circumstances, we must assess whether a Virginia statutory burglary constitutes an aggravated felony using the categorical approach. See Omargharib, 775 F.3d at 196. As the Attorney General concedes in this proceeding, the Virginia burglary statute is broader than the federal crime of generic burglary. In Taylor, the Supreme Court included in its definition of a generic burglary “an unlawful or unprivileged entry” into “a building or other structure,” and explained that state burglary statutes that “eliminat[e] the requirement that the entry be unlawful, or . . . includ[e] places, such as automobiles and vending machines, other than buildings,” fall outside the definition of generic burglary. See 495 U.S. at 598-99. As we noted above, the Virginia burglary statute is satisfied by various alternative means of entry, including one’s entry without breaking or one’s concealment after lawful entry. By proscribing such conduct, the statute falls outside the scope of generic burglary. The Virginia burglary statute also reaches several places that are not buildings or structures, such as ships, vessels, river craft, railroad cars, automobiles, trucks, and trailers. As the BIA recently recognized, the breadth of the statute means that it falls outside the definition of an aggravated felony. See In re H-M-F, __ I. & N. Dec. __ (BIA Mar. 29, 2017). Utilizing the categorical approach, we are also satisfied that the Virginia offense of statutory burglary criminalizes more conduct than the generic federal offense of burglary. The DHS therefore erred in classifying Castendet’s conviction as an aggravated felony.”
******************************************
Could the wheels be starting to come off the DHS’s “Expedited Removal Machine” before it even gets up to full throttle?
