For some time now, immigrant advocates have been fearing/expecting Attorney General Jeff Sessions to use his authority to “certify” BIA cases to himself as a means to undo or restrict BIA administrative precedents that might be helpful or favorable to migrants.
For those new to the practice, the U.S. immigration Court, including both the trial courts and the Appellate Division (“BIA”), is a “wholly owed subsidiary” of the Attorney General and the U.S. Department of Justice. The Attorney General gets to select U.S. Immigration Judges and BIA Appellate Judges, and they basically serve in their judicial positions at his pleasure (although, for the most part, they can’t be removed from their positions as DOJ Attorneys without cause — in other words, they can be reassigned to non-judicial duties at the same pay and grade largely “at will”).
Additionally, the Attorney General has the authority to promulgate regulations governing the jurisdiction and authority of the Immigration Courts and the BIA. Beyond that, he can actually change the result in individual cases with which he disagrees by a regulatory device known as “certifying” cases to himself for final decision. This process, of course, also applies to BIA precedents, which otherwise are binding on U.S. Immigration Judges nationwide.
The process of certification has now begun. Today, Sessions “certified” a BIA case to himself for the apparent purpose of stripping or limiting the authority of the BIA and Immigration Judges to “administratively close” cases. “Administrative closure” is a method of removing the case from the court’s active docket (significantly, it then no longer counts toward the “backlog” of pending cases).
It is normally used for cases that are pending for adjudication somewhere within the USCIS. It had also been widely used, particularly during the Obama Administration, as a means of implementing decisions by the ICE Chief Counsel to exercise “prosecutorial discretion” or “PD” in particular humanitarian situations, as well as a way for removing so-called “DACA” grants from the courts’ active dockets.
The particular case certified is Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 87 (A.G. 2018). The BIA’s decision is unpublished (“non-precedcential”). However, Session’s real target appears to be the BIA’s precedents Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012), and Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017), which gave Immigration Judges at least some independent authority to administratively close cases over the objection of a party (although, importantly, not the authority to close a case for “PD” without ICE Counsel’s consent). While Matter of Castro-Tum asks for briefing on a number of questions, it seems highly unlikely that Sessions went to the trouble of certifying the case to reaffirm, continue, or expand the use of “administrative closing.”
“Administrative closing” was initiated by the first EOIR Chief immigration Judge, the late William R. Robie, as a way of clearing court dockets of cases that were not actually under active consideration before the Immigration Court. It has been an effective way or reducing and prioritizing immigration Court dockets that has presented few problems in administration. Its elimination or restriction could lead to more “Aimless Docket Reshuffling” (“ADR”) or bigger backlogs.
Some advocates have even suggested that Sessions actually intends to maximize the Immigration Court’s already huge 660,000 case backlog to support a request for 1) a dramatic immediate increase in immigration Judge funding, or 2) a dramatic expansion of the number of individuals subject to so-called “Administrative (or “Expedited”) Removal” by DHS Enforcement officers without recourse to the immigration Court, or both.
Stay tuned to see which BIA precedents might be next on Session’s “chopping block.”
Here’s a copy of Matter of Castro-Tum:
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1022366/download
Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 187 (A.G. 2018) Interim Decision #3911
Matter of Reynaldo CASTRO-TUM, Respondent
Decided by Attorney General January 4, 2018
U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General
The Attorney General referred the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals to himself for review of issues relating to the authority to administratively close immigration proceedings, ordering that the case be stayed during the pendency of his review.
BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(h)(l)(i) (2017), I direct the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) to refer this case to me for review of its decision. The Board’s decision in this matter is automatically stayed pending my review. See Matter of Haddam, A.G. Order No. 2380-2001 (Jan. 19, 2001). To assist me in my review, I invite the parties to these proceedings and interested amici to submit briefs on points relevant to the disposition of this case, including:
1. Do Immigration Judges and the Board have the authority, under any statute, regulation, or delegation of authority from the Attorney General, to order administrative closure in a case? If so, do the Board’s decisions in Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012), and Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017), articulate the appropriate standard for administrative closure?
2. If I determine that Immigration Judges and the Board currently lack the authority to order administrative closure, should I delegate such authority? Alternatively, if I determine that Immigration Judges and the Board currently possess the authority to order administrative closure, should I withdraw that authority?
3. The regulations governing removal proceedings were promulgated for “the expeditious, fair, and proper resolution of matters coming before Immigration Judges.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.12 (2017). Are there any circumstances where a docket management device other than administrative closure—including a continuance for good cause shown (8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2017)), dismissal without prejudice (8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c) (2017)), or termination without prejudice (8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f))—would be inadequate to promote that objective? Should there be different legal consequences, such as eligibility to apply for a provisional waiver of certain grounds of inadmissibility under the immigration laws or for benefits under federal or state programs, where a case has been administratively closed rather than continued?
4. If I determine that Immigration Judges and the Board do not have the authority to order administrative closure, and that such a power is unwarranted or unavailable, what actions should be taken regarding cases that are already administratively closed?
187
Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 187 (A.G. 2018) Interim Decision #3911
The parties’ briefs shall not exceed 15,000 words and shall be filed on or before February 2, 2018. Interested amici may submit briefs not exceeding 9,000 words on or before February 9, 2018. The parties may submit reply briefs not exceeding 6,000 words on or before February 20, 2018. All filings shall be accompanied by proof of service and shall be submitted electronically to AGCertification@usdoj.gov, and in triplicate to:
United States Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General, Room 5114 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530
All briefs must be both submitted electronically and postmarked on or before the pertinent deadlines. Requests for extensions are disfavored.
188
If you want a copy of the BIA’s unpublished decision in Castro-Tum, go on over to LexisNexis Immigration Community at this link:
PWS
01-05-18