Gomez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 9th Cir., 04-06-18, Published, vacating Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I&N Dec. 339 (BIA 2014)
COURT STAFF SUMMARY:
The panel granted Guillermo Gomez-Sanchez’s petition for review of the published decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339 (BIA 2014), which concluded that Gomez-Sanchez was statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal because he was convicted of a “particularly serious crime” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B), and vacated and remanded.
Gomez-Sanchez was convicted of assault with a non- deadly firearm weapon in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(1), which the BIA concluded constituted a particularly serious crime that prevented Gomez-Sanchez from being eligible for withholding of removal. In reaching this decision, the BIA held that a petitioner’s mental health could not be considered when addressing whether he had committed a particularly serious crime.
The panel held that Matter of G-G-S- was not entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C., Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under step one of Chevron, the panel concluded that Matter of G-G-S-’s blanket rule against considering mental health is contrary to Congress’s clearly expressed intent that the particularly serious crime determination, in cases where a conviction falls outside the only statutorily enumerated per se category of particularly serious crimes, requires a case-by-case analysis. The panel also concluded that, even if Matter of G-G-S- were to survive step one of Chevron, it would fail at step two because the BIA’s interpretation is not reasonable in that the BIA’s two rationales for its broad rule – 1) that the Agency could not reassess a criminal court’s findings, and 2) that mental health is never relevant to the particularly serious crime determination – are unpersuasive and are inconsistent with the law of this Circuit and the BIA’s own decisions.
*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
PANEL:
Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw* and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges, and Janet Bond Arterton,**District Judge.
* This case was submitted to a panel that included Judge Kozinski, who recently retired. Following Judge Kozinski’s retirement, Judge Wardlaw was drawn by lot to replace him. Ninth Circuit General Order 3.2.h. Judge Wardlaw has read the briefs, reviewed the record, and listened to oral argument.
** The Honorable Janet Bond Arterton, United States District Judge for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.
OPINION BY:
Judge Janet Bond Arterton
KEY QUOTES:
Against this backdrop, the BIA here announced and applied a blanket rule against considering an individual’s mental health as a factor when deciding whether his or her crime of conviction is particularly serious. Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 339, 347.4 This decision is contrary to Congress’s clearly expressed intent that the analysis of whether a crime is particularly serious “requires the agency to conduct a case-by-case analysis of convictions falling outside the category established by Congress,” Blandino- Medina, 712 F.3d at 1345, because such categorical rules undermine the ability of the agency to conduct a case-by- case analysis in each case, see Konou, 650 F.3d at 1128; see also Arteaga De Alvarez, 704 F.3d at 740.
. . . .
Here, the Board cited In re N-A-M- approvingly, as if applying it. See Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 343. However, in reality, its decision to constrain the evidence IJs may consider when making a particularly serious crime determination is at least inconsistent with, if not directly in contradiction with its earlier holding permitting consideration of “all reliable information.” See In Re N-A- M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 338, 342. Petitioner’s case makes this inconsistency clear—despite not disputing the reliability of the information Petitioner submitted concerning his mental illness, the Board entirely precluded consideration of that evidence. Given that the Board made no attempt to address the apparent inconsistencies between its earlier rule and the rule at issue here, we find its current interpretation to be unreasonable and thus decline to afford it deference. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (“[A]n ‘[u]nexplained inconsistency’ in agency policy is ‘a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice,’” and thus finding that the interpretation is not entitled to Chevron deference. (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)));see also Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 920 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Given the severe repercussions of being found to have committed a particularly serious crime, the risk of precluding relevant evidence that might alter that determination is unreasonable. Furthermore, this risk is readily avoided by permitting the IJ to use his or her discretion in weighing relevant, reliable evidence of mental health rather than categorically barring this evidence in all cases.
For all of these reasons the Board’s interpretation of the INA does not warrant deference under Chevron.
. . . .
We find the Board’s conclusion to be unreasonable because it is inconsistent with its own precedent recognizing the relevance of motivation and intent to the particularly serious crime determination. See Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1048 (“The BIA acts arbitrarily when it disregards its own precedents and policies without giving a reasoned explanation for doing so.” (quoting Israel v. I.N.S., 785 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1986))). In Matter of L-S-, the Board found significant that an individual convicted of alien smuggling did not intend to harm the victim. 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 655–56 (BIA 1999). Indeed, the Government concedes that a particularly serious crime analysis permits consideration of an individual’s motivation. See Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1048 (finding no intent to harm either the arresting officer or members of the public).
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The BIA got it wrong in just about every conceivable way, including ignoring and misapplying its own precedents, in trying to reach a result unfavorable to the respondent. Against this backdrop of serious substantive problems (and, frankly, anti-respondent bias) permeating the entire U.S. Immigration Court System, from top to bottom, Sessions outrageously is trying to speed up the system without regard to quality or due process.
Suppose you inherited a factory that was producing defective cars. Would you solve the problem by speeding up the assembly line, forbidding the workers to think about their job functions, and denying them necessary training and equipment. No, that would produce even more defective cars, likely putting your company out of business. So, how is Session’s “just pedal faster” approach to assembly line justice acceptable? Obviously, it isn’t!
Sometimes, it doesn’t take a Government Accountability Office study to ferret out waste, fraud, and abuse. In this case, Jeff Sessions is right out there in public view intentionally and maliciously destroying a key part of the U.S. justice system. Why is Congress standing by and letting him get away with it? Why is the taxpayers’ money being wasted on illegal, illogical, and totally counterproductive actions? Whatever happened to effective oversight?
PWS
04-06-18