Levinson–The Facade Of Quasi-Judicial Independence
Read Peter’s full article at the above link (sorry about the difficult formatting — this was my “file copy.”)
| Abstract: |
Recently the quasi-judicial appellate process for reviewing decisions of immigration judges in noncitizen removal proceedings changed dramatically when the Department of Justice proposed and later implemented a major downsizing of the Board of Immigration Appeals combined with greatly enhanced reliance on single Board members to decide cases. Because the rule restructuring the Board did not limit the Attorney General�s discretion in identifying those who would lose their Board Member positions�and potential criteria referenced by the Department of Justice in that regard were not helpful in explaining how reassigned Board Members differed from colleagues who remained-�this study undertook an examination of case related data.
The study of closely divided en banc precedent decisions of the Board during the period of service by all five subsequently reassigned Board Members showed that adjudicators inclined to favor the position of noncitizens were particularly vulnerable. In fact, four out of the five Board Members who most often supported outcomes favorable to the noncitizen faced reassignment�and the fifth reassigned Member�s stance in favor of the noncitizen in a high profile case of importance to the Attorney General could explain his reassignment. Outcomes in the closely divided cases also suggested that the Attorney General succeeded in moving the Board of Immigration Appeals in a conservative direction just by announcing his downsizing plans�and the result of implementing downsizing the following year was to remake the Board into a largely homogeneous body without significant dissent.
The paper discusses the need for independent immigration adjudicators and points to the judicial nature of the Board�s work. The Board�s experience under Attorney General Ashcroft, the paper concludes, should give new impetus to efforts to separate review of immigration judge decisions from an agency with law enforcement responsibilities. The alternatives recommended by Federal commissions�a specialized court or an independent Executive Branch adjudicatory agency�continue to provide potential solutions.
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Ashcroft certainly “poisoned the well” for judicial independence and Due Process at EOIR. And, frankly, the Obama Administration was also a huge part of the problem.
Well aware of the Ashcroft travesty at EOIR, the Obama DOJ basically covered up the truth and furthered a captive, complacent, “go along to get along” Immigration Court system, overwhelmingly composed of judges from government and prosecutorial backgrounds, because it furthered their own aims of compromising judicial independence to achieve “political goals,” when necessary. As one of my colleagues said, “while the Obama Administration was not Sessions, they certainly made Sessions possible, perhaps probable.”
If Ashcroft and the Bushies “poisoned the well,” Obama let the contamination fester, and Sessions now basically “dumps cyanide into the well” on an almost daily basis.
History is repeating itself in the ugliest possible manner at EOIR. The only question is whether armed with knowledge of the evils of the past, we can change the future to create a system of independent judges who will truly aspire to “be the worlds’ best tribunals, guaranteeing fairness and Due Process for all.”
Join the New Due Process Army! Due Process Forever!
PWS
05-17-18
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