ALFREDO MARQUEZ-MARTINEZ v. U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 11th Cir., 10-17-18, Per Curiam, Unpublished
KEY QUOTE:
When reviewing an agency decision for abuse of discretion, we evaluate whether the agency’s exercise of its discretion was arbitrary or capricious. Abdi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Avila-Santoyo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 713 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2013). The arbitrary- and-capricious standard is “exceedingly deferential”—we are not authorized to substitute our judgment for an agency’s so long as its conclusions are rational. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
That being said, we may nonetheless find an agency action arbitrary and capricious where an agency has “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Id. (citing Ala.–Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir. 2007)).
Here, Marquez-Martinez has demonstrated that the denial of his motion to reopen was arbitrary and capricious. As indicated by the BIA, the IJ’s decision rested solely on two “negative” grounds: (1) Marquez-Martinez’s delay in filing the motion to reopen and (2) Marquez-Martinez’s prior relationships. Neither the IJ nor the BIA, however, provided any reason why these factors counted against Marquez-Martinez—indeed, the IJ explicitly discounted the only reason for which either factor could support a denial of Marquez-Martinez’s motion.