Alom v. Whitaker, 2d Cir., 12-17-18, Published
PANEL: HALL, LOHIER, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, Judge.
Judge Jane A. Restani, of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
OPINION BY: Per Curiam
KEY QUOTE:
In the present case, the BIA expressly stated that “[w]hether a marriage was entered into in good faith is a factual question” subject to clear error review. CAR 177. And at the end of its decision, it emphasized that it could not “reverse an Immigration Judge’s decision simply because the facts could have been viewed differently,” concluding that it would not disturb an IJ’s ruling if it “was based on a permissible view of the evidence.” CAR 178. But these statements conflict with the BIA’s published authority holding that where the question is whether established facts meet a legal standard, the BIA may weigh the evidence differently than the IJ. See In re A-S-B-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 497. Here, the established facts—subject to clear error review by the BIA—were that the couple married in Bangladesh in mid-2003, barely resided together during their marriage, divorced six months after Alom’s entry to the United States in 2005, and had no children or demonstrable marital property. But the BIA failed to acknowledge the de novo standard applicable to the mixed question of whether the established facts were sufficient to establish a good faith marriage under § 1186a(c)(4)(B). In fact, the BIA’s commentary implies that it applied only clear error review to the entirety of the good faith marriage determination (i.e., whether the established facts demonstrated that Alom entered his marriage in good faith) and did not contemplate its authority to reweigh the evidence or to conclude that the IJ’s legal conclusions were insufficient. See id. In sum, although the BIA properly reviewed the IJ’s credibility and other factual findings for clear error, it erred by not treating the ultimate determination of whether Alom met his burden as a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review. See, e.g., In re Moody, 2012 BIA LEXIS 40, at *1–2. Accordingly, we grant the petition and remand for the BIA to apply the appropriate standards of review. See Upatcha, 849 F.3d at 185–87.
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Speeding up a system that hasn’t mastered the basics of the law and due process. A prescription for disaster. An appellate body that doesn’t know what standards it’s applying (and this is hardly a “new” provision) is in deep trouble, as are those judges and litigants who look to the BIA for “expert” guidance in the law. And, it’s not going to be fixed by “know nothing” politicos at the DOJ!
PWS
12-23-18