🏴‍☠️ GARLAND BIA’S MANTRA: “WHEN IN DOUBT, THROW ‘EM OUT!” 🤮 — I Dissent From The Wrong Decision In Matter of AZRAG, 28 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2024)!

Matter of AZRAG, 28 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2024)

https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-02/4073.pdf

BIA HEADNOTE:

Where a State court order granting a respondent’s motion to vacate a conviction does not indicate the reason for the vacatur, and there is no other basis in the record to independently establish the reason, the respondent has not satisfied his burden to show that the court vacated his conviction because of a substantive or procedural defect in his criminal proceedings.

FOR THE RESPONDENT: William M. Sharma-Crawford, Esquire, Kansas City,

Missouri

BEFORE: Board Panel: HUNSUCKER, PETTY, and CLARK, Appellate Immigration

Judges.

PETTY, Appellate Immigration Judge: [Opinion]

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SCHMIDT, Judge of the Round Table, dissenting:

I dissent.

This respondent moves to reopen and terminate proceedings. His motion is biased on a valid order of a Kansas State Judge vacating the conviction that was the basis for his removal. I would grant the motion and terminate proceedings.

Contrary to the panel’s claim, the basis for the respondent’s motion to vacate the conviction in state court is clear on this record: the respondent was ineffectively advised by counsel during his criminal proceedings where he pled guilty. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court has found that failing to properly advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of his conviction is ineffective assistance under the sixth amendment to the Constitution. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

According to the record, the prosecuting attorney agreed with the respondent’s assertion. On the basis of that agreement and his review of the record, the state judge granted the motion. Thus the record shows that the reason for the action was a violation of the respondent’s sixth amendment rights during his criminal proceedings. There is no evidence that the state court acted “solely for immigration purposes” as the BIA found in Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621, 625 (BIA 2003), rev’d on other grounds, Pickering v Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006).  Therefore, the panel’s reliance on Pickering is wrong.

Because there is no conviction supporting the DHS’s charge of removability, they have failed to meet their burden of proof. Consequently, these proceedings must be terminated.

Even if there were ambiguity in the state judge’s order, I would reach the same result. The INA places the burden of establishing removability on DHS by a very high “clear and convincing evidence” standard. INA section 240(c)(3)(A). Consequently, any ambiguities in the DHS’s proof must be construed against them. Therefore, even if I found some ambiguity as to the reason for the state judge’s order, the DHS would still fail to sustain their burden and proceedings should be terminated.

There is no evidence in this record that the state judge acted solely to eliminate immigration bars or for other rehabilitative purposes as was the case in Pickering. Therefore Pickering does not control. To get around this defect, the panel essentially invents a “presumption of immigration rehabilitative purposes” to fill the gap in their reasoning and save the DHS’s case. This attempt to overrule the statutory burden placed on DHS is clearly inappropriate.

For the foregoing reasons the DHS has not established the respondent’s removability by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, I would grant the respondent’s motion to reopen and terminate proceedings. Consequently, I dissent from the panel’s unjustified denial of the motion.

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever

PWS

02-26-24