"The Voice of the New Due Process Army" ————– Musings on Events in U.S. Immigration Court, Immigration Law, Sports, Music, Politics, and Other Random Topics by Retired United States Immigration Judge (Arlington, Virginia) and former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals Paul Wickham Schmidt and Dr. Alicia Triche, expert brief writer, practical scholar, emeritus Editor-in-Chief of The Green Card (FBA), and 2022 Federal Bar Association Immigration Section Lawyer of the Year. She is a/k/a “Delta Ondine,” a blues-based alt-rock singer-songwriter, who performs regularly in Memphis, where she hosts her own Blues Brunch series, and will soon be recording her first full, professional album. Stay tuned! 🎶 To see our complete professional bios, just click on the link below.
2-1 D.C. Circuit decision in Grace v. Barr, on the AG’s credible-fear rules.
Holding: We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to the circularity rule and the statements regarding domestic- and gang-violence claims, vacate the injunction insofar as it pertains to those issues, and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, we affirm.
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Marty Lederman
Georgetown University Law Center
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Perhaps the key holdings in this 45-page majority decision are that:
The “condoned- or-completely-helpless standard” cannot replace the “unable or unwilling to control” standard in determining whether persecution by non-state-actors” (e.g., gangs) qualifies; and
The direction to apply “law of the Circuit where the credible fear interview took place” instead of “the interpretation most favorable to the applicant . . . when determining whether the applicant meets the credible fear standard” is arbitrary and capricious.
The full decision with dissent is at the above link.
Of course, with most asylum and immigration laws for arriving individuals basically (and quite illegally) “suspended” during the COVID-19 “crisis,” and the regime’s plans (also patently illegal) to repeal asylum law by regulation in process, the practical effects of this decision remain unclear.
“Mario Ordonez Azmen petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to remand and dismissing his appeal of the denial of his asylum and statutory withholding claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The BIA did not adequately explain its conclusion that Ordonez Azmen’s proposed social group of former gang members in Guatemala was not particular. Nor did the BIA adequately explain its reasons for denying Ordonez Azmen’s motion to remand based on evidence of new country conditions. Finally, we hold that under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D), changed circumstances presenting an exception to the one-year deadline for filing an asylum application need not arise prior to the filing of the application, and the BIA erred when it refused to consider Ordonez Azmen’s alleged changed circumstances on the ground that the change occurred while his application was pending. We GRANT the petition, VACATE the BIA’s decision, and REMAND for reconsideration of Ordonez Azmen’s application for asylum and statutory withholding of removal and his motion to remand, consistent with this opinion.”
[Hats off to Zachary A. Albun, Albert M. Sacks Clinical Teaching & Advocacy Fellow, Harvard Immigration & Refugee Clinical Program, Harvard Law School, who writes: “The Court found the INA unambiguously provides that “material changed circumstances” excepting the one year filing deadline need not precede filing of the asylum application (i.e., you can rely on a changes that occur during proceedings). The court further held that W-G-R- & M-E-V-G- do not create a per se rule that “former gang member” PSGs lack cognizability. Another important point is that the Court relied on two unpublished BIA decisions that we’d submitted in determining it need not defer to the agency, but instead decide the case based on its own reading of the governing statute and regulations. Major credit and a huge thanks goes to my co-counsel at the University of Minnesota Federal Immigration & Litigation Clinic and the National Immigrant Justice Center, and to my colleagues and students at HIRC.”]
“Maria Cared Millan-Hernandez petitions for review of a 2018 Board of Immigration Appeals decision dismissing her appeal of an Immigration Judge’s denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of her motion to suppress evidence. On appeal, we consider whether Millan-Hernandez provided sufficient evidence of an egregious Fourth Amendment violation to warrant an evidentiary hearing. We conclude that she did and that the agency applied an incorrect standard in determining otherwise. Accordingly, the petition for review is GRANTED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.”
[Hats off to AADHITHI PADMANABHAN, The Legal Aid Society, New York, NY (Nicholas J. Phillips, Joseph Moravec, Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York, Buffalo, NY, on the brief), for Petitioner!]
“Carlos Rendon began living in the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1991. Then in 1995, he pled guilty to resisting a police officer with violence. Under immigration law this offense qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). At the time, Mr. Rendon’s sentence of 364 days in state custody did not affect his status as a lawful permanent resident. But Congress later changed the law. In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) made him deportable based on his CIMT conviction. And in 1997, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) created the “stop-time rule,” which meant people convicted of certain crimes were no longer eligible for a discretionary form of relief known as cancellation of removal. Approximately 25 years after his guilty plea, an immigration judge found Mr. Rendon removable and ruled he was no longer eligible for cancellation of removal on account of the stop-time rule. On appeal, Mr. Rendon now argues that it was error to retroactively apply the stop-time rule to his pre-IIRIRA conviction. After careful review, we conclude that Mr. Rendon is right. We reverse the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and remand for further proceedings.”
[Hats off to Anthony Richard Dominquez at Prada Urizar, PLLC!]
“David Nunez-Vasquez seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) finding that he was removable because he had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”)—a conviction for leaving an accident in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 46.2–894 and a conviction for use of false identification in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–186.3(B1). We hold that neither conviction is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. We therefore grant Nunez-Vasquez’s petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order of removal, order the Government to return Nunez-Vasquez to the United States, and remand to the BIA for further proceedings.”
[Hats off to Ben Winograd, Trina Realmuto, Kristin Macleod-Ball, Nancy Morawetz and Samantha Hsieh!]
“In these tandem cases, Jervis Glenroy Jack and Ousmane Ag each petition for review of decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordering them removed based on their New York firearms convictions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (a)(2)(C). We principally conclude that the statutes of conviction, sections 265.03 and 265.11 of the New York Penal Law, criminalize conduct involving “antique firearms” that the relevant firearms offense definitions in the Immigration and Nationality Act do not. This categorical mismatch precludes the petitioners’ removal on the basis of their state convictions. We therefore GRANT the petitions, VACATE the decisions of the BIA, and REMAND both causes to the agency with instructions to terminate removal proceedings.”
[Hats off to Nicholas J. Phillips, Joseph Moravec, Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York, Buffalo, NY; Alan E. Schoenfeld, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, for Jervis Glenroy Jack, Petitioner in No. 18-842-ag., Stephanie Lopez, Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem, New York, NY; Alan E. Schoenfeld, Andrew Sokol, Beezly J. Kiernan, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, for Ousmane Ag, Petitioner in No. 18-1479-ag.!]
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Remember, unlike most so-called “civil litigation,”lives and futures are at stake in every one of these cases. It’s like sending in brain surgeons trained by the “American Academy of Morticians.” Over and over, the Trump DOJ has shown itself more interested in “upping the body count” than on fairness, due process, and just results at EOIR. Is there a “breaking point” at which the Article IIIs will finally get tired of correcting the BIA’s mistakes and doing their work for them?
Good thing the BIA isn’t sitting for the final exam in my “Immigration Law & Policy” course at Georgetown Law. Even “the curve” might not be enough to save them.
Back before the 2016 election, GOP backbench Jim Crow hate monger Senator Jeff “Gonzo Apocalypto” Sessions saw a kindred spirit who would help him realize his whitewashed, faux Christian view of America: Donald Trump. Becoming the first Senator to endorse Trump got Gonzo a ticket to the U.S. Attorney General’s Office, where he quickly established himself as probably the worst inhabitant after the Civil War and before Billy Barr ( a period that notably includes “John the Con” Mitchell).
During his tenure, Gonzo separated families, caged kids, targeted vulnerable Latino refugee women for abuse, illegally punished “sanctuary cities,” expanded the “New American Gulag,” diverted prosecutorial resources from real crimes to minor immigration violations, expanded the “New American Gulag,” advocated discrimination against the LGBTQ community under the guise of religious bigotry, encouraged police brutality against Black Americans, aided efforts to disenfranchise Black and Latino voters, spread false narratives about immigrant crime and asylum fraud, dissed private lawyers, stripped Immigration Judges of their authority to control their own dockets, multiplied the Immigration Court backlogs, illegally tried to terminate DACA while smearing Dreamers, spoke to hate groups, issued unethical “precedent decisions” while falsely claiming to be acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, interfered with asylum grants and judicial independence, put anti-due-process production quotas on Immigration Judges, attempted to dismantle congressionally mandated “know your rights” programs, to name just a few of his gross abuses of public office. Indeed, other than Stephen Miller and Trump himself, how many notorious child abusers get to walk free in America while their victims suffer lifetime trauma?
Despite never being the brightest bulb in the pack, his feeble attempt at “legal opinions” sometimes drawing ridicule from lower court judges, Gonzo is generally credited with doing more than any other Cabinet member to advance Trump’s agenda of hate and White Nationalist bigotry. He actually was dumb enough to believe that his unswerving dedication to a program of promoting the white race over people of color and Christians over all other religions would ingratiate him with Trump.
That would assume, however, that Trump had some guiding principle, however vile and disgusting, beyond himself. Sessions might be the only person in Washington who thought racism would trump self-protection. I’m not saying that Trump isn’t a committed racist — clearly he is.Just that his commitment to racism is subservient to his only real defining characteristic — narcissism. Just ask his niece, Mary.
Gonzo failed in the only thing that ever counted: Protecting Trump, his family, and his corrupt cronies from the Mueller investigation. It wasn’t, as some have inaccurately claimed, a show of ethics or dedication to the law.
Even Gonzo realized that participating in an investigation involving a campaign organization of which he was a member and therefore both a potential witness and target, would be an egregious ethical violation that could cost him his law license as well as a potential criminal act of perjury, given that he had testified under oath during his Senate confirmation that he intended to recuse himself. Apparently, that was on a day when Trump was too busy tweeting or playing golf to focus on the implications of that particular statement under oath by his nominee.
After Trump fired him, Gonzo’s political fortunes took a sharp downturn. A guy who polled 97% of the vote in running unopposed for the Senate in 2014, polled only 38% of the vote in overwhelmingly losing the GOP primary to former Auburn Football Coach Tommy Tuberville. Tommy, a “Trump loyalist” with extreme far-right views and no known qualifications for the job, is not much of an improvement over Sessions.
Perhaps the only good news is that Alabama currently has a very decent and competent U.S. Senator, Doug Jones (D), who represents all of the people of the state. Everybody should support Doug’s campaign to maintain decency and commitment to equal justice in Government.
For those who want a further retrospective on Sessions’s grotesque career of promoting a return to Jim Crow while on the public dole, I recommend the following articles from Mother Jones and the Advocate:
I want to share some good news: my Deportation Defense Clinic at the Hofstra Law Clinic won an asylum case on the PSG of “U.S. law enforcement labeled gang members” before Judge Poczter at 290 Broadway for a client falsely accused of gang allegations. See the redacted decision attached. We’re waiting to see if DHS appeals within these next two weeks and are prepared to continue the fight if necessary.
Quote on Page 13:
“Respondent’s social group, ‘U.S. law enforcement labeled gang members’ is cognizable, in that its members share an immutable characteristic that is socially distinct within Salvadorian society and defined with sufficient particularity.”
I’m willing to share the redacted TOE and brief with those interested.
Deep gratitude is owed to CLINIC/NITA, Michelle Mendez, Vickie Neilson, and folks at Hofstra including Lauris Wren, law graduates Lorena Paulino and Trishshawn Raffington, and many others.
Dr. Tom Boerman and I are working on a law review article on this topic, and I hope this new resource will be helpful to others defending clients from false gang allegations. More to follow soon.
So, even in the time of time of extreme White Nationalist restrictionism in Government, there are still plenty of “winnable” asylum cases out there if individuals: 1) get access to the hearing process; 2) have access to competent lawyers; 3) get time to prepare and document cases; and 4) have a fair and impartial Immigration Judge with knowledge of asylum law. A fair and reasonable INS Assistant Chief Counsel is also an important factor.
How many valid cases like this are being turned back at our borders under the regime’s “fake COVID-19” rules with no hearings at all? How many are being summarily deported without fair credible fear interviews or an opportunity for impartial judicial review as a result of the Supremes’ latest expedited removal constitutional abomination?
Interestingly, this case was so well prepared and documented that ICE and the Clinic stipulated as to the testimony and merely submitted that record to Judge Poczter for a legal analysis and decision. Shows that without political interference, judges and parties can work together to facilitate a fair and timely resolution of cases without trampling on due process.
It’s simply a “crime against humanity” that the Immigration Court system is run by bigoted anti-asylum zealots with no interest in due process or fundamental fairness.
So, what if decisions like Judge Poczter’s (a former BIA Attorney Advisor during my tenure) were the precedents, instead of deny, deny, deny? What if “best practices” were valued? What if achieving correct results in accordance with due process were the object, rather than increasing the number of asylum denials to fit a false narrative? What if asylum law were properly applied to protect, rather than reject?
This could be a system that would do justice and make Americaproud. But, it’s not going to happen without an independent, merit-based judiciary and an Administration that works to achieve equal justice for all, rather than undermining it at every step.
Asylum is not a perfect solution for families like mine, who are fleeing human rights abuses. Starting all over again in another country is not easy.
We have, at times, struggled to survive. I have worked night shifts in a factory, as a janitor for a public school system, and in retail. I have worked hard to provide for my family.
Today, I am a U.S. citizen and my children are in college. My daughter can’t make up her mind about which major to choose. Above all, we are safe from physical harm and threats to my daughter’s safety and my own that we fled in our home country.
I fled my home country in West Africa in 2010. My husband and I had a happy life and after university I worked as a high school biology teacher.
Things became too dangerous for us to stay, however, when family and community members came after us, insisting that my young daughter be subjected to female genital cutting and early forced marriage to a much older man.
Wanting to protect my child from what I myself had endured when I was young, I decided to take a stand. My husband and I were united in our opposition to female genital cutting, which is very common in our country, especially for girls between 5 and 9 years old. Given my traumatic and painful experience and how it has affected me throughout my life, we did everything we could to protect our daughter.
This antagonized our community and families, and we both endured numerous threats, physical attacks, and beatings, in an attempt by our family to convince us to let her be cut. We lived in constant fear of my daughter being kidnapped and cut.
At one point, an extended family member who insisted that we agree to let our daughter be cut ran over my husband, causing him to suffer brain damage and severe injuries. The authorities refused to intervene in what they saw as “family matters,” and the law against female genital cutting is not enforced in my country. To protect our child, I knew we had to leave.
I had visited the United States before and knew it would be a safe place to raise our family. There was no way to apply for asylum outside the U.S., so I obtained tourist visas for us. There are no direct flights from my home country to the United States, so we stopped in North Africa for a brief layover, before arriving in the U.S.
Soon after arrival, I found a lawyer, to help me with my case: Lindsay Harris, with the Tahirih Justice Center. I was lucky to find a lawyer, but the process of applying for asylum was extremely challenging—although Lindsay spoke French, one of the languages I speak comfortably, we had to complete all of the paperwork in English. I had to re-tell my story time and time again and eventually before an asylum officer.
I realize now that I was actually lucky because I had my asylum interview in 2011, and my case was granted only six months later that same year. Now, asylum seekers often wait several years before an interview, and the U.S. government just made the waiting period longer. During those six months, I lived with the constant anxiety of being sent back to my country where my daughter would be cut and our lives were in danger.
When we were granted asylum, we were finally able to live in safety and peace. My daughter was able to focus on school and have a happy childhood.
My heart sank earlier this month when I learned that other women and girls may not have the same access to safety that we did. The Trump administration wants to make major changes to the rules for asylum law. If these rules were in effect when I sought asylum in 2011, I would not have been granted.
The more I learn about these policy changes, the more stunned and saddened I am. It’s staggering to think that under these new rules,gender-based violence would not count—as if it’s not important enough to matter.
In my country, and many countries around the world, women are subjected to specific forms of harm based on their gender: gender-specific violence. Men simply are not at risk of female genital cutting and generally not child or forced marriage.
Under the new rules, what happened between my family and community members would be considered just a “private dispute”—despite the strong evidence then and now to show that my government would not intervene in what they see as family issues, even where serious physical harm and death are involved.
Part of my asylum claim was that I was targeted because of my feminist political opinion: I believe women and girls have the right to decide what happens to their own bodies. These new rules would prevent those claims too.
It’s unbelievable that things like taking a non-direct flight, as my family did—which had nothing to do with how much we needed protection or whether or not we were telling the truth—could bar someone from being granted asylum protection. That stop, briefly, at another airport in North Africa, would have undermined our entire claim for protection. My husband and I may not be alive today and our daughter would have been married off as the third wife of a man in his fifties by the time she was twelve.
It angers me that the government wants to create all of these new bars to asylum, leaving some asylum seekers with access only to something called “withholding of removal.”
For me, this would have meant separation from my husband and children—who would not have also been granted that protection as my derivatives or who would each have to have their own asylum claim—never being able to travel outside the U.S., never being able to become a lawful permanent resident or a citizen, and continually renewing a work permit and reporting to a deportation officer on a routine basis. We would be living in limbo.
Take Action
The public can comment on the proposed rules to change asylum until July 15, 2020.
It is painful and frightening for me to speak out, but I have chosen to do so.
I want to ensure that the women who come after me, seeking protection for themselves and their daughters, will not find that the United States has closed its doors and shut its eyes to human rights abuses and persecution against women and girls.
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These proposals have been developed and promoted by neo-Nazi racist xenophobe Stephen Miller. They are totally outrageous and illegal. Many entitled to our nation’s protection have already been maimed, tortured, raped, or died as a result ofour nation’s failure to stand up against this arrogant human rights abuser on our public payroll.
The humanity of every American is diminished by Miller’s White Nationalist hate agenda and the corrupt regime that employs him.
WASHINGTON, DC — The American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) condemns the Trump administration’s recent ramp-up of efforts to turn the immigration court system into an enforcement tool rather than an independent arbiter for justice. The immigration courts are formally known as the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and are overseen by the Department of Justice (DOJ).
AILA President Jennifer Minear, noted, “AILA has long advocated for an independent immigration court, one that ensures judges serve as neutral arbiters of justice. This administration has instead subjected the courts to political influence and exploited the inherent structural flaws of the DOJ-controlled immigration courts, which also prosecutes immigration cases at the federal level. The nail in the coffin of judicial neutrality is the fact that the administration has put the courts in the control of a new Chief Immigration Judge who has no judicial experience but served as ICE’s chief immigration prosecutor. No less concerning is DOJ’s recent choice for Chief Appellate Immigration Judge – an individual who also prosecuted immigration cases and advised the Trump White House on immigration policy. This administration continues to weaponize the immigration courts for the sole purpose of accelerating deportations rather than dispensing neutral justice. Congress must investigate these politically motivated appointments and pass legislation to create an independent, Article I immigration court.”
Among the recent actions taken by this administration to bias the immigration courts:
As a friend and former colleague said recently “I would have thought that the one thing everyone could get behind, regardless of political philosophy, would be a neutral court system.” Sadly, not so in today’s crumbling America.
There are three groups blocking the way:
The Trump Administration, where due process only applies to Trump and his corrupt cronies;
GOP legislators whose acquittal of Trump against the overwhelming weight of the evidence shows exactly what due process means to them;
Five GOP-appointed Justices on the Supremes who don’t believe that due process applies to all persons in the US, notwithstanding the “plain language” of Article 5 of our Constitution — particularly if those persons have the misfortune to be asylum seekers of color.
The end result is “Dred Scottification” — that is, dehumanization or “de-personification” of “the other.” The GOP has made it a centerpiece of their failed attempt to govern, from voter suppression, to looting the Treasury for the benefit of the rich and powerful, to immunity for law enforcement officers who kill minorities, to greenlighting cruel, inhuman,and counterproductive treatment of lawful asylum seekers and immigrants. Not surprisingly, this essentially “Whites Only” view of social justice is ripping our nation apart on many levels.
I find it highly ironic that at the same time we are rightfully removing statutes of Chief Justice Roger Taney, a racist who authored the infamous Dred Scott Decision, Chief Justice Roberts and four of his colleagues continue to “Dred Scottify” asylum seekers and other immigrants, primarily those of color, by denying them the due process, fundamental fairness, fair and impartial judges, and, perhaps most of all, racist-free policies that our Constitution demands!
Compare the “due process” afforded Trump by the GOP Senate and the pardon of a convicted civil and human rights abuser like “Racist Sheriff Joe” with the ugly and dishonest parody of due process afforded Sister Norma’s lawful asylum seekers whose “crime” was seeking fair treatment, justice, and an acknowledgement of their humanity from a nation that has turned it’s back on those values.
What Sister Norma’s article did not mention is that those who survive in Mexico long enough to get to “court” have their asylum claims denied at a rate of about 99% by an unfair system intentionally skewed and biased against them. Most experts believe that many, probably a majority, of those being denied actually merit protection under a fair and impartial application of our laws.
But, as pointed out by AILA, that’s not why Billy the Bigot has appointed prosecutors as top “judges” and notorious asylum deniers as “appellate judges.” He intends to perpetuate a highly unfair “deportation railroad” designed by infamous White Nationalist racist Stephen Miller. In other words, our justice system is being weaponized in support of an overtly racist agenda formulated by a racist regime that has made racism the centerpiece of its pitch for remaining in office. Incredible! Yet true!
The Supremes have life tenure. But, the other two branches of our failing Government don’t. And, a better Executive and a better Legislature that believe in our Constitution and equal justice for all is a necessary start on a better Federal Judiciary — one where commitment to due process, fundamental fairness, and equal justice for all is a threshold requirement for future judicial appointments.Time to throw the “non-believers” and their enablers out of office.
This November, vote like your life and our country’s existence depend on it! Because they do!
The Trump Administration has repeatedly acted to damage our country’s asylum laws. Its latest move, expressed in 161 pages of proposed regulations, does so with a sledgehammer. The proposal claims that “as an expression of a nation’s foreign policy, the laws and policies surrounding asylum are an assertion of a government’s right and duty to protect its own resources and citizens, while aiding those in true need of protection from harm.” Note how “aiding those in true need of protection from harm” comes last. The proposal supports the preceding statement with a case that not only had nothing to do with asylum, but predated by eight years the enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act, which continues to serve as our country’s law of asylum.
It was necessary to reach back so far because the Refugee Act actually stands for the opposite proposition, placing the protection of those in need above foreign policy considerations. The Refugee Act replaced our Cold War-influenced refugee preferences with an obligation to provide protection to those from any country fearing persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
The Department of Justice tried to limit the impact of this monumental change at its outset by interpreting the new legal standard as restrictively as possible. In 1987, the Supreme Court rejected the Department’s interpretation of the term “well-founded fear,” finding that the meaning the Department applied to the term was not the one intended by Congress. The Court found it clear that the primary purpose of Congress was to bring U.S. law into conformity with the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees. It therefore looked for guidance to UNHCR and legal scholars, and concluded that the standard passed by Congress allowed for as little as a ten percent chance of persecution in order to merit asylum.
More than three decades later, District Court Judge Emmet G. Sullivan put a stop to the Department’s attempt to exclude victims of domestic violence and gang violence from asylum protection at the credible fear stage. In a lengthy, detailed decision whose reasoning the Sixth Circuit recently adopted for full asylum determinations, the court reiterated that Congress, and not the Attorney General, creates our asylum laws, and that Congress intended for those laws to conform to the Protocol’s more expansive view.
It was because of that more expansive view that the Protocol, and its predecessor, the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, avoided the type of strict definitions the proposed regulations seek to impose. One renowned scholar explained the drafters’ intent “to introduce a flexible concept which might be applied to circumstances as they might arise; or in other words, that they capitulated before the inventiveness of humanity to think up new ways of persecuting fellow men.”1 It is this built-in flexibility that the latest proposal takes exception to.
Of course, it is still Congress, and not the executive branch, that enacts our asylum laws. And should the present proposal become a final rule before this administration is done, it will be the reassertion of that reality by the courts that will save those seeking refuge here.
I plan to address the different sections of the proposals in installments. I begin with the proposal to redefine “political opinion.”
The last few months have taught us that, under the Trump Administration, everything is political. Even the decision to wear a mask and self-isolate out of consideration to our neighbors has been cast as an expression of political opinion. The virus itself was first depicted as a Democratic hoax; once its existence could no longer be denied, it had to be given a nationality and portrayed as part of a foreign plot. This is a virus we are talking about.
The Administration saw political allies in armed and angry mobs who somehow portrayed temporary rules designed to protect us all by slowing the spread of disease as a denial of their basic human rights. And then the same administration branded as political enemies those protesting the very real and systemically ingrained deprivation of their basic human rights solely because of the color of their skin. The irony is not lost in this very same government that politicizes everything now imposing a very narrow, strict view of what can be called political opinion for asylum purposes.
Regulations may define or clarify laws, but may not rewrite them. And the courts need only defer to the Department’s interpretation where the language of the law itself is ambiguous. Courts may go to great lengths and employ all tools of construction at their disposal before deeming a statute ambiguous.
Looking to the Refugee Act, the courts will find that in the 40 years since its passage, the only amendment relating to its definition of political opinion expanded the meaning of that term. In 1996, the Republican-controlled Congress amended the refugee definition to read that coercive abortion and sterilization procedures constitute persecution on account of the victim’s political opinion. Neither the wording of the statute nor its application by the BIA require any inquiry into the motives or beliefs of the victim of the coercive family planning policy. In other words, a woman need not declare in an online manifesto that she will become pregnant as a statement of protest against an oppressive government’s policy. One at risk of abortion for any pregnancy by law fears persecution on account of her political opinion.
The proposed regulations acknowledge this. However, they fail to reconcile how the rest of the proposed language on this topic, the first attempt ever to restrict by either statute or regulation what may constitute a political opinion, is consistent with Congress’s adoption of such an expansive view of political opinion to allow even an accidental pregnancy to satisfy the term’s definition.
The Department provides a weak justification for interjecting itself into the matter in the first place, claiming that the evolving state of case law makes it just too difficult for immigration judges to apply the law consistently. Any pretense of providing clarification vanishes upon attempting to decipher the proposed guidance on the topic. Under the proposed rule, immigration judges, asylum officers, and the BIA will be precluded from granting asylum based on a political opinion “defined solely by generalized disapproval of, disagreement with, or opposition to criminal, terrorist, gang, guerilla, or other non-state organizations absent expressive behavior in furtherance of a cause against such organizations related to efforts by the state to control such organizations or behavior that is antithetical to or otherwise opposes the ruling legal entity of the state or a legal sub-unit of the state.” What could be clearer than that?
As its sole example of the confusion that purportedly warrants the administration stepping in, the proposal cites two recent decisions. The first (which we can assume the administration doesn’t like) is the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, holding that in resisting rape by an MS-13 member, the asylum applicant expressed “her opposition to the male-dominated social norms in El Salvador and her taking a stance against a culture that perpetuates female subordination and the brutal treatment of women.”
The other case referenced was a 15 year old Fourth Circuit decision, Saldarriaga v. Gonzales, which the Department describes as holding that “disapproval of a drug cartel is not a political opinion.” In its attempt to demonstrate that immigration judges sitting in the jurisdictions of the Second and Fourth Circuits might reach different results, the Department conveniently omits a much more recent Fourth Circuit decision, Alvarez Lagos v. Barr, which found unrefuted evidence that the Barrio 18 gang imputed an anti-gang political opinion to the asylum-seeker’s nonpayment of extortion and flight to the U.S. Including that decision would have cleared up the purported confusion used to justify the new rules, so the proposal simply ignored it.
But even accepting the Department’s view that different circuits might take different views on this topic, and that somehow, it’s the responsibility of someone like Stephen Miller, as opposed to the Supreme Court, to resolve such conflict, would applying that garbled definition cited above (and no, it does not become clearer with repeated reading) change the outcome of Hernandez-Chacon? Because in the view of the court, the asylum applicant in that case did not simply express a generalized disapproval of a gang. Her opposition to systemic injustice perpetuating brutality against women, who are viewed as a subordinate class, is an expression of something much larger, in which the government is implicated.
Grasping at additional straws, the Department also pointed to one sentence in a BIA decision from 1996, Matter of S-P-, stating the need in that case to examine whether the persecutors were motivated at least in part by their belief that the asylum applicant held political views “antithetical to the government.” This, according to the administration, is proof that only views antithetical to the government can be political opinion. However, in that case, the asylum seeker had been arrested, detained for six months, interrogated, and tortured by the government, specifically, government soldiers. So in determining whether such persecution was on account of the applicant’s political opinion, in that particular case, the Board obviously focused on whether those soldiers thought the victims views were anti-government. The sentence in no way intended to state that under all circumstances must political opinion be one that is directly aimed at the government. By analogy, the BIA didn’t say that only women can be members of particular social groups because in one gender-based case, it analyzed whether the social group elements were “fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman.” See Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 366 (BIA 1996). The point is, the Board used the language necessary to decide the case before it, and for the Department to now pretend otherwise is disingenuous.
Note:
Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law 193 (1966).
Copyright 2020 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.
Republished with permission.
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A nation’s inhumanity to others, allowing unqualified individuals like Stephen Miller to make policy, and moral cowardice will have severe future consequences.
Planned Asylum Overhaul Threatens Migrants’ Due Process
By Suzanne Monyak | June 12, 2020, 9:34 PM EDT
The Trump administration’s proposed overhaul of the U.S. asylum process, calling for more power for immigration judges and asylum officers, could hinder migrants’ access to counsel in an already fast-tracked immigration system.
The proposal, posted in a 161-page rule Wednesday night, aims to speed up procedures and raise the standards for migrants seeking protection in the U.S. at every step, while minimizing the amount of time a migrant has to consult with an attorney before facing key decisions in their case.
“It certainly sets a tone by the government that fairness, just basic day-in-court due process, is no longer valued,” said Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, director for the Center for Immigrants’ Rights Clinic at Penn State Law, University Park, Pennsylvania.
The proposed rule, which will publish in the Federal Register on Monday, suggests a slew of changes to the U.S. asylum system that immigrant advocates say would constitute the most sweeping changes to the system yet and cut off access for the majority of applicants.
Stephen Yale-Loehr, an immigration law professor at Cornell University Law School, said that it was as if administration officials took every precedential immigration appellate decision, executive order and policy that narrowed asylum eligibility under this administration and “wrapped them all in one huge Frankenstein rule that would effectively gut our asylum system.”
Among a litany of changes, the rule, if finalized, would revise the standards to qualify for asylum and other fear-based relief, including by narrowing what types of social groups individuals can claim membership in, as well as the very definitions of “persecution” and “torture.”
In doing so, the proposal effectively bars all forms of gender-based claims, for example, as well as claims from individuals fleeing domestic violence.
These tighter definitions and higher standards would make it difficult even for asylum-seekers who are represented to win their cases, attorneys said.
“I worry about how a rule like this can cause a chilling effect on private law firms, or even BigLaw, from even engaging with this work on a pro bono level because it’s just so challenging and this rule only puts up those barriers even more,” said Wadhia.
But for migrants without lawyers, the barrier to entry is particularly profound. For instance, the rule permits immigration judges to pretermit asylum applications, or deny an application that the judge determines doesn’t pass muster before the migrant can ever appear before the court.
This could pose real challenges for migrants who may not be familiar with U.S. asylum law or even fluent in English, but who are not guaranteed attorneys in immigration court.
“If you’re unrepresented, give me a break,” said Lenni B. Benson, a professor at New York Law School who founded the Safe Passage Project. “I don’t think my law students understand ‘nexus’ even if they’ve studied it,” she added, referring to the requirement that an individual’s persecution have a “nexus” to, or be motivated by, their participation in a certain social group.
“Giving all judges the authority to end an asylum application with no hearing at all is pretty jaw-dropping,” she said. “Those 90%-denial-rate judges are doing that with the respondent in front of them who’s already testifying about the persecution they’ve suffered or their fear.”
The proposal also allows asylum officers, who are employed by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and are not required to have earned law degrees, to deem affirmative asylum applications frivolous, and to do so based on a broader definition of “frivolous.”
Currently, applicants must knowingly fabricate evidence in an asylum application for it be deemed frivolous. But the proposal would lower that standard, while expanding the definition of “frivolous” to include applications based on foreclosed law or that are considered to lack legal merit.
The penalty for a frivolous application is steep. If an immigration judge agrees that the application is frivolous under the expanded term, the applicant would be ineligible for all forms of immigration benefits in the U.S. for making a weak asylum claim, Collopy said.
“And under the new regulation, everything is a weak application,” she added.
Benson also said that allowing asylum officers to deny applications conflicts with a mandate that those asylum screenings not be adversarial.
When consulting for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security during the Obama administration, Benson had once supported giving asylum officers more authority to grant asylum requests on the spot when migrants present with strong cases from the get-go. But with this proposal, DHS “took that idea,” but then went “the negative way,” she said.
. . . .
“I can’t even think of a single client I have right now that could get around this,” Collopy said.
“It’s a fairly well-crafted rule,” said Yale-Loehr. “They clearly have been working on this for months.”
But it may not be strong enough to ultimately survive a court challenge, he said.
The proposal was met with an onslaught of opposition from immigrant advocates and lawmakers, drawing sharp rebukes from Amnesty International, the American Immigration Council and AILA, as well as from House Democrats.
Rep. Jerrold Nadler, D-N.Y., who chairs the House Judiciary Committee, and Rep. Zoe Lofgren, D-Calif., who leads the committee’s immigration panel, slammed the proposal in a Thursday statement as an attempt “to rewrite our immigration laws in direct contravention of duly enacted statutes and clear congressional intent.”
If the rule is finalized — the timing is tight during an election year — attorneys said it would likely face a constitutional challenge alleging that it doesn’t square with the due process clause by infringing on an individual’s right to access the U.S. asylum system.
And while the administration will consider public feedback before the policy takes effect, attorneys said it could still be vulnerable to a court challenge claiming it violates administrative law.
Benson said the proposed rule fails to explain why its interpretation of federal immigration law should trump federal court precedent.
“They can’t just do it, as much as they might like to, with the wave of a magic wand called notice-and-comment rulemaking,” she said.
Yale-Loehr predicted a court challenge to the policy, if finalized, could go the way of DHS’ public charge rule, which was struck down by multiple lower courts, and recently by a federal court of appeals, but was allowed by the U.S. Supreme Court to take effect while lawsuits continued.
If the policy is in place for any amount of time, it will likely lead to migrants with strong claims for protection being turned away, attorneys said. But Yale-Loehr didn’t believe it would lead to fewer asylum claims.
“If you’re fleeing persecution, you’re not stopping to read a 160-page rule,” he said. “You’re fleeing for your life, and no rule is going to change that fact.”
–Editing by Kelly Duncan.
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Read Suzanne’s full analysis at the above link.
Although nominally designed to address the current Immigration Court backlog by encouraging or even mandating summary denial without due process of nearly 100% of asylum claims, as observed in the article, the exact opposite is likely to happen with respect to backlog reduction.
As Professor Steve Yale-Loehr points out, finalization of these regulations would undoubtedly provoke a flood of new litigation. True, the Supreme Court to date has failed to take seriously their precedents requiring due process for asylum seekers and other migrants. But, enough lower Federal Courts have been willing to initially step up to the plate that reversals and remands for fair hearings before Immigration Judges will occur on a regular basis in a number of jurisdictions.
This will require time-consuming “redos from scratch” before Immigration Judges that will take precedence on already backlogged dockets. It will also lead to a patchwork system of asylum rules pending the Supreme Court deciding what’s legally snd constitutionally required.
While based on the Court Majority’s lack of concern for due process, statutory integrity, and fundamental fairness for asylum seekers, particularly those of color, shown by the last few major tests of Trump Administration “constitutional statutory, and equal justice eradication” by Executive Order and regulation, one can never be certain what the future will hold.
With four Justices who have fairly consistently voted to uphold or act least not interfere with asylum seekers’ challenges to illegal policies and regulations, a slight change in either the composition of the Court or the philosophy of the majority Justices could produce different results.
As the link between systemic lack of equal justice under the Constitution for African Americans and the attacks on justice for asylum seekers, immigrants, and other people of color becomes clearer, some of the Justices who have enabled the Administration’s xenophobic anti-immigrant, anti-asylum programs might want to rethink their positions. That’s particularly true in light of the lack of a sound factual basis for such programs.
As good advocates continue to document the deadly results and inhumanity, as well as the administrative failures, of the Trump-Miller White nationalist program, even those justices who have to date been blind to what they were enabling might have to take notice and reflect further on both the legal moral obligations we owe to our fellow human beings.
In perhaps the most famous Supreme Court asylum opinion, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987), Justice Stevens said:
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of “refugee,” and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, to which the United. States acceded in 1968.
These proposed regulations are the exact opposite: without legislation, essentially repealing the Refugee Act of 1980 and ending U.S. compliance with the international refugee and asylum protection instruments to which we are party. Frankly, today’s Court majority appears, without any reasonable explanation, to have drifted away from Cardoza’s humanity and generous flexibility in favor of endorsing and enabling various immigration restrictionist schemes intended to weaponize asylum laws and processes against asylum seekers. But, are they really going to allow the Administration to overrule (and essentially mock) Cardoza by regulation? Perhaps, but such fecklessness will have much larger consequences for the Court and our nation.
Are baby jails, kids in cages, rape, beating, torture, child abuse, clearly rigged biased adjudications, predetermined results, death sentences without due process, bodies floating in the RioGrande, and in some cases assisting femicide, ethnic cleansing, and religious and political repression really the legacy that the majority of today’s Justices wish to leave behind? Is that how they want to be remembered by future generations?
Scholars and well-respected legal advocates like Professor Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Professor Stephen Yale-Loehr, Professor Lenni Benson, and Dree Collopy have great expertise in immigration and asylum laws and an interest in reducing backlogs and creating functional Immigration Courts consistent with due process and Constitutional rights. Like Professor Benson, they have contributed practical ideas for increasing due process while reducing court backlogs. Instead of turning their good ideas, like “fast track grants and more qualified representation of asylum seekers, on their heads, why not enlist their help in fixing the current broken system?
We need a government that will engage in dialogue with experts to solve problems rather than unilaterally promoting more illegal, unwise, and inhumane attacks on, and gimmicks to avoid, the legal, due process, and human rights of asylum seekers.
As Professor Yale-Loehr presciently says at the end of Suzanne’s article:
“If you’re fleeing persecution, you’re not stopping to read a 160-page rule,” he said. “You’re fleeing for your life, and no rule is going to change that fact.”
Isn’t it time for our Supreme Court Justices, legislators, andpolicy makers to to recognize the truth of that statement and require our asylum system and our Immigration Courts to operate in the real world of refugees?
Juan Antonio v. Barr, 6th Cir., 05-19-20, published
PANEL: COLE, Chief Judge; BOGGS and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges
OPINION BY: Judge Gibbons
CONCURRING OPINION: Judge Boggs
KEY QUOTES:
Footnote 3:
3Matter of A-R-C-G was overruled by Matter of A-B, which held that the Board in Matter of A-R-C-G- did not conduct a rigorous enough analysis in its determination that the particular social group was cognizable. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 331 (A.G. 2018) (noting that because DHS conceded that particular social group was cognizable, “the Board performed only a cursory analysis of the three factors required to establish a particular social group”). Our sister circuits have determined that this change counsels remand. See Padilla- Maldonado v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 751 F. App’x 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2018) (“While the overruling of A-R-C-G- weakens [the applicant’s] case, it does not automatically defeat her claim that she is a member of a cognizable particular social group. As we remand to the BIA to remand to the IJ, the IJ should determine whether [the applicant’s] membership in the group . . . is cognizable . . ..”); Moncada v. Sessions, 751 F. App’x 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2018) (“This Court, like the BIA, applies the law as it exists at the time of decision. And, where, as here, intervening immigration decisions from the executive branch alter the applicable legal standards, we have previously exercised our discretion to remand the matter to the BIA to apply the new standards in the first instance. Recognizing the wisdom of this practice, we take the same tack here and remand this case ‘for the BIA to interpret and apply the standards set forth in [Matter of A-B-] in the first instance.’” (quoting Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted)).
However, Matter of A-B- has since been abrogated. See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018). Grace found that the policies articulated in Matter of A-B- were arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. See id. at 126–27 (holding that there is no general rule against claims involving domestic violence as a basis for membership in a particular social group and that each claim must be evaluated on an individual basis under the statutory factors). The district court’s decision in Grace is currently on appeal to the D.C. Circuit. We acknowledge that we are not bound by Grace but find its reasoning persuasive. Because Matter of A-B- has been abrogated, Matter of A-R-C-G- likely retains precedential value. But, on remand, the agency should also evaluate what effect, if any, Matter of A-R-C-G- and Grace have had on the particular social group analysis. See Bi Xia Qu, 618 F.3d at 609 (“When the BIA does not fully consider an issue, . . . the Supreme Court has instructed that a reviewing court ‘is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed.’ Rather, ‘the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the [BIA] for additional investigation or explanation.’” (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006))).
. . . .
When an asylum claim focuses on non-governmental conduct, the applicant must show that the alleged persecutor is either aligned with the government or that the government is unwilling or unable to control him. See Khalili, 557 F.3d at 436. An applicant meets this burden when she shows that she cannot “reasonably expect the assistance of the government” in controlling her perpetrator’s actions. Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 998. For example, in In re S-A, the Board found that an applicant was eligible for asylum when she suffered domestic abuse at the hands of her father. In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000). Relying on evidence showing that “in Morocco, domestic violence is commonplace and legal remedies are generally unavailable to women,” and that “‘few women report abuse to authorities’ because the judicial procedure is skewed against them,” the Board held that “even if the respondent had turned to the government for help, Moroccan authorities would have been unable or unwilling to control her father’s conduct.” Id. at 1333, 1335 (quoting Committees on International Relations and Foreign Relations, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997 1538 (Joint Comm. Print 1998)).
Here, both the immigration judge and Board agreed that the beatings, rape, and threats Maria suffered were severe enough to constitute persecution, but that she failed to show that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control Juan. In support of its conclusion,
No. 18-3500 Juan Antonio v. Barr Page 16
the Board noted that the government issued a restraining order against Juan, the mayor fined Juan for beating their daughter, and that Maria and their children were able to remain in their home for the year before she left Guatemala. AR 5, BIA Decision. Maria argues on appeal that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. We agree with her.
Taken as a whole, the record compels the conclusion that Maria cannot “reasonably expect the assistance of the government” in controlling Juan. Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 998. First, the Board’s conclusion that the restraining order effectively controlled Juan is clearly contradicted by the evidence. Maria testified that Juan “did not obey [the restraining order] because there [was] no police” and “[h]e wasn’t afraid” of any consequences, AR 180, Immigration Ct. Tr., and that at some time that year, Juan came to Maria’s home and beat their oldest child with his belt. She further testified that she went to the police station to file a complaint, but the police never investigated the crime. Second, the Board’s conclusion that “the respondent and her children were able to live legally in the family house” for a year does not paint an accurate picture of that year. AR 5, BIA Decision. The year was not a “period of calm,” as the Board characterized it, but rather, a year which affirmed that the Guatemalan government had not effectively gained control over Juan. Id at 5 n.2. Throughout the course of the year, Maria received threats that Juan “was going to kill [her], and if not[,] that he would pay someone to do something.” AR 188, Immigration Ct. Tr. Juan’s girlfriend also “began threatening [Maria] about once a week, yelling at [her] . . . that she and Juan would kill [her] if [she] didn’t move out of the house.” AR 332, I-589 Appl. In May 2014, Juan’s sister told Maria that “Juan had bought a gun and that he planned to kill [Maria].” Id. at 333. The events of that year indicate that the government had not effectively gained control over Juan.
Moreover, that Juan received a fine of approximately $200 for beating up their oldest child (from a judge who no longer works in town, at a courthouse that has since been destroyed) may indicate some willingness of the Guatemalan government to control Juan but it does not indicate its ability to do so. The concurrence points to the restraining order and fine as evidence
No. 18-3500 Juan Antonio v. Barr Page 17
Guatemala is willing to enforce its laws but may not always be successful.4 While the concurrence would emphasize what Guatemala did, it is more important to look at the numerous instances when the government failed to act or even respond as well as the harm the government failed to prevent. The death threats Maria received continued even after Juan was fined. And Juan’s purchasing of a gun—which ultimately led Maria to flee—came after Juan was fined. Moreover, the police failed to respond to Maria’s calls for help on two occasions when Juan came to Maria’s house and threatened her and/or their children. In reviewing this evidence, the immigration court opined that it “would be left to wonder if Juan intended to kill the respondent, the mother of his four children, why would he not have done so.” AR 70, Immigration Ct. Order. But it cannot be that an applicant must wait until she is dead to show her government’s inability to control her perpetrator.
The supplemental evidence regarding Guatemala’s country conditions corroborates that Maria could not “reasonably expect the assistance of the government” in controlling Juan’s actions. Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 998; see In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000). The evidence Maria submitted shows that “[t]he systemic marginalization of indigenous communities . . . continues with no meaningful efforts by the government to overcome it.” AR 285, State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2015—Guatemala. It also indicates that “[i]mpunity for perpetrators remain[s] very high,” AR 255, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016, and that for Mayan indigenous women, there is “increased vulnerability and gender-based violence . . . exacerbated by a weak state apparatus that struggles to implement laws and programming to protect these groups.” AR 274, Guatemala Struggles to Protect Women Against Endemic Violence. Indigenous Mayan women are particularly unable to seek help from the government because they speak a different language from most of the country’s authorities. To be sure, the supplemental material does not indicate no willingness on behalf of the Guatemalan government—indeed, the country has taken some steps to codify laws prohibiting violence against women—but rather, the material reinforces the country’s lack of
4The concurrence’s reference to the enforcement of domestic abuse law violations in this country is both inapt and irrelevant.
No. 18-3500 Juan Antonio v. Barr Page 18 resources and infrastructure necessary to protect indigenous Mayan women from their perpetrators.
Further, the Board’s conclusion that Maria did not meet her burden of showing that the Guatemalan government was “helpless” relies on a standard that has since been deemed arbitrary and capricious. AR 5, BIA Decision. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that the “complete helplessness” standard is arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, and “not a permissible construction of the persecution requirement.” Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 130 (D.D.C. 2018).
Thus, the Board’s conclusion that Maria did not demonstrate that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control Juan is not supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Zhao, 569 F.3d at 247 (quoting Koulibaly, 541 F.3d at 619). Maria’s testimony about her experiences, corroborated by supplemental evidence of the conditions for indigenous Mayan women in Guatemala, compels a contrary conclusion to that of the Board. See Mandebvu, 755 F.3d at 424. Based on the evidence in the record, Maria could not “reasonably expect the assistance of the government” in controlling Juan’s actions. Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 998. We therefore vacate the Board’s finding that Maria did not show that the government was unable or unwilling to protect her and remand so the agency can reconsider her application consistent with this opinion.
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Thanks to my Round Table colleague Judge Jeffrey Chase for spotting this decision and sending it my way.
And congratulations to Margaret Wong, Esquire, of Cleveland, OH, who represented the respondent so ably before the 6th Circuit. Margaret and the attorneys from her firm appeared before me numerous times during the many years that I was assigned to the Cleveland docket part-time from Arlington, with most of the hearings taking place by televideo.
Margaret W./ Wong Senior PartnerMargaret W. Wong & Associates LLC
The BIA’s bogus “helpless standard” came directly from Matter of A-B- — Sessions’s unethical, legally incorrect, and misogynistic attempt to write female domestic violence victims from Central America out of refugee protections as part of his White Nationalist agenda. Judge Gibbons’s opinion found persuasive U.S. District Judge Sullivan’s (D. D.C.) conclusion in Grace v. Whitakerthat Sessions’s A-B- atrocity was “arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.”
This further confirms the problems of a politicized and weaponized Immigration Court system controlled by anti-asylum politicos. How many more “Marias” are out there who are arbitrarily denied protection by the Immigration Courts and the BIA, but lack the ability to obtain competent counsel to assist them and/or are not fortunate enough to have a Court of Appeals panel that takes their case seriously, rather than just “deferring” to the BIA? For example, the Fifth Circuit has “tanked” on the A-B- issue. And, today, the Trump regime is being allowed to turn away asylum seekers at the border in violation of law and without any meaningful opportunity whatsoever to present a claim.
Disgraceful as the BIA’s performance was in this case, worse happens every day in the broken Immigration Court system and the abusive, scofflaw enforcement system administered by the Trump regime.And those charged with putting an end to such blatant violations of law and human rights – the Article III Judiciary – have largely shirked their duty to put an end to this unconstitutional, illegal, unethical, and inhumane “bad joke” of a “court system” and to stop the regime’s illegal abrogation of U.S. asylum laws.
“Manuel Guzman, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an immigration judge’s denial of his application for withholding of removal. Because the IJ and BIA erred in failing to give Guzman an opportunity to explain why he could not reasonably obtain certain corroborative evidence, because substantial evidence does not support the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and BIA’s determinations regarding the unavailability of evidence to corroborate Guzman’s claim about abuse by his stepfather, and because the BIA incorrectly required Guzman to demonstrate that his membership in a particular social group was “at least one central reason” for his persecution, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the BIA’s order, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
PANEL: MERRITT, MOORE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
OPINION: Judge Moore
DISSENT: Judge Murphy
In looking for ways to deny protection, the BIA continues to “blow the basics.” That’s going to continue to happen as long as EOIR is allowed to operate as a branch of DHS Enforcement rather than a fair-minded, impartial court system with true expertise and which grants needed protection in meritorious cases, rather than searching for specious “reasons to deny.”
No wonder the EOIR backlog is mushrooming out of control when those responsible for doing justice waste countless time and resources “manufacturing denials,” rather than just promptly granting relief in many meritorious cases.
InDe Pena Paniagua v. Barr, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit made several corrections to the Trump administration’s application of the law of asylum as it applies to victims of domestic violence. The court’s precedent decision provided validation to the longstanding views of asylum advocates that the administration has worked hard to ignore.
As background, after an 18-year legal battle, the BIA in a 2014 decision, Matter of A-R-C-G-, finally recognized that the particular social group of married Guatemalan women unable to leave their relationship warranted asylum where its members are targeted for persecution due to their group characteristics.
In 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions vacatedA-R-C-G-, claiming that it lacked the rigorous legal analysis expected of such a decision. Sessions stated that while his new decision did not bar all such claimants from asylum, he believed few victims of domestic violence would manage to qualify. In particular, Sessions decided that “women unable to leave their domestic relationship” could not form the legitimate particular social group needed under the asylum laws, on the ground that such groups cannot be defined even in part by the persecution the group fears. In support of this view, Sessions concluded that the asylum-seeker’s inability to leave her relationship in the case in question was due to persecution, although he provided no insight as to what facts supported his belief.
Many similar cases were pending when Sessions issued his fateful decision. But instead of remanding all pending cases to allow the opportunity to respond to the sudden change in the law, the BIA instead began denying those cases on the grounds that Sessions had rejected the concept, without bothering to actually analyze the specific facts of each case to see if they still merited asylum under the law.
In De Pena Paniagua, the First Circuit called shenanigans. It began by noting that nothing in Sessions’ decision created a categorical rule precluding any and all applicants from succeeding on asylum claims as members of the group defined as women unable to leave their relationships. The BIA had thus erred in categorically denying such a claim.
The court next turned to Sessions’ error in concluding that the inability to leave a relationship necessarily results from persecution, calling Sessions’ statement to the contrary “arbitrary and unexamined fiat.” But the court continued that even if persecution was the cause, the threatened abuse that precludes someone from leaving a relationship “may not always be the same…as the physical abuse visited upon the woman within the relationship.” Finally, the court held that even if the harm was the same, there is no reason such abuse can’t do “double-duty, both helping define the group and providing the basis for a finding of persecution.”
It bears noting that in a 2007 precedent decision, Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, the BIA had only held that a particular social group cannot be defined “exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected to harm.” And the group in De Pena Paniagua (and in A-B- and A-R-C-G-, for that matter) was not exclusively defined by the inability to leave, but also by its members’ gender, nationality, and domestic relationship status. Of course, the inability to leave a relationship can be due to social, religious, economic, or other factors having nothing to do with persecution. But even if the inability to leave is interpreted as resulting from persecution, the fact that such harm would only partially define the group would not invalidate it under A-M-E- & J-G-U- (which borrowed the “exclusively defined” language from particular social group guidelines issued by UNHCR in 2002, which the Board had cited in an earlier decision).
In a 2014 case, Matter of M-E-V-G–, DHS had argued for a requirement that a particular social group “must exist independently of the fact of persecution,” a stricter requirement that would seemingly forbid a group from being even partially defined by persecution. Strangely, the BIA responded to DHS’s argument in a footnote, claiming that DHS’s proposal “is well established in our prior precedents,” a statement that was clearly untrue. And in support of its claim, the BIA cited to Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, which as discussed only precludes groups defined exclusively by persecution.
In his decision in A-B-, Sessions relied in part on the footnote in M-E-V-G- mischaracterizing prior case law to support his claim that a particular social group must exist independently of the harm asserted, thus perpetuating the Board’s prior falsehood. As in fact no prior BIA precedent had ever held that a particular social group cannot partially be defined by persecution, the First Circuit was correct to call out the unsupported legal conclusion. As merely looking up the citation in the BIA’s footnote would have revealed the error, one could argue that Sessions’ decision lacked the rigorous legal analysis expected of such a decision.
In remanding the record back to the BIA, the First Circuit also held out the possibility of considering a more concise group defined by an asylum applicant’s gender per se. This group was suggested in the amicus brief filed in the case by Harvard Law School’s Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program. While leaving it to the BIA to decide whether gender alone may constitute a cognizable particular social group for asylum purposes, the court provided very strong reasons why it should. The BIA’s recognition of gender per se would constitute a historical correction to U.S. asylum law, putting it in line with long recognized international standards. The same 2002 UNHCR Guidelines recognized gender as falling “properly within the ambit of the social group category, with women being a clear example of a social subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics, and who are frequently treated differently to men.”
Attorneys Jonathan Ng and Robert F. Ley of the Law Offices of Johanna Herrero represented the petitioner. Our Round Table of Former Immigration Judges is proud to have been among the distinguished amici filing briefs in the case, which included the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, a distinguished group of immigration law professors, and a group of faith-based organizations. Our heartfelt thanks to attorneys Richard W. Mark, Amer S. Ahmed, Indraneel Sur, Timothy Sun, Grace E. Hart, and Chris Jones of the law firm of Gibson Dunn for their outstanding efforts on our brief.
Copyright 2020 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.
Republished with permission.
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The biased, substandard performance and deficient scholarship of both the Attorney General and the BIA is matter of public record. The AG is not a qualified quasi-judicial official; he’s a prosecutor, with vengeance, who harbors a very clear enforcement bias against migrants. The BIA is structured to facially look like an expert body of quasi-judicial adjudicators. But, the frequent mistakes in their decisions and the clear bias in their hiring and supervision by the Attorney General expose the unhappy truth: they are nothing of the sort. So, what’s the excuse for the Article IIIs “deferring” to decisions on questions of law from these unqualified enforcement officials masquerading, not very convincingly, as “fair and impartial adjudicators?”
Looks like “judicial task avoidance” and “abdication of duty” to me!
Article III Judges are paid to determine what the law is (and not much else). They should do their jobs rather than hiding beyond the “doctrine of false deference.”
Whatever happened to the “promise of Kasinga? How have Sessions & Barr attacked the international refugee definition? Does international law have any meaning for the U.S. today? All this and more in 15 minutes!
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See the “premier offering” from the “Courtside Video” broadcasting from our redesigned studio!
Thanks so much, Jason, for inviting me to do this! I hope your students find it useful! And, remember, I’m always available to answer questions at “Courtside.”
PANEL: Howard, Chief Judge, Kayatta and Barron, Circuit Judges.
OPINION BY: Judge Kayetta
KEY EXCERPTS (Courtesy of Amer S. Ahmed, Esquire, Gibson Dunn, Pro Bono Counsel for the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges as Amici):
[The BIA] added, however, that “[e]ven if [De Pena] had
suffered harm rising to the level of past persecution,” De Pena’s
proposed particular social groups are analogous to those in Matter
of A-R-C-G, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), which the BIA
understood to have been “overruled” by the Attorney General in
Matter of A-B, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 319 (A.G. 2018). The BIA read
A-B as “determin[ing] that the particular social group of ‘married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship’ did
not meet the legal standards to qualify as a valid particular
social group.”
…
That conclusion poses two questions to be resolved on
this appeal: First, does A-B categorically reject any social group
defined in material part by its members’ “inability to leave” the
relationships in which they are being persecuted; and, second, if
so, is A-B to that extent consistent with the law?
…
Is it reasonable to read the law as supporting such a categorical
rejection of any group defined by its members’ inability to leave
relationships with their abusers? A-B itself cites only fiat to
support its affirmative answer to this question. It presumes that
the inability to leave is always caused by the persecution from
which the noncitizen seeks haven, and it presumes that no type of
persecution can do double duty, both helping to define the
particular social group and providing the harm blocking the pathway
to that haven. These presumptions strike us as arbitrary on at
least two grounds.
….
First, a woman’s inability to leave a relationship may
be the product of forces other than physical abuse. In
Perez-Rabanales v. Sessions, we distinguished a putative group of
women defined by their attempt “to escape systemic and severe
violence” from a group defined as “married women in Guatemala who
are unable to leave their relationship,” describing only the former
as defined by the persecution of its members. 881 F.3d 61, 67
(1st Cir. 2018). In fact, the combination of several cultural,
societal, religious, economic, or other factors may in some cases
explain why a woman is unable to leave a relationship.
…
We therefore do not see any basis other
than arbitrary and unexamined fiat for categorically decreeing
without examination that there are no women in Guatemala who
reasonably feel unable to leave domestic relationships as a result
of forces other than physical abuse. In such cases, physical abuse
might be visited upon women because they are among those unable to
leave, even though such abuse does not define membership in the group
of women who are unable to leave.
…
Second, threatened physical abuse that precludes
departure from a domestic relationship may not always be the same
in type or quality as the physical abuse visited upon a woman
within the relationship. More importantly, we see no logic or
reason behind the assertion that abuse cannot do double duty, both
helping to define the group, and providing the basis for a finding
of persecution. An unfreed slave in first century Rome might well
have been persecuted precisely because he had been enslaved (making
him all the same unable to leave his master). Yet we see no reason
why such a person could not seek asylum merely because the threat
of abuse maintained his enslaved status. As DHS itself once
observed, the “sustained physical abuse of [a] slave undoubtedly
could constitute persecution independently of the condition of
slavery.” Brief of DHS at 34 n.10, Matter of R-A, 23 I. & N. Dec.
694 (A.G. 2005).
For these reasons, we reject as arbitrary and unexamined
the BIA holding in this case that De Pena’s claim necessarily fails
because the groups to which she claims to belong are necessarily
deficient. Rather, the BIA need consider, at least, whether the
proffered groups exist and in fact satisfy the requirements for
constituting a particular social group to which De Pena belongs.
Amer S. Ahmed
GIBSON DUNN
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Read the full opinion at the link above.
While Judge Kayetta does not specifically cite our Round Table’s brief, a number of our arguments are reflected in the opinion. Undoubtedly, with lots of help from Amer and our other superstar friends over at Gibson Dunn, we’re continuing to make a difference and hopefully save some deserving lives of the refugees intentionally screwed by our dysfunctional Immigration Court system under a politicized DOJ.
Knightess of the Round Table
I’ve heard of the bogus rationale used by the BIA in this case reflected in a number of wrongly decided unpublished asylum denials by both the BIA and Immigration Judges. This should make for plenty of remands, slowing down the “Deportation Railroad,” jacking up the backlog, and once again showing the “substantial downside” of idiotic “haste makes waste shenanigans” at EOIR and allowing biased, unqualified White Nationalist hacks like Sessions and Barr improperly to interfere with what are supposed to be fair and impartial adjudications consistent with Due Process and fundamental fairness.
Great as this decision is, it begs the overriding issue: Why is a non-judicial political official, particularly one with as strong a prosecutorial bias as Sessions or Barr, allowed to intervene in a quasi-judicial decision involving an individual and not only reverse the result of that quasi-judicial tribunal, but also claim to set a “precedent” that is binding in other quasi-judicial proceedings? Clearly, neither Ms. De Pena-Paniagua nor any other respondent subject to a final order of removal under this system received the “fair and impartial decision by an unbiased decision-maker” which is a minimum requirement under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Let’s put it in terms that an Article III Circuit Court Judge should understand. Suppose Jane Q. Public sues the United States in U.S. District Court in Boston and wins a judgment. Unhappy with the result, Attorney General Billy Barr orders the U.S. District Judge to send the case to him for review. He enters a decision reversing the U.S. District Judge and dismissing Public’s claim against the United States. Then, he orders all U.S. District Judges in the District of Massachusetts to follow his decision and threatens to have them removed from their positions or demoted to non-judicial positions if they refuse.
The First Circuit or any other Court of Appeals would be outraged by this result and invalidate it as unconstitutional in a heartbeat! They likely would also find Barr in contempt and refer him to state bar authorities with a recommendation that his law license be revoked or suspended.
Yet this is precisely what happened to Ms. A-B-, Ms. De Pena Paniagua, and thousands of other asylum applicants in Immigration Court. It happens every working day in Immigration Courts throughout the nation. It will continue to happen until Article III Appellate Judges live up to their oaths of fealty to the Constitution and stop the outrageous, life-threatening miscarriages of justice and human dignity going on in our unconstitutional, illegal, fundamentally unfair, and dysfunctional Immigration Courts.
“We must now decide three issues: (1) whether persons who publicly provide assistance to law enforcement against major Salvadoran gangs constitute a cognizable particular social group for purposes of asylum and withholding of removal under the INA, (2) whether Guzman has established that he suffered past persecution on account of anti-gang political opinion imputed to him, and (3) whether the BIA correctly applied the framework we enunciated in Myrie v. Attorney General1 in denying Guzman relief under the CAT. For the reasons that follow, we hold that persons who publicly provide assistance against major Salvadoran gangs do constitute a particular social group, that Guzman has failed to meet his burden to show that imputed anti-gang political opinion was a central reason for the treatment he received, and that the BIA erred in its application of Myrie to Guzman’s application. Accordingly, we will vacate the BIA’s decision and remand this case for further proceedings on Guzman’s petition for relief from removal.”
[Hats off to J. Wesley Earnhardt Troy C. Homesley, III Brian Maida (ARGUED) Cravath, Swaine & Moore!]
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*** I believe that the Third Circuit uses “Attorney General” rather than the name of the particular Attorney General in their immigration citation.
Before: RESTREPO, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Roth.
Distortion of evidence and law happens all the time in this dysfunctional system now operated to deny basic due process and fundamental fairness to endangered individuals. Frankly, the Judges of the Third Circuit and other Courts of Appeals should be more than just “troubled” by the BIA’s legal incompetence and anti-immigrant decision-making. This isn’t just some “academic exercise.” The lives of innocent individuals are being put at risk by the ongoing fraud at EOIR under Barr!
This one-sided politically and prosecutorially-dominated charade of a “court system” is clearly unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to our Constitution. Not everyone has the ability to appeal to the Circuit Courts and be fortunate enough to get a panel that actually looks critically at the case, rather than just “rubber stamping” the BIA’s decisions or giving them “undue deference” like all too many Article III Judges do. Most asylum seekers aren’t represented by Cravath, Swaine & Moore, one of America’s top law firms.
Indeed, many asylum applicants are forced by the Government to proceed without any counsel and don’t have the foggiest notion of what’s happening in Immigration Court. How would an unrepresented individual or a child challenge the Immigration Judge’s or the BIA’s misapplication of the “three-part test” for “particular social group?” How would they go about raising failure to apply the applicable Circuit precedent in Myrie v. Attorney General?
Even with the best representation, as was present in this case, under pressure from political bosses like Sessions, Whitaker, and Barr, Immigration Judges and BIA Appellate Judges constantly look for “reasons to deny” relief even where the case clearly has merit, as this one does! If against these odds, the respondent “wins,” or achieves something other than an outright “loss,” Barr can merely reach in and change the result to favor DHS Enforcement.
More outrageously, he can make that improper and unethical decision a so-called “precedent” for other cases. How totally unfair can a system get? Is there any other “court system” in America where the prosecutor or the opposing party gets to select the judges, evaluate their performance under criteria that allow for no public input whatsoever, and then change results at both the trial and appellate level? How is this consistent with Due Process or basic judicial ethics, both of which require a “fair, impartial, and unbiased decision-maker.” In the “real world,” the mere “appearance” of impropriety or bias is enough to disqualify a judge from acting. Here “actual (not apparent) bias” is institutionalized and actively promoted!
The ongoing legal, ethical, and Constitutional problems at EOIR are quite obvious. For the Article III Courts to merely “tisk tisk” without requiring that immigration adjudications comply with basic Constitutional, statutory, and ethical requirements is a disservice to the public that continues to demean and undermine the role of the Article III Courts as an independent judiciary.
Due Process Forever! Captive Courts & Complicit Judges, Never!
Professor Geoffrey Hoffman Immigraton Clinic Director University of Houston Law Center
Geoffrey writeS in ImmigrationProf Blog.
A Stunning Fifth Circuit Asylum Decision: An Analysis of Inestroza-Antonelli v. Barr by Geoffrey Hoffman, Clinical Professor, University of Houston Law Center
I was moved this morning to write about a recent decision from the Fifth Circuit. This is an insightful and sensitive decision from the 2-person panel’s majority, Judges Dennis and King, with Judge Jones dissenting. The April 9th decision is Inestroza-Antonelli v. Barr.
In the very first paragraph, the essence of the decision is announced: “Without addressing the coup, the BIA found that any change in gender based violence was incremental or incidental and not material. Because this conclusion is not supported by the record, we grant the petition and remand.” Id. at 1.
Procedurally, the case involved an in absentia order of removal from 2005. In 2017, the petitioner moved to reopen proceedings outside the 90-day deadline for such motions based on a change in country conditions in Honduras. The petitioner argued that in Honduras since the time of her original removal order there had been “a 263.4 percent increase in violence against women since 2005.” She submitted a trove of documents to support her motion. The Immigration Judge, and Board on appeal denied her motion to reopen.
As recounted in the panel’s decision, there had been a military coup in Honduras in 2009. Specifically, there were several principal changes in the country as a result: “(1) the Gender Unit of the Honduran National Police, established between 2004 and 2005, has been restricted in its operations, and access to the Unit is now limited or nonexistent; (2) the power of the Municipal Offices for Women to address domestic violence has been severely diluted, and officials have been removed from their positions for responding to women’s needs, especially those related to domestic violence; (3) institutional actors have targeted women for violence, including sexual violence, and threatened the legal status of over 5,000 nongovernmental women’s, feminist, and human rights organizations that have opposed the post-coup government’s policies; (4) the rate of homicides of women more than doubled in the year after the coup and has continued to steadily increase, ultimately becoming the second highest cause of death for women of reproductive age; and (5) in 2014, the status of the National Institute for Women was downgraded and other resources for female victims of violence were eliminated….”
The crux of the Immigration Judge’s decision in denying her motion to reopen was that the violence suffered by women in Honduras is an “ongoing problem” and the increase allegedly did not represent a “change in country conditions.” The Board, in its decision, did not even mention the coup, finding instead that the IJ had not clearly erred” because the evidence reflected only an “incremental or incidental,” rather than a “material” change in country conditions.
I would like to point out several noteworthy and instructive aspects of this excellent decision.
First, in analyzing her claim, the Fifth Circuit’s majority noted, as is usual, that the government had introduced “no conflicting evidence.” Indeed, they did not introduce any evidence of country conditions in Honduras at all. Instead, on appeal they “cherry-pick[ed]” excerpts from the evidence introduced by the petitioner. Most typically, the relied on a 2014 Department of State report describing the availability of “domestic violence shelters and municipal women’s offices.”
This first point is important because it accurately describes what is typical of these asylum proceedings. The government often relies on little beyond the State report, and introduces no other evidence of its own. The result sometimes leads to tortured arguments on appeal, nitpicking before the Board, or unfair conclusions before the immigration judge.
It is frustrating sometimes when we litigate these cases and we see parties attempt to shoehorn their conclusions into preconceived molds. This selective reasoning should be called out more often. Many times when confronted with a record that contains a treasure trove of material that is largely favorable to the immigrant, the government is at a loss about how to respond on appeal. Instead of agreeing to a remand, they are faced with defending a sparse record with support for their position. As such, they have to (assuming they do not agree to a remand) cull through the record to find anything to shore up the precarious reasoning in the administrative decisions below.
Second, the majority rejects reliance on a prior case where a petitioner had not presented sufficient evidence of changed country conditions. As astutely pointed out by the majority, it makes no sense to hold that the current petitioner is unable to meet her evidentiary burden merely because a prior petitioner had failed to do so. In the words of the majority, “to hold that Inestroza-Antonelli is precluded from proving that conditions changed as a factual matter during this period simply because a previous petitioner failed to do so would violate the ‘basic premise of preclusion’—i.e., ‘that parties to a prior action are bound and nonparties are not bound.’ Id. at 7 (citing 18A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4449 (3d ed. 2019)). It is refreshing to see a panel rely on the famous federal practice and procedure treatise.
Third, the decision does a wonderful job of elucidating the “substantial evidence” standard, which is used so often against the immigrant-petitioner. Here, the majority explains that this standard does not mean that the Court of Appeals reviews the BIA decision to determine whether “there theoretically could have been some unevidenced occurrence that would make its findings correct.” Id. at 5 (emphasis added). Instead, the “substantial evidence” standard just means what it says: whether a party has produced substantial evidence in support of their position. Here, the government – as noted – provided no evidence against the petitioner’s position. In fact, the record “compels” the conclusion that conditions have “significantly changed,” according to the majority.
Fourth, the decision takes to task the BIA’s lack of analysis in its decision, specifically the failure on the part of the agency even to mention the “coup” in Honduras. Instead, there was nothing but a conclusory statement that the Board had “considered [the petitioner’s] arguments.” We have seen, for example, other courts of appeals such as the Seventh Circuit, take to task the BIA in recent months. See Baez-Sanchez v. Barr (7th Cir. 2020) (Easterbrook, J.) . It is a very good sign that circuit courts are making searching inquiries, demanding compliance from the Board and EOIR, and not engaging in mere cursory review.
There was a frustration shown in that, as they noted, the Board evidenced a “complete failure” to address the “uncontroverted evidence” of a clear significant “turning point” in Honduras’ history. The majority characterized this failure as an abuse of discretion by the BIA. On a separate point concerning the Board’s rejection of an argument about her abusive husband’s return to Honduras in 2009, as a changed in country conditions, the majority stopped short of calling that argument’s rejection an “abuse of discretion.” In a footnote, the majority noted several sister circuits that agreed that such a change should be characterized as a change in “personal circumstances.”
The most notable thing about the panel’s 2-1 decision besides its well thought-out reasoning is the lack of any discussion involving Matter of A-B-, 27 I & N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), anywhere in either the majority’s or dissent’s decisions. Arguably, A-B- is related and has been used (routinely) by the government to argue against relief for women who are similarly situated. Because this case turned on a denial of a motion to reopen in 2017, and there was no Attorney General’s decision until 2018, there was no occasion for the IJ and, later, the BIA rely on the AG’s A-B- decision. To the extent that AG Sessions in A-B- did not rule out all gender-based violence claims, the more important take away here is this: Matter of A-B- can be overcome and is no prohibition on relief, despite what a number of judges and BIA members may believe, so long as the petitioner can produce substantial evidence in support of his or her claims, as the petitioner did so well here. (Note, since this decision relates to a motion to reopen, the case will now be remanded to the BIA and IJ and the petitioner’s fight will continue on remand.)
Judge Edith Jones in her dissent, while never relying outright on A-B-, still takes affront at the perceived failure to “defer” to the BIA. In a telling passage, she states: “The majority has failed to defer to the BIA, which, hearing no doubt hundreds (or thousands) of cases from Honduras, must be far more familiar with country conditions than judges working from our isolated perch . . . . .” This is a scary position. While it is true the BIA has heard thousands of cases from Honduras, this cannot and should not form the basis for any rationale to blindly “defer” to the Board.
This type of deference and the attempted “rubber-stamping” that it engenders was exactly what Justice Kennedy warned about in his short but biting concurrence in Pereira v. Sessions. To quote Justice Kennedy, the “type of reflexive deference exhibited in some of these cases is troubling…it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision.” Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018), Kennedy, J., concurring (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy was right. The dissent’s transparent and clearly forthright encapsulation of the arguments in favor of “deference” highlights the dangers inherent in such a position and shows just why Chevron must (and will) be reconsidered.
Geoffrey Hoffman, Clinical Professor, University of Houston Law Center, Immigration Clinic Director
(Individual capacity; Institution for identification only)
KJ
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Judge Jones’s dissent ignores the clear evidence that the BIA is no longer anything approaching an “expert tribunal,” and that it’s jurisprudence has swung sharply in an anti-immigrant, and specifically anti-asylum, direction under Sessions, Whitaker, and Barr.
How long can the Article IIIs keep “papering over” not only the all too often deficient work-product produced by today’s BIA, but, more significantly, the glaring unconstitutionality of a system constructed and run by prosecutors and politicos that purports to function like a “court.” I doubt that Judge Jones would be willing to trust her life to a “court” that was composed and run like EOIR. So, why aren’t other “persons” entitled to the same Constitutional treatment and human dignity that she would expect if their positions were reversed?
In the meantime, I wholeheartedly endorse Geoffrey’s observation that even in the “Age of A-B-,” and in the normally “asylum-unfriendly” Fifth Circuit, great scholarship, persistence, and good lawyering can save lives! We just need more “good lawyers” out there in th NDPA to keep pressing the fight until all of the Article III’s stop “going along to get along” with the charade currently unfolding at EOIR and we also get the “regime change” necessary to establish an Article I Immigration Court that functions like a “real court” rather than a surreal vision of a court.
