HON. JEFFREY S. CHASE: 1ST CIRCUIT CORRECTS BIA ON GENDER-BASED ASYLUM DENIALS: De Pena Paniagua v. Barr – The Recurring Failure Of Scholarship By The AG & The BIA Again “Outed” By Article IIIs: So Why Do Federal Courts Continue “Deferring” To Politicized, Non-Expert, Sloppy Adjudications By Enforcement Officials Working For The Executive Branch?

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog
Coordinator & Chief Spokesperson, Round Table of Retired Immigration Judges

JEFFREY S. CHASE | OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW

Blog

 

Archive

 

Press and Interviews

Calendar

 

Contact

Gender Per Se

In De Pena Paniagua v. Barr, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit made several corrections to the Trump administration’s application of the law of asylum as it applies to victims of domestic violence.  The court’s precedent decision provided validation to the longstanding views of asylum advocates that the administration has worked hard to ignore.

As background, after an 18-year legal battle, the BIA in a 2014 decision, Matter of A-R-C-G-, finally recognized that the particular social group of married Guatemalan women unable to leave their relationship warranted asylum where its members are targeted for persecution due to their group characteristics.

In 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions vacated A-R-C-G-, claiming that it lacked the rigorous legal analysis expected of such a decision.  Sessions stated that while his new decision did not bar all such claimants from asylum, he believed few victims of domestic violence would manage to qualify.  In particular, Sessions decided that “women unable to leave their domestic relationship” could not form the legitimate particular social group needed under the asylum laws, on the ground that such groups cannot be defined even in part by the persecution the group fears.  In support of this view, Sessions concluded that the asylum-seeker’s inability to leave her relationship in the case in question was due to persecution, although he provided no insight as to what facts supported his belief.

Many similar cases were pending when Sessions issued his fateful decision.  But instead of remanding all pending cases to allow the opportunity to respond to the sudden change in the law, the BIA instead began denying those cases on the grounds that Sessions had rejected the concept, without bothering to actually analyze the specific facts of each case to see if they still merited asylum under the law.

In De Pena Paniagua, the First Circuit called shenanigans.  It began by noting that nothing in Sessions’ decision created a categorical rule precluding any and all applicants from succeeding on asylum claims as members of the group defined as women unable to leave their relationships.  The BIA had thus erred in categorically denying such a claim.

The court next turned to Sessions’ error in concluding that the inability to leave a relationship necessarily results from persecution, calling Sessions’ statement to the contrary “arbitrary and unexamined fiat.”  But the court continued that even if  persecution was the cause, the threatened abuse that precludes someone from leaving a relationship “may not always be the same…as the physical abuse visited upon the woman within the relationship.”  Finally, the court held that even if the harm was the same, there is no reason such abuse can’t do “double-duty, both helping define the group and providing the basis for a finding of persecution.”

It bears noting that in a 2007 precedent decision, Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, the BIA had only held that a particular social group cannot be defined “exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected to harm.”  And the group in De Pena Paniagua (and in A-B- and A-R-C-G-, for that matter)  was not exclusively defined by the inability to leave, but also by its members’ gender, nationality, and domestic relationship status.  Of course, the inability to leave a relationship can be due to social, religious, economic, or other factors having nothing to do with persecution.  But even if the inability to leave is interpreted as resulting from persecution, the fact that such harm would only partially define the group would not invalidate it under A-M-E- & J-G-U- (which borrowed the “exclusively defined” language from particular social group guidelines issued by UNHCR in 2002, which the Board had cited in an earlier decision).

In a 2014 case, Matter of M-E-V-G, DHS had argued for a requirement that a particular social group “must exist independently of the fact of persecution,” a stricter requirement that would seemingly forbid a group from being even partially defined by persecution.  Strangely, the BIA responded to DHS’s argument in a footnote, claiming that DHS’s proposal “is well established in our prior precedents,” a statement that was clearly untrue.   And in support of its claim, the BIA cited to Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, which as discussed only precludes groups defined exclusively by persecution.

In his decision in A-B-, Sessions relied in part on the footnote in M-E-V-G- mischaracterizing prior case law to support his claim that a particular social group must exist independently of the harm asserted, thus perpetuating the Board’s prior falsehood.   As in fact no prior BIA precedent had ever held that a particular social group cannot partially be defined by persecution, the First Circuit was correct to call out the unsupported legal conclusion.  As merely looking up the citation in the BIA’s footnote would have revealed the error, one could argue that Sessions’ decision lacked the rigorous legal analysis expected of such a decision.

In remanding the record back to the BIA, the First Circuit also held out the possibility of considering a more concise group defined by an asylum applicant’s gender per se.  This group was suggested in the amicus brief filed in the case by Harvard Law School’s Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program.  While leaving it to the BIA to decide whether gender alone may constitute a cognizable particular social group for asylum purposes, the court provided very strong reasons why it should.  The BIA’s recognition of gender per se would constitute a historical correction to U.S. asylum law, putting it in line with long recognized international standards.  The same 2002 UNHCR Guidelines recognized gender as falling “properly within the ambit of the social group category, with women being a clear example of a social subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics, and who are frequently treated differently to men.”

Attorneys Jonathan Ng and Robert F. Ley of the Law Offices of Johanna Herrero represented the petitioner.  Our Round Table of Former Immigration Judges is proud to have been among the distinguished amici filing briefs in the case, which included the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, a distinguished group of immigration law professors, and a group of faith-based organizations.  Our heartfelt thanks to attorneys Richard W. Mark, Amer S. Ahmed, Indraneel Sur, Timothy Sun, Grace E. Hart, and Chris Jones of the law firm of Gibson Dunn for their outstanding efforts on our brief.

Copyright 2020 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

Republished with permission.

 

**************************************

The biased, substandard performance and deficient scholarship of both the Attorney General and the BIA is matter of public record. The AG is not a qualified quasi-judicial official; he’s a prosecutor, with vengeance, who harbors a very clear enforcement bias against migrants. The BIA is structured to facially look like an expert body of quasi-judicial adjudicators. But, the frequent mistakes in their decisions and the clear bias in their hiring and supervision by the Attorney General expose the unhappy truth: they are nothing of the sort. So, what’s the excuse for the Article IIIs “deferring” to decisions on questions of law from these unqualified enforcement officials masquerading, not very convincingly, as “fair and impartial adjudicators?”

 

Looks like “judicial task avoidance” and “abdication of duty” to me!

 

Article III Judges are paid to determine what the law is (and not much else).  They should do their jobs rather than hiding beyond the “doctrine of false deference.”

 

Here’s my previously posted “take” on De Pena Paniaguahttps://immigrationcourtside.com/2020/04/24/due-process-gender-based-asylum-wins-1st-cir-slams-bia-sessionss-matter-of-a-b-atrocity-remands-for-competent-adjudication-of-gender-based-asylum-claim-de-pena-paniagua-v-ba/

 

Due Process Forever!

 

PWS

 

05-11-20

DUE PROCESS/GENDER-BASED ASYLUM WINS: 1st Cir. Slams BIA, Sessions’s Matter of A-B- Atrocity – Remands For Competent Adjudication of Gender-Based Asylum Claim — DE PENA-PANIAGUA v. BARR   

Amer S. Ahmed
Amer S. Ahmed
Partner
Gibson Dunn
NY

DE PENA-PANIAGUA v. BARR, 1st Cir., 04-24-20, published

OLBD OPINION VACATING AND REMANDING

PANEL: Howard, Chief Judge, Kayatta and Barron, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: Judge Kayetta

KEY EXCERPTS (Courtesy of Amer S. Ahmed, Esquire, Gibson Dunn, Pro Bono Counsel for the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges as Amici):

[The BIA] added, however, that “[e]ven if [De Pena] had

suffered harm rising to the level of past persecution,” De Pena’s

proposed particular social groups are analogous to those in Matter

of A-R-C-G, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), which the BIA

understood to have been “overruled” by the Attorney General in

Matter of A-B, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 319 (A.G. 2018). The BIA read

A-B as “determin[ing] that the particular social group of ‘married

women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship’ did

not meet the legal standards to qualify as a valid particular

social group.”

That conclusion poses two questions to be resolved on

this appeal: First, does A-B categorically reject any social group

defined in material part by its members’ “inability to leave” the

relationships in which they are being persecuted; and, second, if

so, is A-B to that extent consistent with the law?

Is it reasonable to read the law as supporting such a categorical

rejection of any group defined by its members’ inability to leave

relationships with their abusers? A-B itself cites only fiat to

support its affirmative answer to this question. It presumes that

the inability to leave is always caused by the persecution from

which the noncitizen seeks haven, and it presumes that no type of

persecution can do double duty, both helping to define the

particular social group and providing the harm blocking the pathway

to that haven. These presumptions strike us as arbitrary on at

least two grounds.

….

 

First, a woman’s inability to leave a relationship may

be the product of forces other than physical abuse. In

Perez-Rabanales v. Sessions, we distinguished a putative group of

women defined by their attempt “to escape systemic and severe

violence” from a group defined as “married women in Guatemala who

are unable to leave their relationship,” describing only the former

as defined by the persecution of its members. 881 F.3d 61, 67

(1st Cir. 2018). In fact, the combination of several cultural,

societal, religious, economic, or other factors may in some cases

explain why a woman is unable to leave a relationship.

We therefore do not see any basis other

than arbitrary and unexamined fiat for categorically decreeing

without examination that there are no women in Guatemala who

reasonably feel unable to leave domestic relationships as a result

of forces other than physical abuse. In such cases, physical abuse

might be visited upon women because they are among those unable to

leave, even though such abuse does not define membership in the group

of women who are unable to leave.

Second, threatened physical abuse that precludes

departure from a domestic relationship may not always be the same

in type or quality as the physical abuse visited upon a woman

within the relationship. More importantly, we see no logic or

reason behind the assertion that abuse cannot do double duty, both

helping to define the group, and providing the basis for a finding

of persecution. An unfreed slave in first century Rome might well

have been persecuted precisely because he had been enslaved (making

him all the same unable to leave his master). Yet we see no reason

why such a person could not seek asylum merely because the threat

of abuse maintained his enslaved status. As DHS itself once

observed, the “sustained physical abuse of [a] slave undoubtedly

could constitute persecution independently of the condition of

slavery.” Brief of DHS at 34 n.10, Matter of R-A, 23 I. & N. Dec.

694 (A.G. 2005).

 

For these reasons, we reject as arbitrary and unexamined

the BIA holding in this case that De Pena’s claim necessarily fails

because the groups to which she claims to belong are necessarily

deficient. Rather, the BIA need consider, at least, whether the

proffered groups exist and in fact satisfy the requirements for

constituting a particular social group to which De Pena belongs.

 

Amer S. Ahmed

GIBSON DUNN

 

******************************

 

Read the full opinion at the link above.

 

While Judge Kayetta does not specifically cite our Round Table’s brief, a number of our arguments are reflected in the opinion. Undoubtedly, with lots of help from Amer and our other superstar friends over at Gibson Dunn, we’re continuing to make a difference and hopefully save some deserving lives of the refugees intentionally screwed by our dysfunctional Immigration Court system under a politicized DOJ.

Knightess
Knightess of the Round Table

 

I’ve heard of the bogus rationale used by the BIA in this case reflected in a number of wrongly decided unpublished asylum denials by both the BIA and Immigration Judges. This should make for plenty of remands, slowing down the “Deportation Railroad,” jacking up the backlog, and once again showing the “substantial downside” of  idiotic “haste makes waste shenanigans” at EOIR and allowing biased, unqualified White Nationalist hacks like Sessions and Barr improperly to interfere with what are supposed to be fair and impartial adjudications consistent with Due Process and fundamental fairness.

 

Great as this decision is, it begs the overriding issue: Why is a non-judicial political official, particularly one with as strong a prosecutorial bias as Sessions or Barr, allowed to intervene in a quasi-judicial decision involving an individual and not only reverse the result of that quasi-judicial tribunal, but also claim to set a “precedent” that is binding in other quasi-judicial proceedings?  Clearly, neither Ms. De Pena-Paniagua nor any other respondent subject to a final order of removal under this system received the “fair and impartial decision by an unbiased decision-maker” which is a minimum requirement under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

 

Let’s put it in terms that an Article III Circuit Court Judge should understand. Suppose Jane Q. Public sues the United States in U.S. District Court in Boston and wins a judgment. Unhappy with the result, Attorney General Billy Barr orders the U.S. District Judge to send the case to him for review. He enters a decision reversing the U.S. District Judge and dismissing Public’s claim against the United States. Then, he orders all U.S. District Judges in the District of Massachusetts to follow his decision and threatens to have them removed from their positions or demoted to non-judicial positions if they refuse.

 

The First Circuit or any other Court of Appeals would be outraged by this result and invalidate it as unconstitutional in a heartbeat! They likely would also find Barr in contempt and refer him to state bar authorities with a recommendation that his law license be revoked or suspended.

 

Yet this is precisely what happened to Ms. A-B-, Ms. De Pena Paniagua, and thousands of other asylum applicants in Immigration Court. It happens every working day in Immigration Courts throughout the nation. It will continue to happen until Article III Appellate Judges live up to their oaths of fealty to the Constitution and stop the outrageous, life-threatening miscarriages of justice and human dignity going on in our unconstitutional, illegal, fundamentally unfair, and dysfunctional Immigration Courts.

 

Due Process Forever!

 

PWS

04-24-20