Judge Henry F. Floyd – immigrationcourtside.com

🏴‍☠️🤮👎🏽 WHAT’S GARLAND DOING? — LATEST 4TH CIR. REJECTION OF ABSURDIST EOIR ASYLUM DENIAL SHOWS WHY GARLAND MUST “PULL THE PLUG” 🔌 ON THE BIA! — While He’s At It, He Needs To Look At OIL’s Mindless “Defense Of The Clearly Indefensible!” — Why Are American Women Giving Garland A “Free Pass” On Overt, Institutionalized, Racially-Charged, Misogyny @ His DOJ?

Doctor Death — Would you want this guy as your Immigration Judge or BIA “panel?” If not, tell Garland to “pull the plug” on his deadly and incompetent BIA!
Public Domain

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/201762.P.pdf

Sorto-Guzmán v. Garland, 4th Cir., 08-93-22, published

PANEL: KING and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

OPINION: Judge FLOYD

KEY QUOTE:

In sum, we hold that the IJ’s decision, which the BIA adopted, blatantly ignored our long line of cases establishing that the threat of death alone establishes past persecution. This was legal error, and therefore, an abuse of discretion. See Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 337 (4th Cir. 2014). We hold that Sorto-Guzman has established she was subjected to past persecution in El Salvador.2 She is thereby entitled to the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. Li, 405 F.3d at 176; 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). The IJ and the BIA erred in not affording Sorto-Guzman this presumption, which would

2 Sorto-Guzman argues, in the alternative, that the IJ and the BIA erred in finding that she failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. We will not answer that question today. Because we hold that she properly established past persecution, the proper remedy is to remand the case to the BIA to consider the question of whether DHS can rebut the presumption that Sorto-Guzman has a well-founded fear of future persecution.

11

have then shifted the burden to DHS to rebut the presumption. Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 2004); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i).

*************

Sorto-Guzman is a life-long Catholic who regularly attended Catholic services in El Salvador. In December 2015, about five members of the Mara 18 gang accosted Sorto- Guzman in the street as she was leaving church. At the time, she was wearing a crucifix medallion around her neck. The gang members tore the chain from her neck, hit and kicked her, and threatened to kill her if she ever wore it or attended church again. Sorto-Guzman stopped attending church after the attack, fearing the gang and their threats.
A few weeks later in January 2016, a group of Mara 18 gang members—including some of the gang members from the December 2015 assault—stopped Sorto-Guzman, along with her sister and Rivas-Sorto, as she was coming home from a shopping trip. One of the men attempted to sexually assault Sorto-Guzman and had started to forcefully kiss her. He only stopped when her screams caught the attention of a neighbor. The gang members threatened to kill Sorto-Guzman and Rivas-Sorto if Sorto-Guzman did not join the gang and start living with them.
3

On February 13, 2016, some of the gang members from the prior incidents tracked where Sorto-Guzman lived and broke into her house carrying guns. The gang members viciously beat Sorto-Guzman, threatened her life, and robbed her. Sorto-Guzman’s neighbors called the police, but they did not come until several hours after the assault. Sorto-Guzman reported the assault and robbery to the officers who arrived at the scene. She also went to the local police station the next day to report the attack. The police made one attempt to investigate, but Petitioners were not home when the police arrived, and the officers never followed up. The day after, a gang member called Sorto-Guzman, warning her she would regret making the report to the police and that they would soon kill her, her son, and her sister.

Absurdly, an Immigration Judge found that this gross abuse and death threats by a gang with the ability and willingness to carry them out did not amount to “persecution.” Worse yet, on appeal, rather than reversing and directing the judge below to follow the law, the BIA agreed — invoking the outlandish “theory” that the death threats, on top of the savage beating, weren’t so bad because they had never come to “fruition.” In other words, the applicant hadn’t hung around to be killed. Then, to top it off, attorneys from the DOJ’s Office of Immigration Litigation (“OIL”) unethically defended this deadly nonsense before the Fourth Circuit! This is “justice” in Garland’s disgraceful, deadly, and dysfunctional “court” system!

Trial By Ordeal — Garland’s BIA Judges applying the “fruition” test. If she lives, it’s not persecution!
Public Realm
Source: Ancient Origins Website
https://www.ancient-origins.net/history/trial-ordeal-life-or-death-method-judgement-004160

NOT, a “mere mistake.”

EOIR’s performance is this case, particularly the BIA’s absurdist conclusion that, essentially, death threats must result in death to constitute past persecution, is a contemptuous disregard for binding circuit precedent, a demonstration of gross anti-asylum bias, misogyny, and a clear example of judicial incompetence.

Would a heart transplant surgeon who “forgot” to install a new heart or neglected to sew up the patient’s chest be allowed to continue operating? Of course not! So, why is the BIA still allowed to botch life or death cases — the equivalent of open heart surgery?

If Garland allows his “delegees” to perform in this dangerous and unprofessional manner, in his name, what is he doing as Attorney General? This is a farce, not a “court system?” Those responsible need to be held accountable! And, OIL’s unethical defense of this deadly nonsense is indefensible!

Alfred E. Neumann — “What are legal ethics? Not my friends or relatives whose lives as being destroyed by these ‘Kangaroo Courts.’ Just ‘the others’ and their dirty immigration lawyers! So, who cares? Why worry about professionalism, ethics, and due process in Immigration Court?”
PHOTO: Wikipedia Commons

We’ve heard lots lately from Garland about “accountability.” Why doesn’t it apply to his own, wholly owned, totally dysfunctional, legally deficient, contemptuous, unprofessional “court system” that builds astounding, self-created backlogs while causing pain, suffering, and sometimes sending innocents to death?☠️

EOIR Clown Show Must Go T-Shirt — “EOIR Clown Show Must Go” T-Shirt Custom Design Concept

Additionally, in Kansas this week, women have shown the power of their just demand to be treated as humans, with rights, rather than dehumanized pawns just there to re-populate the world for the men in charge. So, why not unleash the same passion and rightful fury on Garland and his ongoing, illegal, misogynistic treatment of women (primarily women of color) at EOIR!

Woman Tortured — “She struggled madly in the torturing Ray” — AG Garland has failed miserably to engage with the plight of women, mostly those of color, being denied fundamental rights and abused daily by his lawless, anti-immigrant, anti-asylum, misogynistic “holdover” EOIR! Why are women putting up with his bad attitude and dilatory approach to justice? What happened to Lisa Monaco, Vanita Gupta, and Kristen Clarke? Are they “locked in a dark closet” somewhere in Garland’s DOJ?
Amazing StoriesArtist Unknown, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-04-22

4TH CIRCUIT PUNCHES ANOTHER HOLE IN TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S “NEW AMERICAN GULAG” – Those Held For “Asylum Only” Hearings Entitled To Apply For Bond – Chavez v. Hott

CHAVEZ V. HOTT, 4TH, 186086.P

Chavez v. Hott, No. 18-6086, 4^th Cir., 10-10-19, published

PANEL: Floyd, Harris, & Richardson, Circuit Judges

OPINION BY: Judge Pamela Harris

DISSENTIONG OPINION: Judge Richardson

KEY QUOTE FROM THE MAJORITY:

PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:
The petitioners in this case are a class of noncitizens subject to reinstated removal

orders, which generally are not open to challenge. The petitioners may, however, pursue withholding of removal if they have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in the countries designated in their removal orders. Availing themselves of that right, these petitioners sought withholding of removal, and they are being detained by the government while they await the outcome of their “withholding-only” proceedings. The question before us is whether they have the right to individualized bond hearings that could lead to their release during those proceedings.

Answering that question requires that we determine the statutory authority under which the government detains noncitizens who seek withholding of removal after a prior removal order has been reinstated. The petitioners argue that their detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which authorizes detention “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed,” and would allow them to seek release on bond and to make their case before an immigration judge. The government, on the other hand, points to 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which applies “when an alien is ordered removed” – as the petitioners were, the government says, by virtue of their reinstated removal orders – and makes that detention mandatory during a 90-day “removal period.”

The district court granted summary judgment to the petitioners, holding that they are detained under § 1226 because a decision on removal remains “pending” until their withholding-only proceedings are complete. We agree with the district court’s careful

analysis of the relevant statutes and affirm its judgment.

KEY QUOTE FROM DISSENT:

RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation. Are previously removed

aliens, who are subject to a reinstated order of removal from the United States, entitled to a bond hearing when they seek withholding of removal? The answer turns on which provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act governs their detention. Section 1231 applies “when an alien is ordered removed” and provides no right to a bond hearing. On the other hand, § 1226 applies to an alien awaiting “a decision on whether the alien is to be removed” and permits the alien’s release on bond after a hearing. The majority holds that § 1226 controls.

I respectfully dissent. Both the plain language and the structure of the Immigration and Nationality Act compel the conclusion that § 1231, not § 1226, governs the detention of aliens with reinstated orders of removal. Petitioners are thus not entitled to a bond hearing while they seek withholding of removal under their reinstated orders of removal.

***********************************************************

Great decision! Congratulations to Paul Whitfield Hughes, III, Mayer Brown, LLP who argued the case for the Appellees. Also, congratulations to the Legal Aid and Justice Center and to Mark Stevens, Murray Osorio, LLC, who practiced before me in Arlington, for their role in litigating the case below.

I am particularly proud and gratified by the role played by my former Georgetown Law student, now a full-fledged member of “New Due Process Army,” Rachel Colleen McFarland, who is an attorney with the Legal Aid and Justice Center.

Nice to know that some Article III Appellate Judges are “getting it,” and standing up to the Trump Administration’s abuse.

Not surprisingly, those of us who have seen how the system often doesn’t work know that many of those under so-called “reinstated orders” were railroaded out the first time around without any “Due Process.”

PWS

10-17-19

DOJ POLITICOS SEEK TO “SPEED UP” A CAPTIVE COURT SYSTEM ALREADY STRUGGLING WITH THE BASICS OF DUE PROCESS FOR MIGRANTS: 4th Cir. Has To Instruct BIA On Applying The Burden Of Proof In Removal Proceedings – Mauricio-Vasquez v. Whitaker

172209.P

Mauricio-Vasquez v. Whitaker, 4th Cir., 12-06-18, published

PANEL: NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: JUDGE DIAZ

KEY QUOTE:

It was DHS’s burden to affirmatively prove (by clear and convincing evidence) that Mauricio-Vasquez last entered in 2000 without inspection, and was therefore not admitted until 2008, because this determines whether his 2012 felony abduction offense fell within the five-year window for removability. But here, the record contains essentially unrebutted evidence showing that Mauricio-Vasquez was in Peru from 1999 to 2001, and that he presented himself for inspection and was allowed to enter the United States at Reagan National Airport in 2002 (whether on a visa or otherwise).5 In our view, any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude that DHS failed to prove Mauricio-Vasquez was admitted in 2008.6 He is therefore not removable on the ground alleged by DHS.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Mauricio-Vasquez’s petition for review.

Although the ordinary practice is to remand to the agency for further proceedings consistent with our disposition, we conclude that such proceedings “would serve no purpose” here. Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106, 1118 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotingKarimi v. Holder, 715 F.3d 561, 565 (4th Cir. 2013)). The Board remanded this case once before, after the Immigration Judge determined that DHS had failed to satisfy its burden of proof. Yet despite being allowed to fully develop the record on remand, DHS has again failed to carry its burden. Under the circumstances, we decline to give DHS a “third bite at the apple.” Id. (quoting Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 612 (5th Cir. 2012)).

We therefore vacate the order of removal, and remand to the agency with instructions to grant Mauricio-Vasquez’s motion to terminate removal proceedings.

**************************************************

Reminds me of a BIA colleague who once wrote in a dissent from a much remanded visa petition case that it was “time to put an end to this pathetic attempt at adjudication by the District Director.”

Fixing the glaring quality and due process problems in the Immigration Court system should be “priority 1.” Instead, the emphasis from the politicos is on artificially trying to make a broken system go faster and churn out more potentially erroneous decisions.

Time to get this court system out of the clutches of the DOJ so that it can be fixed and function as a court should.

PWS

12-17=18

BIGGIE ON GANG ASYLUM: PUBLISHED 4TH CIR. BLASTS BIA’S BOGUS APPROACH TO NEXUS IN GANG CASES — Court Eviscerates BIA’s Disingenuous Approach To Nexus In Matter of L-E-A- (Without Citing It!) – SALGADO-SOSA V. SESSIONS

4thGangsNexusSalgado-Sosa

Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 4th Cir., 04-13-18, Published

PANEL: GREGORY, Chief Judge, and FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: JUDGE PAMELA HARRIS

SUMMARY OF HOLDING (From Court’s Opinion):

“Reynaldo Salgado-Sosa, a native and citizen of Honduras, seeks asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. If he is returned to Honduras, he fears, he will face persecution at the hands of the gang MS-13, which has repeatedly attacked his family for resisting extortion demands.

The agency proceedings focused on whether Salgado-Sosa could show, for purposes of both his asylum and withholding of removal claims, a nexus between MS-13’s threats and membership in a cognizable “particular social group” – here, Salgado-Sosa’s family. The Board of Immigration Appeals found that Salgado-Sosa could not establish the requisite nexus, and denied withholding of removal on that ground. The Board separately found that Salgado-Sosa’s asylum application was untimely, and that there was insufficient evidence to justify protection under the Convention Against Torture.

We conclude that the Board erred in holding that Salgado-Sosa did not meet the nexus requirement. The record compels the conclusion that at least one central reason for Salgado-Sosa’s persecution is membership in his family, a protected social group under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Accordingly, we vacate the denial of withholding of removal, and remand for further proceedings on that claim. On the asylum claim, we separately remand for consideration of whether our recent decision in Zambrano v. Sessions, 878 F.3d 84 (4th Cir. 2017), affects Salgado-Sosa’s argument that a statutory “changed circumstances” exception allows consideration of his untimely application.”

KEY QUOTE FROM OPINION:

“For three reasons, we are “compelled to conclude,” see Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 948, that the IJ and the Board erred in finding that Salgado-Sosa has not shown that his kinship ties are “at least one central reason” for the harm he fears. First, the record manifestly establishes that MS-13 threatened Salgado-Sosa “on account of” his connection to his stepfather and to his family. Salgado-Sosa testified, for instance, that MS-13 attacked him because of his stepfather Merez-Merlo’s conflict with the gang, not his own. Merez-Merlo similarly testified that his refusal to give MS-13 “what they wanted, which was the war tax,” led the gang to repeatedly threaten to kill his wife and son. J.A. 236; see J.A. 234, 315–16. Other evidence also corroborates the centrality of family ties. For example, the family’s long-time neighbor submitted an affidavit averring

2 As before the IJ and Board, Salgado-Sosa’s argument in this court emphasizes evidence that he and his family were targeted because of his stepfather’s testimony against MS-13. But both on appeal and before the agency, Salgado-Sosa also has argued more generally that he fears persecution based on his membership in a “particular social[] group, as defined by Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011).” Appellant’s Br. at 5; see also A.R. 101, 478–79. And our holding in Crespin-Valladares was not limited to family members of witnesses, but instead established that family membership itself is a “prototypical example of a [cognizable] particular social group.” 632 F.3d at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted). The IJ and BIA accordingly considered not only whether Salgado-Sosa was persecuted for being a family member of a witness, but also whether he was persecuted because of his kinship ties generally. See A.R. 126 (finding that Salgado-Sosa “has not demonstrated” that any persecution “would be on account of a statutorily protected ground, be that family group membership, as witnesses, or any other potential protected ground”) (emphasis added). Following that lead, we also consider whether the evidence shows that Salgado-Sosa was threatened on account of his familial ties, regardless of the role played by his stepfather’s testimony.

10

that “the reason why the gang members wants [sic] to hurt [Salgado-Sosa]” is that he “defended his stepfather from the gang member[s]” when they assaulted the family. J.A. 537 (emphasis added). And the IJ, as noted above, did not doubt the credibility of any of this evidence.

Second, that Salgado-Sosa’s anticipated harm is on account of membership in his family follows from the IJ’s own factual findings, adopted by the BIA. The IJ herself determined that the central reasons for Salgado-Sosa’s feared persecution are his stepfather’s refusal to pay the gang and revenge on the family for resisting MS-13’s extortion. See J.A. 5–6, 126–27. On a proper reading of the nexus requirement and our cases applying it, that finding compels the conclusion that Salgado-Sosa’s kinship ties are a central reason for the harm he fears.

Our decision in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch is instructive. There, the petitioner applied for asylum after gang members in El Salvador threatened her for refusing to allow her son to join the gang. 784 F.3d at 947. The BIA rejected her assertion that the persecution was “on account of” familial ties, concluding that the petitioner “was not threatened because of her relationship to her son (i.e. family), but rather because she would not consent to her son engaging in a criminal activity.” Id. at 949. We found this distinction “meaningless” and “unreasonable” given that “[petitioner’s] relationship to her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened” by the gang. Id. at 950 (emphasis added). Thus, because the petitioner’s “family connection to her son” was at least one of “multiple central reasons” for the gang’s threats, we found the nexus

requirement satisfied, and rejected the BIA’s contrary determination as resting on “an 11

excessively narrow reading of the requirement that persecution be undertaken ‘on account of membership in a nuclear family.’” Id. at 949–50.

The same logic applies here. There is no meaningful distinction between whether Salgado-Sosa was threatened because of his connection to his stepfather, and whether Salgado-Sosa was threatened because MS-13 sought revenge on him for an act committed by his stepfather. See Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 950. However characterized, Salgado-Sosa’s relationship to his stepfather (and to his family) is indisputably “why [he], and not another person, was threatened” by MS-13. See id. Thus, the IJ and BIA erred by focusing narrowly on the “immediate trigger” for MS-13’s assaults – greed or revenge – at the expense of Salgado-Sosa’s relationship to his stepfather and family, which were the very relationships that prompted the asserted persecution. See Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 60 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that the BIA drew “too fine a distinction” between the “immediate trigger” for persecution – breaking the rules imposed on former gang members – and what ultimately led to persecution – protected status as a former gang member). On the IJ’s own unchallenged account of the facts – that Salgado-Sosa’s fear of persecution arises from the actions of his stepfather and his family – the only reasonable conclusion is that family membership is “at least one central reason for [his] persecution.” See Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 950.

Third and finally, the BIA’s decision improperly focused on whether Salgado- Sosa’s family was persecuted on account of a protected ground, rather than on whether Salgado-Sosa was persecuted because of a protected ground – here, his relationship to his

family. The critical fact, for the BIA, was that the motive for the attacks on Salgado- 12

Sosa’s family was “financial gain or personal vendettas,” neither of which is itself a protected ground under the INA. J.A. 6. But as we have explained before, it does not follow that if Salgado-Sosa’s family members were not targeted based on some protected ground, then Salgado-Sosa could not have been targeted based on his ties to his family. Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting argument that feared persecution is not on account of membership in family if attacks on family are not related to protected ground). Instead, “[t]he correct analysis focuses on [Salgado-Sosa himself] as the applicant, and asks whether [he] was targeted because of [his] membership in the social group consisting of [his] immediate family.” Villatoro v. Sessions, 680 F. App’x 212, 221 (4th Cir. 2017). And once the right question is asked, the record admits of only one answer: whatever MS-13’s motives for targeting Salgado-Sosa’s family, Salgado-Sosa himself was targeted because of his membership in that family.

For all these reasons, it is clear that Salgado-Sosa has shown the required nexus between anticipated persecution and membership in a particular social group consisting of his family. Specifically, Salgado-Sosa has demonstrated that “at least one central reason” for the harm he faces is his connection to his stepfather and family. See 8 U.S.C. §1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Because the IJ and BIA relied exclusively on an erroneous determination as to nexus in denying withholding of removal, we vacate that denial and remand for further proceedings regarding Salgado-Sosa’s application.”

**********************************************

First, congrats to Alfred Lincoln (“Rob”) Robertson, Jr., ROBERTSON LAW OFFICE, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, who successfully represented Mr. Salgado-Sosa before the Fourth Circuit. Rob was a “regular” in the Arlington Immigration Court, particularly on my always challenging detained docket. One of the things I liked about him is that he was willing to take “tough cases” — ones where the respondent had a decent argument but by no means a “slam dunk winner.” He also practiced before the local Virginia criminal courts, so was familiar with what “really happens” in criminal court as opposed to the “Alice in Wonderland Version” often presented in Immigration Court.

Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011) lives! One of my all-time favorite cases, because I was the Immigration Judge incorrectly reversed by the BIA on an asylum grant. I was right on all sorts of things, and the BIA was wrong! But, hey, who remembers things like that?

This decision is good news for justice and due process for asylum seekers. It spells some bad news for the BIA’s highly contrived decision in Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&n 40 (BIA 2017). There, the BIA looked beyond primary causation (the “but for” rule) of a family-based PSG to find a secondary cause, “criminal extortion” that did not relate to the protected ground. In other words, the BIA encouraged IJs to look for any way possible to twist facts to deny family-based PSG asylum claims. Indeed, the only lame example that the BIA could cite that might qualify under their bizarre analysis was the long-dead Romanov Family of Russia.

Both Judge Jeffrey Chase and I ripped the BIA’s anti-asylum, anti-Due Process machinations in previous blogs:

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/05/25/new-precedent-family-is-a-psg-but-beware-of-nexus-matter-of-l-e-a-27-in-dec-40-bia-2017-read-my-alternative-analysis/

http://immigrationcourtside.com/2017/06/03/introducing-new-commentator-hon-jeffrey-chase-matter-of-l-e-a-the-bias-missed-chance-original-for-immigrationcourtside/

What if EOIR concentrated on quality, Due Process, and fairness for asylum seekers, rather than merely looking for ways to deport more migrants (whether legally correct or not) in accordance with Sessions’s anti-migrant agenda? We need an independent Article I U.S. Immigration Court with an Appellate Division that acts like a U.S. Court of Appeals, not an extension of the Administration political agendas and DHS enforcement!

PWS

02-21-18

4TH CIRCUIT SHRUGS OFF VIOLATION OF REFUGEE’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS! — MEJIA V. SESSIONS

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/161280.P.pdf

All the quote your really need to understand how far into the sand the Article III Judges on this panel were willing to stick their heads to avoid upholding the Constitution:

“Calla Mejia warns that our interpretation of § 1252(b)(1) contravenes the REAL ID Act and effectively “abolish[es] review of all underlying orders in reinstatement,” thereby raising “‘serious constitutional problems’”—namely, Suspension Clause concerns.12 Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 12, 17 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001)). Not so. Rather, we think it more than feasible that an individual removed to her home country could illegally re-enter the United States, have the original removal order reinstated by DHS, and petition for review—all within a month’s time.”

Ah, according to the judges who joined the majority here, the respondent’s mistake was that she waited several months before reentering the U.S. illegally, instead of reentering illegally within 30 days. Of course, the trauma caused by her having been raped by her husband upon return, after being improperly duressed by a U.S. Immigration Judge in a detention facility (who seriously misrepresented the law) into abandoning what should have been a “slam dunk” asylum grant under Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), might have had something to do with it. But, if you’re a life-tenured judge in the “ivory tower” who cares? And, of course, unrepresented aliens subject to reinstated orders in detention centers would have little trouble filing a petition for review in a U.S. Court of Appeals. Com’ On, Man!

But, wait a minute! Judge Traxler, in his separate opinion, had an even better idea: let’s find no jurisdiction over everything so we can completely wash our hands of what we’re doing to this undisputed “refugee.”

Well, the good news here is that the Respondent did end up with a basically uncontested grant of mandatory withholding of removal to Peru, so her life is saved. That’s because, unlike the four other U.S. Judges who heard her case, the second Immigration Judge to hear the case, in Maryland, was actually interested in making the law work to grant protection. Lucky for the respondent she wasn’t sent to Charlotte, Atlanta, or Stewart!

But, as a result of the due process violations by the first Immigration Judge who heard (but didn’t take the time to understand) the case (probably one of those who can “really crank out the removal orders” for unrepresented individuals at detention centers) and the unwillingness of the Fourth Circuit Panel that reviewed this case to uphold the Constitution, this respondent will be condemned to “limbo” in the U.S., unable to qualify for the green card or the eventual chance to become a U.S. citizen that she otherwise should have had.

Read the full decision and understand my point that some, or perhaps the majority, of Article III Judges who are the only hope for due process for many refugees and others entitled to remain in the U.S. will be happy to sign on as “station masters” on the “Trump-Sessions Deportation Express.” It’s the easiest path to take.

PANEL: CIRCUIT JUDGES TRAXLER, DIAZ, and FLOYD

OPINION BY: JUDGE DIAZ

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: JUDGE TRAXLER

PWS

08-11-17

4th Cir. Judges File Separate Opinion Praising Bravery Of Transgender Teen — Take Shot At Those On The “Wrong Side Of History!”

Senior Judge Davis, joined by Judge Floyd said this in a published separate opinion:

“Our country has a long and ignominious history of discriminating against our most vulnerable and powerless. We have an equally long history, however, of brave individuals—Dred Scott, Fred Korematsu, Linda Brown, Mildred and Richard Loving, Edie Windsor, and Jim Obergefell, to name just a few—who refused to accept quietly the injustices that were perpetuated against them. It is unsurprising, of course, that the burden of confronting and remedying injustice falls on the shoulders of the oppressed. These individuals looked to the federal courts to vindicate their claims to human dignity, but as the names listed above make clear, the judiciary’s response has been decidedly mixed. Today, G.G. adds his name to the list of plaintiffs whose struggle for justice has been delayed and rebuffed; as Dr. King reminded us, however, “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” G.G.’s journey is delayed but not finished.

G.G.’s case is about much more than bathrooms. It’s about a boy asking his school to treat him just like any other boy. It’s about protecting the rights of transgender people in public spaces and not forcing them to exist on the margins. It’s about governmental validation of the existence and experiences of transgender people, as well as the simple recognition of their humanity. His case is part of a larger movement that is redefining and broadening the scope of civil and human rights so that they extend to a vulnerable group that has traditionally been unrecognized, unrepresented, and unprotected.

. . . .

G.G.’s lawsuit also has demonstrated that some entities will not protect the rights of others unless compelled to do so. Today, hatred, intolerance, and discrimination persist — and are sometimes even promoted — but by challenging unjust policies rooted in invidious discrimination, G.G. takes his place among other modern-day human rights leaders who strive to ensure that, one day, equality will prevail, and that the core dignity of every one of our brothers and sisters is respected by lawmakers and others who wield power over their lives.”

The full opinion is well worth a read. Here’s a link: 161733R1.P-4th Circuit GG

Judge Davis incorporates this poem,

Famous by N.S. Nye:

The river is famous to the fish.

The loud voice is famous to silence, which knew it would inherit the earth before anybody said so.

The cat sleeping on the fence is famous to the birds watching him from the birdhouse.

The tear is famous, briefly, to the cheek.

The idea you carry close to your bosom is famous to your bosom.

The boot is famous to the earth, more famous than the dress shoe, which is famous only to floors.

The bent photograph is famous to the one who carries it and not at all famous to the one who is pictured.

I want to be famous to shuffling men who smile while crossing streets, sticky children in grocery lines, famous as the one who smiled back.

I want to be famous in the way a pulley is famous,
or a buttonhole, not because it did anything spectacular, but because it never forgot what it could do.

Here’s an article from yesterday’s Washington Post explaining the context of the 4th Circuit’s procedural decision and why the published, signed separate opinion is unusual.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/judges-hail-transgender-teen-gavin-grimm-as-human-rights-leader/2017/04/07/ade47f12-1bc8-11e7-bcc2-7d1a0973e7b2_story.html?utm_term=.11ce2b2d3a58

The case is G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board.

*************************************

The Trump Administration’s attacks on vulnerable individuals such as Muslims, migrants, and now transgender students have given rise to an interesting new phenomenon in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: separate published opinions vigorously commenting on or dissenting from what normally would be routine, unsigned, unpublished, barely noticed, procedural orders.

Another good example was the recent spate of published opinions dissenting and concurring with the granting of an uncontested motion by the Government to dismiss the appeal from the TRO in State of Washington v. Trump (“Travel Ban 1.0”) which I discussed in an earlier blog: http://wp.me/p8eeJm-vM

In the 9th Circuit case, several judges used separate opinions to lash out at their colleagues and show their support for the Trump Administration’s “Travel Ban 1.0.” This drew a reaction from some of their colleagues who accused the dissenters of using the forum and device of the separate opinions to deliver a message to politicians, other courts, and the parties for use in future litigation that was not yet before the court. In other words, to influence matters that were not part of the the actual “case or controversy” before the court, which was being dismissed without objection by either party.

In any event, in just a short time in office, the Trump Administration has “gotten the attention” of normally aloof and “ivory towerish” Federal Appellate Judges who seem to be energized and eager to engage in the fray with the Administration, its detractors, and each other.

PWS

04-09-17

Sorto-Guzmán v. Garland, 4th Cir., 08-93-22, published

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

Related posts:

Related posts:

Related posts:

Related posts:

Related posts:

Related posts: