Judge Consuelo M. Callahan – immigrationcourtside.com

⚖️👏😎 BREAKING: SUPREME RELIEF: Court Reaffirms Executive’s Authority To Set Sane Immigration Enforcement Policies! — “Standing” Key! — Baseless Attacks By GOP In Texas & Louisiana Thwarted (For Now) — 8-1 Win For Administration, Opinion by Justice Kavanaugh, 3 Concurring, Alito Lone Dissenter! — U.S. v. Texas

Here’s a copy of the full decision:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf

Here’s the syllabus (NOT part of the decision):

UNITED STATES ET AL. v. TEXAS ET AL. CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–58. Argued November 29, 2022—Decided June 23, 2023

In 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security promulgated new immigra- tion-enforcement guidelines (Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law) that prioritize the arrest and removal from the United States of noncitizens who are suspected terrorists or dangerous criminals or who have unlawfully entered the country only recently, for example. The States of Texas and Louisiana claim that the Guide- lines contravene two federal statutes that they read to require the ar- rest of certain noncitizens upon their release from prison (8 U. S. C. §1226(c)) or entry of a final order of removal (§1231(a)(2)). The District Court found that the States would incur costs due to the Executive’s failure to comply with those alleged statutory mandates, and that the States had standing to sue based on those costs. On the merits, the District Court found the Guidelines unlawful and vacated them. The Fifth Circuit declined to stay the District Court’s judgment, and this Court granted certiorari before judgment.

Held: Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge the Guidelines. Pp. 3–14.

(a) Under Article III, a plaintiff must have standing to sue. This bedrock constitutional requirement has its roots in the separation of powers. So the threshold question here is whether the States have standing to maintain this suit. Based on this Court’s precedents and longstanding historical practice, the answer is no.

To establish standing, a plaintiff must show an injury in fact caused by the defendant and redressable by a court order. The District Court found that the States would incur additional costs due to the chal- lenged arrest policy. And monetary costs are an injury. But this Court has stressed that the alleged injury must also “be legally and judicially cognizable.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 819. That requires that

2

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS Syllabus

the dispute is “traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Ibid. Here, the States cite no precedent, history, or tradition of federal courts entertaining lawsuits of this kind. On the contrary, this Court has previously ruled that a plaintiff lacks standing to bring such a suit “when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.” See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 619. The Linda R. S. Article III standing principle remains the law today, and the States have pointed to no case or historical prac- tice holding otherwise. Pp. 3–6.

(b) There are good reasons why federal courts have not traditionally entertained lawsuits of this kind. For one, when the Executive Branch elects not to arrest or prosecute, it does not exercise coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property, and thus does not infringe upon interests that courts often are called upon to protect. Moreover, such lawsuits run up against the Executive’s Article II authority to decide “how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. ___, ___. The principle of Executive Branch enforcement dis- cretion over arrests and prosecutions extends to the immigration con- text. Courts also generally lack meaningful standards for assessing the propriety of enforcement choices in this area, which are invariably affected by resource constraints and regularly changing public-safety and public-welfare needs. That is why this Court has recognized that federal courts are generally not the proper forum for resolving claims that the Executive Branch should make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. Pp. 6–9.

(c) This holding does not suggest that federal courts may never en- tertain cases involving the Executive Branch’s alleged failure to make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. First, the Court has adjudi- cated selective-prosecution claims under the Equal Protection Clause in which a plaintiff typically seeks to prevent his or her own prosecu- tion. Second, the standing analysis might differ when Congress ele- vates de facto injuries to the status of legally cognizable injuries re- dressable by a federal court. Third, the standing calculus might change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory respon- sibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions. Fourth, a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both arrest or prosecution priorities and the provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis. Fifth, policies governing the contin- ued detention of noncitizens who have already been arrested arguably might raise a different standing question than arrest or prosecution policies. But this case presents none of those scenarios. Pp. 9–12.

(d) The discrete standing question raised by this case rarely arises because federal statutes that purport to require the Executive Branch

Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 3 Syllabus

to make arrests or bring prosecutions are rare. This case is different from those in which the Federal Judiciary decides justiciable cases in- volving statutory requirements or prohibitions on the Executive, be- cause it implicates the Executive Branch’s enforcement discretion and raises the distinct question of whether the Federal Judiciary may in effect order the Executive Branch to take enforcement actions. The Court’s decision does not indicate any view on whether the Executive is complying with its statutory obligations. Nor does the Court’s nar- row holding signal any change in the balance of powers between Con- gress and the Executive. Pp. 12–14.

606 F. Supp. 3d 437, reversed.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS and BAR- RETT, JJ., joined. BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judg- ment, in which GORSUCH, J., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Key quotes from Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion:

In short, this Court’s precedents and longstanding

historical practice establish that the States’ suit here is not the kind redressable by a federal court.

B

Several good reasons explain why, as Linda R. S. held, federal courts have not traditionally entertained lawsuits of this kind.

To begin with, when the Executive Branch elects not to arrest or prosecute, it does not exercise coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property, and thus does not infringe upon interests that courts often are called upon to protect. See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562. And for standing purposes, the absence of coercive power over the plaintiff makes a difference: When “a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed” to establish standing. Id., at 562 (emphasis deleted).2

Moreover, lawsuits alleging that the Executive Branch has made an insufficient number of arrests or brought an insufficient number of prosecutions run up against the Executive’s Article II authority to enforce federal law. Article II of the Constitution assigns the “executive Power” to the President and provides that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U. S. Const., Art. II, §1, cl. 1; §3. Under Article II, the Executive Branch possesses authority to decide “how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.” TransUnion LLC, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13); see Lujan, 504 U. S., at 576–578; Allen, 468

——————

2 By contrast, when “the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or

forgone action) at issue,” “there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562.

Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 7

Opinion of the Court

U.S., at 760–761. The Executive Branch—not the Judiciary—makes arrests and prosecutes offenses on behalf of the United States. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 693 (1974) (“the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case”); Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 922–923 (1997) (Brady Act provisions held unconstitutional because, among other things, they transferred power to execute federal law to state officials); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456, 464 (1996) (decisions about enforcement of “the Nation’s criminal laws” lie within the “special province of the Executive” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 138 (1976) (“A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’” (quoting U.S. Const., Art. II, §3)); see also United States v. Cox, 342 F. 2d 167, 171 (CA5 1965).

That principle of enforcement discretion over arrests and prosecutions extends to the immigration context, where the Court has stressed that the Executive’s enforcement discretion implicates not only “normal domestic law enforcement priorities” but also “foreign-policy objectives.” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 490–491 (1999). In line with those principles, this Court has declared that the Executive Branch also retains discretion over whether to remove a noncitizen from the United States. Arizona v. United States, 567 U. S. 387, 396 (2012) (“Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all”).

In addition to the Article II problems raised by judicial review of the Executive Branch’s arrest and prosecution policies, courts generally lack meaningful standards for assessing the propriety of enforcement choices in this area. After all, the Executive Branch must prioritize its

8 UNITED STATES v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court

enforcement efforts. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S. 598, 607–608 (1985). That is because the Executive Branch (i) invariably lacks the resources to arrest and prosecute every violator of every law and (ii) must constantly react and adjust to the ever-shifting public-safety and public- welfare needs of the American people.

This case illustrates the point. As the District Court found, the Executive Branch does not possess the resources necessary to arrest or remove all of the noncitizens covered by §1226(c) and §1231(a)(2). That reality is not an anomaly—it is a constant. For the last 27 years since §1226(c) and §1231(a)(2) were enacted in their current form, all five Presidential administrations have determined that resource constraints necessitated prioritization in making immigration arrests.

In light of inevitable resource constraints and regularly changing public-safety and public-welfare needs, the Executive Branch must balance many factors when devising arrest and prosecution policies. That complicated balancing process in turn leaves courts without meaningful standards for assessing those policies. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 830–832 (1985); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U. S. 182, 190–192 (1993). Therefore, in both Article III cases and Administrative Procedure Act cases, this Court has consistently recognized that federal courts are generally not the proper forum for resolving claims that the Executive Branch should make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. See Linda R. S., 410 U. S., at 619; cf. Heckler, 470 U. S., at 831 (recognizing the “general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement”); ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 283 (1987) (“it is entirely clear that the refusal to prosecute cannot be the subject of judicial review”).3

——————

3 Also, the plaintiffs here are States, and federal courts must remain

mindful of bedrock Article III constraints in cases brought by States

Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 9

Opinion of the Court

All of those considerations help explain why federal courts have not traditionally entertained lawsuits of this kind. By concluding that Texas and Louisiana lack standing here, we abide by and reinforce the proper role of the Federal Judiciary under Article III. The States’ novel standing argument, if accepted, would entail expansive judicial direction of the Department’s arrest policies. If the Court green-lighted this suit, we could anticipate complaints in future years about alleged Executive Branch under-enforcement of any similarly worded laws—whether they be drug laws, gun laws, obstruction of justice laws, or the like. We decline to start the Federal Judiciary down that uncharted path. Our constitutional system of separation of powers “contemplates a more restricted role for Article III courts.” Raines, 521 U. S., at 828.

C

In holding that Texas and Louisiana lack standing, we do not suggest that federal courts may never entertain cases involving the Executive Branch’s alleged failure to make more arrests or bring more prosecutions.

First, the Court has adjudicated selective-prosecution claims under the Equal Protection Clause. In those cases, however, a party typically seeks to prevent his or her own prosecution, not to mandate additional prosecutions

——————

against an executive agency or officer. To be sure, States sometimes have standing to sue the United States or an executive agency or officer. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144 (1992). But in our system of dual federal and state sovereignty, federal policies frequently generate indirect effects on state revenues or state spending. And when a State asserts, for example, that a federal law has produced only those kinds of indirect effects, the State’s claim for standing can become more attenuated. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U. S. 886 (1970); Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 16–18 (1927); cf. Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562. In short, none of the various theories of standing asserted by the States in this case overcomes the fundamental Article III problem with this lawsuit.

10 UNITED STATES v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court

against other possible defendants. See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U. S., at 604; Armstrong, 517 U. S., at 459, 463.

Second, as the Solicitor General points out, the standing analysis might differ when Congress elevates defacto injuries to the status of legally cognizable injuries redressable by a federal court. See Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 3; cf. TransUnion LLC, 594 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 10–11); Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 20 (1998); Raines, 521 U. S., at 820, n. 3; Lujan, 504 U. S., at 578; Linda R. S., 410 U. S., at 617, n. 3. For example, Congress might (i) specifically authorize suits against the Executive Branch by a defined set of plaintiffs who have suffered concrete harms from executive under-enforcement and (ii) specifically authorize the Judiciary to enter appropriate orders requiring additional arrests or prosecutions by the Executive Branch.

Here, however, the relevant statutes do not supply such specific authorization. The statutes, even under the States’ own reading, simply say that the Department “shall” arrest certain noncitizens. Given the “deep-rooted nature of law- enforcement discretion,” a purported statutory arrest mandate, without more, does not entitle any particular plaintiff to enforce that mandate in federal court. Castle Rock, 545 U. S., at 761, 764–765, 767, n. 13; cf. Heckler, 470 U. S., at 835. For an arrest mandate to be enforceable in federal court, we would need at least a “stronger indication” from Congress that judicial review of enforcement discretion is appropriate—for example, specific authorization for particular plaintiffs to sue and for federal courts to order more arrests or prosecutions by the Executive. Castle Rock, 545 U. S., at 761. We do not take a position on whether such a statute would suffice for Article III purposes; our only point is that no such statute is present in this case.4

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4 As the Solicitor General noted, those kinds of statutes, by infringing

Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 11 Opinion of the Court

Third, the standing calculus might change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory responsibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a plaintiff arguably could obtain review of agency non-enforcement if an agency “has consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” Heckler, 470 U. S., at 833, n. 4 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id., at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring); cf. 5 U. S. C. §706(1). So too, an extreme case of non-enforcement arguably could exceed the bounds of enforcement discretion and support Article III standing. But the States have not advanced a Heckler-style “abdication” argument in this case or argued that the Executive has entirely ceased enforcing the relevant statutes. Therefore, we do not analyze the standing ramifications of such a hypothetical scenario.

Fourth, a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution priorities and the Executive Branch’s provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis. That is because the challenged policy might implicate more than simply the Executive’s traditional enforcement discretion. Cf. Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 11–12) (benefits such as work authorization and Medicare eligibility accompanied by non- enforcement meant that the policy was “more than simply a non-enforcement policy”); Texas v. United States, 809 F. 3d 134, 154 (CA5 2015) (Linda R. S. “concerned only nonprosecution,” which is distinct from “both nonprosecution and the conferral of benefits”), aff ’d by an equally divided Court, 579 U. S. 547 (2016). Again, we need

——————

on the Executive’s enforcement discretion, could also raise Article II issues. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 24–25.

12 UNITED STATES v. TEXAS Opinion of the Court

not resolve the Article III consequences of such a policy. Fifth, policies governing the continued detention of noncitizens who have already been arrested arguably might raise a different standing question than arrest or prosecution policies. Cf. Biden v. Texas, 597 U. S. ___ (2022). But this case does not concern a detention policy, so

we do not address the issue here.5

***************************************

Given the narrow resolution on standing grounds, and the reservations set forth in Section C of Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion, in addition to the somewhat different approach of the three concurring Justices, Gorsuch, Thomas, and Barrett, it’s unpredictable what this decision might mean if the DACA challenge now pending before U.S. District Judge Hanen eventually reaches the Supremes. In “point four” of “Section C,” Justice Kavanaugh goes to some length to distinguish a situation “that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution priorities and the Executive Branch’s provision of legal benefits or legal status,” citing the Court’s earlier decision in DHS v. Regents, involving a DACA challenge that was decided on APA technical grounds.

Still, this is a strong statement rejecting the attempt of GOP States and GOP lower Federal Court Judges to take over Federal immigration enforcement! And, with Immigration Courts overwhelmed with a largely artificially-inflated 2 million case backlog, many consisting of cases in which relief should be granted elsewhere (like at USCIS) or where removal would actually be detrimental to the interests of the U.S., a reaffirmation of the Executive’s historical authority to set reasonable, practical immigration enforcement priorities could not come soon enough.

In that light, it’s curious why in a case where the ultimate result was lopsided, the Court DENIED the Administration’s motion for a stay pending review of the Fifth Circuit’s and USDC’s wrong orders! This unnecessarily created months of “enforcement chaos” which has been damaging both to individuals and to our national interests.

I also find it interesting that Justice Kavanaugh cited and in part relied upon the Executive’s Article II authority to enforce the law. This was also part of the rationale I used in a 1976 legal opinion written for then General Counsel Sam Bernsen reaffirming the “Legacy” INS’s authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion in designating some cases as “non priority.”

That memo stated:

The ultimate source for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the Federal Government is the power of the President. Under Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, the executive power is vested in the President. Article II, Section 3, states that the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

. . . .

The reasons for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion are both practical and humanitarian. There simply are not enough resources to enforce all of the laws and regulations presently on the books. As a practical matter, therefore, law enforcement officials have to make policy choices as to the most effective and desirable way in which to deploy their limited resources. Thus, for example, police and prosecutors may choose to concentrate on apprehension and prosecution of perpetrators of violent crimes, while choosing not to proceed against those committing so-called “victimless crimes,” such as certain consensual sex acts and possession of small amounts of marihuana. In addition, there are times when defects in the quality, quantity, or method of gathering evidence will make it difficult to prove the matter before a court.

Aside from purely practical considerations, it is also obvious that in enacting a statute the legislature cannot possibly contemplate all of the possible circumstances in which the statute may be applied. In some situations, application of the literal letter of the law would simply be unconscionable and would serve no useful purpose. For instance, a prosecutor may well decide not to proceed against a terminally ill individual, even in the presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt.

You can find a copy of that legal opinion here: https://wp.me/p8eeJm-260. Still relevant, after nearly half a century!

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-23-23

SPLIT 9TH CIR. PANEL TO TPS HOLDERS: Black & Brown Lives Don’t Matter! — Dissenting Judge Morgan Christen Stands Up For Equal Justice, Against Trump’s Racism, White Nationalism, & Nativism Endorsed By Panel Colleagues!

Shithole Countries — Trump’s Words Need No Deciphering
Phil Roeder from Des Moines, IA, USA
Creative Commons License

https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-09-14/9thcircuit-immigrants-temporary-protected-status

Maura Dolan reports for the LA Times:

. . . .

“To the extent the TPS statute places constraints on the Secretary’s discretion, it does so in favor of limiting unwarranted designations or extensions of TPS,” wrote Callahan, an appointee of President George W. Bush. She was joined by Judge Ryan D. Nelson, an appointee of President Trump.

Judge Morgan Christen, an appointee of President Obama, dissented.

She said the Trump administration had changed policy and practice without public review. She described the administration’s action as “an abrupt and unexplained change.”

She noted that the lawsuit challenging the deportation notices said they were motivated by racial and ethnic bias.

Trump reportedly called Haiti and El Salvador “shithole countries” and characterized immigrants from Mexico and Central America as criminals and snakes.

“We cannot sweep aside the words that were actually used, and it would be worse for us to deny their meaning,” wrote Christen. “Some of the statements expressly referred to people, not to places. The President’s statements require no deciphering.”

A statement by the ACLU Foundation of Southern California, which represented the immigrants and their children, said the ruling would not immediately end temporary protected status.

Such holders from these countries will be permitted to maintain their status until at least February, and those from El Salvador until at least November.

The challengers said they would appeal the ruling to a larger panel of the 9th Circuit.

. . . .

****************

Read Maura’s complete article at the link.

“The President’s statements require no deciphering.” Yup! The Federal Courts obviously know exactly what they are doing and what’s at stake when they blow by due process and equal protection to advance the Trump/Miller/Bar agenda of overt bigotry and racism, often supported by patently contrived or false narratives.

In the end, this will be decided by the election. Still, the disingenuous, racism-denying performances of Judges Callahan and Nelson show why the already failing U.S Judicial system will remain a problem no matter who wins the election. The only issue is whether it will just be a problem or, if Trump were re-elected, become an out of control cancer that will hasten the demise of our democratic republic.

The case is Ramos v. Wolf.

Due Process Forever!

PWS

09-14-20

COURTS: As BIA Continues To Squeeze The Life Out Of Pereira, 9th Circuit Finally Pushes Back — Why The “Lost Art” Of BIA En Banc Review & Dissent Is So Essential To Due Process & Fundamental Fairness!

Here are the head notes from two new BIA decisions distinguishing Pereira:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1164976/download

Matter of Lourdes Suyapa PENA-MEJIA, Respondent

27 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 2019)

Decided May 22, 2019
U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

Neither rescission of an in absentia order of removal nor termination of the proceedings is required where an alien did not appear at a scheduled hearing after being served with a notice to appear that did not specify the time and place of the initial removal hearing, so long as a subsequent notice of hearing specifying that information was properly sent to the alien. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), distinguished.
FOR RESPONDENT: Daniel A. Meyer, Esquire, Jackson Heights, New York
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Jonathan Graham, Assistant Chief Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: GUENDELSBERGER, GRANT, and KENDALL CLARK, Board Members
GRANT, Board Member, with the opinion

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1164981/download

Matter of Renata MIRANDA-CORDIERO, Respondent

27 I&B Dec. 551 (BIA 2019)
Decided May 22, 2019
U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

Pursuant to section 240(b)(5)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B) (2012), neither rescission of an in absentia order of removal nor termination of the proceedings is required where an alien who was served with a notice to appear that did not specify the time and place of the initial removal hearing failed to provide an address where a notice of hearing could be sent. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), distinguished.
FOR RESPONDENT: Renee LaRosee, Esquire, Elizabeth, New Jersey
BEFORE: Board Panel: GUENDELSBERGER, GRANT, and KENDALL CLARK, Board Members
GRANT, Board Member, with the opinion

**********************************************

But here’s some better news from a split 9th Circuit:

Isaias Lorenzo Lopez v. William P. Barr, 9th Cir., 05-22-19, published

15-72406

Before: Dorothy W. Nelson and Consuelo M. Callahan,
Circuit Judges, and Edward R. Korman,* District Judge. Opinion by Judge Korman;
Dissent by Judge Callahan
* The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

SUMMARY BY COURT STAFF:

SUMMARY** Immigration
Granting Isaias Lorenzo Lopez’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel held that a Notice to Appear that is defective under Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), cannot be cured by a subsequent Notice of Hearing and therefore does not terminate the residence period required for cancellation of removal.
Lorenzo sought cancellation of removal, a form of relief from removal that requires that an applicant must, among other requirements, reside in the United States continuously for seven years after having been admitted in any status. However, under the “stop-time” rule, as relevant here, the service of a Notice to Appear under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) terminates an alien’s residence. In Lorenzo’s case, an immigration judge and the BIA found him ineligible for cancellation because his March 2008 Notice to Appear terminated his residence period before he had accrued the requisite seven years.
In Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the Supreme Court held that a Notice to Appear, as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), must contain the time and place at which removal proceedings will be held to trigger the stop-time rule. The panel concluded that Lorenzo’s Notice to Appear
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

LORENZO LOPEZ V. BARR 3
did not terminate his residence because it lacked time-and- place information.
However, because Lorenzo also received a subsequent Notice of Hearing that advised him of the time and place of his proceedings, the Attorney General argued that the Notice of Hearing cured the defective Notice to Appear and triggered the stop-time rule. The Attorney General relied on Popa v. Holder, 571 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2009), which held that a Notice to Appear that fails to include the date and time of an alien’s deportation hearing, but that states that a date and time will be set later, is not defective so long as a notice of the hearing is later sent to the alien.
The panel held that a Notice to Appear that is defective under Pereira cannot be cured by a subsequent Notice of Hearing, explaining that the plain language of the statute foreclosed the Attorney General’s argument and that Pereira had effectively overruled Popa.
The panel noted that the BIA reached a conclusion contrary to the panel’s holding in Matter of Mendoza- Hernandez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 520 (BIA 2019) (en banc), where, over a vigorous dissent, a closely divided BIA held that a Notice of Hearing that contains time-and-place information perfects a deficient Notice to Appear and triggers the stop-time rule. However, the panel declined to defer to that conclusion because: (1) the BIA acknowledged that Pereira could be read to reach a different result, and the courts owe no deference to agency interpretations of Supreme Court opinions; (2) the BIA ignored the plain text of the statute; and (3) the BIA relied on cases that cannot be reconciled with Pereira.
Thus, the panel concluded that, because Lorenzo never received a valid Notice to Appear, his residency continued

4 LORENZO LOPEZ V. BARR
beyond 2008 and, accordingly, he has resided in the United States for over seven years and is eligible for cancellation of removal.
Dissenting, Judge Callahan wrote that she does not read Pereira as holding that the notice of the time and place must be provided in a single document. Rather, Judge Callahan reads Pereira as allowing the Department of Homeland Security to cure a deficient notice to appear by subsequently providing a noncitizen with actual notice of the time and place of the removal proceedings, with the result that the stop-time rule is triggered upon the noncitizen’s receipt of the supplemental notice.

**********************************
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit majority recognized the “vigorous” dissent of Judge John Guendelsberger in Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez, 27 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2019), which was joined by Vice Chair Adkins-Blanch and Appellate Immigration Judges Cole, Grant, Creppy, & Kendall Clark. The Ninth Circuit essentially adopted the dissenters’ opinion, quoting at length:

The reasoning of the Supreme Court in Pereira . . . leaves little room for doubt that the Court’s decision requires us to follow the plain language of the Act that the DHS must serve a [8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)] “notice to appear” that includes the date, time, and place of hearing in order to trigger the “stop-time” rule. The Court in Pereira repeatedly emphasized the “plain text” of the “stop- time” rule and left no room for agency gap- filling as to whether an Immigration Court can “complete” or “cure” a putative “notice to appear” by subsequent issuance of a “notice of hearing” that would trigger the “stop-time” rule on the date of that event. Quite simply, . . . a “notice of hearing” is not a “notice to appear” and, therefore, it does not satisfy the requirement that the DHS serve a [Section 1229(a)(1)] “notice to appear” that specifies the date and time of hearing, in order to trigger the “stop-time” rule.

16 LORENZO LOPEZ V. BARR
27 I. & N. Dec. at 540–41 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted).

Prior to the “Ashcroft Purge, “ completed in 2003, en banc opinions in precedents and “vigorous dissents” were much more frequent at the BIA. I know, because I frequently was among the dissenters, particularly in the latter days of my BIA career.

Well done dissenters! Bravo!

Given the more or less “built in pro-Government bias” of an administrative “court” captive within the DOJ, the dissents often contained important alternative viewpoints that sometimes were more in accordance with the law as later interpreted by the “real” Article III Courts upon judicial review. The en banc process also forced every BIA Appellate Immigration Judge to take a public position on important issues.

In that way, it promoted both transparency and accountability, as well as “putting into play” alternative interpretations and results that the majority otherwise would “blow by.” Accordingly, it also promoted more rigorous analysis by the majority.

Ashcroft basically removed the “gang of dissenters” from the BIA while “dumbing it down” by mandating mostly “single member panels,” discouraging en bancs, and supressing dissents. Since that time, the quality of the BIA decisions has suffered, and the positions of most individual BIA judges on most precedent issues has become a “mystery.” Not surprisingly, the BIA jurisprudence post-Ashcroft has become very one-sided in favor of the DHS.

The “vigorous en banc dissent” in Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez was striking to observers as the first one in recent memory. And, clearly it made a difference. The lack of meaningful dissent at the BIA is one of many things that have degraded due process, judicial independence, and decisional quality at EOIR since the “Ashcroft Purge.” Worse yet, Barr’s ludicrous “proposed regulations” would further “dumb down” the BIA process.

The importance of dissents and transparency in a legitimate judicial system can’t be overstated. That’s why we need an independent, Article I U.S. Immigration Court that does not answer to the Attorney General.

PWS

05-28-19

CALLING ALL FORMER IMMIGRATION JUDGES & BIA APPELLATE JUDGES: DUE PROCESS FOR CHILDREN IS ON THE LINE: Join In An Amicus Brief Supporting A Right To Counsel For Children In Immigration Court — Motion For Rehearing En Banc in C.J.L.G. v. Sessions! —Judges Gossart, Klein, Rosenberg, & I Are Already On Board! — Please Join Us!

Hi Judges Klein, Schmidt, Rosenberg, and Gossart:

Hope all of you are well. Thanks so much for your help with an amicus brief in support of rehearing en banc in CJLG v. Sessions, our children’s right to appointed counsel case. I’m copying in Buzz Frahn and his team from Simpson Thacher, who have agreed to draft the amicus brief on your behalves. We’ve given Buzz the previous briefs submitted in JEFM, and he and his team are getting started.

I think all of you can take it from here. It would be great if we could get your help in reaching out to other former IJs or BIA members who may be interested in participating as amici in our case.

Please let me know if you have any questions, or if I can do anything else to help. We’ll be in touch with the Simpson Thacher folks regarding some issues that might be worth highlighting in the amicus, and I’m sure they’d welcome feedback from all of you as well. Thanks again and have a great weekend!

Stephen

Stephen B. Kang
Pronouns: he/him/his
Detention Attorney
ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project
39 Drumm Street, San Francisco, CA 94111
415.343.0783 | skang@aclu.org
*********************

In C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, a 9th Circuit 3-Judge Panel found that: 1) the child respondent was denied due process at his Immigration Court hearing; 2) he suffered past persecution; 3) but there was no “prejudice” because he couldn’t establish “nexus.” Therefore, the panel rejected his claim that he had a right to appointed counsel.

The “no prejudice” finding is basically ludicrous! “Nexus” is such a complex and convoluted legal concept that judges at all levels get it wrong with regularity. How do we know that this child couldn’t show “nexus” when he and his mother didn’t have any idea of the legal and evidentiary standards they were required to meet?

On Friday, I attended a FBA Immigration/Asylum program at NYU Law. It was clear from the outstanding panel on Northern Triangle asylum that claims very similar, if not identical, to CJLG’s are being granted in many Immigration Courts.

But, it requires many hours of client interviews, extensive trial preparation, and the knowledge and ability to present claims often under alternative legal theories. No unrepresented child has a fair chance to make such a winning presentation on asylum or Convention Against Torture Withholding in Immigration Court, even though there are “life or death” stakes.

Here’s a link to my previous blog on C.J.L.G.:

https://wp.me/p8eeJm-22V

We would love to have your support in speaking out against this injustice and systemic denial of due process to our most vulnerable.

Please contact Judges Gossart, Klein, Rosenberg, or me if you wish to join our effort.

Best wishes and many thanks for considering this request.

PWS

02-25-18

9th SLAMS DUE PROCESS DOOR ON ENDANGERED HONDURAN TEEN — FLAWED ASYLUM HEARING WAS “GOOD ENOUGH FOR GOVERNMENT WORK” — NO RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL! — C.J.L.G. V. SESSIONS!

9th-CJLG-Consel

C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, 9th Cir., 01-29-18, published

PANEL: Consuelo M. Callahan and John B. Owens,
Circuit Judges, and David A. Faber,* District Judge.

* The Honorable David A. Faber, United States District Judge for the Southern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY: Judge Callahan

CONCURRING OPINION: Judge Owens

SUMMARY BY COURT STAFF:

“The panel denied C.J.L.G.’s petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision, holding that neither the Due Process Clause nor the Immigration & Nationality Act creates a categorical right to court-appointed counsel at government expense for alien minors, and concluding that the Board’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention against Torture was supported by substantial evidence.
The panel held that it is not established law that alien minors are categorically entitled to government-funded, court-appointed counsel and, applying the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), held that C.J. had not shown a necessity for such counsel to safeguard his due process right to a full and fair hearing.
The panel incorporated its analysis of C.J.’s asylum claim into its Mathews analysis in determining that C.J. was not prejudiced by any procedural deficiencies in his proceeding. The panel concluded that the record compelled a finding that C.J. had a well-founded fear of persecution based on threats he received from the Mara gang when he resisted their recruitment efforts, but rejected C.J.’s asylum claim because he had not established that the threats had a nexus to a protected ground, or that the government was unable or unwilling to control the Maras. The panel deemed waived any argument that he was denied due process on his withholding and CAT claims, but noted that his withholding claim would also fail.
The panel also rejected C.J.’s argument that the INA’s fair hearing provision, § 1229a(b)(4)(B), implicitly requires court-appointed counsel at government expense for all alien minors.
The panel further held that the IJ was not required to inform C.J. that he might be eligible for Special Immigrant Juvenile status, concluding that the IJ’s duty to inform aliens of “apparent eligibility” for relief was not triggered because, at the time of his removal proceeding, C.J. did not have a state court order that could have made him apparently eligible for SIJ status.
Finally, the panel concluded that the agency’s denial of CAT relief was supported by substantial evidence. The panel concluded that 1) the Board did not err in concluding that C.J.’s experience of having a member of the Maras put a gun to his head did not amount to “severe pain or suffering;” 2) there was no showing that the Honduran government acquiesced in the act; and 3) the record did not compel the conclusion that the government either turned a blind eye to the Maras’ threats or that it would be unable or unwilling to control the Maras in the future.
Concurring, Judge Owens wrote that the majority’s opinion does not hold, or even discuss, whether the Due Process Clause mandates counsel for unaccompanied minors, and observed that that is a different question that could lead to a different answer.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.”

KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY:

“We are mindful that our decision means that, absent a reprieve offered by the government, C.J. will likely be returned to a country in turmoil. We sympathize with his personal plight, as C.J. appears to have displayed courage in the face of serious adversity. But while “our hearts are with [C.J.],” the law does not support his requested relief. Cf. Dugard v. United States, 835 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2016). Neither Supreme Court nor circuit precedent compels the remedy that C.J. seeks: court-appointed counsel at government expense. And to the extent the IJ failed to provide all the trappings of a full and fair hearing, any shortcomings did not prejudice the outcome because the IJ adequately developed the record on issues that are dispositive to C.J.’s claims for relief. Attorney representation could not have altered this reality, which forecloses C.J.’s claim to an implied right to court-appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause. Moreover, the INA itself neither provides for nor implies a right to court-appointed counsel at government expense.

We further hold that the IJ was not required to advise C.J. of a separate state court process that could ultimately form the predicate for C.J.’s application for SIJ status with the IJ. The IJ is only required to advise an alien of relief for which he is “apparent[ly] eligib[le].” Because C.J.’s claimed relief—SIJ status—depends on a state court making certain findings before an IJ may grant him such relief—something that has not occurred here—C.J. is not “apparent[ly] eligib[le]” for SIJ status.
Finally, we decline to reverse the Board’s denial of C.J.’s asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims, because substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that he is ineligible for any such relief.”

CONCURRING OPINION BY JUDGE OWENS:

“I concur in the majority opinion and its narrow scope. It holds that the Due Process Clause does not mandate government-funded counsel for C.J.L.G, an accompanied minor. The opinion does not hold, or even discuss, whether the Due Process Clause mandates counsel for unaccompanied minors. That is a different question that could lead to a different answer. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981) (holding that whether the Due Process Clause requires the appointment of counsel is considered on a case-by-case basis); J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1039–41 (9th Cir. 2016) (McKeown, J., jjoined by M. Smith, J., specially concurring) (outlining unique challenges that unrepresented unaccompanied minors in immigration proceedings confront).”

******************************************

BOTTOM LINE: This kid should join the gang in Honduras to save his life (and the lives of his family), or they should all die. We really don’t care as long as he doesn’t darken our door!
We’re willing to send this teen back to death or a life of forced gang membership after a hearing that none of us, and probably no American citizen, would consider fair or just if it were applied to us or someone we cared about. The key here is not to care about human lives.
It would be easy enough to define “those who resist gang membership” as a “particular social group” entitled to protection under our asylum and related laws. We have just intentionally chosen not to do so to avoid having to give protection to kids like this.
We also have ample authority to exercise Executive discretion to allow individuals in danger in their home countries to remain here in safety even if they don’t satisfy the technical requirements for asylum or withholding of removal. We have just chosen not to do so.
Contrary to the majority’s holding, a lawyer, particularly one who could find “expert” evidence or testimony probably could have secured protection for this young man under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The latest State Department Country Report shows that gang torture is reported in Honduras, that the government and the justice system are inherently corrupt and incompetent, and that criminal justice system often fails to protect citizens.
While perhaps “well-meaning,” Judge Owens concurring opinion suggesting a different result for a “truly unaccompanied” minor is highly disingenuous. From the record, it appears that this kid’s mother was barely literate, (not surprisingly) didn’t understand asylum law, and couldn’t even fill out his application coherently in English. Her lack of understanding that the case depended on (counterintuitively) proving something “other than pure gang recruitment” was at work here actually appears to have undermined his case. If clearly incompetent “assistance” by a lay person like this like this is the dividing line between “due process” and “no due process,” that would be an absurd result!
The panel basically shirks its duty by conferring upon the trial judge, the U.S. Immigration Judge, the responsibility of acting as the unrepresented child’s attorney and developing the record. But, this runs directly counter to the most recent “OPPM” from the Chief Immigration Judge “reminding” Immigration Judges to “maintain neutrality” and not be too helpful to unrepresented minors as they are being railroaded out of the country.
The “Trump/Sessions Deportation Railroad” is up and running. At least this panel of Article III Judges in the 9th Circuit appear anxious to establish themselves as “Just Another Whistle Stop on the Deportation Railroad.”
The blood of this young man and others like him who come seeking protection, only to find rejection based on a twisted hyper-legalistic reading of our laws and an abdication of moral responsibility to protect those in harm’s way will be on our hands as a nation. At some point it will stain. At some point, the stain will become indelible.
As a national policy, telling kids in the Northern Triangle that they have no choice but to join gangs or die is not likely to “solve” the “gang problem” here or there in the short or long run. Essentially, we’ve already demonstrated that. But, nobody is paying attention.

PWS

01-30-18

Here’s a copy of the full decision:

Here’s the syllabus (NOT part of the decision):

Key quotes from Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion:

🇺🇸 Due Process Forever!

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Due Process Forever!

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Well done dissenters! Bravo!

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