Judge Kim Wardlaw – immigrationcourtside.com

SCOFFLAWS 🏴‍☠️ STUFFED AGAIN: Split 9th Agrees That Trump’s “Stunt Wall” Illegal — Sierra Club v. Trump!

Dan Kowalski reports for LexisNexis Immigration Community:

https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/insidenews/posts/ca9-on-use-of-military-for-border-wall

Daniel M. Kowalski

12 Oct 2020

wall

border

CA9 on Use of Military $ for Border Wall

Sierra Club v. Trump

“This appeal presents the question of whether the emergency military construction authority provided by 10 U.S.C. § 2808 (“Section 2808”) authorized eleven border wall construction projects on the southern border of the United States. We conclude that it did not. We also consider whether the district court properly granted the Organizational Plaintiffs a permanent injunction and whether the district court improperly denied the State Plaintiffs’ request for a separate permanent injunction. We affirm the decision of the district court on both counts. … We hold that the States and Sierra Club both have Article III standing and a cause of action to challenge the Federal Defendants’ border wall construction projects, that Section 2808 did not authorize the challenged construction, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in either granting a permanent injunction to Sierra Club or in denying a separate permanent injunction to the States.”

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PANEL: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and WARDLAW and COLLINS, Circuit Judges

Opinion by Chief Judge Sidney R. Thomas; Dissent by Judge Collins

The only real question here is whether the Supremes will bail out the regime’s scofflaws once again.

PWS

10-13-20

THREE STRIKES & YOU’RE OUT — Faced With BIA’s Third Wrong Deportation Order In Same Case, 9TH Cir. Finally Ends EOIR’s Decade-Long Effort To Misconstrue Law To Deport — Valenzuela Gallardo v. Barr (Valenzuela Gallardo III), Vacating Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 27 I&N Dec. 449 (BIA 2018)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/08/06/18-72593.pdf

Valenzuela Gallardo v. Barr, 9th Cir., 08-06-20, published

SYNOPSIS BY COURT STAFF:

Immigration

The panel granted Agustin Valenzuela Gallardo’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and vacated his order of removal, holding that 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(S), which describes an aggravated felony “offense relating to obstruction of justice,” requires a nexus to an ongoing or pending proceeding or investigation and that, therefore, the BIA’s contrary construction of the statute was inconsistent with the statute’s unambiguous meaning.

In a prior published opinion, the BIA found Valenzuela Gallardo removable on the ground that his conviction for being an accessory to a felony, in violation of California Penal Code § 32, was an obstruction of justice aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(S). Switching directions from its precedent, the BIA concluded that the existence of an ongoing proceeding was not an essential element of an offense relating to obstruction of justice. However, a prior panel of this court vacated the BIA’s redefinition because it raised serious questions about whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague. On remand, the BIA issued a published decision concluding that obstruction of justice offenses included not only offenses that interfered with ongoing or pending investigations or proceedings, but also those that interfered with investigations or proceedings that were reasonably

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. BARR 3

foreseeable by the defendant. Valenzuela Gallardo again petitioned for review.

The panel began at Chevron Step Zero, where the court determines whether the Chevron framework applies at all. The panel noted amici’s argument that the BIA’s interpretation of the term “aggravated felony,” which includes offenses related to obstruction of justice, is ineligible for Chevron deference because the term has dual application in both civil proceedings, including removal proceedings, and criminal proceedings, including increased maximum prison terms for illegal reentry. The panel explained that deferring to the BIA’s construction of statutes with criminal applications raises serious constitutional concerns because only Congress has the power to write new federal criminal laws. However, the panel concluded that it was bound by the law of the case doctrine because the panel that decided Valenzuela Gallardo’s prior petition for review had applied the Chevron framework, and no exceptions to the doctrine applied.

At Chevron Step One, the panel concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) is unambiguous in requiring a nexus to an ongoing or pending proceeding or investigation. The panel rejected the Government’s assertion that the court had already held that the statute is ambiguous in this regard. Next, the panel explained that the ordinary meaning of the term “obstruction of justice” when the statute was enacted in 1996 required a nexus to an extant investigation or proceeding. Looking to the term’s relevant statutory context – which the panel concluded to be Chapter 73 of Title 18, entitled “Obstruction of Justice” – the panel further explained that almost all of the substantive provisions in Chapter 73 that existed in 1996 required a nexus to an ongoing or pending proceeding or investigation.

4 VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. BARR

Because the panel concluded that § 1101(a)(43)(S) was unambiguous, it did not proceed to Chevron Step Two. The panel also noted that it would reach the same conclusion even if it were not to apply the Chevron framework.

Finally, the panel concluded that the statute under which Valenzuela Gallardo was convicted, California Penal Code § 32, is not a categorical match with obstruction of justice under § 1101(a)(43)(S) because the text of § 32 and its practical application demonstrate that it encompasses interference with proceedings or investigations that are not pending or ongoing. Accordingly, the panel vacated Valenzuela Gallardo’s removal order.

COUNSEL:

Frank Sprouls (argued) and John E. Ricci, Law Office of Ricci & Sprouls, San Francisco, California, for Petitioner.

Rebecca Hoffberg Phillips (argued), Trial Attorney; John S. Hogan, Assistant Director; Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

Amalia Wille and Judah Lakin, Van Der Hout Brigagliano & Nightingale LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae American Immigration Lawyers Association, U.C. Davis School of Law Immigration Law Clinic, and Asian Americans Advancing Justice—Asian Law Caucus.

PANEL: Eugene E. Siler,* Kim McLane Wardlaw, and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY: Judge Wardlaw

KEY QUOTE:

Nonetheless, both a de novo interpretation of the obstruction of justice provision utilizing traditional tools of statutory interpretation and a Chevron Step One analysis of the precise question before us—whether the BIA’s new “reasonably foreseeable” definition is at odds with the plain meaning of the statute, which was not before the prior panel—lead us to the same conclusion: the statute is unambiguous in requiring an ongoing or pending criminal proceeding, and the Board’s most recent interpretation is at odds with that unambiguous meaning.

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So, let’s put this in perspective. Today’s EOIR has been “weaponized” by the Trump regime as a deportation assembly line. Immigration Judges and the BIA are pushed to cut corners and avoid careful legal analysis in a rush to deport.

Beyond that, the regime has, with the connivance of the Supremes, found ways to deport asylum seekers and others without any meaningful hearing whatsoever. Notwithstanding all these gimmicks, moronic “production quotas,” coercive detention, biased anti-immigrant “precedents,” and the appointment of mostly prosecutors to function as “judges,” the EOIR backlog continues to mushroom out of control because of the regime’s gross mismanagement.

Yet, in the middle of all this mess, the BIA finds time to spend a decade, including three trips to the Court of Appeals, trying to manipulate the law and disregard and misinterpret prior precedent in a misguided effort to wrongfully deport this particular individual. What if we had judges who just got it correct in the first place? No wonder this system is totally out of control.

Do we need a maliciously incompetent and misdirected system like this? Of course not!

With the same amount of resources, a group of independent, qualified expert judges committed to the rule of law and due process could drastically improve the functioning of the Immigration Courts by rendering fair decisions, granting more relief where possible, and working with all “stakeholders” to prioritize cases, find alternate dispositions for “non-priority cases,” and to move the cases that actually need to be tried through the system in a fair, reasonable, professional, and predictable manner. Such a system would produce more consistency and would avoid much of the wasteful litigation and constant intervention of the Courts of Appeals to correct mistakes that is now a staple of this system. It would be a “win” for everyone involved, including the DHS’s legitimate enforcement functions.

Of course, the particular problem with this case began when the “Post-Ashcroft-Purge” BIA started fabricating ways to deviate from one of the old “Schmidt Board” precedents, Matter of Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889, 892–94 (BIA 1999) (en banc). That case had actually found in favor of the (unrepresented) respondent, an unheard of result in today’s “bend and distort the law to deport” climate fostered by “Billy the Bigot” Barr and his predecessor “Gonzo Apocalypto” Sessions! You basically can trace EOIR’s continuous downward “death spiral” from “The Purge.”

Due Process Forever!

PWS

08-07-20

TRUMP’S ILLEGAL BEHAVIOR REBUKED: The 9th Joins Other Circuits Finding That Trump Administration Lacked Legal Authority To “Punish” Jurisdictions Choosing Not To Assist ICE!

http://enewspaper.latimes.com/infinity/article_share.aspx?guid=a28c0bb6-7496-4bde-a4f5-5fa4a50a4a12

Maura Dolan reports for the LA Times:

Court rules against Trump

9th Circuit panel says White House can’t force L.A. to help deport immigrants in order to receive funds.

By Maura Dolan

SAN FRANCISCO — A federal appeals court decided unanimously Thursday that the Trump administration may not force Los Angeles to help the government deport immigrants as a condition of receiving a federal police grant.

A panel of two Republican appointees and one Democrat of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals said federal law did not permit the Trump administration to impose the conditions.

The decision involved the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program, the primary provider of federal aid to local and state law enforcement agencies.

Congress authorized the program in 2005 to help law enforcement pay for personnel, supplies and other services. It is administered by the U.S. Department of Justice.

In 2017, the Trump administration imposed two new requirements on the grant. One required recipients to notify immigration authorities before releasing immigrants from jail. The other said recipients had to give federal agents access to correctional facilities to meet with immigrants who might be in the country without authorization.

The city of Los Angeles sued, saying it did not cooperate with immigration agents because doing so would discourage immigrants from helping police in fighting crime.

A district judge blocked the requirements, and the Trump administration appealed to the 9th Circuit.

Judge Sandra S. Ikuta, writing for the panel, said the 9th Circuit agreed with two other circuit courts that the law authorizing the grants does not give the Justice Department “broad authority to impose any condition it chooses.”

Ikuta, appointed by President George W. Bush, was joined by Judge Jay S. Bybee, also appointed by Bush, and Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw, a Clinton appointee.

Wardlaw wrote separately, saying she agreed the conditions were unlawful but criticizing the majority’s analysis as “contrary to every other court to have addressed the issue in a reasoned opinion.”

Los Angeles City Atty. Mike Feuer called Thursday’s decision “a victory for public safety on our streets and for the Constitution.”

“We will continue to fight the Trump administration’s unlawful overreach and to stand up for the best interests of L.A. residents,” he said.

Los Angeles uses the federal grant to support local criminal law enforcement and drug treatment and enforcement programs.

The immigration conditions would have denied the grant to hundreds of sanctuary cities.

Last year, the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an injunction preventing the federal government from applying the immigration conditions. That ruling stemmed from a lawsuit by the city of Chicago.

In another decision this year, the 3rd Circuit also decided the conditions were not authorized by law. That case was brought by the city of Philadelphia.

The grants can be used for technical assistance, strategic planning, research and evaluation, data collection, training, personnel, equipment, forensic laboratories, supplies, contractual support and criminal justice information systems.

The law authorizes $1.1 billion in grants, but funding is generally significantly lower.

According to the National Criminal Justice Assn., Congress appropriated $830 million for fiscal year 2002, but in later years funding for the grants was about $500 million.

********************************************************************

A wiser, more professional, and less ideological future Administration likely could work out agreements with states and localities for mutually beneficial cooperation in the immigration area.

But, the Trump Administration’s intentionally toxic and inflammatory White Nationalist rhetoric and actions overtly intended to terrorize local ethnic communities have “poisoned the well.” They have also been bad for legitimate law enforcement; reporting of serious crimes, particularly domestic violence, as well as cooperation in anti-gang efforts, has gone down in localities mindlessly targeted by Trump’s totally politicized DHS.

It’s also significant that conservative Bush-appointed Judge Jay S. Bybee, often the target of liberals because of his involvement in Bush-era attempts to legally rationalize torture, has stood up against the Trump Administration’s lawlessness on several important occasions.

PWS

11-01-19

BIA WRONG AGAIN – 9TH CIR. VACATES MATTER OF G-G-S-, 26 I&N DEC. 339 (BIA 2014) (“PARTICULARLY SERIOUS CRIME”) — GOMEZ-SANCHEZ V. SESSIONS – As Jeff Sessions Plans To Speed Up The System, Rig Law Against Individuals, & Undermine Due Process, The “REAL” Courts Continue To Highlight Serious Substantive Flaws In Immigration Court System That Sessions Is Attempting To Cover Up!

GGS,9TH14-72506

Gomez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 9th Cir., 04-06-18, Published, vacating Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I&N Dec. 339 (BIA 2014)

COURT STAFF SUMMARY:

The panel granted Guillermo Gomez-Sanchez’s petition for review of the published decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339 (BIA 2014), which concluded that Gomez-Sanchez was statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal because he was convicted of a “particularly serious crime” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B), and vacated and remanded.

Gomez-Sanchez was convicted of assault with a non- deadly firearm weapon in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(1), which the BIA concluded constituted a particularly serious crime that prevented Gomez-Sanchez from being eligible for withholding of removal. In reaching this decision, the BIA held that a petitioner’s mental health could not be considered when addressing whether he had committed a particularly serious crime.

The panel held that Matter of G-G-S- was not entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C., Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under step one of Chevron, the panel concluded that Matter of G-G-S-’s blanket rule against considering mental health is contrary to Congress’s clearly expressed intent that the particularly serious crime determination, in cases where a conviction falls outside the only statutorily enumerated per se category of particularly serious crimes, requires a case-by-case analysis. The panel also concluded that, even if Matter of G-G-S- were to survive step one of Chevron, it would fail at step two because the BIA’s interpretation is not reasonable in that the BIA’s two rationales for its broad rule – 1) that the Agency could not reassess a criminal court’s findings, and 2) that mental health is never relevant to the particularly serious crime determination – are unpersuasive and are inconsistent with the law of this Circuit and the BIA’s own decisions.

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

PANEL:

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw* and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges, and Janet Bond Arterton,**District Judge.

* This case was submitted to a panel that included Judge Kozinski, who recently retired. Following Judge Kozinski’s retirement, Judge Wardlaw was drawn by lot to replace him. Ninth Circuit General Order 3.2.h. Judge Wardlaw has read the briefs, reviewed the record, and listened to oral argument.

** The Honorable Janet Bond Arterton, United States District Judge for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY:

Judge Janet Bond Arterton

KEY QUOTES:

Against this backdrop, the BIA here announced and applied a blanket rule against considering an individual’s mental health as a factor when deciding whether his or her crime of conviction is particularly serious. Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 339, 347.4 This decision is contrary to Congress’s clearly expressed intent that the analysis of whether a crime is particularly serious “requires the agency to conduct a case-by-case analysis of convictions falling outside the category established by Congress,” Blandino- Medina, 712 F.3d at 1345, because such categorical rules undermine the ability of the agency to conduct a case-by- case analysis in each case, see Konou, 650 F.3d at 1128; see also Arteaga De Alvarez, 704 F.3d at 740.

. . . .

Here, the Board cited In re N-A-M- approvingly, as if applying it. See Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 343. However, in reality, its decision to constrain the evidence IJs may consider when making a particularly serious crime determination is at least inconsistent with, if not directly in contradiction with its earlier holding permitting consideration of “all reliable information.” See In Re N-A- M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 338, 342. Petitioner’s case makes this inconsistency clear—despite not disputing the reliability of the information Petitioner submitted concerning his mental illness, the Board entirely precluded consideration of that evidence. Given that the Board made no attempt to address the apparent inconsistencies between its earlier rule and the rule at issue here, we find its current interpretation to be unreasonable and thus decline to afford it deference. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (“[A]n ‘[u]nexplained inconsistency’ in agency policy is ‘a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice,’” and thus finding that the interpretation is not entitled to Chevron deference. (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)));see also Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 920 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

Given the severe repercussions of being found to have committed a particularly serious crime, the risk of precluding relevant evidence that might alter that determination is unreasonable. Furthermore, this risk is readily avoided by permitting the IJ to use his or her discretion in weighing relevant, reliable evidence of mental health rather than categorically barring this evidence in all cases.

For all of these reasons the Board’s interpretation of the INA does not warrant deference under Chevron.

. . . .

We find the Board’s conclusion to be unreasonable because it is inconsistent with its own precedent recognizing the relevance of motivation and intent to the particularly serious crime determination. See Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1048 (“The BIA acts arbitrarily when it disregards its own precedents and policies without giving a reasoned explanation for doing so.” (quoting Israel v. I.N.S., 785 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1986))). In Matter of L-S-, the Board found significant that an individual convicted of alien smuggling did not intend to harm the victim. 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 655–56 (BIA 1999). Indeed, the Government concedes that a particularly serious crime analysis permits consideration of an individual’s motivation. See Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1048 (finding no intent to harm either the arresting officer or members of the public).

********************************************

The BIA got it wrong in just about every conceivable way, including ignoring and misapplying its own precedents, in trying to reach a result unfavorable to the respondent. Against this backdrop of serious substantive problems (and, frankly, anti-respondent bias) permeating the entire U.S. Immigration Court System, from top to bottom, Sessions outrageously is trying to speed up the system without regard to quality or due process.

Suppose you inherited a factory that was producing defective cars. Would you solve the problem by speeding up the assembly line, forbidding the workers to think about their job functions, and denying them necessary training and equipment. No, that would produce even more defective cars, likely putting your company out of business. So, how is Session’s “just pedal faster” approach to assembly line justice acceptable? Obviously, it isn’t!

Sometimes, it doesn’t take a Government Accountability Office study to ferret out waste, fraud, and abuse. In this case, Jeff Sessions is right out there in public view intentionally and maliciously destroying a key part of the U.S. justice system. Why is Congress standing by and letting him get away with it? Why is the taxpayers’ money being wasted on illegal, illogical, and totally counterproductive actions? Whatever happened to effective oversight?

PWS

04-06-18

LPR CANCELLATION: Split 9th Follows 5th — Holds That “Admission In Any Status” Includes Unlawful Status — Saldivar v. Sessions!

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/11/07/13-72643.pdf

Saldivar v. Sessions, 9th Cir., 11-07-17, published

PANEL: Stephen Reinhardt, Alex Kozinski, and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: Judge Reinhardt

DISSENT: Judge Kozinski

KEY QUOTE:

“The structure of § 1229b thus confirms what was already unambiguously clear from the plain meaning of the text: the statute requires continuous presence for seven years after a procedurally lawful admission in any immigration status, lawful or unlawful.8 Perhaps, had Congress required admission “in any status whatsoever” in § 1229b(a)(2), the government might have acknowledged that unlawful status was covered by the phrase it now finds ambiguous. However, as we have explained, the term “any,” in its plain meaning, is all-inclusive and any further language would be pure surplusage. In short, any is any, and a status is a status, be it lawful or unlawful.”

JUDGE KOZINSKI, DISSENTING, WAS UNIMPRESSED:

“My colleagues misread the INA, trample our precedent and turn their backs on Chevron, all to create a giant loophole that will enable thousands to lie their way to relief that Congress never intended them to have. The Fifth Circuit got it wrong and the Ninth now follows them down the rabbit hole. It’s time for another opinion.”

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Read the complete opinion at the link.

The 9th Circuit majority declines to give the “Chevron deference” to the BIA precedent Matter of Blancas- Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 458, 460 (BIA 2002) by finding the statute “unambiguous.” So far, no “Circuit split.”

Undoubtedly, migrants without visas arriving at the border have lots of reasons to lie or otherwise misrepresent. However, with due deference to Judge Kozinski, it seems highly unlikely that the off-chance of applying for discretionary relief 10 years in the future would be one of them.

I find it interesting that it has taken 15 years since the BIA’s decision in Blancas-Lara for the Article IIIs to come to grips with the issue.

PWS

11-11-17

DUE PROCESS WINS IN 9TH CIR! – DHS & IJS REQUIRED TO CONSIDER “ABILITY TO PAY” IN SETTING BOND! – HERNANDEZ V. SESSIONS

9TH-HERNANDEZ-BOND-2017

Hernandez v. Sessions, 9th Cir., 10-02-17 (Published)

PANEL: Stephen Reinhardt, Ferdinand F. Fernandez, and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: Judge Reinhardt

CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Fernandez

KEY QUOTE:

“Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their challenge under the Due Process Clause to the government’s policy of allowing ICE and IJs to set immigration bond amounts without considering the detainees’ financial circumstances or alternative conditions of release. The government has failed to offer any convincing reason why these factors should not be considered in bond hearings for non-citizens who are determined not to be a danger to the community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without bond. The irreparable harm to Plaintiffs of detention pursuant to bond amounts determined through a likely unconstitutional process far outweighs the minimal administrative burdens to the government of complying with the injunction while this case proceeds.

The district court’s order granting the preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.

29 The government also challenges the requirement that it meet and confer with Plaintiffs to develop guidelines for future immigration hearings. According to the government, this requirement gives “Plaintiffs’ counsel veto authority over the terms and guidelines to be used in those bond proceedings, [which] violates Congress’s delegation of such authority to the Executive.” To the contrary, the district court retains authority to resolve any disputes between the parties regarding implementation of the injunction. The requirement that the parties meet and confer is merely an administrative mechanism to reduce unnecessary burdens on the district court’s resources. It is an entirely ordinary exercise of the district court’s authority to manage cases and to encourage cooperation before parties resort to asking the court to resolve a dispute. See, e.g., C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-3 (requiring parties to confer prior to filing most motions and to file the motion only if the parties are “unable to reach a resolution which eliminates the necessity for a hearing”).”

KEY QUOTE FROM JUDGE FERNANDEZ, CONCURRING & DISSENTING:

“I agree that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it decided to issue a preliminary injunction requiring the consideration of “financial ability” and “alternative conditions of supervision”1 in making determinations regarding the release of aliens who have been detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). However, I do not agree with the breadth of the injunctive order that was issued. Thus, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.”

*********************************************

Read the full decision at the above link.

WHY IT’S IMPORTANT

With an estimated 10 to 11 million “undocumented migrants” currently in the U.S., hundreds of thousands of cases annually being added to the U.S. Immigration Courts’ already out of control docket of 630,000 cases, and the Trump Administration’s “gonzo” enforcement policy where line agents often arbitrarily decide which migrants to place in Immigration Court (presumably somewhat driven by the need to show “numbers” for budget and performance purposes), one thing is obvious: The system would collapse immediately if everyone apprehended by the DHS at the border and in the interior simply insisted on a full due process “Individual Merits” hearing. Thus, the migrants’s exercise of the Constitutional right to due process and a meaningful opportunity to be heard is the enemy of DHS’s out of control, “gonzo” enforcement.

So, what is DHS to do to suppress this dangerous exercise of constitutional rights? Here are DHS’s “strategies:”

Avoid the hearing process entirely by using some form of “expedited removal” which avoids Immigration Court altogether;
In absentia orders, often based on incomplete address information and inadequate warnings being given to migrants by DHS and/or on sloppy address recording and hearing notice procedures by DHS and EOIR resulting in individuals being clueless about their so-called “final orders” and therefore ill-equipped to exercise their statutory right to move for reopening;
Coercive detention, used to demoralize, discourage, and duress migrants into “waiving” their due process rights and agreeing to depart without a merits hearing either by so-called “voluntary departure” or an uncontested final order.

Obviously, setting reasonable bonds that allow-income migrants can actually pay interferes with the full coerciveness of detention. Once released, migrants have a better chance of locating an attorney, filing a plausible application for relief, and ultimately being granted permission to stay. Therefore, resisting and “monkey wrenching” reasonable release on bonds is a key element of the current DHS “gonzo” enforcement strategy.

One of the ways that most fair U.S. Immigration Judges combat this is by using various “arbitration and mediation skills” to encourage DHS to accept reasonable bonds and waive appeal. But, as previously reported, counsel across the country report that DHS is refusing to negotiate bonds and appealing many of those set by the IJ. In other words, DHS is hoping that the coercive effect of detention will force folks to leave without a hearing before they run out of detention space in the New American Gulag.

Thus, U.S. Immigration Judges have become somewhat feckless in the bond process. DHS simply “blows off” the IJs’ entreaties to negotiate because DHS knows that they can unilaterally block release pending appeal anyway. And, as I previously pointed out, the BIA routinely holds bond appeals pending the completion of detained merits hearings and then simply dismisses the bond appeal as “moot.” As one (now former) Assistant Chief Counsel in Arlington undiplomatically informed me during a bond hearing shortly after I took the bench in 2003: “You can enter any order you want Judge, but the Detention Officer is going to decide whether or not this respondent gets released.” That’s the point at which I became an “Article I convert.”

Consequently, an Article III (a/k/a “Real”) Court enforcing due process and also requiring the DHS to negotiate some reasonable criteria and procedures for release on bond is both essential to our Constitutional system of due process and justice and also is a direct threat to unbridled DHS “gonzo enforcement.” As you can see from “FN 29” above, DHS has absolutely no interest in settling this case on a reasonable basis, although urged to do so by both the US District Court and the Court of Appeals. They expect and want the Article III Courts to “just roll over” like the “captive” Immigration Courts do.

Consequently, we can expect the Administration to fight tooth and nail against all efforts to put meaning in the currently largely false promise of Due Process in Immigration Court! Expect a DHS appeal to the Supremes! Stay tuned!

PWS

10-03-17

New From 9th Circuit: Ayala v. Sessions — Reaffirming “economic extortion on the basis of a protected characteristic can constitute persecution!” — Judicial Review of Credible Fear/Reinstatement — “Extortion Plus” Reaffirmed!

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/05/01/13-72250.pdf

“The IJ abused his discretion in concluding that there was no legal error in his previous opinion affirming the negative reasonable fear determination.5 Contrary to the IJ’s holding, our precedents make clear that economic extortion on the basis of a protected characteristic can constitute persecution.

5 We review the legal error de novo and conclude that the IJ abused his discretion in reaching the result he did. See Popa v. Holder, 571 F.3d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 2009) (“An IJ abuses his discretion when he acts arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (“A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”).

AYALA V. SESSIONS 17

Borja, 175 F.3d at 736; Barajas-Romero, 846 F.3d at 357 & n.5 (“A person seeking withholding of removal must prove not only that his life or freedom will be threatened in his home country, but also that the threat is ‘because of’ one of the five listed reasons:” race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)). In Borja, for example, the petitioner suffered past persecution on account of her political opinion when she was extorted partly for economic reasons and partly on the basis of her political statements. 175 F.3d at 736. We described this type of persecution as “extortion plus”—that is, extortion, with the threat of violence, on the basis of a protected characteristic. Id.

Here, Ayala testified that she suffered this type of persecution by stating that she faced extortion, and threats of violence, not only for economic reasons, but also because of her family ties. Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he family remains the quintessential particular social group.”). Whatever the merits of her claim, it was legal error for the IJ to hold that extortion could not constitute persecution for the purposes of withholding of removal: where the petitioner’s membership in a particular social group (in this case, a family) is at least “a reason” for the extortion, it is sufficient to meet the nexus requirement for withholding of removal. See Barajas-Romero, 846 F.3d at 360 (Post REAL-ID withholding claims are not governed by the “one central reason” test that applies to asylum claims, but instead require only that a protected ground was “a reason” for persecution, which “is a less demanding standard.”).

18 AYALA V. SESSIONS

Therefore, we grant Ayala’s petition for review, and remand for the IJ to address whether Ayala has established a reasonable fear based on her extortion-plus claim of persecution.

CONCLUSION

We have jurisdiction to review the IJ’s negative reasonable fear determination relating to the reinstatement of Ayala’s expedited removal order. The BIA’s dismissal of Ayala’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction was the final order of removal; therefore, Ayala’s petition for review is timely because it was filed less than 30 days after that order.

We hold that the IJ abused his discretion in concluding that extortion could not constitute past persecution, and in failing to consider the question of Ayala’s family ties. Therefore, we GRANT Ayala’s petition for review and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

PANEL:

Stephen Reinhardt and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges, and Edward R. Korman,* District Judge. (*The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.)

OPINION BY: Judge Reinhardt

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In my experience, U.S. Immigration Judges, the BIA, and some Courts of Appeals make the mistake highlighted by the 9th Circuit in far too many instances by summarily disregarding credible claims of persecution based on extortion. That’s why the Trump Administration’s effort to “heighten” the standards for “credible fear” and “reasonable fear” of persecution will almost certainly compromise due process and fairness.

PWS

05-01-17

9th Cir. En Banc — After 80 Pages, 9-2 Majority Finds Mexican Gov. “Unwilling Or Unable To Prevent” Persecution Of Gays — Dissent Bemoans “Usurpation” Of BIA’s Fact-Finding Authority — BRINGAS-RODRIGUEZ V. SESSIONS

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/03/08/13-72682.pdf

Judge Wardlaw for the majority:

“In Castro-Martinez, we also failed to consider the difference between a country’s enactment of remedial laws and the eradication of persecutory practices, often long ingrained in a country’s culture. Rejecting Castro’s claim that, in Mexico, a systematic pattern or practice of persecution against homosexuals remained, we found Castro’s evidence unpersuasive “in light of recent country reports,” which showed that the “Mexican government’s efforts to prevent violence and discrimination against homosexuals . . . ha[d] increased in recent years.” Castro- Martinez, 674 F.3d at 1082.

Mexico is to be lauded for its efforts. But it is well recognized that a country’s laws are not always reflective of actual country conditions. It is not unusual that a country’s “de jure commitments to LGBTI protection do not align with the de facto reality of whether the State is able and willing to provide protection.” Brief for UNHCR as Amicus Curiae at 4. And we have recently recognized that Mexico has experienced “an increase in violence against gay, lesbian, and transgender individuals during the years in which greater legal protections have been extended to these communities.” Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original).

Moreover, the anti-discrimination efforts discussed in Castro-Martinez seem to have been made by the national government, and thus do not necessarily reveal anything about the practices within state or municipal jurisdictions. See Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 507 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that while Mexico’s national government was willing to control the drug cartel that attacked the petitioner, it was not necessarily able to do so, in part because state and local officials were involved with drug traffickers).”

Writing for the dissent, Judge Bea (who claims to be the only U.S. Circuit Judge to actually have been the subject of deportation proceedings), joined by Judge O’Scannlain:

“I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because it usurps the power of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to determine facts. It does this by reciting, but ultimately departing, from the “substantial evidence” standard which states that agency “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added).”

**********************************

The Administration apparently believes that cases like this are going to be resolved on an “assembly line” operation with U.S. Immigration Judges sitting in “shifts” in detention centers from 6 AM until 10 PM.

While notable for its potential precedential effect, this case is not particularly unusual in terms of the difficult factual and legal issues that arise daily in U.S. Immigration Court in asylum cases coming from countries “south of our border.” This happened to be Mexico, but LGBT cases involving individuals from the Northern Triangle are quite common, even in jurisdictions like the Arlington Immigration Court.

I note that the amicus views of the UNHCR fare much better in the majority’s decision than they typically do these days at the BIA. For example, in Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 248 (BIA 2014), the BIA summarily “blew off” the views of the UNHCR on the issue of “particular social group.”

It’s also interesting that notwithstanding the dissent, the BIA actually lacks de novo fact finding authority of its own. Following a regulation change during the “Ashcroft era,” that authority belongs to the Immigration Judge with review by the BIA for “clear error.”

PWS

03/14/17

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