BIA SAYS IT’S FINE FOR IMMIGRATION JUDGES TO HELP OUT ICE ENFORCEMENT – Read Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase On Latest One-Sided Decision In Matters of Andrade Jaso and Carbajal Ayala.

 

Jeffrey S. Chase
Hon. Jeffrey S. Chase
Jeffrey S. Chase Blog

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/6/7/the-bia-and-selective-dismissal

The BIA and Selective Dismissal

On May 31, the BIA published a precedent decision in Matters of Andrade Jaso and Carbajal Ayala.  In that decision, Board Member Garry Malphrus (writing for a panel that included Hugh Mullane and Ellen Liebowitz) held that immigration judges have the authority to dismiss removal proceedings upon a finding that it is an abuse of the asylum process to file a meritless asylum application with USCIS for the sole purpose of seeking cancellation of removal in proceedings before the immigration court.

As always, some context is required.  Cancellation of removal is a relief available to those who have been in the U.S. for at least 10 years, have led a generally clean life here, and have a child, spouse, or parent who is a U.S. citizen or green card holder who would suffer a very high degree of hardship if their noncitizen relative were to be deported.  The hardship might be to elderly parents for whom the noncitizen is a necessary caregiver, or to a spouse with a serious medical or psychological condition, or children with special needs. But unlike most other forms of relief, which usually involve the mailing of an application to USCIS, cancellation of removal may only be requested from an immigration judge after the applicant is placed in removal proceedings in immigration court.

Once, an attorney who felt his client had a strong enough claim would arrange with the ICE investigations unit to process the client and place her or him into removal proceedings.  A number of years ago, under the Obama Administration, ICE discontinued this practice. According to a former ICE official, the reason given by the investigations office for the change was that it is not their job to help people obtain benefits.

With this decades-old avenue suddenly closed, attorneys asked the ICE office of general counsel for guidance.  ICE’s own response: apply for asylum with USCIS. Any asylum applicant not granted is referred to an immigration judge, where the applicant can then apply for any relief, including cancellation of removal.  This answer was confirmed at a high level in ICE headquarters, which assured that there was nothing wrong with filing for asylum for the sole purpose of applying for cancellation of removal before an immigration judge.

It is worth noting that ICE’s present solution places a very unfair burden on the USCIS Asylum Offices, which are already overwhelmed with the backlog of asylum claims and credible and reasonable fear interviews.  The workload of individual asylum officers is untenable at present. The simple and obvious solution would be to have ICE return to processing those wishing to be placed into proceedings, but that’s a matter for DHS to work out internally.  In the meantime, applying for asylum remains the only avenue for cancellation of removal candidates.

The question obviously arises as to how an immigration judge can find the following of DHS’s own recommendation to be an abuse of the asylum process, or how such argument can be raised by attorneys employed by the exact ICE office that came up with the suggestion in the first place.

Such a position might have been justifiable under the Obama Administration, which in response to the growing case backlog created a system of prioritization, which included the closing out of cases not considered urgent.   However, as we all know, the Trump Administration did away with such priority system, on the apparent belief that everyone should be deported immediately.  Those cases closed as non-priority under Obama are being forced back into an already overloaded system.  The press is filled with stories of a pizza delivery man, or a father dropping his child at school being arrested, detained, and placed into removal proceedings.  Of course, we have all read the reports of children being torn from their parents and detained separately (undoubtedly causing permanent psychological damage), and, if lucky enough to be released, sped through the system because this administration believes everyone deserves to be deported.

Some immigration judges used their authority to administrative close, delay, dismiss, or terminate proceedings where appropriate in the hopes of affording justice to those caught in proceedings.  Former attorney general Jeff Sessions reacted quickly, issuing binding decisions prohibiting such efforts. In Matter of Castro-Tum, Sessions stripped IJs of their long-standing ability to administratively close cases.  In Matter of L-A-B-R-, Sessions made it prohibitively more difficult for IJs to even grant continuances for legitimate reasons.  And in Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-, Sessions held that immigration judges have no inherent authority to dismiss or terminate proceedings, a move consistent with his overall goal of downgrading independent judges to the role of assembly line workers.  Sessions also stated that an IJ may dismiss proceedings only under the limited circumstances set out in the regulations.

The applicable regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a), lists seven circumstances under which DHS (but not the private bar) may seek dismissal of proceedings.  The first four, where the respondent turns out to in fact be a national of the U.S., to not be deportable from or inadmissible to the U.S., to be deceased, or to not be in the U.S., are pretty obvious reasons to dismiss proceedings, as all involve situations in which, due to either error or intervening events, there is no living respondent in the U.S. who is removable under the law, and thus no case to pursue in court.  Reason 5 involves a very specific situation where one granted conditional residence as the spouse of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident was placed into proceedings because she or he did not timely file the petition to remove the condition on their residence within the required time frame, but it turned out they filed late for a legitimate reason permitted by the law. Reason 6 is where the NTA was improvidently issued.  An example of that is where after issuing an NTA, DHS realizes that the respondent was already issued an NTA at an earlier time, and therefore seeks to dismiss the second NTA and reopen the first proceeding.

Reason 7 is where circumstances have changed since the NTA was issued to such an extent that continuation of the proceedings is no longer in the best interest of the government.  This is obviously meant to be a broadly-defined category. However, it clearly doesn’t cover the situation arising in Andrade Jaso.  DHS advised those wishing to apply for cancellation of removal but lacking a path to be placed into proceedings to file an asylum application for the sole purpose of being referred to the immigration court.  The DHS asylum offices are so cognizant of the situation that a pilot project was briefly instituted to allow asylum applicants with over 10 years of residence to waive their asylum interview. So what is the drastically changed circumstance?  Furthermore, all of the first 6 examples involve situations where the person in proceedings is not removable, because they are dead, outside of the U.S., actually in lawful status, etc., or may be removable, but there is some technical defect with the issuance of this specific NTA.  All focus on whether there is a respondent who is properly removable; none allow for termination of the proceedings of a removable respondent based on what they might be seeking as a relief. But Andrade Jaso was properly in removal proceedings, and is properly removable from the U.S. as charged in the NTA.  In all similar cases, the respondents admit removability, because otherwise, they would not be able to apply for cancellation of removal.

So in summary, Andrade Jaso is inconsistent with all of the AG’s precedent decisions under this administration, and with binding regulations.  And yet, a three Board Member panel had no reservations (there wasn’t any dissent) in issuing this decision.  Why? Because it prevents the only group of people who actually want to be in proceedings from having the chance to apply for legal status.

The good news is that the decision states that an immigration judge “may” terminate proceedings, not that they must.  Hopefully, judges will exercise good judgment in refusing to terminate worthy cases. However, the decision might offer an equitable resolution where one who lacks the requirements for cancellation of removal, which requires an exceptional degree of hardship to the qualifying relative, was wrongly steered into removal proceedings and would otherwise have faced certain removal.

In closing, it is wondered how the AG or BIA might respond to a situation in which an IJ dismisses proceedings upon the motion of a DHS attorney that the separation of a child from its parent with no plan as to how to reunite the family, the permanent psychological damage such separation causes to child and parent, and the subsequent need to rush the family through the system before they can adequately obtain counsel or prepare their applications, constitutes such an abuse of the asylum system as to warrant dismissal under the same regulation.  Are any DHS attorneys willing to make such motion?

Copyright 2019 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

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Why are the Immigration Court dockets out of control? Many, perhaps the majority, of the cases that DHS has put on the Immigration Court docket, shouldn’t be there.  That’s because:

  • They involve individuals who have relief pending at USCIS; or
  • They involve long-term, law abiding undocumented residents, many with U.S. citizen or LPR family members, that in any rational system, particularly one straining to adjudicate cases of arriving asylum seekers in a timely manner, would be considered “low priority” — where removal actually is likely to be a “net negative” to the U.S. rather than serving any reasonable purpose; or
  • They are older asylum cases that should have been granted by the Asylum Office or should be “stip-granted” by DHS under a properly generous interpretation of asylum laws (disregarding lawless decisions like Matter of A-B-); or
  • They are potential “Non-Lawful-Permanent-Resident Cancellation Cases,” subject to an unrealistic numerical limit, that under a properly working system, could initially be vetted by Asylum Officers or other USCIS Adjudicators and only referred to the Immigration Court, in small manageable batches, if they could not potentially be granted by DHS.

With proper docket management, professional discipline, professional management, and the use of liberal amounts of “prosecutorial discretion” by the DHS, like every other prosecutorial office in he U.S save the “Trump DHS,” the Immigration Courts’ overwhelming backlog could be cut to manageable levels in relatively short order.

That, in turn, would allow the Immigration Courts to handle incoming asylum cases in a fair and timely manner without degrading Due Process or otherwise stepping on anyone’s rights. In other words, the idea that DHS should be empowered to force the Immigration Courts “to proceed to a final decision in every case filed” is killing the Immigration Courts and ultimately will tank the Article III Federal Courts if allowed to proceed without some “adult supervision.”

Additionally, the Immigration Courts need more 8ibetter qualified judges (with proven immigration expertise, not almost exclusively from the DHS side), much better training, improved staffing including a Judicial Law Clerk for each Immigration Judge, decisional and docket management independence, emphasis on written rather than oral decisions in most appealed cases, and, most of all, freedom from the pernicious political meddling from the DOJ and the White House that has brought this system into disrepute within the larger legal community and to the brink of collapse. 

The “rule” established by the DOJ now appears to be that:

  • If a private party requests a continuance, closing, termination, or other reasonable postponement of removal proceedings, that request ordinarily should be denied in favor of proceeding to a final order whether it makes any sense or not; but
  • If “EOIR’s Partner” DHS requests that a case be taken off the docket for any reason, that should be viewed sympathetically even if it deprives a respondent in proceedings of substantial rights.

As long as so-called “courts” are told to consider themselves “in partnership with Government prosecutors,” to the derogation of private parties and individual rights, both statutory rights and Constitutional rights of individuals will be largely meaningless in the immigration context. And, if we let them become meaningless in immigration, soon they will be meaningless almost everywhere the Government chooses to overstep its legal and Constitutional authority. That’s the difference between an authoritarian state and a functioning democratic republic. Make no mistake about it, thanks to a great degree to what is happening in U.S. Immigration “Courts,” that difference is diminishing, for all of us, every day.

PWS

06-10-19

HON. JEFFREY S. CHASE: The History Of A Flawed Judiciary; The Intentional Tilting Of Asylum Law Against Asylum Seekers; The Farce Of Justice In The Immigration Courts; The Need For An Independent Article I Court!

 

The Immigration Court: Issues and Solutions

The following is the transcript of my lecture on March 28, 2019 at Cornell Law School as part of its Berger International Speaker Series titled The Immigration Courts: Issues and Solutions. Here is a link to the actual recording of the lecture. My heartfelt thanks to Prof. Stephen Yale-Loehr, Prof. Estelle McKee, and everyone at Cornell Law School for the honor of speaking, and for their warmth, intelligence, and dedication.

I’ve had a couple of occasions recently to consider the importance of faith in our judicial institutions.  I discussed the issue first in a blog post in which I commented on the Kavanaugh confirmation hearings, and then again in remarks relating to a play I was involved in in NYC based on an actual immigration court case, called The Courtroom.  Attorneys more commonly focus on faith in our courts on an individualized, case-by-case basis.  But in a democracy, a larger societal faith in our judicial institutions is paramount. And this may sound strange, but a large reason for this is that our courts will not always reach the right result.  But society will abide by judicial outcomes that they disagree with if they believe that the result was reached impartially by people who were genuinely trying to get it right. Abiding by judicial decisions is a key to democracy.  It is what prevents angry mobs from taking justice into their own hands. In the words of Balzac, “to distrust the judiciary marks the beginning of the end of society.”

If we accept this point of view, I believe that recent developments provide a cause for concern.  As Jeffrey Toobin recently wrote in The New Yorker, “these days the courts are nearly as tribal in their inclinations as the voters are,”  a point that the partisan nature of recent Supreme Court confirmation battles has underscored.

Our immigration courts are particularly prone to political manipulation because of their unique combination of structure, history, and function.  The present administration has made no secret of its disdain for judges’ ability to act as a check on its powers. But the combination of the fact that immigration judges are under the direct control of the Attorney General, and that their jurisdiction concerns a subject matter of particular importance to this administration has made this court especially ripe for interference.

A brief history of the immigration courts reveals it to be what my friend Prof. Deborah Anker at Harvard Law School calls a “bottom up” institution.  Immigration Judges originated as “special inquiry officers” within the old INS, where they held brief “hearings” under very non-courtlike conditions. In 1998, while I was an IJ, the court held a ceremony to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the immigration courts.  This was not the anniversary of its recognition as a court by Congress, which came much later, but rather, the anniversary of the agency beginning to refer to its personnel as judges.

The keynote speaker at the ceremony was William Fliegelman, who was the first person to hold the title of Chief Immigration Judge.  To the extent that his historical account was accurate, the immigration judge corps essentially invented itself, purchasing their own robes, designing the layout of their hearing rooms to better resemble courtrooms, and coordinating with INS district counsel to send its attorneys to each hearings to act as prosecutors.  Judge Fliegelman and then-INS District Counsel Vincent Schiano together created the Master Calendar hearing which is still used by the courts as its method of preliminary hearing. In other words, according to Judge Fliegelman’s account, the immigration judges presented themselves to the Washington bureaucrats as a fait accomplis, leaping fully formed much like Athena from Zeus’s head.

However, the judges still remained employees of the INS, the agency prosecuting the cases.  Most of the immigration judges were former INS trial attorneys. It was not uncommon for the judge and prosecutor to go out to lunch together, which didn’t exactly create the appearance of impartiality.  In 1983, the immigration judges, along with the Board of Immigration Appeals, were moved into an independent agency called the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”). However, EOIR remained within the Department of Justice, as did the INS.  As both the INS commissioner and EOIR director reported to the same boss at Main Justice, and as INS was a much larger, more influential agency than EOIR, the former continued to be able to exert undue influence on the latter agency. That dynamic ended when the functions of the old INS were moved into the newly-created Department of Homeland Security in 2003.  Actually, EOIR was slated to move to DHS as well, but managed to finally achieve some space from ICE once again only through the IJ’s own lobbying efforts.

Although EOIR did begin sporadically appointing private attorneys to the bench in the 1980s, the number of more liberal private bar advocates appointed increased under the Clinton Administration in the mid-1990s, significantly changing the overall makeup of the immigration judge corps.  Many of those more liberal hires became retirement eligible under the present administration.

It wasn’t until 1996 that Congress finally recognized immigration judges by such title in statute.  As I was a new judge at the time, I can report that yet again, this development was accomplished by the immigration judges themselves, who chipped in to pay a lobbyist to bring about this change, with no assistance from EOIR management.

Soon thereafter, the immigration judge’s union began advocating for independent Article I status.  In the 1990s, then-Congressman Bill McCollum of Florida sponsored such a bill, which was opposed by EOIR management (out of its own self-interest), and which did not advance in Congress.  A very similar bill was drafted last year by New York Senator Kristin Gillibrand, which was never proposed to the Republican-controlled Congress.  A main difference between the 1990s proposal and present one is the climate in which they are made. While many of the arguments for Article I status involved hypothetical threats in the 1990s, over the past two years, many of the fears that gave rise to such proposal have become reality.

Some of the recent developments underscoring the urgency of the need for Article I courts include:

Politicized IJ hiring.  Following the more diverse corps of IJs hired under the Clinton Administration, a backlash occurred under the George W. Bush Administration.  A report following an investigation by the DOJ Inspector General’s Office detailed a policy of extending IJ offers only to those who had been found to meet the proper conservative, Republican profile.  For example, the report indicated that one candidate was found to have the proper conservative views on the “three Gs:” God, Guns, and Gays.

Although such practices came to an end in the latter part of the Bush Administration, in May of last year, a letter by 8 members of Congress. Prompted by whistleblowers within EOIR, requested the DOJ Inspector General to investigate new reports of a return of such politicized hiring under the present Administration.  At present, nearly all new IJ hires are former prosecutors or those who otherwise have been deemed to fit this administration’s ideological profile.

Completion quotas:  As of October 1, 2018, IJs are required to satisfy completion quotas set by EOIR management.  According to the President of the Immigration Judges’ Union, Hon. Ashley Tabaddor, no other class of judges are subject to similar quotas.  Judge Tabaddor has stated that IJs cease to be true judges under such system, as an adjudicator who must repeatedly choose between the requirements of due process and their own job security is one who lacks the independence required of judges.

Since October 1, judges are treated to a graphic on their computer screens each day which resembles the gauges on an airplane or sports car, with an animation of a needle which in seven different “gauges” will either be in the green, yellow, or red zone.  Not surprisingly, IJs find this demeaning.

Under the quotas, IJs are each required to complete 700 cases per year.  95 percent must be completed at their first scheduled individual hearing.  The judges may not have more than 15 percent of their decisions remanded or reversed by the BIA.

Judges have reported that when they find it necessary to continue a merits hearing, they soon receive a call from management requiring them to provide a detailed defense of their decision to continue the case.  In some courts, EOIR management has asked the court’s judicial law clerks to act as spies by listening to the recording of the continued hearing and reporting whether the in-court statements of the judge match the explanation the judge later provided to their supervisor for the continuance.  As a result, judges appointed by the Attorney General of the U.S. to hear life-and-death claims for asylum now feel the need to play-act on the record to avoid punishment from their superiors.

Another thing about quotas: right after they were announced, a reporter from NPR called me to ask what impact they were likely to have on judges.  In response, I suggested that we look at the most recent case completion figures on EOIR’s website.  I said we should first look at the court with the highest denial rate in the country, Atlanta. We divided the total number of case completions by the number of judges, and found that these judges averaged over 1,500 completions for the year, or more than double what was needed to meet the quota.  We then did the same for one of the more liberal courts in the country, the New York City court, and found that the judges there averaged just 566 completions a year, well under what would be needed to satisfy the quota. So just to be clear, the quotas are not designed to have a neutral impact; the administration hopes that forcing more completions will also result in more denials.

It should be noted that despite these quotas and numerous other efforts by the Trump Administration to supposedly increase the court’s productivity, the backlog has actually increased by 26% over the past two years.

Continued impact of the 2003 BIA purge:  In 2002, then Attorney General John Ashcroft expressed his dismay for some of the BIA’s more liberal decisions.  His response was to strip some of the BIA’s authority (in particular, taking away its de novo review authority over immigration judges’ findings of fact).  Ashcroft also announced that, in order to improve an overburdened BIA’s efficiency, he would reduce its size from 21 to 12 members. If you believe that the last part makes no sense, believe me, you are not alone.

One year later, Ashcroft followed through on his threat, removing every judge he deemed to be liberal from the BIA.  The Board, which had always been conservative leaning, subsequently took a much greater tilt to the right.  There was no correction under the Obama Administration, meaning that the BIA for the past 16 years and counting has been devoid of any liberal members.  It’s present chair, David Neal, is a Republican who served as a staff member to former U.S. Senator and Kansas Governor Sam Brownback.  The Board’s most prolific judge under the Trump Administration, Garry Malphrus, had been appointed to the bench after playing a role in the “Brooks Brothers riot,” in which Republican faithful hampered the recount of ballots in Florida following the 2000 presidential election.  Board Member Ed Grant was a Republican staff member to Rep. Lamar Smith, a Texas Republican with anti-immigrant views who previously chaired the House Immigration Subcommittee.

Of course, the result has been the issuance of more conservative precedent decisions which are binding on immigration judges.  And due to the common practice of Circuit Courts to accord deference to those decisions, under Chevron, Brand X, or Auer deference, humane interpretations of the immigration laws have become harder to come by.  Prior to 2002, the BIA commonly decided precedent decisions en banc, often providing a range of concurring and dissenting opinions, some of which were later adopted by the circuit courts on appeal.  But since that time, the Board only publishes three-member panel decisions as precedent, with a very small number of dissents.

A recent article in the Stanford Law Review by Prof. Jennifer Lee Koh provides an example of one of the effects of the Board’s more conservative makeup.  Being convicted of what is characterized as a “crime involving moral turpitude,” or CIMT, may render noncitizens removable from the U.S. and ineligible for immigration benefits or reliefs.  An attempt by the last Attorney General to serve under the Bush Administration, Michael Mukasey, to increase the BIA’s ability to find crimes to be CIMTs by creating his own alternative to the categorical and modified categorical approaches was vacated by his successor, Eric Holder (after having been rejected by 5 Circuit Courts of Appeal).  As several related Supreme Court decisions sealed the matter, the Board in 2016 was finally forced (at least on paper) to acknowledge the need to make CIMT determinations through a strict application of the categorical approach. However, as Prof. Koh demonstrates with examples from BIA precedent decisions, since 2016, the Board, while purporting to comply with the categorical approach, in fact has expanded through its precedent decisions the very meaning of what constitutes “moral turpitude,” enabling a greater number of offenses to be categorized as CIMTs.

Consistent with this approach was a training given by now-retired arch conservative Board member Roger Pauley at last summer’s IJ training conference.  From the conference materials obtained by a private attorney through a FOIA request, Pauley appears to have trained the judges not to apply the categorical approach as required by the Supreme Court when doing so won’t lead to a “sensible” result.  I believe the IJ corps would understand what this administration is likely to view as a “sensible” result. Remember that the IJs being trained cannot have more than 15 percent of their decisions remanded or reversed by the BIA under the agency’s completion quotas.  So even if an IJ realizes that they are bound by case law to apply the categorical approach, the same IJ also realizes that they ignore the BIA’s advice to the contrary at their own risk.

As to the law of asylum, not long after the purge of its liberal members, the BIA issued six precedent decisions between 2006 and 2014 making it more difficult to qualify for asylum based on membership in a particular social group.  The standard set out by the BIA in its 1985 decision Matter of Acosta – requiring the group to be defined by an “immutable characteristic” that its members either cannot change, or that is so fundamental to their identity that they should not be required to change it – had worked well for 21 years.  However, with no liberal push back, the more right-leaning Board members chose to add the additional requirements of particularity and social distinction to the PSG determination. The Board’s reliance on 2002 UNHCR Guidelines as justification for adding the latter requirement was most disingenuous, as the UNHCR employed the word “or” to allow those unable to otherwise satisfy the PSG requirements an alternative means of doing so, thus expanding those able to meet the definition.  But by changing the “or” to an “and,” the Board required applicants to establish both immutability and social distinction, thus narrowing the ranks of those able to qualify.

The changes had a dramatic impact on the large number of refugees escaping gang violence in Central America who generally relied on particular social group-based asylum claims.  Furthermore, while family has always been acknowledged as a particular social group, the BIA issued a decision in 2017 making it much more difficult to establish that the persecutor’s motive is on account of the victim’s family membership.   In that decision, the BIA offered the Bolshevik assassination of members of the family of Czar Nicholas II in Russia in 1918 as an example of what must be established to be granted asylum based on one’s family membership.   I have yet to find any lawyer who represents clients whose family presently enjoys a similar standing to the Romanov family in 1918 Russia. The ridiculously narrow interpretation was obviously designed to make it close to impossible for such claimants to qualify for relief.

The BIA also recently held that a Central American woman who was kidnaped by a guerrilla group and forced to cook and clean for them while in captivity had provided material support to a terrorist organization, thus barring her from a grant of asylum.  In reaching such holding, the Board determined that the victim should have reasonably known that the Salvadoran guerrilla group that kidnaped her was a terrorist organization in 1990, a time at which the U.S. government did not seem to yet hold such view.

Of course, IJs are bound by these decisions.  There have always been IJs who have forwarded new and sometimes creative legal theories which overcome these Board-imposed obstacles in order to grant relief.  But as stated previously, the quota guidelines will deter such creative decisionmaking by threatening the IJ’s job security. Judges should not have to fear repercussions for their good faith interpretations of the law.

Under prior administrations, ICE prosecutors have agreed in worthy cases to waive appeal when appropriate, and would even stipulate to grants of relief in worthy cases.  Also, under the previous administration, ICE would commonly agree to exercise its prosecutorial discretion to close non-priority cases. However, ICE attorneys at present are directed to oppose everything and agree to nothing.

Increased AG certifications:  In 2016, former Bush Attorney General Alberto Gonzales co-authored an article in the Iowa Law Review suggesting that instead of issuing a controversial executive order, the Obama Administration should have instead had the Attorney General issue precedent decisions in order to change the immigration laws.  A strange regulatory provision allows an Attorney General to direct the BIA to refer any decision for review. The AG can then simply rewrite any decision as he or she sees fit, creating precedent binding on the BIA, IJs, and DHS.

Clearly, the present administration is using Gonzales’s article as its playbook.  Apparently not satisfied with its power to appoint its own immigration judges, with packing the BIA with conservative former Republican Congressional staffers, and with its power to publish regulations interpreting the immigration laws to its own will and to issue policy directives binding on the judges, the Attorneys General serving the Trump Administration are also issuing precedent decisions through the process of self-certification at an alarming rate.  The decisions are different from those of other administrations, in that they are self-certified through procedural irregularity, are decided based on issues entirely different than those presented before the IJs and the BIA, and upend what had been settled issues of law that were not being questioned by either party to the action.

Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions used the certification process to make immigration judges less judge-like by stripping away necessary tools of docket management such as the right to administratively close proceedings, to terminate proceedings where appropriate, or to freely grant continuances in pending cases.  Sessions certified one case, Matter of E-F-H-L-, to himself four years after the BIA’s decision in the case, after it had been not only remanded back to the IJ, but had subsequently been administratively closed to allow the respondent to await the approval of an immigrant visa petition.  Sessions’s purpose in digging such an old case up was to vacate its holding guaranteeing asylum seekers a right to a full hearing on their application before an immigration judge. And his interest in doing so was to suggest to immigration judges that a way to increase their efficiency would be to summarily deny asylum claims without affording a hearing, which some judges have actually started to do.  And in another decision, Sessions suggested exactly what type of asylum cases he deemed most appropriate for such treatment.

Sessions’s most egregious decision attempted to unilaterally strip women of the ability to obtain asylum as victims of domestic violence.  This was not an issue that was in dispute, but had been a matter of settled law since 2014, when the BIA issued its precedent decision in Matter of A-R-C-G-, in which the DHS had stipulated that “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” constituted a cognizable particular social group to which asylum could be granted.

In certifying the case of Matter of A-B- to himself to reconsider such holding, Sessions invited briefs from all interested parties.  A total of 14 briefs were filed, two by the parties, and 12 amicus briefs (including one from my group of former IJs and BIA members).  The briefs from both parties (i.e. including DHS), and of 11 of the amici (the exception being FAIR, an anti-immigration group that regularly files the sole opposing amicus brief in such cases) all concluded that A-R-C-G- should not be vacated, and constituted a valid application of law which satisfied all of the BIA’s post-purge obstacles described above.  Thus, with the exception of FAIR, there was agreement by DHS, the BIA, the private bar, legal scholars, advocacy groups, and under international law as to the validity of the existing practice.

Nevertheless, Sessions issued a poorly-written decision in which he strongly disagreed, and vacated A-R-C-G- while attempting to make it close to impossible for such claims to succeed in the future.  I emphasize the word “attempting,” because fortunately, Sessions is a terrible lawyer with no asylum law expertise.  As a result, his decision is largely dicta, which even Department of Justice attorneys admit only managed to vacate A-R-C-G- without otherwise altering the legal factors that would allow such grants in the future.  But the BIA has simply been dismissing such claims on the grounds that Sessions had rejected them, without undertaking the individualized analysis required in such cases.  As a result, the circuit courts, and not the BIA, will likely decide the propriety and impact of Sessions’s decision.

My final note concerning A-B- is that while the case was still pending before him, Sessions stated in a radio interview in Arizona that “We’ve had situations in which a person comes to the United States and says they are a victim of domestic violence; therefore they are entitled to enter the United States.  Well that’s obviously false, but some judges have gone along with that.” Clearly, any judge making such a statement would have to recuse him or herself from the case. But Sessions, who never hid his bias against immigrants (among other groups), neither felt the need to be impartial, nor did the law require it of him.

Which makes Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein’s recent remarks to a new class of immigration judges particularly worrisome.  Rosenstein reminded the group that they are “not only judges,” but also employees of the Department of Justice, and members of the executive branch.  As such, Rosenstein stated, IJs must “follow lawful instructions from the Attorney General, and…share a duty to enforce the law.”  But shouldn’t judges who make such important decisions that sometimes involve life and death be “only judges?”

The incongruity is that the DOJ is an enforcement agency.  As such, it is not designed to be either neutral or transparent.  As already noted at length, it is headed by a Presidential political appointee, many of whose decisions and policies are guided by a purely political agenda.  As such, DOJ has never understood IJs, who need to be neutral, transparent, and insulated from political influence.

Although many in EOIR’s management hold titles that make them sound like judges, in fact, they see their role not as protectors of immigration judge independence, but rather as executive branch, DOJ managers whose main job is to appease their higher-ups in the Justice Department.  They view DHS not as one of the parties appearing before the agency, but rather as fellow executive-branch comrades. They take the same view of attorneys with OIL and the U.S. Attorneys Office who litigate immigration decisions in the federal courts. Significantly, they view the private bar and academia as being outside of this executive branch fold.

As my friend and fellow blogger, retired Immigration Judge Paul Schmidt recently wrote in a blog post, “what real court acts as an adjunct to the prosecutor’s office?” adding that such relationship is common in authoritarian, refugee-producing countries.

The last recent development I wish to mention that underscores this conflict was the treatment of a highly respected and fair immigration judge in Philadelphia, Steven Morley, who had issued a decision which was certified and reversed by Sessions, Matter of Castro-Tum.  Castro-Tum entered the U.S. as an unaccompanied minor.  After his release from ICE detention, he did not appear for his immigration court proceedings.  However, Judge Morley was concerned, based on his past experience, that ICE had provided the court with an inaccurate address for the youth, and felt it would be unfair to order him removed in absentia without first determining if he had received proper notice of the hearing as required by law.

On remand, Judge Morley was directed by Sessions to proceed  according to the section of the law that governs in absentia orders.  Now, that section also requires a finding of proper notice on the respondent.  Judge Morley therefore proceeded properly and consistently with the AG’s order when he granted a short continuance for briefing on the issue of proper notice.  In response, the case was immediately removed by EOIR management from Judge Morley’s calendar. While a case would normally then be randomly reassigned to another judge in the same court, EOIR hand chose a management-level supervisory judge known for following the company line, who was sent to Philadelphia to conduct a single five-minute hearing in which she ordered the youth removed in his absence.  Furthermore, Judge Morley was chastised by his supervisor, Assistant Chief Immigration Judge Jack Weil, who, according to a grievance filed by the IJ’s union, incorrectly told Judge Morley that he was required to enter a final decision at the first hearing following the remand, and further falsely accused him of acting unprofessionally in purportedly criticizing the AG’s and BIA’s decisions.  86 similar cases were subsequently removed from Judge Morley’s calendar. Such action sent a very strong warning to the entire IJ corps (many of whom are new hires still in their two year probation period) of what to expect should they choose to act as “only judges” and not loyal employees of the Attorney General and executive branch.

The above inadequacies in the immigration court system have allowed the present administration to exploit it like never before in support of its own political narrative.  Examples of this include:

The Trump Administration’s early trumpeting of causing a “return to the rule of law” by increasing the number of removal orders its judges entered compared to the prior administration.  Early on, this was supposedly “accomplished” through what Paul Schmidt refers to as “ADR” or Aimless Docket Reshuffling. Judges in busy courts were told to continue two weeks worth of cases at a time (usually involving noncitizens represented by attorneys who had already waited years for their day in court) to instead travel to courts near the southern border to hear cases of largely unprepared and unrepresented, newly-arrived asylum seekers.  To repeat, in fact, the backlog has grown significantly in spite of such policies.

The administration also maintains a false narrative that Central American asylum seekers fleeing horrible gang and domestic violence are not really refugees, and in fact are dangerous criminals.  Through the AG’s issuance of Matter of A-B- and the compliant BIA’s reliance on that decision to give short shrift to such claims; through the detention of asylum seekers in remotely located detention centers, and the new policy of forcing some to wait in Mexico while their claims are adjudicated, thus severely limiting such asylum seekers access to counsel and their ability to meaningfully participate in compiling evidence and otherwise presenting their best claims; by indoctrinating new IJs that “these are not real claims,” the administration has artificially lowered the percentage of such claims that are being granted asylum, which thus furthers its narrative that “these are not real refugees.”

Furthermore, by forcing those attempting to apply legally to wait in Mexico under inhospitable and sometimes dangerous conditions for increasingly long periods of time, those who finally out of desperation cross the border without authorization are immediately arrested and tried criminally for the “crime” of crossing the border illegally, thus supporting the narrative that our country is being invaded by “criminals.”

The administration also maintains the narrative that immigrants should just be deported quickly, without due process and hearings before judges.  It is trying to accomplish this through the transformation of the immigration judge corps. By stripping IJs of much of what makes them independent judges, through the removal of necessary case management tools such as administrative closure, termination, and the ability to grant continuances; by imposing on them insulting completion quotas, and by making IJ training less about the proper application of the law and more about efficiency, many more experienced IJs are retiring sooner than they intended.  The administration is most happy to replace them with their hand-picked candidates who they expect to be made more compliant through the lengthy period of probation, the completion quotas, and an indoctrination of the type described above.

The result of all this was summarized in a detailed report of the ABA released last week.  The ABA report concluded that the immigration courts at present are “irredeemably dysfunctional” and on the verge of collapse.  There are those who believe that such collapse has been the goal all along, as it would allow the administration to replace the present system with one that is even more compliant and affords even less due process, perhaps something like the old special inquiry officer model.

What can be done?  A number of respected organizations, including the ABA, the Federal Bar Association, the American Immigration Lawyers Association, and of course the National Association of Immigration Judges have endorsed moving the immigration courts out of DOJ and making them an independent Article I court.

Article I status will likely not solve every problem, but for the reasons detailed above, it is an absolutely necessary starting point.  Article I is truly a non-partisan position. It’s first sponsor, Rep. McCollum, was a Republican; Sen. Gillibrand, who has recently shown interest in the issue, is a Democrat.  As the leader of a group of former immigration judges and BIA members, which includes members from across the ideological spectrum, I have found certain issues to be divisive within the group.  However, the issue of immigration judge independence has been unique in garnering universal support.

While it is too early to discuss the details of what such bill might contain, it is hoped that the BIA as presently constituted will be replaced by an immigration appeals court committed to independently and fairly interpreting the law, free of any fear of displeasing the Attorney General.  It’s members must be bipartisan, and appointed based on their knowledge of the law and their courage to apply it correctly. This would be a drastic change from the present group led by former Republican staffers still aiming to please their old bosses, and fleshed out with career DOJ bureaucrats who will loyally follow the party line.  I’ve always felt that choosing a former Article III judge to head an independent immigration court would immediately change the court’s priorities in the proper manner.

What role can we all play in making this happen?  At present, the most vocal advocates are immigration lawyers.  As such change would need to come from Congress, it bears noting that no elected official’s election hopes are likely to hinge on their winning the immigration lawyer vote, which amounts to probably a few thousand votes in total spread across many states and congressional districts.

However, we are all constituents of our senators and representatives. It is therefore incumbent on all of us to be advocates, and where possible, to join forces with other groups of constituents that might both share our interest in the issue and carry more sway with elected officials.

Speak out to anyone willing to listen to tell them that Article I is a non-partisan solution to the unrepairable mess that our present immigration court system has become.  In speaking to elected officials, try to find a reputable representative to endorse the concept.

Tell your own stories to make your points.  Because lawyers at heart are storytellers.

Explain that quotas and deadlines run contrary to judicial independence.

Ask for oversight hearings, to which groups such as the NAIJ, the ABA and AILA should be invited to the table.

Outside of the actual immigration judges and BIA, the following additional changes are needed.  First, ICE attorneys in the employ of DHS, i.e. the prosecutors in immigration court proceedings, must be allowed once again to offer prosecutorial discretion and to stipulate to grants in worthy cases, or to otherwise conference cases with private attorneys in an effort to streamline hearings.  I can’t think of any high volume court in which stipulations, plea agreements, and conferencing between the parties is not the common practice. Imagine what would happen to criminal courts if they were told that from now on, every jay walking ticket will require a full trial and appeal.

Prosecutorial discretion and some of these other streamlining techniques had finally become common practice in the immigration courts under the Obama administration.  It makes good sense and serves an important purpose in such an overburdened system to prioritize cases, and temporarily close out those cases that are not a priority. Most such cases involve noncitizens who are law-abiding, tax-paying individuals, some of whom have US citizen children.

Lastly, there are a large number of specially-trained asylum officers presently employed by DHS.  Some have suggested moving them as well into an independent court system in a supporting role, and providing the asylum officers with expanded jurisdiction to hear not only a broader array of asylum claims (thus removing those cases they grant from the actual judges’ dockets), but perhaps also allowing the asylum officers to adjudicate other classes of cases, such as cancellation of removal claims.

In closing, as summarized earlier, over several decades, immigration judges evolved from non-judicial adjudicators in the employ of an enforcement agency into administrative judges comprised of lawyers from a broad spectrum of ideological backgrounds who were allowed to exercise a good deal of independent judgment in a court setting.  And much of this positive development came from the “bottom up,” through the judges’ own collective efforts.

Because the final step of Article I status was never realized, actions by the Trump administration, which views independent judges as an unwanted obstacle to enforcing its own anti-immigration agenda, is attempting to roll back immigration judges to a state more closely resembling their INS special inquiry officer origins.

Although my focus has been on the present crisis under the Trump Administration, in fairness I want to state that the factors which set the stage for it built up over many years under both Democratic and Republican administrations.  Regardless of what administration follows this one, the immigration courts at best will almost certainly continue to suffer from the not-so-benign neglect that led us here, simply because immigration is such a controversial topic that problems are kicked down the road rather than resolved.

The reforms which Article I will bring will help insulate the system from unnecessary costs and delay caused by clogged dockets and unnecessary appeals prompted by a lack of trust in the system.  It will also help guarantee a clear funding stream with necessary resources not syphoned off by DOJ for other programs, and will safeguard the Circuit Courts from needless (and costly) appeals.

For all of these reasons, only an independent Article I court can sufficiently remove the threat of political manipulation, and again restore the faith in the immigration court’s fairness and impartiality that a democracy requires.

Copyright 2019 Jeffrey S. Chase. All rights reserved.

 

 

Court Rebukes Youth Policy Shift

 

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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City.  Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge, senior legal advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals, and volunteer staff attorney at Human Rights First.  He is a past recipient of AILA’s annual Pro Bono Award, and previously chaired AILA’s Asylum Reform Task Force.

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Thanks Jeffrey my friend and colleague for telling it like it is and setting the record straight.

PWS

03-29-19

BIA THWARTS CAL’S ATTEMPT TO END RUN REMOVABILITY FOR MINOR OFFENDERS – Matter of VELASQUEZ-RIOS, 27 I&N Dec. 470 (BIA 2018)

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1098611/download

Matter of VELASQUEZ-RIOS, 27 I&N Dec. 470 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

The amendment to section 18.5 of the California Penal Code, which retroactively lowered the maximum possible sentence that could have been imposed for an alien’s State offense from 365 days to 364 days, does not affect the applicability of section 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012), to a past conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude “for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed.”

PANEL:  BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES GUENDELSBERGER, MALPHRUS, and LIEBOWITZ

OPINION BY: Judge John Guendelsberger

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Criminal lawyers take note:  This Respondent received a sentence of only 12 days in jail! A great deal, right? Not if you look at the immigration consequences! Also, given the change of removability, he would be subject to “mandatory detention.” Therefore, I’m sure that he spent far more than 12 days in ICE custody awaiting this unfavorable result.

PWS

10-07-18

 

 

BIA RULES ON OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE AS AN AGFEL —Matter of Agustin VALENZUELA GALLARDO, 27 I&N Dec. 449 (BIA 2018)

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1092896/download

Matter of Agustin VALENZUELA GALLARDO, 27 I&N Dec. 449 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:
(1) An “offense relating to obstruction of justice” under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2012), encompasses offenses covered by chapter 73 of the Federal criminal code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (2012), or any other Federal or State offense that involves (1) an affirmative and intentional attempt (2) that is motivated by a specific intent (3) to interfere either in an investigation or proceeding that is ongoing, pending, or reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, or in another’s punishment resulting from a completed proceeding. Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I&N Dec. 838 (BIA 2012), clarified.

(2) A conviction for accessory to a felony under section 32 of the California Penal Code that results in a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year is a conviction for an aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act.

PANEL: APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES GUENDELSBERGER, MALPHRUS, LIEBOWITZ

OPINION BY:  JUDGE GARRY D. MALPHRUS

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As one of my colleagues quipped, “how does this apply to tweeting!”

PWS

09-15-18

 

SPLIT BIA FINALLY RULES ON “FINALITY” – MATTER OF J.M. ACOSTA, 27 I&N DEC. 420 (BIA 2018)

3934JM ACOSTA

Matter of J.M. ACOSTA, 27 I&N Dec. 420 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

(1) A conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until the right to direct appellate review on the merits of the conviction has been exhausted or waived.

(2) Once the Department of Homeland Security has established that a respondent has a criminal conviction at the trial level and that the time for filing a direct appeal has passed, a presumption arises that the conviction is final for immigration purposes, which the respondent can rebut with evidence that an appeal has been filed within the prescribed deadline, including any extensions or permissive filings granted by the appellate court, and that the appeal relates to the issue of guilt or innocence or concerns a substantive defect in the criminal proceedings.

(3) Appeals, including direct appeals, and collateral attacks that do not relate to the underlying merits of a conviction will not be given effect to eliminate the finality of the conviction.

PANEL: BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES KELLY, GREER, AND MALPHRUS

OPINION BY: JUDGE EDWARD F. KELLY

CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION: JUDGE GARRY D. MALPHRUS

KEY QUOTE FROM JUDGE KELLY’S MAJORITY OPINION:

In holding that the finality requirement continues to apply after the enactment of the IIRIRA, we emphasize that a conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until the right to direct appellate review on the merits of the conviction has been exhausted or waived.11 Consequently, absent proof of a waiver of appeal rights, a conviction does not achieve finality for immigration purposes until the time for filing an initial direct appeal has expired under the laws of the applicable jurisdiction. However, once the DHS has established that a respondent has a criminal conviction at the trial level and that the time for filing a direct appeal has passed, a presumption arises that the conviction is final for immigration purposes.

To rebut that presumption, a respondent must come forward with evidence that an appeal has been filed within the prescribed deadline, including any extensions or permissive filings granted by the appellate court.12 He or she must also present evidence that the appeal relates to the issue of guilt or innocence or concerns a substantive defect in the criminal proceedings. See Matter of Marquez Conde, 27 I&N Dec. at 255 (reaffirmingMatter of Pickering and reiterating that “convictions that have been vacated based on procedural and substantive defects in the underlying criminal proceeding [are] no longer valid for immigration purposes”); see also Matter of Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I&N Dec. at 1379–80 (giving effect to the alien’s vacated conviction where there was evidence by way of a court order that the conviction was vacated on the legal merits of the underlying criminal proceedings).

Appeals, including direct appeals, and collateral attacks that do not relate to the underlying merits of the conviction will not be given effect to eliminate the finality of the conviction. Such appeals include those that relate only to the alien’s sentence or that seek to reduce the charges, to ameliorate the conviction for rehabilitative purposes, or to alleviate immigration hardships, and any other appeals that do not challenge the merits of the conviction. See Matter of Roldan, 22 I&N Dec. 512, 521–24 (BIA 1999) (holding that under the statutory definition of a “conviction” in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, no effect is to be given in immigration proceedings to a State action that purports to expunge, dismiss, cancel, vacate, discharge, or otherwise remove a guilty plea or other record of guilt or conviction by operation of a State rehabilitative statute); see also Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. at 624–25 (holding that a conviction set aside for reasons solely related to post-conviction events such as rehabilitation or immigration hardships will remain a conviction for immigration purposes).13

In this case, the respondent submitted evidence indicating that he filed a motion for an extension of the appeal deadline and that the motion was granted and the appeal was permitted by the New York appellate court.14Under these circumstances, we will remand this case to the Immigration Judge to consider the status of the pending appeal and its basis and to determine whether a continuance may be appropriate. See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018). In this regard, the respondent and the DHS should be given an opportunity to present any additional documentary and testimonial evidence they wish to offer in assisting the Immigration Judge.

Accordingly, the appeal from the Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondent is removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act and from his denial of the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Act will be dismissed. The respondent’s motion to remand based on new evidence will be granted.

[Text of Footnotes Omitted]

KEY QUOTE FROM JUDGE MALPHRUS’S CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION:

Based on the plain language of the Act and the clear weight of authority in the circuit courts, I would conclude that “the first definition of ‘conviction’ in § [101](a)(48)(A) requires only that the trial court enter a formal judgment of guilt, without any requirement that all direct appeals be exhausted or waived.” Planes, 652 F.3d at 996. The majority errs by invoking congressional silence to convert the otherwise plain language at issue here into statutory ambiguity, thereby giving us license to resolve the ambiguity in the manner that we think is best. “Regardless of our view on the wisdom or efficacy of Congress’s policy choices, we are not free to read in additional elements where the legislature has declined to include them.”Id. (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216–17 (2007)).

I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to remand this case for further proceedings. I would deny the respondent’s motion to remand because the new evidence does not indicate that his conviction has been overturned or vacated, and he remains ineligible for relief under former section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994). See Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464 (BIA 1992).

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This is important guidance from the BIA on a recurring question before U.S. Immigration Judges.  Congrats to Judge Kelly on what, by my calculation, is his first published precedent opinion. And, he and Judge Anne Greer appear to have gotten it right. I don’t understand Judge Malphrus’s contention (in a part of his opinion not quoted above) that an individual who is actually removed based on a conviction later vacated on appeal hasn’t suffered any unfairness or irreparable harm.

PWS

08-30-18

MIKE VICK WANNABES WATCH OUT – THE BIA HAS YOUR NUMBER! — Matter of ORTEGA-LOPEZ, 27 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 2018) — CIMT — Animal Fighting

3931

Matter of Ortega-Lopez, 27 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

(1) The offense of sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in an animal fighting venture in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) (2006) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. Matter of Ortega-Lopez, 26 I&N Dec. 99 (BIA 2013), reaffirmed.

(2) An alien is ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2012), for having “been convicted of an offense under” section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012), irrespective of both the general “admission” requirement in section 237(a) and the temporal (within 5 years of admission) requirement in section 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Matter of Cortez, 25 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 2010), reaffirmed.

PANEL: APPELLATE IMMIGRATON JUDGES MALPHRUS, MULLANE, and LIEBOWITZ

OPINION BY: JUDGE GARRY D. MALPHRUS

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Woof, woof! 🐕🐕🐕

PWS

08-06-18

 

 

BETTER LATE THAN NEVER? – After 9 Years, The BIA Finally Completes The Supreme’s Remand – Creates A “Limited Duress Defense” To Persecutor Bar, With Judge Malphrus Dissenting – Matter of NEGUSIE, 27 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2018)

Matter of NEGUSIE, 27 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2018)

Here’s the link:

3930

BIA HEADNOTE:

(1) An applicant who is subject to being barred from establishing eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal based on the persecution of others may claim a duress defense, which is limited in nature.

(2) To meet the minimum threshold requirements of the duress defense to the persecutor bar, an applicant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he acted under an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others; (2) he reasonably believed that the threatened harm would be carried out unless he acted or refrained from acting; (3) he had no reasonable opportunity to escape or otherwise frustrate the threat; (4) he did not place himself in a situation in which he knew or reasonably should have known that he would likely be forced to act or refrain from acting; and (5) he knew or reasonably should have known that the harm he inflicted was not greater than the threatened harm to himself or others.

BIA PANEL: APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES GRANT, GREER, MAPPHRUS

OPINION BY: Judge Edward R. Grant

CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION: Judge Garry d. Malphrus

KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY:

In a decision dated May 31, 2005, an Immigration Judge denied the applicant’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal but granted his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987; for the United States Apr. 18, 1988) (“Convention Against Torture”). On February 7, 2006, we dismissed the appeals of both the applicant and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).1 This case is now before us on remand pursuant to a decision of the United States Supreme Court in

1 The DHS does not now challenge the applicant’s grant of deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture.

page1image1919785008

347

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2018) Interim Decision #3930

Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009). Having reviewed the record and the arguments presented by the parties and amici curiae, we will again dismiss the applicant’s appeal.2

We conclude that duress is relevant in determining whether an alien who assisted or otherwise participated in persecution is prevented by the so-called “persecutor bar” from establishing eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal under sections 101(a)(42), 208(b)(2)(A)(i), and 241(b)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), and 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (2012), and for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) and (d)(2) (2018).3 In this decision, we set forth a standard for evaluating claims of duress in this context. Applying that standard to the uncontested findings of fact in the record, we conclude that the applicant has not established that he was under duress when he assisted in the persecution of prisoners who were persecuted under his guard in an Eritrean prison camp.

KEY QUOTE FROM DISSENT:

The United States Supreme Court remanded this case for us to make an “initial determination of the statutory interpretation question,” Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 524 (2009), “with respect to whether an alien who

ORDER: The applicant’s appeal is dismissed.

368

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2018) Interim Decision #3930

was coerced to assist in persecution is barred from obtaining asylum in the United States,” id. at 525 (Scalia, J., concurring). The remand directed us to interpret the statute anew based on principles of statutory construction, free of our prior assumption that Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981), definitively resolved this question. The majority decision is artfully drafted, but it does not engage in this analysis. Instead, the majority reads a duress exception into the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the United States Nov. 1, 1968) (“Protocol”), and, by extension, the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (“Refugee Act”), that simply does not exist. And it does so essentially by deferring to international expectations of how the Protocol should be interpreted. I cannot agree with this approach.

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  • Wow! Deferring to international interpretations and expert interpretations from the UNHCR that actually give an asylum applicant a very circumscribed break for actions he or she was forced to take. Very “Un-Boardy.” Could actually be “career threatening.” No wonder Judge Malphrus wanted to separate himself from any such rational and reasonable actions in the “Age of Sessions & Trump.”
  • 9 years in the making, during which the DHS position changed several times, is a pretty good argument against “Chevron deference” (a/k/a “task avoidance by life-tenured Article III Judges”). What were Immigration Judges supposed to do during those 9 years?
  • Odds on whether or how long it will take “Gonzo” to intervene?

PWS

06-29-18

 

HON. JEFFREY CHASE: SOME IMMIGRATION JUDGES START PARTICIPATING IN THE SESSIONS/DHS ALL-OUT ATTACK ON DUE PROCESS BY SUBJECTING ASYLUM APPLICANTS TO AN UNAUTHORIZED “SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCESS” TO DENY ASYLUM WITHOUT A HEARING – The Likely Result Of Yet Another Administration “Haste Makes Waste” Initiative – Massive Denials Of Due Process, Unlawful Removals, Lost Lives, Massive Remands From The “Real” Courts, Further Loss Of Credibility For The Immigration Courts, More Unnecessary Backlogs, Waste Of Taxpayer Funds – Hey, What’s Not To Like About Another Jeff Sessions Bogus White Nationalist Scheme?

https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/6/24/are-summary-denials-coming-to-immigration-court

Are Summary Denials Coming to Immigration Court?

An attorney recently reported the following: at a Master Calendar hearing, an immigration judge advised that if on the Individual Hearing date, both the court and the ICE attorney do not believe the respondent is prima facie eligible for asylum based on the written submissions, the judge will deny asylum summarily without hearing testimony.  The judge stated that other immigration judges around the country were already entering such summary judgments, in light of recent decisions of the Attorney General.

I have been telling reporters lately that no one decision or policy of the AG, the EOIR Director, or the BIA should be viewed in isolation.  Rather, all are pieces in a puzzle.  Back in March, in a very unusual decision, Jeff Sessions certified to himself a four-year-old BIA precedent decision while it was administratively closed (and therefore off-calendar) at the immigration judge level, and then vacated the decision for the most convoluted of reasons.  What jumped out at me was the fact that the decision, Matter of E-F-H-L-, had held that all asylum applicants had the right to a full hearing on their application without first having to establish prima facie eligibility for such relief.  It was pretty clear that Sessions wanted this requirement eliminated.

Let’s look at the timeline of recent developments.  On January 4 of this year,  Sessions certified to himself the case of  Matter of Castro-Tum, in which he asked whether immigration judges and the BIA should continue to have the right to administratively close cases, a useful and common docket management tool.  On January 19, the BIA published its decision in Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, in which it required asylum applicants to clearly delineate their claimed particular social group before the immigration judge (an extremely complicated task beyond the ability of most unrepresented applicants), and stated that the BIA will not consider reformulations of the social group on appeal.  The decision was written by Board Member Garry Malphrus, a hard-line Republican who was a participant in the “Brooks Brother Riot” that disrupted the Florida ballot recount following the 2000 Presidential election.

On March 5, Sessions vacated Matter of E-F-H-L-.  Two days later, on March 7, Sessions certified to himself an immigration judge’s decision in Matter of A-B-, engaging in procedural irregularity in taking the case from the BIA before it could rule on the matter, and then completely transforming the issues presented in the case, suddenly challenging whether anyone fearing private criminal actors could qualify for asylum.

On March 22, Sessions certified to himself Matter of L-A-B-R- et al., to determine under what circumstances immigration judges may grant continuances to respondents in removal proceedings.  Although this decision is still pending, immigration judges are already having to defend their decisions to grant continuances to their supervisors at the instigation of the EOIR Director’s Office, which is tracking all IJ continuances.

On March 30, EOIR issued a memo stating that immigration judges would be subjected to performance metrics, or quotas, requiring them to complete 700 cases per year, 95 percent at the first scheduled individual hearing, and further requiring that no more than 15 percent of their decisions be remanded.  On May 17, Sessions decided Castro-Tum in the negative, stripping judges of the ability to manage their own dockets by administratively closing worthy cases.

On May 31, Castro-Tum’s case was on the Master Calendar of Immigration Judge Steven Morley.  Instead of ordering Castro-Tum deported in absentia that day, the judge continued the proceedings to allow an interested attorney to brief him on the issue of whether Castro-Tum received proper notice of the hearing.  Soon thereafter, the case was removed from Judge Morley’s docket and reassigned to a management-level immigration judge who is far less likely to exercise such judicial independence.

On June 11, Sessions decided Matter of A-B-, vacating the BIA’s 2014 decision recognizing the ability of victims of domestic violence to qualify for asylum as members of a particular social group.  In that decision, Sessions included headnote 4: “If an asylum application is fatally flawed in one respect, an immigration judge or the Board need not examine the remaining elements of the asylum claim.”  The case was intentionally issued on the first day of the Immigration Judges training conference, at which the need to complete more cases in less time was a repeatedly emphasized.

So in summary, within the past few months, the immigration judges have been warned that their livelihood will depend on their completing large numbers of cases, without the ability to grant continuances or administratively close cases.  They have had the need to hold a full asylum hearing stripped away, while at the same time, having pointed out to them several ways to quickly dispose of an asylum claim that until weeks ago, would have been clearly grantable under settled case law.

So where does all this leave the individual judges?  There has been much discussion lately of EOIR’s improper politicized hirings of immigration judges.  I feel that the above developments have created something of a Rorschach test for determining an immigration judge’s ideology.

The judges that conclude from the above the best practice is to summarily deny asylum without testimony are exactly the type of judges the present administration wants on the bench.  They can find a “fatal flaw” in the claim – either in the formulation (or lack thereof) of the particular social group, or in the lack of preliminary documentation as to the persecutor’s motive, the government’s inability to protect, or the unreasonableness of internal relocation, and simply deny the right to a hearing.  It should be noted that these issues are often resolved by the detailed testimony offered at a full merits hearing, which is the purpose of holding such hearings in the first place.

On the other hand, more thoughtful, liberal judges will find that in light of the above developments, they must afford more time for asylum claims based on domestic violence, gang threats, or other claims involving non-governmental actors.  They will conference these cases, and hear detailed testimony from the respondent, country experts, and other witnesses on the particular points raised by Sessions in Matter of A-B-.  They may consider alternative theories of these cases based on political opinion or religion.  They are likely to take the time to craft thoughtful, detailed decisions.  And in doing so, they will find it extremely difficult to meet the completion quotas set out by the agency with Sessions’ blessing.  They may also have their decisions remanded by the conservative BIA, whose leadership is particularly fearful of angering its superiors in light of the 2003 purge of liberal BIA members by then-Attorney General John Ashcroft.  The removal of Castro-Tum’s case from the docket of Judge Morley is clearly a warning that the agency does not wish for judges to behave as independent and impartial adjudicators, but rather to act in lockstep with the agency’s enforcement agenda.

There is another very significant issue: most asylum claims also apply for protection under Article III of the U.N. Convention Against Torture.  Unlike asylum, “CAT” relief is mandatory, and as it does not require a nexus to a protected ground, it is unaffected by the AG’s holding in A-B-.  So won’t those judges pondering summary dismissal still have to hold full hearings on CAT protection?  It would seem that a refusal to hold a full CAT hearing would result in a remand, if not from the BIA, than at the circuit court level.

Copyright 2018 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

 

 

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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City.  Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge, senior legal advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals, and volunteer staff attorney at Human Rights First.  He is a past recipient of AILA’s annual Pro Bono Award, and previously chaired AILA’s Asylum Reform Task Force.

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Four Easy, Low Budget, Steps To A Better, Fairer, & More Efficient U.S. Immigration Court System:

  • Remove Jeff Sessions and all other politicos from control.
  • Restore Immigration Judges’ authority to “administratively close” cases when necessary to get them off the docket so that relief can be pursued outside the Immigration Court system.
  • Give Immigration Judges authority to set and control their own dockets, working with Court Administrators and attorneys from both sides (rather than having DHS enforcement policies essentially “drive the docket” as is now the case) to:
    • Schedule cases in a manner that insures fair and reasonable access to pro bono counsel for everyone prior to the first Master Calendar;
    • Schedule cases so that pleadings can be taken and applications filed at the first Master Calendar (or the first Master Calendar after representation is obtained);
    • Schedule Individual Hearings in a manner that will maximize the chances of “completion at the first Individual Hearing” while minimizing “resets” of Individual Hearing cases.
  • Establish a Merit Selection hiring system for Immigration Judges overseen by the U.S. Circuit Court in the jurisdiction where that Immigration Judge would sit, or in the case of the BIA Appellate Immigration Judges, by the U.S. Supreme Court.

No, it wouldn’t overnight eliminate the backlog (which has grown up over many years of horrible mismanagement by the DOJ under Administrations of both parties). But, it certainly would give the Immigration Courts a much better chance of reducing the backlog in a fair manner over time. Just that, as opposed to the Trump Administration’s “maximize unfairness, minimize Due Process, maximize backlogs, shift blame, waste money and resources” policies would be a huge improvement at no additional costs over what it now takes to run a system “designed, built, and operated to fail.”

PWS

06-25-48

IT TOOK MANY YEARS AND LOTS OF EFFORT, BUT RESPONDENTS FINALLY WON ONE @ THE BIA — ON STALKING — Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, 27 I&N Dec. 256 (BIA 2018), overruling Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, 26 I&N Dec. 7 (BIA 2012)

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Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, 27 I&N Dec. 256 (BIA 2018), overruling Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, 26 I&N Dec. 7 (BIA 2012)

BIA HEADNOTE:

The offense of stalking in violation of section 646.9 of the California Penal Code is not “a crime of stalking” under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2012). Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, 26 I&N Dec. 71 (BIA 2012), overruled.

PANEL: BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES PAULEY, GUENDELSBERGER, MALPHRUS

OPINION BY: JUGE JOHN GUENDELSBERGER

DISSENTING OPINION: JUDGE GARRY D. MALPHRUS

KEY QUOTE FROM MAJORITY:

Although the DHS appears to concede that stalking under section 646.9 is “overbroad” relative to the definition we outlined in Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, it asserts that we should broaden the definition of a “crime of stalking” under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act to meet contemporary standards. Specifically, it argues that we should redefine the term “stalking” in the Act based on its commonly understood meaning, either in 2012 when we decided Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, or based on the common elements of State and Federal stalking statutes in 2017.

We recognize that the common elements of stalking have evolved since section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) was added to the Act in 1996, in that a number of States have broadened the term “stalking” to cover threats of nonphysical harm in an effort to afford greater protections to their citizens against stalkers. However, we are constrained to define offenses “based on the ‘generic, contemporary meaning’ of the statutory words at the time the

statute was enacted.” Matter of Cardiel, 25 I&N Dec. 12, 17 (BIA 2009) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990)); see also Matter of Alvarado, 26 I&N Dec. 895, 897 (BIA 2016). The DHS relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2281 (2016), which declined “to wind the clock back” to consider the common law in discerning whether the provision at issue reached reckless acts. But that case also looked to the legislative history and the “state-law backdrop” that existed at the time the statute was enacted. Id. at 2280–82. We are therefore unpersuaded to broaden the definition of the term “stalking” under section 237(a)(2)(E) of the Act to encompass the most contemporary understanding of that offense.

Upon reconsideration, we conclude that the offense of stalking in violation of section 646.9 of the California Penal Code is not “a crime of stalking” under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act. We will therefore overrule our decision in Matter of Sanchez-Lopez and vacate all prior orders in this case to the extent they hold to the contrary. Accordingly, because the respondent is not removable, his appeal will be sustained and the removal proceedings will be terminated.

KEY QUOTE FROM DISSENT:

The legal landscape has changed since we published our decision inMatter of Sanchez-Lopez. This case illustrates the limitations of applying the categorical approach imposed by the Supreme Court in Descamps andMathis to provisions of the immigration laws enacted by Congress for the purpose of removing aliens convicted of serious criminal conduct. See Matter of Chairez, 27 I&N Dec. 21, 25–26 (BIA 2017) (Malphrus, concurring). Under this approach, only if section 646.9 is divisible can we look to the respondent’s conviction records to determine if his conduct involved an intent to cause the victim to fear death or bodily injury, as many such stalking cases do. Because of this strict categorical approach, many statutes that have since broadened the scope of protection for stalking victims may not qualify as a categorical match to section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act. As a result, in California and many other States, an alien who was criminally convicted of stalking an innocent victim will not be removable under the Act, even though the record makes clear that he or she committed “a crime of stalking.” It is highly unlikely that Congress intended this result.

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I liked the comment from Dan Kowalski over at LexisNexis Immigration Community: “It only took about 6 years and several trips up and down the administrative and judicial food chain.”

My point (that I make over and over) is that there is NO WAY that an unrepresented respondent (particularly in DHS detention where most respondents convicted of crimes end up) could have achieved this result. That means that unrepresented individuals are wrongfully deported by DHS every day. 

The Immigration Court system already is failing in its duty to guarantee fairness and due process to all respondents.  Outrageously, instead of doing what he should do — working to insure maximum representation and raising the quality of Immigration Judge and BIA decisions to insure Due Process — Jeff Sessions is doing just the opposite!

He’s putting “haste makes waste quotas” on Immigration Judges; encouraging judges to deny continuances needed to obtain counsel and adequately prepare defenses; locating Immigration Courts in detention centers which intentionally lack both public access and ready availability of pro bono counsel; using coercive, substandard detention and family separation to deter individuals from pursuing potentially successful claims and defenses; further skewing the law against asylum seekers; and suspending the essential “Legal Orientation Program” which helps unrepresented individuals in detention understand their rights and what will happen in Immigration Court before their first appearance before a judge.

PWS

04-20-18

WELCOME TO BIA-LAND! – Where You Might Be Better Off Committing A Felony Than Concealing It – Matter of Mendez, 27 I&N Dec. 219 (BIA 2018)

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Matter of Mendez, 27 I&N Dec. 219 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

“Misprision of felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. Matter of Robles, 24 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 2006), reaffirmed. Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2012), followed in jurisdiction only.”

PANEL: BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES PAULEY, GUENDELSBERGER, and MALPHRUS

OPINION BY: Judge Roger A. Pauley

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Pretty straight forward. There was a so-called “Circuit split.” Given alternative choices, the BIA almost always chooses the interpretation most favorable to the DHS and least favorable to the respondent.

Hence, the respondent loses, the BIA doesn’t “rock the boat,” the Office of Immigration Litigation can defend the most restrictive position in the Courts of Appeals and, if necessary, before the Supremes, Jeff Sessions remains happy, and BIA judges retain their jobs.

The only losers: Due Process, fairness, and the respondent. But, who cares about them anyway? It’s all about maximizing removals.

PWS

02-27-18

 

 

BIA PROVIDES FEEBLE GUIDANCE ON BORDER STATEMENTS — MATTER OF J-C-H-F-, 27 I&N DEC. 211(BIA 2018)! PLUS SPECIAL BONUS: MY “CRITICAL ANALYSIS!”

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Matter of J-C-H-F-, 27 I&N Dec. 211 (B IA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

“When deciding whether to consider a border or airport interview in making a credibility determination, an Immigration Judge should assess the accuracy and reliability of the interview based on the totality of the circumstances, rather than relying on any one factor among a list or mandated set of inquiries.”

PANEL: BIA Appellate Immigration Judges MALPHRUS, CREPPY, and LIEBOWITZ

OPINION BY: JUDGE GARRY D. MALPHRUS

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MY ANALYSIS

  • Predictably, the respondent loses. Even though faulty analysis leading to unwarranted denial of asylum cases by the BIA and Immigration Judges is a recurring problem (see, e.g., Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, recent 4th Circuit, Blogged here  https://wp.me/p8eeJm-2aS), when was the last time the BIA explained how U.S. Immigration Judges should analyze and grant asylum? No, the BIA’s recent asylum jurisprudence is basically a one-sided “blueprint for denials that will pass appellate muster.” In reality, Due Process is supposed to be about protecting individuals (whether documented or undocumented) from Government overreach, not how to maximize DHS removals. But, you’d be hard pressed to get that from reading the BIA precedents.
  • What this decision really tells Immigration Judges: “Presume that sworn statements taken at the border are reliable. Feel free to use any inconsistencies against the asylum applicant. Go ahead and reject all efforts to explain. Deny the application based on credibility Don’t worry, we’ve ‘got your back’ on appeal.”
  • Even more seriously, although the BIA is supposed to  consider “all relevant factors,” the panel totally ignored strong, impartial, widely disseminated evidence that statements taken at the border on Form I-867A are highly unreliable. Not only that, but such evidence is in the public realm and in fact was actually presented at EOIR training conferences at which Board Judges and staff were present!
  • Let’s reprIse a recent article by Hon. Jeffrey Chase, who was both an Immigration Judge and a BIA Attorney Adviser:”

In August 2016 I [Judge Chase] organized and moderated the mandatory international religious freedom training panel at the immigration judges’ legal training conference in Washington, D.C.  One of the panelists from the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (“USCIRF”) informed me of a just-published report she had co-authored. The report, titled Barriers to Protection: The Treatment of Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal, is the follow-up to a 2005 study by USCIRF of the treatment of arriving asylum seekers in their interactions with the various components of DHS and the Department of Justice involved in the expedited removal process.  What jumped out at me from the report was the first key recommendation to EOIR: “Retrain immigration judges that the interview record created by CBP is not a verbatim transcript of the interview and does not document the individual’s entire asylum claim in detail, and should be weighed accordingly.”

The new report referenced the Commission’s 2005 findings, which it described as “alarming.”  The earlier study found that “although they resemble verbatim transcripts, the I-867 sworn statements” taken from arrivees by agents of DHS’s Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) component “were neither verbatim nor reliable, often indicating that information was conveyed when in fact it was not and sometimes including answers to questions that were never asked.  Yet immigration judges often used these unreliable documents against asylum seekers when adjudicating their cases.”

The 2016 report found similar problems with the airport statements taken a decade later.  The study found the use of identical answers by CBP agents in filling out the form I-867 “transcript,” including clearly erroneous answers (i.e. a male applicant purportedly being asked, and answering, whether he was pregnant, and a four year old child purportedly stating that he came to the U.S. to work).  For the record, USCIRF is a bipartisan organ of the federal government.  So this is a government-issued report making these findings.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has long recognized the problems inherent in the reliability of airport statements.  In Ramseachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 179 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit held that “a record of the interview that merely summarizes or paraphrases the alien’s statements is inherently less reliable than a verbatim account or transcript.”  The court determined that the airport statement in that case bore “hallmarks of reliability, as it is typewritten, signed by Ramseachire, and initialed on each page.  The record also indicates that he was given the opportunity to make corrections to the transcription.”

But was that truly the case?  The USCIRF study (the first of which was published a year after the Ramseachire decision) shows that the Second Circuit’s reliance may have been misplaced.  The USCIRF researchers found instances in which the statement was not read back; when asked, a CBP agent stated “that he only reads back the contents if the interviewee requests it because it takes too long, and that the interviewee initialing each page only indicates that s/he received a copy of that page.”

As noted in the USCIRF study, the problems with airport statements go beyond merely summarizing or paraphrasing, to include actual misstatements and omissions.  But the I-867 statements as prepared by the CBP agents give the appearance of being verbatim transcripts, and further claim to contain multiple safeguards to guarantee their accuracy which, pursuant to the findings of the USCIRF studies, may not have actually been employed.  And based upon the appearance of those safeguards, immigration judges have relied on the contents of these statements to reach adverse credibility findings that result in the denial of asylum.  And as in Ramseachire, many of those credibility findings are being affirmed on appeal.

This is not to say that all airport statements are unreliable.  But the point is that, as in Ramseachire, courts see something that looks like a verbatim transcript, see additional signs that safeguards were employed to ensure accuracy, and as a result, afford the document more evidentiary weight than it might actually deserve.  Under such circumstances, an immigration judge might reasonably rely on an airport statement purporting that the respondent had stated he came to the U.S. to work when in fact, he or she said no such thing.  And the judge might discredit the respondent’s denial of such statement when the words are recorded in a seemingly verbatim transcript bearing the respondent’s signature and initials which says it was read back to him and found accurate.

Attorneys and immigration judges should therefore be aware of the report and its findings.  The link to the report is:  https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Barriers%20To%20Protection.pdf

 

Border Patrol agents claim that a 3-year-old boy said the reason he came to the United States was to look for work, thus making it easier for the undocumented immigrant to be deported.

The boy, hailing from Honduras and identified in court documents as Y.F., was allegedly interviewed in the summer of 2014 by Border Patrol agents trying to determine if immigrants had a credible fear of harm or death if they returned to their home countries. Those who claim such fear—and can prove it—have a shot at getting asylum in the United States, while those who say they came looking for work are most often deported.

Agents interviewed Y.F. and wrote on the appropriate form that he said he was looking for work. A brief (pdf) filed by the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) with the Justice DepartmentBoard of Immigration Appeals points out the unlikelihood of that being true. “Y-F-’s interview, so painstakingly transcribed, sworn, signed and counter-signed, almost certainly never happened in the format in which it was memorialized. The impossibility of the interview, in spite of the DHS officers’ affirmations of veracity and the rule of government regularity is plain on the face of the writings themselves: Y-F- was three years old at the time he was interrogated,” the brief said.

AILA says that information on those forms, I-867 A/B, “are not inherently reliable because they often contain fake responses, do not accurately reflect testimony presented, and were almost always created under coercive conditions,” according to AILA.

The case of Y.F. isn’t unique. Earlier this year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) argued that a particular undocumented immigrant should be deported because she came to the United States to find work in Dodge City, Kansas, according to Elise Foley of Huffington Post. The immigrant was 11 days old at the time.

The case against the infant girl was thrown out because her mother claimed the baby was born in the United States. The boy, now 4, has been living in a detention center in Texas for a year. He has been approved for release, but his mother has not, so he remains in detention.

Maybe he can apply for a work release.

  • Let’s see what else the BIA Judges “blew by” in J-C-H-F-.
    • The Border Patrol agent acted as the Spanish interpreter. Interpretation is a professional job. It’s different from being “bilingual.” Indeed, at one past ImmigratIon Judge Conference, we actually received a graphic demonstration from the EOIR Interpretation Staff of how and why being bilingual wouldn’t necessarily qualify someone to interpret accurately in a legal setting! In one ear, out the other, I guess. The BIA gives no explanation of how and why a Border Patrol Agent would be qualified to interpret accurately.
    • Yeah, but the BIA says it’s all OK because the respondent “understands English.” I probably “understand” German. If you said something slowly and clearly to me in German I probably could “get the gist” and say “Ja,” “Nein,” or “Nicht Verstehen.” But, would that mean I really understood what was going on? Highly unlikely!
    • There is a body of evidence out there that asylum applicants are often traumatized as well as afraid of figures of authority such as “border police.” That can have something do with border statements. Indeed this respondent made such a claim. But, the panel simply blew it off, saying that the respondent was offered an opportunity to speak “confidentially with an officer.” How would that address trauma and fear of authorities? The BIA never tells us.
    • The BIA reassures us that the statement is reliable because it “contains a detailed recitation of the questions and answers relating to the applicant’s claim, including the purpose of his visit, the length of his stay, and the issue whether he feared any harm if returned to Mexico.” Yet these are the very aspects of the I-867 that the USCIRF has said are often inaccurate, manipulated, or outright falsified. 
  • The BIA could have selected as a precedent a case that illustrated the inherent shortcomings of the Form I-867 and why they should be viewed critically by Immigration Judges with at least a degree of skepticism, if not an outright presumption of unreliability.  The BIA could further have used such a decision as a forum to demand that the DHS show what steps it has taken to address the problems discovered by the USCIRF and to improve the process for insuring accuracy of border statements if they want them treated with a “presumption of reliability” in Immigration Court.
  • Instead, the BIA once again “stuck its collective head in the sand” and ignored the real due process, fairness, and integrity problems plaguing our asylum adjudication system at all levels!
  • We can only hope that some independent Court of Appeals will take a more critical and objective look at the “border statement issue” than the BIA has chosen to do in J-C-H-F.
  • I also hope that in the future, respondents’ counsel make better use of readily available public materials to challenge over-reliance on border statements than apparently was done in this case.

PWS

02-22-18

 

 

NEW BIA PRECEDENT SAYS DUI “IS A SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE CONSIDERATION IN BOND PROCEEDINGS” & FINDING OF “DANGEROUSNESS” CAN’T BE “OFFSET” BY CLOSE FAMILY & COMMUNITY TIES IN THE U.S. – MATTER OF SINIAUSKAS, 27 I&N Dec. 207 (BIA 2018)

3914–DUI-Bond

Matter of SINIAUSKAS, 27 I&N Dec. 207 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

“(1) In deciding whether to set a bond, an Immigration Judge should consider the nature and circumstances of the alien’s criminal activity, including any arrests and convictions, to determine if the alien is a danger to the community, but family and community ties generally do not mitigate an alien’s dangerousness.

(2) Driving under the influence is a significant adverse consideration in determining whether an alien is a danger to the community in bond proceedings.”

BIA PANEL: Appellate Immigration Judges MALPHRUS, MULLANE, and GREER

OPINION BY: Judge Garry D. Malphrus

KEY QUOTE:

“The issue in this case is whether the respondent is a danger to the community, and family and community ties generally do not mitigate an alien’s dangerousness. While there may be a situation where a family member’s or other’s influence over a young respondent’s conduct could affect the likelihood that he would engage in future dangerous activity, this is not such a case. The respondent is an adult and has not shown how his family circumstances would mitigate his history of drinking and driving, except to explain that the most recent incident occurred on the anniversary of his mother’s death. The factors that the respondent claims mitigate or negate his dangerousness existed prior to his most recent arrest, and they did not deter his conduct.

We recognize that the Immigration Judge set a significant bond of $25,000, which he said “reflects the seriousness with which this court views the respondent’s repeated conduct.” However, an Immigration Judge should only set a monetary bond if the respondent first establishes that he is not a danger to the community. Matter of Urena, 25 I&N Dec. at 141.

This is not a case involving a single conviction for driving under the influence from 10 years ago. The respondent has multiple convictions for driving under the influence from that period and a recent arrest for the same conduct, which undermines his claim that he has been rehabilitated. Under these circumstances, we are unpersuaded that the respondent has met his burden to show that that he is not a danger to the community. See Matter of Fatahi, 26 I&N Dec. at 793−94. We therefore conclude that he is not eligible for bond. Accordingly, the DHS’s appeal will be sustained, the Immigration Judge’s decision will be vacated, and the respondent will be ordered detained without bond.”

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As an Immigration Judge, I would have come out the same way the BIA did on this case. I would not have set bond.

For me, that the respondent was arrested again for DUI, ten years after his last of three previous DUI convictions, is telling. It shows me that the problem is a continuing one that has not been solved by passage of time or counseling, that the respondent still hasn’t “gotten the picture” about the dangers of DUI, and, significantly, that I couldn’t trust him not to DUI again or get in some other trouble while out on bond.

Less face it, stressful and traumatic events are a constant occurrence in life, particularly for someone already in Removal Proceedings. Therefore, I wouldn’t “buy” the respondent’s argument that the anniversary of his mother’s death was a “one-timer” that wouldn’t happen again.

What if he loses his job, what if a family member has a medical emergency, what if he has domestic problems — all of these fairly common traumas in our community. Why won’t he react the same way he did to the one-year anniversary of his mother’s death? Also, having a LPR wife, USC daughter, and a possible avenue for legal immigration didn’t seem to “motivate” him to say away from trouble. If he DUIs again while awaiting hearing, it’s on my hands. No thanks.

No, I’d rather have a full hearing on this respondent in detention where I know here won’t get into any more trouble in the meantime. If, after that hearing he qualifies for some relief and the equities outweigh the adverse factors, then so be it. I’d grant the case. But, I wouldn’t trust this guy out on the street on my bond during the several years it might take to get to a case such as this on the Arlington non-detained docket. “Getting to the bottom” of complicated cases like this is the purpose of the Individual Merits Hearings.

That said, if the pending DUI changes were dismissed or he were found “not guilty,” I’d be willing to “revisit” the bond.

So, what’s the danger with the BIA’s decision here. That it will be misread by the DHS or Immigration Judges for things the BIA didn’t hold:

  • The BIA did not say that bond could never be granted in a DUI case, even where there was a recent arrest;
  • The BIA also did not say that family and community support could never be a factor in assessing “dangerousness.” On the contrary, the BIA recognized that there could be situations where the influence of family or community members would be a proper factor for the Immigration Judge to consider in assessing dangerousness. For example, I found that having family members or co-workers who would drive the respondent to work and counseling as well as involvement in community or church-based alcohol avoidance groups were often strong predictors that individuals could avoid future alcohol-related problems. But, sadly, in this case, neither family nor past efforts at rehabilitation seem to have worked.

PWS

02-05-18

 

MAKING GONZO PROUD: BIA TRASHES DUE PROCESS FOR PSG ASYLUM SEEKERS IN NEW PRECEDENT Matter of W-Y-C-& H-O-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 189 (BIA Jan. 19, 2018) — Read Hon. Jeffrey’s Chase’s Commentary Here!

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Matter of W-Y-C-& H-O-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 189 (BIA Jan. 19, 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

“(1) An applicant seeking asylum or withholding of removal based on membership in a particular social group must clearly indicate on the record before the Immigration Judge the exact delineation of any proposed particular social group.

(2) The Board of Immigration Appeals generally will not address a newly articulated particular social group that was not advanced before the Immigration Judge.”

PANEL: BIA Appellate Immigraton Judges MALPHRUS, MULLANE, and LIEBOWITZ

OPINION BY: Judge Garry D. Malphrus

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The Impact of the BIA’s Decision in Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-

In Matter of W-Y-C-& H-O-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 189 (BIA Jan. 19, 2018), the Board of Immigration Appeals held that “an applicant seeking asylum…based on membership in a particular social group must clearly indicate on the record before the Immigration Judge the exact delineation of any proposed particular social group.”  My question is: “why?”

Delineating a particular social group is very complicated, even for experienced immigration lawyers.  When I put together the advanced asylum panel for the 2016 Immigration Judges’ legal training conference, an asylum specialist from the Department of Justice’s Office for Immigration Litigation (“OIL”) chose to lecture the immigration judges on a common error in the crafting of proposed social groups.  It is worth noting that OIL (which defends immigration judge decisions when they are appealed to the U.S. circuit courts) felt that immigration judges needed such instruction.   Prior to this decision, the BIA had issued 8 precedent decisions defining particular social groups since 2006.  Two of those decisions (issued in 2014) were required in order to clear up confusion caused by the language of the previous four decisions on the topic.

When describing the concept of asylum to non-attorney clients, I have completely given up on trying to explain to them what a particular social group is.  I’ve noticed that during asylum interviews, the DHS asylum officers have reached the same conclusion; they simply ask the asylum applicants if they were a member of “a group,” with no attempt to explain the unique properties of particular social groups.  Let’s also remember that there are many unaccompanied children applying for asylum, and that some are not represented because EOIR has opposed efforts to require the agency to assign them counsel.

The impact of requiring asylum applicants to clearly delineate such a complex term of art is significant.  Many of the “surge” cases filed by individuals fleeing violence in Central America are asylum claims based on membership in a particular social group.  With some 660,000 cases presently overwhelming the immigration court system, the decision in W-Y-C- & H-O-B- should help speed adjudication by allowing immigration judges and the BIA to issue boilerplate denials where social groups are not clearly delineated, and further prevent time-consuming remands where better defined groups are proposed on appeal (perhaps after a pro se respondent was able to obtain counsel).  But at what cost is this efficiency achieved?

Our adversarial system presents court decisions as entailing a winner and loser.  However, there are no winners when someone entitled to asylum is nevertheless denied and ordered deported.  This point was underscored by a recent article in The New Yorker, documenting that for many, deportation is truly a death sentence (Sarah Stillman, “When Deportation is a Death Sentence,” Jan.18,2018 https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportation-is-a-death-sentence).

In a recent blog post concerning the treatment of children in immigration court, I referenced Matter of S-M-J-, a BIA precedent decision from 1997 (21 I&N Dec. 722).  The decision contains the following words of wisdom:  “Although we recognize that the burden of proof in asylum and withholding of removal cases is on the applicant, we do have certain obligations under international law to extend refuge to those who qualify for such relief.”  Noting the shift from the non-adversarial nature of affirmative Asylum Office  interviews (then a part of the INS, now within DHS) to the adversarial immigration court proceedings, the Board concluded that “a cooperative approach in Immigration Court is particularly appropriate.”

This approach underscores a major difference between asylum and other types of legal status.  A person applying for lawful permanent status through, for example, cancellation of removal or via an immigrant visa is not an LPR until they are granted such status by an immigration judge or DHS.  However, as the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status states at paragraph 28, “A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfills the criteria contained in the definition…Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make him a refugee but declares him to be one.  He does not become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee.”

Paragraph 205 of the UNHCR Handbook delineates the duties of the asylum applicant and the adjudicator.  While the applicant’s duties involve truthfully providing detailed facts, supporting evidence where available, and “a coherent explanation of all of the reasons invoked” in his asylum application, the adjudicator, in addition to ensuring that the applicant presents his or her claim as fully as possible and then assessing credibility and evaluating the evidence, must also “relate these elements to the relevant criteria of the 1951 Convention, in order to arrive at the correct conclusion as to the applicant’s refugee status.”

It is this last requirement upon the adjudicator that is at odds with the Board’s decision in W-Y-C- & H-O-B-.  Under the decision, an asylum applicant may already have satisfied all of the refugee requirements (which of course includes establishing a well-founded fear of suffering persecution if returned to their country of nationality), yet be denied asylum and ordered deported to suffer serious harm simply because they lacked the legal sophistication to articulate a very complicated formula for delineating a particular social group.  Why wouldn’t the present Board invoke a cooperative approach as required by the nature of asylum and its international law obligations, as an earlier BIA did in Matter of S-M-J-?  Why shouldn’t the immigration judge (perhaps with assistance from the DHS attorney) step in where the applicant is not able and analyze the facts presented pursuant to the relevant case law to help formulate a particular social group (as some IJs do at present)?

In summary, the Board’s recent decision will allow immigration judges to deny asylum to credible applicants who clearly meet the refugee criteria.  By setting a nearly impossible standard for non-attorneys (including children) to meet, it can result in those deserving of protection being sent to countries where they may face rape, torture, or death.

Why?

Copyright 2017 Jeffrey S. Chase.  All rights reserved.

 

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Jeffrey S. Chase is an immigration lawyer in New York City.  Jeffrey is a former Immigration Judge, senior legal advisor at the Board of Immigration Appeals, and volunteer staff attorney at Human Rights First.  He is a past recipient of AILA’s annual Pro Bono Award, and previously chaired AILA’s Asylum Reform Task Force.

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OK. Let’s make this real simple. As opposed to asylum, which is discretionary, withholding of removal based on fear on account of a “particular social group” is mandatory relief under the Act.  The BIA is saying that even if the Respondent were entitled to mandatory withholding of removal based on a “particular social group,” they will refuse that mandatory protection if the respondent failed to articulate each and every specific element of the “PSG” before the Immigration Judge!

And, just how would unrepresented children and other unrepresented individuals, many in detention, be able to articulate all of the complex elements of a PSG? (And that’s even before the Trump/Gonzo/White Nationalist proposal to illegally strip undocumented children of any Due Process rights and let them be deported at will by CBP!)

Clearly, in Matter of W-Y-C-& H-O-B-, the BIA has abandoned any pretense its essential mission of “guaranteeing fairness and due process for all.” I’m sure that becoming “Conductors on Gonzo’s Deportation Railroad” will be career enhancing for the BIA Judges. But, in actuality, they should be ashamed!

And, what are the views of the other dozen or so BIA Appellate Judges who weren’t on this panel. Do they all agree with this travesty of justice? Is there nobody in this “Gang of 15” willing to stand up for Due Process and fairness for vulnerable asylum seekers? It raises the question of “Why have a BIA at all if it can’t and won’t protect fairness and due process for asylum seekers?”

I dissent!

PWS

01-26-18

 

 

BIA SAYS CATEGORICAL APPROACH INAPPLICABLE TO VIOLATION OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER — MATTER OF OBSHATKO, 27 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2017)

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Matter of OBSHATKO, 27 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2017)

BIA HEADNOTE:

“Whether a violation of a protection order renders an alien removable under section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (2012), is not governed by the categorical approach, even if a conviction underlies the charge; instead, an Immigration Judge should consider the probative and reliable evidence regarding what a State court has determined about the alien’s violation. Matter of Strydom, 25 I&N Dec. 507 (BIA 2011), clarified.”

PANEL: BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES PAULEY, MALPHRUS, GREER

OPINION BY: JUDGE PAULEY

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COMMON THREAD: The Respondent loses, even though he prevailed before the Immigration Judge.

PWS

11-18-17

 

 

“THEY SHALL REAP WHAT THEY SOW” – BIA PASSES ON CHANCE TO GIVE BELEAGUERED U.S. IMMIGRATION JUDGES SOME DOCKET CONTROL — Matter of J-A-B- & I-J-V-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 2017)

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Matter of J-A-B- & I-J-V-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 2017)

BIA HEADNOTE:

“An Immigration Judge does not have authority to terminate removal proceedings to give an arriving alien an opportunity to present an asylum claim to the Department of Homeland Security in the first instance.”

PANEL: Appellate Immigration Judge MALPHRUS, MULLANE, and CREPPY

OPINION BY: Judge Malphrus

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Most “real” courts reserve to themselves some authority to return, remand, or otherwise force action on the part of parties. For example, when the Obama Administration announced an expanded “Prosecutorial Discretion”  (“PD”) program, at least one Court of Appeals required that the Government review each case on their Petition for Review docket and state in advance whether or not it intended to exercise “PD.” Those PD cases were then “un-docketed” by the Article III Court.

Given the huge backlogs for new non-detained asylum cases in most U.S. Immigration Courts, allowing Immigration Judges on a case-by-case basis to require the DHS to decide whether or not they would grant asylum before proceeding to place a case on an overcrowded “Individual Hearing” docket makes lots of sense to me. Perhaps one reason that the Immigration Court docket is in such bad shape is that DOJ and EOIR routinely allow themselves to be “pushed around” by DHS in ways that few other courts would tolerate from a Government party.

If any independent party ever did a detailed analysis of the “Immigration Court Backlog,” I’m betting that they would find a significant number of cases being “warehoused” by EOIR for the DHS. These are cases that could and should have been resolved favorably to the Respondent by the DHS without a trip to Immigration court. But, a rational approach to the backlog is not going to happen with the current Administration’s “Gonzo” enforcement policies and a “captive” Immigration Court system .

PWS

11-03-17