GARLAND’S BIA, OIL “TAKE IT ON THE NOSE” AGAIN: 2d Cir. “Slam Dunks” Matter of J.M. Acosta, 27 I&N Dec. 420 (BIA 2018) (finality of conviction): “The BIA’s burden-shifting scheme and its accompanying evidentiary requirement amounts to an unreasonable and arbitrary interpretation of the IIRIRA.”

Casey Stengel — “Hey Judge Garland! Why not put some REAL judges who can ‘play this game’ into your lineup? What’s with the ‘minor league roster’ left over from the guys who couldn’t shoot straight?”
PHOTO: Rudi Reit
Creative Commons

Here’s the full decision in Brathwaite v. Garland:

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/1284dac9-6e02-4262-ae63-657649702452/1/doc/20-27_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/1284dac9-6e02-4262-ae63-657649702452/1/hilite/

Court summary:

Petitioner Aldwin Junior Brathwaite petitions for review of an order of removability, entered by the Honorable Joy A. Merriman, U.S. Immigration Judge (“IJ”), on June 11, 2019, and approved by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) on December 11, 2019. Because the BIA’s decision is premised on an unreasonable construction of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), we GRANT the petition for review and REMAND the matter to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PANEL: CALABRESI, RAGGI, AND CHIN, Circuit Judges.

OPINON BY: Judge Calabresi

******************************

Man, even with all the ridiculous “built in tilt” favoring Executive interpretations in Chevron, the BIA still blew it! Normally, in their attempt not to burden their comfortable lives with difficult questions of law, the Article III’s will find that any minimally rational interpretation of an ambiguous provision is “good enough for Government work” under Chevron. But, the BIA couldn’t even clear that “low hurdle!” Simply amazing!

Particularly so when you think that one of the (bogus) justifications often given for “Chevron task avoidance” by the Article IIIs is the “superior expertise” of the Executive adjudicators, clearly a mirage in the case of the BIA and EOIR! At least over the past four years, the primary “expertise” for being selected for an EOIR judgeship has been past government experience, preferably in prosecution, a willingness to check the “deny box,” and ability to crank out the required minimum number of final orders of removal without thinking too much, rocking the boat, or, heaven forbid, actually vindicating the rights of migrants over the wishes of “The Partners” at DHS Enforcement! What a total sham that Garland is now presiding over!

Two years of litigation to “get back to ground zero!” And, you wonder why Garland’s Immigration Courts continue to careen out of control and generate backlog faster than they do positive legal guidance and best practices?

At core, courts are about problem solving, and judges are supposed to be “expert practical problem solvers.” Try to unearth those essential qualities in the disgracefully flawed “judicial” hiring practices at EOIR since 2000!

I note that no “outside expert” has been appointed to the BIA since before the 2000 election. Those few who were there in 2000 were rapidly “purged” by Ashcroft, sending the strong message that “expertise and independent voting” will be “career limiting and threatening” at the BIA.

That was followed by thoroughly rotten “jurisprudence” from the BIA that actually provoked widespread outrage among the Article IIIs at the time. The outcry became so loud, that finally even the Bush II Administration had to “tone down” the anti-immigrant rhetoric and abusive treatement of migrants and their attorneys in Immigration Court that Ashcroft’s “purge” engendered and encouraged. Of course, in doing so, DOJ officials disingenuously blamed the Immigration Judges rather than the “perps” in their own ranks who had declared “open season” on migrants’ rights and human dignity.

Not surprisingly, bad, biased hiring practices, which have intentionally excluded and grossly undervalued the most promising expert problem solvers from outside government bureaucracy, have produced a dysfunctional morass at EOIR. The lack of that basic recognition, even from a recently retired Federal Appellate Judge who should know better, is destroying the foundations of our justice system! Enough already! We need, American Justice needs, progressive reforms at EOIR! NOW, not sometime off in the indefinite future!

Yup, there might be problems with an appellate board that almost always tries to skew things against individual applicants. Rushing to crank out those final orders of removal and pushing already overwhelmed IJ’s to “just pedal faster” might not be a very good “strategy.” And, the lack of professional training, competent judicial administration, expert guidance from the BIA, and unwillingness to implement best practices further deteriorates the Immigration Courts every single day.

While fundamental improvements in personnel and administration at EOIR are well within Garland’s reach, he seems relatively uninterested in taking the bold, courageous actions necessary to restore due process. So, litigating his ludicrously broken, unfair, and dysfunctional system to a standstill, while supporting legislation to get an independent court, appear to be progressive advocates’ only viable options at this point.

This issue is likely to end up in the Supremes. In the meantime, however, there should be lots of backlog-building remands in the Second Circuit. And, who knows whether the BIA will get it right this time around. Even after court remands, their record isn’t particularly encouraging.

The BIA probably will have to wait for OIL, their political handlers at DOJ, and DHS enforcement to “signal” what the “preferred result for litigating purposes” is before venturing forth on another precedent. Does this sound like “fair and impartial adjudication” under Matthews v. Eldridge? No way! So why is EOIR continuing to operate as a “Constitution free zone” under Garland?

It’s past time for Garland to pull the plug and give progressive experts a chance to rescue his dysfunctional court system and save many of the individuals caught up in this never-ending due process nightmare! When will they ever learn, when will they ever learn?

Much to the shock, consternation, frustration, puzzlement, and horror of progressive advocates who helped him replace Billy Barr as AG, it’s been three continuous months of “Amateur Night @ EOIR” under Judge Garland! Predictably, many Article IIIs haven‘t been enthralled with this performance! How many cases will be remanded from the Article IIIs and how much more backlog will be unnecessarily generated before Garland wakes up and pays attention?
PHOTO: Thomas Hawk
Creative Commons
Amateur Night

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

PWS

06-25-21

SPLIT BIA FINALLY RULES ON “FINALITY” – MATTER OF J.M. ACOSTA, 27 I&N DEC. 420 (BIA 2018)

3934JM ACOSTA

Matter of J.M. ACOSTA, 27 I&N Dec. 420 (BIA 2018)

BIA HEADNOTE:

(1) A conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until the right to direct appellate review on the merits of the conviction has been exhausted or waived.

(2) Once the Department of Homeland Security has established that a respondent has a criminal conviction at the trial level and that the time for filing a direct appeal has passed, a presumption arises that the conviction is final for immigration purposes, which the respondent can rebut with evidence that an appeal has been filed within the prescribed deadline, including any extensions or permissive filings granted by the appellate court, and that the appeal relates to the issue of guilt or innocence or concerns a substantive defect in the criminal proceedings.

(3) Appeals, including direct appeals, and collateral attacks that do not relate to the underlying merits of a conviction will not be given effect to eliminate the finality of the conviction.

PANEL: BIA APPELLATE IMMIGRATION JUDGES KELLY, GREER, AND MALPHRUS

OPINION BY: JUDGE EDWARD F. KELLY

CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION: JUDGE GARRY D. MALPHRUS

KEY QUOTE FROM JUDGE KELLY’S MAJORITY OPINION:

In holding that the finality requirement continues to apply after the enactment of the IIRIRA, we emphasize that a conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until the right to direct appellate review on the merits of the conviction has been exhausted or waived.11 Consequently, absent proof of a waiver of appeal rights, a conviction does not achieve finality for immigration purposes until the time for filing an initial direct appeal has expired under the laws of the applicable jurisdiction. However, once the DHS has established that a respondent has a criminal conviction at the trial level and that the time for filing a direct appeal has passed, a presumption arises that the conviction is final for immigration purposes.

To rebut that presumption, a respondent must come forward with evidence that an appeal has been filed within the prescribed deadline, including any extensions or permissive filings granted by the appellate court.12 He or she must also present evidence that the appeal relates to the issue of guilt or innocence or concerns a substantive defect in the criminal proceedings. See Matter of Marquez Conde, 27 I&N Dec. at 255 (reaffirmingMatter of Pickering and reiterating that “convictions that have been vacated based on procedural and substantive defects in the underlying criminal proceeding [are] no longer valid for immigration purposes”); see also Matter of Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I&N Dec. at 1379–80 (giving effect to the alien’s vacated conviction where there was evidence by way of a court order that the conviction was vacated on the legal merits of the underlying criminal proceedings).

Appeals, including direct appeals, and collateral attacks that do not relate to the underlying merits of the conviction will not be given effect to eliminate the finality of the conviction. Such appeals include those that relate only to the alien’s sentence or that seek to reduce the charges, to ameliorate the conviction for rehabilitative purposes, or to alleviate immigration hardships, and any other appeals that do not challenge the merits of the conviction. See Matter of Roldan, 22 I&N Dec. 512, 521–24 (BIA 1999) (holding that under the statutory definition of a “conviction” in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, no effect is to be given in immigration proceedings to a State action that purports to expunge, dismiss, cancel, vacate, discharge, or otherwise remove a guilty plea or other record of guilt or conviction by operation of a State rehabilitative statute); see also Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. at 624–25 (holding that a conviction set aside for reasons solely related to post-conviction events such as rehabilitation or immigration hardships will remain a conviction for immigration purposes).13

In this case, the respondent submitted evidence indicating that he filed a motion for an extension of the appeal deadline and that the motion was granted and the appeal was permitted by the New York appellate court.14Under these circumstances, we will remand this case to the Immigration Judge to consider the status of the pending appeal and its basis and to determine whether a continuance may be appropriate. See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018). In this regard, the respondent and the DHS should be given an opportunity to present any additional documentary and testimonial evidence they wish to offer in assisting the Immigration Judge.

Accordingly, the appeal from the Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondent is removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act and from his denial of the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Act will be dismissed. The respondent’s motion to remand based on new evidence will be granted.

[Text of Footnotes Omitted]

KEY QUOTE FROM JUDGE MALPHRUS’S CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION:

Based on the plain language of the Act and the clear weight of authority in the circuit courts, I would conclude that “the first definition of ‘conviction’ in § [101](a)(48)(A) requires only that the trial court enter a formal judgment of guilt, without any requirement that all direct appeals be exhausted or waived.” Planes, 652 F.3d at 996. The majority errs by invoking congressional silence to convert the otherwise plain language at issue here into statutory ambiguity, thereby giving us license to resolve the ambiguity in the manner that we think is best. “Regardless of our view on the wisdom or efficacy of Congress’s policy choices, we are not free to read in additional elements where the legislature has declined to include them.”Id. (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216–17 (2007)).

I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to remand this case for further proceedings. I would deny the respondent’s motion to remand because the new evidence does not indicate that his conviction has been overturned or vacated, and he remains ineligible for relief under former section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994). See Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464 (BIA 1992).

************************************

This is important guidance from the BIA on a recurring question before U.S. Immigration Judges. Congrats to Judge Kelly on what, by my calculation, is his first published precedent opinion. And, he and Judge Anne Greer appear to have gotten it right. I don’t understand Judge Malphrus’s contention (in a part of his opinion not quoted above) that an individual who is actually removed based on a conviction later vacated on appeal hasn’t suffered any unfairness or irreparable harm.

PWS

08-30-18

Here’s the full decision in Brathwaite v. Garland:

🇺🇸Due Process Forever!

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