Here are the head notes from two new BIA decisions distinguishing Pereira:
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1164976/download
Matter of Lourdes Suyapa PENA-MEJIA, Respondent
27 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 2019)
Decided May 22, 2019
U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals
Neither rescission of an in absentia order of removal nor termination of the proceedings is required where an alien did not appear at a scheduled hearing after being served with a notice to appear that did not specify the time and place of the initial removal hearing, so long as a subsequent notice of hearing specifying that information was properly sent to the alien. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), distinguished.
FOR RESPONDENT: Daniel A. Meyer, Esquire, Jackson Heights, New York
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Jonathan Graham, Assistant Chief Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: GUENDELSBERGER, GRANT, and KENDALL CLARK, Board Members
GRANT, Board Member, with the opinion
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1164981/download
Matter of Renata MIRANDA-CORDIERO, Respondent
27 I&B Dec. 551 (BIA 2019)
Decided May 22, 2019
U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals
Pursuant to section 240(b)(5)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B) (2012), neither rescission of an in absentia order of removal nor termination of the proceedings is required where an alien who was served with a notice to appear that did not specify the time and place of the initial removal hearing failed to provide an address where a notice of hearing could be sent. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), distinguished.
FOR RESPONDENT: Renee LaRosee, Esquire, Elizabeth, New Jersey
BEFORE: Board Panel: GUENDELSBERGER, GRANT, and KENDALL CLARK, Board Members
GRANT, Board Member, with the opinion
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But here’s some better news from a split 9th Circuit:
Isaias Lorenzo Lopez v. William P. Barr, 9th Cir., 05-22-19, published
15-72406
Before: Dorothy W. Nelson and Consuelo M. Callahan,
Circuit Judges, and Edward R. Korman,* District Judge. Opinion by Judge Korman;
Dissent by Judge Callahan
* The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
SUMMARY BY COURT STAFF:
SUMMARY** Immigration
Granting Isaias Lorenzo Lopez’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel held that a Notice to Appear that is defective under Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), cannot be cured by a subsequent Notice of Hearing and therefore does not terminate the residence period required for cancellation of removal.
Lorenzo sought cancellation of removal, a form of relief from removal that requires that an applicant must, among other requirements, reside in the United States continuously for seven years after having been admitted in any status. However, under the “stop-time” rule, as relevant here, the service of a Notice to Appear under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) terminates an alien’s residence. In Lorenzo’s case, an immigration judge and the BIA found him ineligible for cancellation because his March 2008 Notice to Appear terminated his residence period before he had accrued the requisite seven years.
In Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the Supreme Court held that a Notice to Appear, as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), must contain the time and place at which removal proceedings will be held to trigger the stop-time rule. The panel concluded that Lorenzo’s Notice to Appear
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
LORENZO LOPEZ V. BARR 3
did not terminate his residence because it lacked time-and- place information.
However, because Lorenzo also received a subsequent Notice of Hearing that advised him of the time and place of his proceedings, the Attorney General argued that the Notice of Hearing cured the defective Notice to Appear and triggered the stop-time rule. The Attorney General relied on Popa v. Holder, 571 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2009), which held that a Notice to Appear that fails to include the date and time of an alien’s deportation hearing, but that states that a date and time will be set later, is not defective so long as a notice of the hearing is later sent to the alien.
The panel held that a Notice to Appear that is defective under Pereira cannot be cured by a subsequent Notice of Hearing, explaining that the plain language of the statute foreclosed the Attorney General’s argument and that Pereira had effectively overruled Popa.
The panel noted that the BIA reached a conclusion contrary to the panel’s holding in Matter of Mendoza- Hernandez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 520 (BIA 2019) (en banc), where, over a vigorous dissent, a closely divided BIA held that a Notice of Hearing that contains time-and-place information perfects a deficient Notice to Appear and triggers the stop-time rule. However, the panel declined to defer to that conclusion because: (1) the BIA acknowledged that Pereira could be read to reach a different result, and the courts owe no deference to agency interpretations of Supreme Court opinions; (2) the BIA ignored the plain text of the statute; and (3) the BIA relied on cases that cannot be reconciled with Pereira.
Thus, the panel concluded that, because Lorenzo never received a valid Notice to Appear, his residency continued
4 LORENZO LOPEZ V. BARR
beyond 2008 and, accordingly, he has resided in the United States for over seven years and is eligible for cancellation of removal.
Dissenting, Judge Callahan wrote that she does not read Pereira as holding that the notice of the time and place must be provided in a single document. Rather, Judge Callahan reads Pereira as allowing the Department of Homeland Security to cure a deficient notice to appear by subsequently providing a noncitizen with actual notice of the time and place of the removal proceedings, with the result that the stop-time rule is triggered upon the noncitizen’s receipt of the supplemental notice.
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Significantly, the Ninth Circuit majority recognized the “vigorous” dissent of Judge John Guendelsberger in Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez, 27 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2019), which was joined by Vice Chair Adkins-Blanch and Appellate Immigration Judges Cole, Grant, Creppy, & Kendall Clark. The Ninth Circuit essentially adopted the dissenters’ opinion, quoting at length:
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in Pereira . . . leaves little room for doubt that the Court’s decision requires us to follow the plain language of the Act that the DHS must serve a [8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)] “notice to appear” that includes the date, time, and place of hearing in order to trigger the “stop-time” rule. The Court in Pereira repeatedly emphasized the “plain text” of the “stop- time” rule and left no room for agency gap- filling as to whether an Immigration Court can “complete” or “cure” a putative “notice to appear” by subsequent issuance of a “notice of hearing” that would trigger the “stop-time” rule on the date of that event. Quite simply, . . . a “notice of hearing” is not a “notice to appear” and, therefore, it does not satisfy the requirement that the DHS serve a [Section 1229(a)(1)] “notice to appear” that specifies the date and time of hearing, in order to trigger the “stop-time” rule.
16 LORENZO LOPEZ V. BARR
27 I. & N. Dec. at 540–41 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted).
Prior to the “Ashcroft Purge, “ completed in 2003, en banc opinions in precedents and “vigorous dissents” were much more frequent at the BIA. I know, because I frequently was among the dissenters, particularly in the latter days of my BIA career.
Well done dissenters! Bravo!
Given the more or less “built in pro-Government bias” of an administrative “court” captive within the DOJ, the dissents often contained important alternative viewpoints that sometimes were more in accordance with the law as later interpreted by the “real” Article III Courts upon judicial review. The en banc process also forced every BIA Appellate Immigration Judge to take a public position on important issues.
In that way, it promoted both transparency and accountability, as well as “putting into play” alternative interpretations and results that the majority otherwise would “blow by.” Accordingly, it also promoted more rigorous analysis by the majority.
Ashcroft basically removed the “gang of dissenters” from the BIA while “dumbing it down” by mandating mostly “single member panels,” discouraging en bancs, and supressing dissents. Since that time, the quality of the BIA decisions has suffered, and the positions of most individual BIA judges on most precedent issues has become a “mystery.” Not surprisingly, the BIA jurisprudence post-Ashcroft has become very one-sided in favor of the DHS.
The “vigorous en banc dissent” in Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez was striking to observers as the first one in recent memory. And, clearly it made a difference. The lack of meaningful dissent at the BIA is one of many things that have degraded due process, judicial independence, and decisional quality at EOIR since the “Ashcroft Purge.” Worse yet, Barr’s ludicrous “proposed regulations” would further “dumb down” the BIA process.
The importance of dissents and transparency in a legitimate judicial system can’t be overstated. That’s why we need an independent, Article I U.S. Immigration Court that does not answer to the Attorney General.
PWS
05-28-19
