Category: ESQ

As former immigration judges and former members of the Board, we submit this amicus brief to ask the Northern District of California to strike down the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 31314 (May 11, 2023). The Rule, which came into effect in the immediate aftermath of Title 42’s sunset and which applies to non-Mexican asylum-seekers at the U.S.-Mexico border, automatically forecloses a migrant’s asylum claim unless the person (i) arrives at an official port of entry having secured an immigration appointment through a complex mobile application, (ii) receives advance permission to travel to the U.S., or (iii) comes to the U.S. after applying for and being denied asylum in a transit country. Absent proof one of these narrow exceptions or a medical or other emergency, asylum-seekers will be unable to seek asylum regardless of whether they have compelling claims to relief.

Immigration judges serve an important role in the Congressionally-mandated process for reviewing the claims of asylum-seekers at or near the U.S.-Mexico border. This decades-old process, known as Expedited Removal, has its own flaws, but it does provide a credible fear review system that provides important protections for those seeking asylum. Specifically, and as explained in more detail below, the Expedited Removal statute requires that asylum-seekers, regardless of how they entered the United States, be interviewed by asylum officers to determine whether they have a credible fear of persecution and therefore can proceed to a full asylum hearing under Section 240 of the INA. The statute further mandates that immigration judges provide de novo review of asylum officers’ negative credible fear determinations, and thus make the final decision about whether an asylum-seeker at the U.S.-Mexico border has shown a credible fear of persecution and will have the opportunity to progress to a full asylum hearing.

The Rule unlawfully undermines this statutory scheme. First, the Rule creates clear bars to asylum for most migrants, disingenuously labeling these as “rebuttable presumptions.” As a result, almost all claims for asylum are pretermitted without the full asylum credible fear interviews required by the statutory Expedited Removal process. Rather, the credible fear interview will be turned into a “reasonable fear” interview to determine whether the migrant can proceed to claim withholding of

removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), lesser forms of relief compared to asylum. Asylum-seekers are thus denied the opportunity to obtain full review of their asylum credible fear claims, including the de novo review by an immigration judge as required by Section 235 of the INA, 8 C.F.R. § 235.3. Instead, asylum-seekers may only seek review from an immigration judge as to the application of the narrow exceptions under the Rule or the lesser claims for relief. Accordingly, the Rule significantly and unlawfully curtails the role of immigration judges in asylum adjudication as set forth in the INA.

Moreover, the idea that the Rule heightens efficiency in the asylum adjudication process is an illusion. When an asylum-seeker is denied the ability to provide a credible fear of persecution, Expedited Removal still requires a review of potentially more complicated claims for withholding of removal and protection under the CAT. Thus, immigration judges on the one hand find their hands tied, unable to review the claims of bona fide asylum-seekers, but on the other hand are required to delve into the standards of withholding and CAT. Thus, the Rule turns a straightforward (and efficient) asylum credible fear review into a three-part analysis: the Rule exceptions, withholding, and CAT.

Finally, by creating exclusions that deny asylum to refugees who appear at the U.S.-Mexico border, the Rule violates U.S. obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Longstanding canons of statutory and regulatory construction require consideration of international law; in this case, the Rule violates both the INA and international law.

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